Chapter VIII

Conclusion

Within the limits of this study, it would be impossible to follow in any detail the further development of either Jung’s or Freud’s work. For our purpose, the differences in their later work are less important than the issues which were no longer the subject of their discussions and which were left unresolved. These issues primarily centered around the development of the libido and its relationship with the experience of reality. Several types of this experience seemed to exist, depending on whether one was speaking of normal perception, of the belief in the truth of a theory, of religious beliefs or of delusion. Their respective relationships with distinct ‘stages’ of sexual development demanded for further investigation. However, this research was never undertaken, nor by Freud nor by Jung. The problem of the link between the reality problem and the libido problem remained unresolved, especially where it involved the problem of the reality in religion.

It is often claimed that the definition of the concept of ‘libido’ constituted the crucial axis of the Freud-Jung alternative. That is indeed true. Yet, the more crucial issue connected with this notion should be situated in a place other than its usual location. One misses the point when one vaguely states that Freud intended to reduce culture as a whole to an extremely narrow concept of sexuality and that he viewed the individual as a being which was primarily determined by his past and, more specifically, by his sexual past. At the same time, Jung is said to have retained the unconscious’ tendency toward the future, to have enlarged the notion of the libido and thus not to have reduced culture to one great farce. Such general reflections, however, do no justice to the specific problem of ‘reality’ as we have met it here.

Let us therefore again call to mind our main lines concerning the notion of ‘libido’. From the very beginning of his research, Freud discovered that, in instances of neurosis, the object of repression appeared to be of an erotic nature. On the basis of this discovery, he concluded that there was a relationship between sexuality and the perception of reality. Moreover, he quickly came to understand that sexuality itself was anything but an unambiguous and easily defined instinct. The distinction between homosexuality and perversion, which lay at the basis of Three
Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, was a decisive factor in Freud’s
discernment between the establishment of a sexual goal and the sexual
object choice. Afterwards, new empirical data led him to raise questions
concerning the relationship between the various types of eroticism and
other failures in the experience of reality, which were different from
neurotic repression. The schizophrenic loss of contact with reality ended
in autoerotism while the structured and strong paranoiac system seemed
to struggle with something what appeared to be homosexuality. Although
the issue had grown more complex, the phrasing of the question had
become more precise: what is the link between the different types of
experience of ’reality’ (perception, fantasy, theory, belief, delusion) and
the elaboration of one’s sexual drive? The specific question of religious
truth should be considered within this complex of questions.

Due to the rupture between Jung and Freud, however, attention was
no longer drawn to the coherence of this complex of questions. We have
already observed how, following the discussion about Freud’s ‘Schreber’,
their attention turned to Jung’s re-interpretation of the libido concept on
the basis of a genetic and energetic perspective. In dealing with this
undoubtedly important problematic, the reference to other, still pending
questions fell from sight. Consequently, there was no further debate con-
cerning the repercussions of their discussion on the distinction between
neurosis and psychosis. They also did not raise the question of how the
notion of ‘repression’ could be otherwise employed or how it could be
distinguished from the other defense mechanisms (or should one say:
‘constitutional mechanisms’ ) of the human psyche. Nor did they raise
questions such as how one might go about explaining an adult’s perverted
sexuality, once one accepted the Jungian scheme.

In their later work, neither author dealt with the question of ‘reality’
and ‘libido’ with the same insistence as when they had worked together.
Freud dismissed the complexity of the religious phenomenon. Jung’s broad
perspective on the historical evolution of the human mind disregarded the
psychodiagnostic differentiations. He was apparently no longer interested
in the detailed approaches to hysteria, to infantile sexuality and to psych-
osis, by which Freud had attempted to reconstruct the puzzle of the human
mind. When one reads Jung’s later work, the lack of attention for clear
diagnostic distinctions is striking.¹ Apparently, the differences between the

¹. Moreover, Jung rarely published any case studies. Thus, it is difficult to determine
whether Jung assigned much importance in his practice to the distinction between the several
psychopathological types. He does not seem to have drawn many theoretical conclusions.
Further, the Jungian theory offers few instruments to the person who wishes to theoretically
distinct types of loss of the sense for reality evaded Jung’s mind.

Unlike his scant interest in psychodiagnostic distinctions, Jung’s interest in the various dimensions of the notion of ‘religion’ was quite strong. It seems that he possessed an uncanny intuition with regard to this field. His hypothesis that gnosia had played an influential role in the origin of Christianity was proven completely correct. Both theology and the history of religion owe Jung a tremendous debt since he used his personal influence to convince the Bollinger Foundation to purchase the Nag Hammadi texts. It is highly uncertain whether we would have ever discovered the content of these extremely important papyri dating from early Christianity without his intervention.²

The Religion of the People and Its Leader: Freud’s Concern

Contrary to Jung, Freud continued to be preoccupied with the detailed analysis of as many aspects of psychopathology as possible, respecting the various distinctions. At the same time, he was also preoccupied with the re-integration of those aspects into the complex structure of the human mind. He did not always succeed in these tasks. We have already pointed out that he ultimately discarded his research on the projection process, which was nonetheless a crucial concept, leaving the issue unresolved. Like Jung, Freud was sometimes tempted to design grand syntheses which were built on very broad concepts. Is it truly coincidental that this is most true for the concept-pair which stemmed directly from Jung’s Transformations and Symbolisms of the Libido: Freud’s ‘eros’ and ‘thanatos’, whereby the libido was reduced to a very general urge for unification? Freud also remained occupied with a number of crucial questions which he intended to research in detail. Typical for Freud, these questions appeared in remarks made on the side or in his footnotes, the place par excellence where Freud, time and again, presented his temporary syntheses for discussion. He remained loyal to his plan to distinguish the various psychopathological types one by one before reconstructing the total composition of the psyche on the basis of the discovered mechanisms.

From the analysis of the ‘Wolfmann’ onward, Freud began investigating a new psychopathological theme, masochism. Until that time, he had underestimated the theme’s importance. He not only considered it as

an autonomous process but also as an element which, in different ways, played a role in the process of identification, the fascination with the figure of the leader, the formation of conscience, the civilizing of mutual male rivalry, homosexuality and finally, the formation of female desire. Freud often linked this research to religion by means of a comparison between the army and the Church; by the concept of an oceanic feeling; by the relationship between religion and morality; and especially, and this seems to be the basic theme whenever Freud considers religion - when he discussed the figure of Moses.

However, the way Freud discussed religion was in sharp contrast to his concern for psychological distinctions. For Freud, religion was a massive concept or rather, an undifferentiated idea. He paid little attention to the various forms which religion could adopt. Religion was, according to him, primarily concerned with the renouncement of instincts and thus, with morality. When Romain Rolland pointed out to him that not every form of religion could be reduced to the oedipal feelings one entertained toward one’s parents as a child, Freud initially conceded in Civilization and Its Discontents, that perhaps for some people, this might be true. Yet he stated that he personally had never experienced the ‘oceanic feeling’ of security, to which Rolland referred. In the wake of this hesitant concession, Freud followed with an argument which, in one movement, dismissed the discussion about the possibility of a less infantile form of religion as being irrelevant: "Let us return to the common man and to his religion - the only religion which ought to bear that name." The intellectual who wanted to defend a higher form of religion was immediately reminded of Goethe’s famous words:

"He who possesses science and art also has religion;
but he who possesses neither of those two,
let him have religion!"

In his text, Freud only mentioned religion as an institution which served morality. This cliché image, against which every theologian since Schleiermacher has rebelled, was apparently the only image of religion which Freud would accept.

In spite of this fact, one does find some reflections in Freud’s work dealing with the complex ties between religion, reality and identity. Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921) dealt with the process of

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4. Id.
identification in light of the theme of the fascination with a leader. The fact that the army and the Church were chosen as typical examples of group formation processes has often aroused people’s imagination to such an extent that one only superficially considered the comparison. The importance of this text lay in the fact that Freud returned to the concept of hypnosis, the very first experience from which his whole work had originated. From the theories of narcissism and identification, to which the further development of psychopathology had led him, Freud looked back and by doing so, broadened the phrasing of the question. Freud investigated how one might become fascinated by someone to such a degree that one surrendered one’s own identity and entered into a relationship of hypnotic dependency.

When dealing with this question, we once again come across all of the themes we have previously encountered. Freud apparently continued to be preoccupied with a number of problems in this realm although he was unable to propose definitive solutions to them. For instance, he repeatedly discussed the precise nature of the libidinous bond between the members of a group and their leader. Is such a bond homosexual? Or should one speak of a sexually indifferent sexual bond? Freud did not only pose these questions with descriptive or classifying intentions. For quite some time, he had voiced the suspicion that something along the lines of homosexuality had to be brought into relation with the reversal of aggression into mutual sympathy. In a footnote, Freud referred to an idea which he had already mentioned in passing in *Totem and Taboo*. It was probably due to their homosexuality that the exiled sons of the primordial tribe succeeded in emotionally detaching themselves from the primordial father and in rebelling against him. For the remainder of the narrative in *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, Freud remained loyal to the story which he had constructed in *Totem and Taboo* and which had so often been criticized for its simplicity. After having murdered the primordial father, the sons were overwhelmed by an enormous awareness of guilt. They posthumously deified the father and subsequently internalized his prohibitions under the guise of religion.

Whatever one may think of this exposition, which found its origin in Darwin, it remains conspicuous that Freud gradually devoted more attention to the strength of the first emotional bond with the father. Thus,

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he must have been amazed by the emergence of aggression directed toward this figure. Homosexuality, which in ‘Schreber’ had been related to a specific moment of love toward a peer as a transitional stage between narcissism and object love, now became related to the reversal of aggression into sympathy as well. In his article *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, Freud attempted to interrelate all these new connections within a theory of identification. However, he did not completely succeed. Moreover, he realized that his study concerning group formation could lead to a further analysis of the phenomenon of religion. He thus concluded his study with a few notes concerning the relationship between adherence to a leader, inhibited sexuality and sublimation of sexuality within a religious framework. When reading these notes, one would expect that Freud would again take up his attempt to reconstruct religion which he had previously described in *Totem and Taboo*. What he had claimed there regarding the totem meal and the sacrifice could undoubtedly be revised in light of the concepts of masochism and identification. Yet this issue remained unresolved.

Nevertheless, Freud had offered a number of indications leading in a certain direction when he was analyzing the functioning of the Catholic Church. He had pointed out that the parallelism between the army and the Church was not perfect. In the army, one intended to collectively combine aggression and to destroy the enemy while the Church claimed to preach love. Considering this, one arrived at the awareness that that form of love which did not merely consist of infantile dependency, only arose due to the transformation of aggression. Yet at the same time, Freud’s comparison between the army and the Church sharpened his perspective on the specific character of the Church as an institution which set out to transform aggression and therefore partly needed aggression as a breeding ground. Perhaps this is also the reason why Churches usually find it difficult to accept explicit homosexuality.²⁶

²⁶ Freud clearly continued to be plagued by this issue. Near the end of *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, he again brought it up. Initially, he stated in a rather trivial manner: "The Catholic Church had the best motives for recommending its followers to remain unmarried and for imposing celibacy upon its priests; but falling in love has often driven even priests to leave the Church. In the same way love for women breaks through the group ties of race, of national divisions, and of the social system and thus produces important effects as a factor in civilization." This was followed by the curious statement: "It seems certain that homosexual love is far more compatible with group ties, even when it takes the shape of inhibited sexual impulsions - a remarkable fact, the explanation of which might carry us far." S. FREUD, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, S.E. XVIII, p. 141, G.W. XIII, p. 159.
Besides the different ways by which aggression and eroticism were linked in Freud’s comparison of army and Church, one can notice yet another distinction. The experience of a general’s presence, on the one hand, and Christ’s, on the other hand, is fundamentally different in nature especially when such presence is interpreted as a ‘physical’ presence. Yet if one speaks of ‘erotic’ ties, these representations of a more corporeal nature should be taken into account.

Moreover, how should one understand the further evolution of this libidinous bond in instances where people flock around an idea rather than the image of a person? In addressing this question, Freud made only a few, very general suggestions which seem very Jungian. He proposed that, thanks to myths or more precisely, heroic myths, the individual might be able to step beyond mass psychology. Since the poet did not keep the myth to himself but shared it with others, he did not remain imprisoned in an inner fantasy world but rather returned to reality.7

These general ideas, however, obscured the fact that the problem concerning the coherence between the experience of reality and the libidinal development was still unresolved. Nevertheless, Freud did make some progress in *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* by focusing the problematic on the fascination which emanated from the primitive, immediately corporeal fantasm related to the father figure and on its repercussion for the individual’s experience of his own identity. The identification process, which nowadays is often reduced to what can be described by an empirical psychology or sociology, established its most basic foundation at this level.

The question most central to religion and the various elements which we have found scattered throughout *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, concerned exactly how the specificity of the religious experience was related to the eroticizing of the individual’s ego. In connection with this, the question also concerned how one became fascinated by the supremacy appearing in the corporeal from of another person. Freud continued to struggle with this question and, more specifically, with the aspect which referred to the man - woman distinction. Yet, the issue ultimately remained unclear to him. His last great work, *Moses and Monotheism*, which he painstakingly completed before his death, again dealt

with the fascination for the father figure who was killed by his people but who was subsequently quasi-deified due to the feeling of guilt which had arisen. The basic scheme of *Totem and Taboo* was thus maintained. Yet Freud’s attention was drawn to the same problematic which had been his main concern in the Wolfman’s case. He delved into biblical studies and actually set out to prove that Moses really had been murdered.8

Why was it so important for Freud to prove that events such as these truly happened? Was it because, by doing so, he thought he could resolve the oppressive question which dealt with how the supreme and physical appearance of another person established one’s identity? Or was it out of a fear of becoming caught up in an endless, paranoia-like conceptual system of thinking? Perhaps, it involved both arguments. In any case, we should keep in mind that this issue affected the position of the psychoanalytical practice as well. For what is the ‘truth’ or ‘reality’ which is attained through analysis? Does it consist in the actual memory of facts which occurred yet were forgotten?

Before we turn our attention to Jung, who unconsciously struggled with precisely the same questions and who, rather unexpectedly, put the same elements (homosexuality, identification, religion, experience of reality) together within an admittedly different theoretical framework, we should consider the following questions which played a key role in Jung’s thinking as well as in Freud’s. What is interpretation and what is its relationship to transference? The issue is best presented for discussion by returning to the very first psychological phenomenon with which both Freud and Jung had started their reflections, namely hypnosis. Freud had already employed this approach in *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*. After years of theorizing and widening the scope of the problematic, had they finally come to a better understanding of the phenomenon of hypnosis?

**Hypnosis and Interpretation**

In order to become better acquainted with the importance of hypnosis, a short cultural and historical excursion seems worthwhile here.

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8. My gratitude goes to one of my students, D. Peeters, who investigated the information on which Freud based himself. Freud indeed seemed to have been well informed. Yet in light of contemporary biblical science, his hypothesis no longer appears to be valid. I refer to an article by a colleague who, after having read the student’s work, further researched the matter: J. Lust, *Freud, Hosea and the Murder of Moses*. In: Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses 65 (1989) 81-93.
Psychiatry had emerged at the beginning of the 18th century due to the systematization of the ‘moral treatment’ by Ph. Pinel (1745-1826). He had developed a method which we, by means of an anachronistic term, could call ‘psychological manipulation’. Insane individuals might be healed when they were subjected to someone who was capable of overwhelming them to such a degree that they felt internally forced to surrender and thus, to abandon their ‘sickly ideas’. This actually pointed to the same phenomenon which Freud would later call ‘transference’. The main difference, however, was that Pinel employed this transference in order to manipulate the patient while Freud analyzed it and, by doing so, made the patient aware of how he had allowed himself to become dependent on others.

However, we should return to the very early stages of psychiatry in order to consider yet another element which would later turn hypnosis into an extremely revealing phenomenon. The first decades of psychiatry were characterized by the controversial question of who was qualified to apply the moral treatment. Should it be the physician’s prerogative? Could not the philosopher, the priest or even the lawyer also qualify for this task? The common presupposition in this debate was that a special societal status was required in order for one to be able to make the profound impression needed for the moral treatment. Even the architectural design of psychiatric institutions as well as their internal organization were intended to again reinforce the feeling of being impressed by an overwhelming social personage.

The confrontation with hypnosis, which had been therapeutically successful, dealt a heavy blow to the proponents of the moral treatment. Then known as ‘animal magnetism’, hypnotism had become immensely popular since the time of F. Mesmer (1734-1815). His method of demonstrating this phenomenon by means of boxes filled with iron filings was well-known. The discussion at that time, however, had been limited to whether or not animal magnetism existed as a physical reality. Gradually, it had become clear that hypnosis consisted of a direct manipulation of one person by another person. For the adherents of the moral treatment,

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it must have been a sobering observation that hypnosis apparently intervened much more profoundly than their own technique and also that an acknowledged social status did not seem to be necessary in order to influence a person to such a degree.

Further, the study of hypnosis had given Freud the insight that hysteria was based on an analogous phenomenon and thus that it was caused by psychological factors. More specifically, hysteria emerged as the consequence of repression. Here, we must call to mind that Freud initially continued to employ hypnosis as a therapeutic instrument. By doing so, he intended to use the influence of his own person as a counterbalance to the patient’s unconscious attitude of ‘not wanting to know’. Later on, he abandoned the use of hypnosis because he obtained the same effect, so he stated, by insisting and by strongly affirming that the patient did know what he claimed he could not remember. Gradually, he even omitted even this insistence and adopted a merely expectant attitude. For in the meantime, it had become apparent to Freud that, in the course of analysis, the patient established a bond with his therapist and began to entertain all sorts of expectations and fears concerning him.

This phenomenon, which Freud called ‘transference’, soon became the instrument *par excellence* for directing the ‘process of coming to consciousness’ which was ultimately the aim of the psychoanalytical treatment. One should, however, not imagine that certain traumatic or significant events from the past were simply reproduced within the psychoanalytical setting. Nevertheless, this could occur. In the analysis of the Wolfman, as well as that of the Ratman, Freud seemed pleased whenever he could give an example of this phenomenon.\(^\text{12}\)

Freud then slowly directed his attention to the fact that the patient developed the same type of relationship toward his analyst as his relationship toward the parental figures which had characterized the construction process of his own identity when he was a child. To say the least, this seemed as important as the detection of repressed memories. By means of the relationship with his analyst, the patient was able to gain more insight into himself. This ‘himself’ should be viewed as the ideal image of the ego which a person developed in light of the parental figures and for which he was prepared to suppress a number of desires. Thanks

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\(^{12}\) Namely, the Ratman’s dream in which he saw Freud’s daughter with excrement instead of eyes (S.E. X, p. 200, G.W. VII, p. 421) and the way in which the Wolfman’s constipation reacted to the progress of his treatment (S.E. XVII, p. 75, G.W. XII, p. 107). Is it truly coincidental that in both cases, the anal aspect was involved and connected to the homosexual element of the transferential relationship?
to transference, the patient was offered an insight into his identification mechanisms and thus into his ‘himself’ as a repressive authority. Moreover, according to some of Freud’s followers, transference provided a climate of safety and understanding within which the patient could achieve a reconstruction of his identity.

While keeping in mind the discussion concerning the moral treatment and the impact of the technique of hypnosis, we should now raise the following question. What caused the analyst to establish a relationship of transference? Was it the logical consequence of his social status? Or did status have nothing to do with it? In the latter case, are we confronted with something such as the mere fact of intersubjectivity?

This question did not present itself to Freud. He was a physician and his patients had come to consult him with the same expectations as they would have of any general practitioner. Freud, however, did not act in the same way as the physicians of his time usually did. While his patients expected to undergo shock treatment, to be massaged or to be subjected to one of the other current medical techniques, Freud applied none of these. Often, it was said that he merely listened. But such a description is incomplete. It is true that Freud listened yet his listening had a typically analytical effect precisely because he did not act as his patients had spontaneously expected him to act.

In the psychoanalytic practice of today, this procedure has become the rule of thumb. As an analyst, one does not comply to the patient’s expectations. The patient expects to be given advice yet none is offered. He expects to be punished yet no punishment follows. He expects to be supported or comforted and yet, neither of these is given. It must be made clear to the patient that the analyst is not the person from whom he should expect support, consolation or advice. Time and again, the analyst appears to be different than expected. The experience of a bond which continues to exist even though the analyst does not seem to fit the patient’s presupposed image, allows the analytical process to take its course.

Yet what exactly is the process of awakening consciousness within the transference relationship established by the analytical treatment? This question touches upon an issue which is still subject to discussion among the different trends within psychoanalysis which have derived from Freud. In any case, it is clear that the recognition of the transference process implies more than the mere confrontation with the fact that one had perceived the analyst differently than he really was. For what is the ‘reality’ of the analyst? A true perception of the analyst must involve more than the fact that, when one accidentally meets him on the street or in a
theater, he seems thinner, younger, less surly, less friendly and so forth than one’s image of him when one is lying on the couch. Admittedly, it might be worthwhile for the patient to learn that his analyst is divorced or has a boyfriend or girlfriend although he had never expected this to be the case. Yet ultimately, the transferential relationship concerns something much more fundamental and much less tangible. Time and again, the patient experiences that he feels, thinks, and reacts differently when this barely known figure is seated out of view than when he is not present. Even though most of the time the analyst remains silent, his presence is quite different from that of a tape recorder.

Thus, the depiction of the analyst as one who ‘mirrors’, is completely false. Analysis confronts a person with the fact that it is impossible to remain indifferent by the presence of another person. The silent presence of the analyst makes one extremely aware of that which is inadvertently overlooked in everyday life because the other person usually responds and one replies to that response. Thus, one comes to realize that someone else’s presence cannot be overlooked. One cannot help but want something out of this relationship. That the other person does not make his intentions known so that one can discuss, negotiate or quarrel within him, which is what would normally happen, renders the other’s presence even more provocative. One cannot help but take the other into account. This insurmountable fact implies that the relationship of transference is a phenomenon which is extremely hard to break down. Freud himself experienced this in the case of the Wolfman. A second stage of analysis performed by Ruth Mack Brunswick was necessary in order to dissolve the transferential relationship between the Wolfman and Freud.13

The awareness that this relationship could not be equated with the mere distortion of a ‘normal relationship’, insofar as the latter is not a fiction, has been the subject of much discussion. Further, a lot has been written concerning Freud’s conclusion that transference was actually a sincere expression of love and on his question as to whether analysis was ever really terminated.14 The attitudes which the various psychoanalytical associations have adopted with regard to these issues depended on the way which they further elaborated on Freud’s insights concerning the notions of narcissism and identification. In the United States, this problematic was

passed over for quite some time. Following Anna Freud, who stressed the defense mechanisms of the ego as the primary subject for further research, the trend in American psychoanalysis viewed the ego as the key element. Psychoanalysis in the United States became ‘ego-psychology’. That Freud had radically relativized the significance of the ego by means of his theory of narcissism was rediscovered only a few years ago. On the other hand, in France, J. Lacan has, from the very beginning of his work, focused on the fact that the ‘I’ originated in a lengthy developmental process. Reflecting upon Freud’s theoretical model of the ‘ego ideal’, especially where it was relevant for the distinction between neurosis and psychosis, Lacan situates the constitution of the ‘I’ in the interaction between an undefined desire and the words handed down by culture which somehow expressed that desire.

What is the purpose of the psychoanalytical treatment in this context? It is definitely not the discovery of the true, unmasked self. Actually, the patient learns that such a true self does not exist even though it is very difficult to let go of that illusion. He constantly re-examines his past hoping that, by his recollection, he can gain a decisive handle on the central scenes - preferably, the primordial scene - which have made him what he is. The patient is doing the same thing that the Wolfman did or rather, that Freud did during his examinations of the Wolfman. He is looking for a permanent grounding in the past because that seems to offer the only absolute guarantee that the ‘I’ is not an illusion to itself.

With this description of the alienating function performed by the reconstruction of the true self based on the past, Lacan actually concurs with Jung’s criticism of Freud. Yet Lacan takes his criticism a radical step further. He investigates what true individuality entails for the person. According to him, true individuality does not consist in a reference to an inner image of oneself - the ideal of the ‘I’. Rather, it is situated in the fact that the person is capable of abandoning the imaginary completion of this image and of choosing to become ‘someone’ by adopting one definite position from among the opposing possibilities provided by a certain culture: man or woman, father or son, father or daughter, mother or son and so forth.

It is not our intention to investigate the justifiable manner in which Lacan integrates insights from structuralism and linguistics into his own interpretation of Freudian thought. We are dealing with the way in which the process of transference supports the psychoanalytical treatment and contributes to the ‘awakening of conscious’. This can be described rather well if one notes the negative moments in the process of transference. The
patient is confronted with the realization that his analyst is not the one who takes care of him, who judges him, who offers advice and so on. To phrase it in a more popular manner, the analyst is neither father nor mother, brother nor sister. Moreover, while the analyst’s social dimension is equally as essential, he is neither a physician nor a police officer, neither a mentor nor an entertainer. Then what is he? That question is often answered with the statement: “he is merely an analyst and the patient needs to realize this.” Yet what does being an analyst imply? For some people, it means having a recognized social image, precisely as an analyst.

This reflection has brought us to the exact point where French psychoanalysis, in the footsteps of Lacan, has reproached American psychoanalysis for not thinking the process through radically enough. When psychoanalysis becomes an institution which is integrated into the social network, it is transformed into a ‘psychology of adaptation’. Psychoanalysis should therefore remain a separate discipline and not allow itself to be confused with psychiatry, psychotherapy, counselling or anything else of that nature. Actually, analysis should aim at radically confronting the patient with the fact that, in his experience of self, he cannot help but refer to ‘the other’ without that reference being completed by some concrete social image. Psychoanalysis is an attempt to confront the patient with the principle of otherness à l’état pur. But on the other hand, it immediately makes clear that the otherness à l’état pur can never be obtained in a direct face-to-face relationship. From the process of transference, the patient may learn that the other does not correspond to the image on which he has built his expectations. However, a clear perspective on exactly who this other person is, is still not offered.

The ‘awakening of conscious’, made possible by transference, consists in the awareness that there are always other, possible references for situating the radical presence of the other besides the concrete references by which one had approached the analyst. Psychoanalysis endeavors to sustain the negative experience as long as possible. It follows hypnosis in that it posits that no social status is needed to engender transference. The difference, however, is that psychoanalysis interprets rather than offers suggestions. Contrary to Freud, that interpretation should not lead to filling lacunas in the memory. Another element which is equally as important is the fact that the story of his past, which the patient cannot refrain from relating, makes him realize that no single tale can neutralize the impact of the other person on him but that this other person can always be different and that he, the patient, can also be different.
Can such a psychoanalytical relationship be maintained? It is definitely not a simple matter because it appears that, both in the psychoanalytical practice and in its theory formation, a number of currents are searching for something positive, beyond the destructive movement of transference, on which psychoanalysis could be based. Sometimes, one endeavors to attribute a separate social status to the psychoanalyst by which he would be granted a proper place within the social field of helping professions. Or one ultimately refers to the psychoanalytic theory in one’s interpretation in order to explain to the patient who he actually is. While at the beginning of analysis, it is annoying that the patient shields himself with theoretical concepts which he has picked up along the way, it sometimes occurs as analysis proceeds that one hears statements such as "that is probably a castration fantasm", "now, this is finally my oedipus complex" or "I really should accept that a thanatos drive compels me time and again to sabotage myself".

Why is the appeal to either the established social order or to a theory which one seems to share with the patient, so attractive? Perhaps this can be explained by the fact that the confrontation with the fantasm of the supreme presence of the other’s corporeality is unbearable when it occurs outside of the framework of the social order and of theory formation. The negative movement, set in motion by the destruction caused by transference, carries the individual back to some sort of beginning stage of culture where the confrontations with the fascinating yet at the same time despicable aspects of brute corporeality; the necessary yet also relative social order which organizes people into a structured cohesion; and the healing but equally alienating power of theory formation all appear in a primitive mutual coherence. Precisely because psychoanalysis developed the practice of referring people to this beginning level, it comes across as a rival to religion and not because, when viewed as a theoretical construction, it might reduce religion.

The vicissitudes of psychoanalysis, influenced by Lacan, are very instructive with regard to this point. It is precisely this trend which has been reproached for stressing the structural aspects (the ‘symbolic order’) of a culture, where an individual is accepted and has acquired his identity, to such a degree that it has overlooked sexuality and corporeality. Although Lacanian ideology refers to ‘castration’ more than any other psychoanalytical trend, it is indeed true that this ideology creates the impression that the underlying corporeal fantasm should be immediately interpreted as the fundamental symbol of the acceptance of ‘limitedness’ in a very broad sense. One often justifiably complains that the notion of
the body has disappeared in Lacanian psychoanalysis although this is not completely true. In principle, there would have been enough room to incorporate it. Perhaps the notion of the body is present, but to an enormous and threatening proportion, as was the case when Jung and Freud were searching for the deepest instinctual basis of identity by means of their scheme: autoerotism - narcissism - homosexuality - object love. Indubitably, this scheme was too simplistic. However, for the first time, it expressed something which until then had been ‘ineffable’. The moralizing discourse often heard in Lacanian circles, which posits that the symbolic choice must be made, that there must be a differentiation, as if this is a duty and not merely a methodical description of an anthropological structure, and the fact that the problematic of homosexuality is either completely omitted or stashed away with the other perversions, precisely from where Freud had uncovered it, probably reveal that a part of the problem, with which Freud and Jung struggled, has astutely been investigated by the Lacanians but that another part of it has been repressed.

A study of the history of the school founded by Lacan and its subsequent fragmentation into various groups would undoubtedly be very enlightening with regard to this point. Furthermore, their ambivalence toward religion is not coincidental. However, it is difficult to draw conclusions from Lacanian studies on religion for a broader application due to the uniqueness of the French situation. By means of the word ‘religion’, the specific opposition between scientistic anticlericalism and restoration Catholicism, which is still being defined in 19th century terms, is understood. Moreover, the words ‘religion’ and ‘laity’ confront the outsider with unrecognizable elements.

When one reviews the development of psychoanalysis, from its beginnings in the practice of hypnosis, it definitely becomes clear that a struggle regarding the core problematic still exists. That problematic concerns several facets: the experience of one’s own identity as a being, characterized by eroticism, which searches for its own place in an unavoidable relationship with the other; the structuredness of the culture that determines the positions from which people can interact; and the designation of an expressed perspective on reality (theoria) as being true.

Remarkably, we re-encounter the same problems in Jung’s work as well. However, in his theory of ‘archetypes’, he also left some of these problems unresolved. Nevertheless, his contribution might offer a complement to what Freud and his followers have said concerning religion.
Jung’s Confrontation with the Unconscious

After his rupture with Freud, Jung developed the following idea. A person must undergo a process of inner development which gradually leads him to a higher spiritual existence. During this process, he is guided by ‘archetypes’ or, to put it less accurately, by ‘primordial images’ which show him the direction he should follow at pivotal moments in his life. At the first stage, a person must confront the ‘shadow’ or the dark side of his personality. Jung often stated that by this, he was referring to the Freudian notion of the unconscious, the unconscious originating in repression. The confrontation with this shadowy side, which could not always be truly considered as an archetype, was designated as a task for the first part of a person’s life. In the second part of life, a man is confronted with his ‘anima’ and a woman with her ‘animus’. By translating the Latin terms, it becomes clear that a person must discover his ‘soul’ during this period.

These archetypes make themselves known through dream images, through suddenly emerging infatuations and, in the case of the artist, through the representations with which he has to struggle in his creativity. The ‘anima’ appears in the form of a fascinating, yet often unattainable woman while the ‘animus’ appears in the form of a man or, more frequently, of several different men. In the Freudian context, one interpreted such elements as distant memories from childhood. In Jung’s framework, however, they were not considered as personal memories. Moreover, the images did not refer to another person. The archetypes anima and animus confront us with an aspect of ourselves. What is involved is a facet of our own personality which is of the opposite gender. During the first part of life, we were blind to this aspect yet in the second part, it forces itself upon us and requires integration.

What should be understood by the aspect of ‘the opposite gender’ of one’s personality? Jung pointed out that, in the construction of one’s life, every person developed a certain number of possibilities and left others aside. However, Jung intended something more fundamental than the repression which could lead a person to hold back unpleasant experiences or inadmissible desires. Rather, the selection of possibilities takes place within the context of a certain project in life. A person has already attached himself to one single identity and he intends to maintain it. Although Jung was not so explicit, the process could be related to one’s sexual identity as follows. The possibilities which a person develops within his own life project become associated with the representation of his own gender while the non-developed possibilities become associated
with the representation of the opposite gender. Since it is the person’s identity which is questioned at the dawn of the second part of life, one might interpret this moment as a confrontation with the ‘opposite gender’ of his personality. In other words, the person begins to realize that there is a wealth of possibilities which he has not yet developed, namely the realm of the collective unconscious.

When investigating the source of Jung’s opinions on the unconscious, one usually refers to his self-analysis. In his autobiography, Jung revealed some information regarding his ‘confrontation with the unconscious’ which took place in the years following his rupture with Freud. The first dream which he recounted dated from the Christmas season of 1912. In his dream, Jung was seated in a beautiful renaissance-style chair in an Italian palace. A white dove landed near him and, through a metamorphosis, turned into an eight year old, blond-haired girl. Suddenly, the girl was once again a bird. She said that she could only change into a human being during the early hours of the night "because at that time, the male dove is occupied with the twelve dead".

Time and again, Jung dreamed about corpses. For example, he dreamed about a series of tombstones dating from the 12th to the 19th century, whose sculptured statues upon closer investigation appeared to be still moving mummies. After having these dreams, Jung said that he then decided to start playing as he had done when he was a ten year old child. With collected rocks, he built a village at the shore of a lake. This turned into a ritual. Jung hesitated for some time before placing an altar in the village church, until he accidentally came across a unique red stone which had washed up on the shore. If Jung’s account in his autobiography is chronological, this event should have taken place during the period when he was preparing A Contribution to the Study of Psychological Types. As is mentioned above, that lecture was presented in Munich in September 1913, at the congress of the International Association for Psychoanalysis, the last congress Jung would attend.

The lecture constituted a direct expression of the ideas which Jung had begun to develop in the wake of his break with Freud. Here, he posited that introversion should not solely be interpreted as a phenomenon of reaction. Some people have a natural disposition toward introversion while there are others who are predominantly extroverted. These are two different psychological types. Yet, a normally functioning individual has disposal of both dispositions. Even though one of the dispositions is dominant, depending on the personality type, the other disposition is
prepared to act as a corrective if the dominant disposition becomes all too exclusive.

A pathological state arises when the automatic correction fails. In order to make this claim, Jung referred to the characteristic distinction between hysteria and schizophrenia. Both pathologies entailed the exaggerated and almost exclusive activity of one or the other disposition. A pathological state, however, did not follow solely as a result of the exaggerated factor but also because of the regression which occurred. According to Jung, hysteria could be defined as ‘regressive extroversion’ and schizophrenia as ‘regressive introversion’. The compensation which occurred spontaneously in a healthy individual, was ultimately extracted by the pathological process although it was already too late. An hysterics’s exaggerated adherence to outward reality turned into an uninhibited submergence into an eroticized fantasy world. The contrary occurred in cases of schizophrenia. While the patient was originally inclined to retreat into his inner world to an extreme degree, he now lost all inhibitions. He became obnoxious and accosted everybody.

Jung’s text questioned the content of this ‘inner world’. With Transformations and Symbolisms of the Libido in mind, we are not surprised to read, in one short passage, that a schizophrenic’s ‘inner world displayed very archaic characteristics and that the mythical creations of the primitive imagination dominated the patient’s personal memories.15 Precisely how should one conceive the constitution of the inner world? More than likely, Jung himself did not have a clear perspective on this question at that time. Moreover, his most stirring experiences in confronting the unconscious occurred only after the Congress in Munich.

According to Jung’s own account, his confrontation with the unconscious began with something similar to a vision which he was able to date very precisely. On 12 December 1913, he experienced the sensation of sinking to a great depth until he had reached a cave in a subterranean mountainside. The entrance to the cave was guarded by a mummified dwarf. Nevertheless, Jung entered the cave and saw a red, luminous crystal. There was water flowing in the depth of the cave which was hidden by the crystal. The corpse of a blond-haired boy, wounded in the head, floated by, followed by a black scarab and a newly born, red sun. When Jung attempted to close off the mouth of the cave with the crystal,

15. C.G. Jung, A Contribution to the Study of Psychological Types, C.W. VI, § 858, G.W. VI, § 931. In the English and the German versions of volume VI, the numbers of the paragraphs do not correspond.
a stream of blood flowed out of it. When the blood finally stopped flowing, the vision was over.

On 18 December, he had a terrible dream. Along with an unknown, wild, dark-skinned boy, Jung lay in wait in order to shoot ‘Siegfried’. At dawn, when Siegfried appeared, triumphantly riding a wagon filled with human bones, Jung and the boy fired the fatal shot. Jung then ran away in a panic. The dream continued with a relieving rain shower which erased all traces of the murder. At that moment Jung awoke, conscious of the obsessional need to either interpret the dream or commit suicide.

In his autobiography, Jung recounted that he had gradually realized that, in the vision and the dream, he was facing the typically mythical theme of the death and resurrection of the hero. He recognized himself in Siegfried who had to be killed. He had to relinquish his conscious, dominating disposition and allow himself to be carried more passively by the less transparent forces which upheld life. But he insisted that this did not imply the abandoning of his conscious insight. On the contrary, if it was not for this insight and for the ethical responsibility for the daily cares of life, he would more than likely have gone insane. Yet first, he had to let the darkness, which surged up from the unconscious, emerge. Only afterwards should he try to comprehend it. Thus, similar to the hero, he would be born again after death.

Jung interpreted the images which he saw surfacing in his dreams and visions as referring to his own identity. They did not refer to beloved ‘objects’ in the sense that Freud had attributed to ‘object love’. Jung diligently recorded his dreams and visions in a series of ‘black books’ which he later very carefully copied into the ‘Red Book’ in the style of a medieval manuscript. A number of persons reappeared more and more frequently in his dreams and fantasies such as a young girl who accompanied an older man, Salome and Elias. The figure of Elias later developed into Philemon, whom Jung considered to be his guardian spirit and with whom he held long, inner conversations. A woman’s voice resounded within him as well. Although he recognized the voice as that of a female patient who was involved with him in a very strong transferential relationship, he concluded that his inner person also harbored a female figure. From that time onward, he wrote his fantasies down as letters addressed to this inner female presence.

The psychic environment in which Jung lived became more and more agitated. Jung again started perceiving all sorts of paranormal phenomena. At a certain moment, the doorbell would start to ring on its own. He wrote that his house was full of ghosts and that his children were also
troubled by them. One evening, Jung sat down at his writing table in order to give these intruding spirits a hearing. During three evenings in 1916, Jung wrote the *Seven Sermons to the Dead*, a remarkable dialogue which started with the words:16

Seven exhortations to the dead, written by Basilides in Alexandria, the city where East and West meet.

*The First Sermon*

The dead came back from Jerusalem, where they did not find what they were seeking. They asked admittance to me and demanded to be taught by me, and thus I taught them:

Hear Ye: I begin with nothing. Nothing is the same as fullness. In the endless state fullness is the same as emptiness. The Nothing is both empty and full. One may just as well state some other thing about the Nothing, namely that it is white or that it is black or that it exists or that it exists not. That which is endless and eternal has no qualities, because it has all qualities.”

In his autobiography, Jung further recounted that he had drawn his first mandala after he finished writing *Seven Sermons to the Dead*. Of course, he did not yet understand it or so he claimed. However, when he went to serve as a commander in the Swiss army at the Château-d’Oeux in 1918-1919, he took up the practice of drawing a mandala every morning. From then onward, he used the technique as an instrument to read his inner disposition.

What Jung wrote concerning this period of confrontation with the unconscious has obviously aroused the curiosity of a number of authors. All sorts of attempts at interpretation have been undertaken. Even those who are not adherents of the Jungian theory are often very interested in how the person involved was able to fend off impending psychosis. Further, it is conspicuous that, in his own interpretation of the process, Jung did not refer to either Freud or Toni Wolff, the woman who had entered his life as his patient and who became his confident and support during the difficult years of his confrontation with the unconscious. Insofar as one’s motives are not based on voyeurism, one can justifiably regret that

16. This translation was taken from S.A. Hoeller, *The Gnostic Jung and the Seven Sermons to the Dead*, London, The Theosophical Publishing House, 1982, p. 44. According to Hoeller, the conversations were recorded between 15 December 1915 and 16 February 1917. This however does not agree with Jung’s account in his autobiography. Jung himself situated the phenomenon of the ringing bell on a warm summer afternoon while the conversations were recorded shortly afterwards.
Jung’s ‘Red Book’ still remains unaccessible and that Jung himself burned his correspondence with Toni Wolff from those years.\textsuperscript{17}

Our study, however, has not intended to understand Jung as an individual nor to understand the formation of his theories in light of his personal experiences. Our task is to deal with the question of how the problems, unresolved in his debate with Freud, resurfaced in Jung’s later theory formation and what repercussions these problems had on the phenomenon of ‘religion’.

**The Jungian Scheme**

A first text which aids us in this task is a lecture which was given on 24 July 1914 in Aberdeen, entitled *On Psychological Understanding*.\textsuperscript{18} Here, Jung presented an elaborate plea to avoid working in a merely reductive manner, attempting to causally explain psychic disturbance as Freud did. He stressed that psychotherapy should also operate constructively. In order to lend force to this opinion, Jung employed two images which he often repeated in his later work. One did not succeed in explaining Goethe’s *Faust* by enumerating its historical sources and by unraveling the universally human motives in it. Nor did one explain the cathedral of Cologne as a work of art by pointing to the fact that it consisted of stones and thus could be studied mineralogically.\textsuperscript{19} The essence of a psychic disturbance did not merely consist of adherence to the past. It also expressed an attempt at progress, although that attempt failed. Therapy should therefore also support this second tendency directed toward the future. With regard to the question of how the therapist should go about doing this, Jung only proposed that the therapist should look for typical motives in the patient’s fantasies, from which a psychological trend of development might be read.\textsuperscript{20}

In December 1916, Jung published an extremely important article entitled *The Structure of the Unconscious* in which one can find the blueprint of all of his later work.\textsuperscript{21} The core of the article consisted of the

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\item[18.] Although the editors of the Gesammelte Werke have not indicated this, according to the Collected Works, this is undoubtedly the text which was reprinted as an epilogue in the 1914 edition of The Content of the Psychoses.
\item[20.] Ibid., § 422-423.
\item[21.] Because the original German text was apparently lost, the English edition of the Collected
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hypothesis that, alongside the personal unconscious, a collective unconscious also existed. In order to support his hypothesis, Jung argued that analysis never succeeded in completely depleting the unconscious. If it merely consisted of personal memories and repressed contents, then there would have to be a moment when the analysis actually reached the bottom of the unconscious. Experience, however, taught that analysis could go on forever. New erotic fantasies were constantly being produced.

To explain this phenomenon, Jung could have simply referred to the influence of regression which, in light of a present conflict, constructed fantasies that seemed to stem from a distant past. However, Jung took it a step further. Appealing to the fact that every person was born with differentiated cerebral material, Jung posited that everyone possessed an innate collective unconscious. What did this collective unconscious consist of? Jung did not immediately delve into that question. Rather, he endeavored to devise a schematic outline of how individuality established itself and distinguished itself from collectivity. In a first stage, according to Jung, every person thought they were identical to what Jung called a ‘persona’. Referring to the original meaning of the word (persona means ‘mask’), Jung proposed that every person claimed a part of the collective unconscious with which he was born to be more explicitly his own and then cultivated it. The persona was thus a segment of the collective unconscious. Upon considering the contents of the persona, however, one found nothing uniquely individual. Individuality lay in the choice of elements from the collective unconscious which one had appropriated or, to put it differently, in the limitations which were established by the persona in the collective unconscious.

With this model in mind, Jung endeavored to explain what occurred during analysis. Due to the fact that the persona dissolved as a result of the analytical process, the patient was brought into direct contact with the collective unconscious without any sort of protection. This often caused the patient to feel ‘deified’ as it were. His self-experience was reinforced

Works offered a translation of the French text as it had appeared in Archives de Psychologie (vol. XVI, 152-179). The corresponding volume of the German Gesammelte Werke appeared later. During its preparation, the original German text with many corrections inserted in the manuscript, seemed to have been discovered. Unfortunately, the editor’s indications do not allow the different redactional layers of Jung’s corrections to be distinguished. The text which is presented as the original appears to be older than the version published in the Archives de Psychologie and many additions, concerning issues such as the “anima”, were clearly written later. Yet how much later? Did Jung only add them when he employed the text in writing his renowned booklet The Relations Between the Ego and the Unconscious? On the basis of the German edition, we can unfortunately not answer this question.
because he felt that he was everything. This was dangerous since manic pathologies were laying in wait. Many patients protected themselves against these pathologies by regressively restoring the persona. This often took place by means of a reductive theory formation. One said, for example, that all one experienced was ‘only infantile sexuality’ or ‘only a hunger for power’. Once again, one shielded oneself from the collective unconscious.

According to Jung, the true solution was found in acknowledging both aspects of the human psyche. In attempting to formulate this more precisely, Jung introduced a number of important notions in just a few phrases. The psychic phenomenon which implied the contact of the ego with the non-ego was called the attitude. One psychological function usually dominated within the attitude. Regarding this, Jung mentioned three functions in the text: feeling, thinking and intuition.\textsuperscript{22} According to him, the persona was always identical to a typical attitude where one single function was dominant. As a result, the other functions were repressed. The persona therefore inhibited the development toward greater individuality and thus had to be dissolved in order to attain further individuation.

What should happen next? As in his previous article, Jung again proposed that one should look for the lifelines indicated by the unconscious itself. However, here he specified how this could be accomplished. The symbols produced by the unconscious should be approached ‘hermeneutically’. In other words, the patient should add analogous symbols to those of his own and, if his imagination did not suffice, the erudition of the therapist should provide related symbols. From this accumulation of related symbols, to which both the patient’s imagination and the knowledge of cultural history contributed, it should become sufficiently clear which goals the patient should strive after in the immediate future. Whether therapy ultimately succeeded depended not only on how one applied hermeneutics but also on the willpower and the moral input of the patient.

*The Structure of the Unconscious* displayed practically all the elements of the classical Jungian system. Upon closer investigation, we discover even more than what has been expounded until now. For example, when referring to *A Contribution to the Study of Psychological Types*, Jung repeated that the introverted personality type favored thinking and the extroverted type favored feeling. He also mentioned a third

\textsuperscript{22} C.G. Jung, *The Structure of the Unconscious*, C.W. VII, § 487.
function in passing, namely intuition. Thus, he was well on his way to the classical scheme which he presented in 1921 in *Psychological Types*. We also notice the beginnings of another classically Jungian theme. While in *The Structure of the Unconscious*, Jung introduced the ‘persona’, he did not yet speak about the ‘anima’. However, the latter concept appeared in a revision of the resumé with which he concluded the published article. The ‘anima’ was defined as an ‘unconscious image of the subject’. In the same way that the persona summarized how one wished to appear to the outside world, the anima was the summary of how one related to the collective unconscious.

It is tempting to let oneself be carried away by the subsequent development of Jung’s work which filled out the framework until it became the beautiful and complex figure of his typological schemes. Not coincidentally, the figure of the mandala was favored in those schemes. As far as the anima was concerned, one notices that, in the above mentioned resumé, it was not yet related to the image of the individual’s opposite gender. With regard to the mentioned functions, one might state that the addition of intuition to the thinking and feeling functions pointed to the fact that the sensation function would soon follow. That immediately introduced the perspective of Jung’s typology in its classical form, as later elaborated in *Psychological Types*. In that text, Jung started from four functions which could bring an individual into contact with what was beyond him: thinking, feeling, sensation and intuition. Each of these four functions could be primarily directed at either the outside world (for the extroverted type) or the inner world (for the introverted type). Thus, Jung distinguished eight different types: an extroverted type of thinking, feeling, sensation and intuition and four introverted equivalents.

However, with regard to the reconstruction of Jung’s later work, the danger of such a fascination is that it too easily overlooks the ambiguous accumulation of explanatory notions which occurred here. When we endeavor to describe the components of the collective unconscious in terms more nuanced than Jung himself used, we arrive at two conclusions. First of all, the collective unconscious consisted of representations or, more precisely, of innate principles which caused humanity to continuously produce analogous representations. Jung’s reference to the differentiated cerebral material with which we are born and his method of ‘amplification’ (as he later called it), where the therapist clarified the symbolic representations, produced by the patient, using analogous images from cultural history, should be understood in this regard. Secondly, the collective unconscious consisted in a number of functions by which people
could direct themselves toward reality and from among which they favored one certain function. The question which posed itself here concerned how one should conceive of the relationship between the functions and the representations, both of which have their origin in the unconscious.

Furthermore, the question as to how the distinction between reality and fantasy and between reality and delusion came into being still remains. Jung was aware of the importance of the distinction. As far as the therapeutic practice was concerned, he insisted that the confrontation with the unconscious should be a conscious event and that the daily tasks of life should be respected as compelling, ethical duties. Yet in Jung’s theoretical reflection, one finds exactly the opposite articulation than one would expect. Unlike Freud, he did not wonder how a person learned to accept reality which existed autonomously, on the basis of primary hallucinatory wish fulfillment. For Jung, the problem seemed to lie in the fact that people spontaneously experienced a number of things as being autonomous, while these things were actually being created by their own inner world. One might say that by nature, people are too paranoid. Our task should be to accept that what seems to be foreign, really belongs to the collective unconscious which we share with all people.

In his resumé at the end of *The Structure of the Unconscious*, Jung phrased the situation as follows:23

"The conscious and unconscious components of an impersonal, i.e., collective, nature constitute the psychological non-ego, the image of the objective world (the object-imago). These components may appear in analysis as projections of either feeling or judgment, but they are *a priori* collective, and identical with the object-imago; that is, they appear to be qualities of the object, and it is only *a posteriori* that they are recognized as psychological qualities."

It is conspicuous that one still finds all the theoretical questions which have dominated the debate between Freud and Jung from their first encounter onward although these questions were not always clearly delineated and although Jung was definitely moving in a different direction. From the beginning, the central question had been: what can the schizophrenic breach with reality teach us regarding the establishment of a normal cathexis of reality? The hypothesis that something must occur before the distinction arose between the ego and the non-ego resumed the Freudian theory of the reality principle. One might justifiably question

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what Jung could accomplish with his own formulations. To do so does not necessarily mean to reproach Jung. In spite of the way in which the term ‘reality principle’ is so easily employed, Freud himself did nothing other than give the problem a name, as we have seen above.

Upon considering the first formulation of Jung’s system, one might wonder in which direction Jung was looking in order to solve the question of how the contact with reality was established. Did it suffice to point to the differentiation of one of the psychological functions? Two reflections keep us from answering positively. Our first reflection concerns the basis on which Jung founded the distinction between these functions and their relation to the processes of introversion and extroversion. Secondly, we wonder how these functions are related to the other aspects of the collective unconscious, the persona and the anima.

The issue concerning the functions left aside, we find ourselves in more familiar territory with these last two concepts. The persona might be considered as a new approach to the identification problematic while the anima might be seen as a reiteration of the homosexuality problematic. The correlation of these two problematics with the problem of the relationship toward reality constituted the very core of ‘Schreber’. If Jung had only talked about the persona and the anima in the same way that he later discussed the ‘self’, the evolution of his thought process would have been relatively easy to follow. Under the influence of his study of mythology, he would have pointed to the fact, merely by his terminology, that the parallel between mythology, fantasy and psychotic delusion needed further examining. The introduction of the functions, however, obscured the formation of his theory. Especially when he abandoned the introversion-thinking and extroversion-feeling connection; when he posited that both introvert as well as extrovert thinking and introvert as well as extrovert feeling existed; and on top of that, when he claimed that both modalities also existed for sensation and intuition, the system seemed to go awry.

In moments such as these, one is often inclined to draw a scheme as Jung did. But what does a scheme clarify? Or is the scheme itself the problem? Why do we have the impression that we know ourselves better when a graphic image is drawn which diametrically opposes ‘thinking’ to ‘feeling’ and so forth? The term ‘archetype’ offers little help to further clarify matters. However, the context in which it was first used is revealing. In July 1919, a symposium was held in London, entitled "Instinct and the Unconscious". It was in Jung’s contribution bearing the
same title, that the term was coined. Jung started with a reference to the philosopher Bergson who held the notion of intuition as a human capacity as most important. According to Jung, intuition was "the unconscious, purposive apprehension of a highly complicated situation".

How should we correctly understand this? Jung started with an example from the animal world to introduce intuition as a unique human capacity. The Yucca moth (Pronuba yucasella) must perform a rather complicated series of actions in order to procreate. First, the moth has to gather pollen from the Yucca flowers which only bloom during one night. It then works the pollen into a little ball, finds a second flower and drills a hole through its pistil. It lays its eggs in the hole and closes it off with the ball of pollen. The moth does this only once in its entire lifetime. There is no room for a learning process. The moth apparently possesses some innate knowledge which allows it to recognize the yucca flower at the right time and to carry out the procreation ritual.

With this example in mind, the first definition of the archetype seems very clear. Jung defined the place of the archetypes within the collective unconscious as follows:

"In this ‘deeper’ stratum we find also the a priori, inborn form of ‘intuition’, namely the archetypes of perception and apprehension, which are the necessary a priori determinants of all psychic processes. Just as his instincts compel man to a specific human mode of existence, so the archetypes force his ways of perception into specifically human patterns. The instincts and the archetypes together form the ‘collective unconscious’.

Posited as such, it seems that the archetype should be understood as an a priori by means of which a person approaches everything that is outside of himself. However, the archetypes mentioned by Jung in other texts, the persona, the anima and the self, were not involved with how the relationship toward the other was established. Rather, they were concerned with how one experienced oneself and how one was able to transform one’s identity. It was true, of course, that there was a connection between one’s self-experience and one’s directedness toward the other. But Jung never addressed that issue. Rather, he obscured it by postulating a parallel between the ‘inner’ and the ‘outer’ world. According to him, these same functions (thinking, feeling, sensation and intuition) brought us into contact with both worlds.

25. Ibid., § 269.
26. Ibid., § 270.
The Lost Problematic

We have now returned to the theme which occupied our attention at the beginning of the correspondence between Freud and Jung, namely Jung’s inability to follow Freud in his attempt to distinguish the schizophrenic decathexis of reality from the neurotic fascination with unconscious fantasms. Here we could perhaps enumerate the criticisms which were directed against Jung’s theory formation. His thought could ultimately be characterized as leaving no room for that which was beyond the person. One continues to recognize in Jung’s later thought the same paradigm of the Romantic concept of the unconscious which was present in his very first writings and lectures from his student days. Without refuting it, Jung passed over the problematic of identification as Freud had described it based on his clinical observations. While Freud, reflecting upon his clinical data, felt more and more obligated to view the ‘ego’ as something which only came into being due to the interaction with the other, Jung continued to consider the ego as the organic development of a form which was provided by nature from the very beginning with all the possibilities for self-development.

The most important argument in this context was the similarity between the psychotic delusion and the symbolism in myths and religions. Jung constantly referred to this argument. However, the argument is also open to criticism. From an anthropological perspective, it has been sufficiently indicated that Jung erroneously isolated symbols from their respective contexts in order to compare them. Without being a fanatic structuralist, it is easy to see that Jung’s ‘amplification’ of symbolic material was indeed very broad. Further, one might reproach Jung for favoring the Eastern traditions rather than his own Judeo-Christian tradition when searching for something along the lines of a universal spiritual symbolism. Moreover, an \textit{a priori} was involved in his endeavor to bring the West to a new spirituality based on the East.

For the most part, these criticisms are justified and it would be needless to deal with them again. In the wake of our study, a second criticism appears to be equally as pressing. It concerns the distinction between the ways one ‘believes’ in symbols and in representations. In his search for archetypes, Jung amassed material from dreams, myths, fairy tales, children’s fantasies, delusions, spiritual traditions, alchemistic teachings and dogmatic formulations without taking into account the distinct

way the individual allowed himself to be affected by these forms in ‘faith’. Nevertheless, this distinction is essential. A believer’s faith in his church’s dogmatic formulas is supposed to be different from a paranoiac’s faith in his delusional system or from a child’s belief in a fairy tale. All these different forms of symbolic stories are able to affect man’s inner world and, as such, all of them are ‘real’. However, they are ‘real’ in different ways. The point at which Jung had arrived in his discussion with Freud might have rise to a further examination of the different modalities of the act of faith without having to refer to perception as the starting point. Psychosis had indeed proven that cathexis, not perception, was the decisive element in distinguishing delusion from reality. A closer analysis of the erotic aspect of cathexis and, more specifically, of the distinction between schizophrenic autoerotism and that which presented itself in paranoia as homosexuality - to be distinguished from a homosexual’s homosexuality - would have been in order. These elements should also be examined in light of the experience of one’s own identity, of otherness and of ‘reality’. Furthermore, one should consider more closely the mediating function of language.28

If this had occurred, the problematic of faith would have been approached in a manner also recognizable to the theologian. For him, God’s transcendence as well as the distinction between true faith and superstition are central themes. No matter how great one might imagine God to be, for the critically reflecting believer, he is not an object among objects. His existence is of a different nature than the existence of the fragments of worldly reality which sometimes tend to overpower mankind. The old-fashioned depiction of God abiding in his own sphere, as well as the facts that one should not attempt to make images of him, that his name is unspeakable and that his presence can only be conceived through a form of absence, point to the unique character of the ‘reality experience’ which constitutes the core of religious faith. The specific task of the theologian consists in keeping this experience as pure as possible or rather, in purifying it time and again despite the distortions which arise whenever the experience is transmitted. Along with this, the theologian endeavors to unravel the complex connections between the erroneous ways of the individual heart, which allows itself to be affected by the experience of

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28. If we do not consider this aspect more deeply, it is not to say that we fail to appreciate it. Quite the contrary! The pioneering work performed by J. Lacan and his school deserves praise. However, their fascination with the problematic of language, castration and the symbolic order sometimes had as a consequence that the primary Freudian question concerning the problematic of the libido and cathexis was suppressed (e.g. in the examination of "Schreber"). See e.g. J. LACAN, D’une question préliminaire à tout traitement possible de la psychose. In: Ecrits, p. 531-583
the absolute, and the established Churches which sometimes seem to place more importance in performing all sorts of social tasks rather than in tactfully transmitting religious wisdom. The problematic relationship between religion and sexuality, which he encountered in different forms throughout Church history, makes the theologian extremely curious as to what psychoanalysis might offer with regard to the various aspects of the ‘libido’ and their connection with several types of experiences of reality.

Not much of this problematic, which constituted the center of the Freud-Jung debate, penetrated into the psychology of religion. Some of the terminology was adopted along with some parts of the theory but, for the most part, the context from which these were taken was overlooked. We have already indicated this with regard to Freudian thought. However, the Jungian term ‘archetype’ was also used in order to hide the problem. Most often, the term was employed to indicate that, in quite a number of different cultures and religions, one found similar motifs and fantasies which were capable of speaking to different peoples. It was used in a merely descriptive manner. The underlying problematic of the distinction between delusion and reality, between the I and the other and between the eroticized experience of the ego and the adherence to the other, was no longer being discussed. Viewed in a scientifically critical manner, the use of the term ‘archetype’ only designated an ostensible explanation. It granted phenomena a name in the same way that Molière’s physician attempted to explain his patient’s sleeping by means of ‘vis dormitiva’.

Nevertheless, Jung’s thought contained an element which was lacking in Freudian thought. No matter how questionable it might appear on the level of theoretical explanation, Jungian thought nonetheless continued to focus on the complexity of the religious phenomenon. Thanks to historical research we are becoming more aware of the important role of gnosis in the emergence of Christianity. Upon reading such texts, we must admit that the Freudian perspective still needs to search for clues in order to understand this type of material. The transformation of the father and mother images into gods, goddesses, totem animals, angels or devils does not occur in gnosticism. Gnostic texts cannot be categorized as mere accounts in which one object is exchanged for another by displacement. Undoubtedly, typical motifs which a Freudian psychoanalysis would immediately recognize, especially bisexuality and androgyny, seem ubiquitous in the gnostic texts. However, the unique characteristic of these motifs is that several psychic functions are personified. Although Jung did not offer an explanation for this by means of his archetypes persona - anima - self, he must be given credit for describing a phenomenon which demanded further examination. Gnosis is just as captivating as the Jungian
thought which fascinates quite a number of people. The person who posits that such systems do not offer satisfactory theoretical explanations, still must clarify what causes these systems to be so captivating and what they bring about. This was what was at stake in the Freud-Jung debate regarding ‘theoria’ and reality.

The material amassed by Jung in his texts filled the void left by the research in the field of the psychology of religion, which was performed along the lines of Freudian thought. Although admittedly many questions remained unresolved in the latter’s perspective, the concepts which Freud and his followers employed were clearer, his diagnostic distinctions were sharper and his flow of thought was more systematic. Still, religion was often reduced. Yet it was not reduced due to the adopted theoretical framework. Rather, religion was reduced by the choice of material which was or was not recognized as religious. We have already mentioned how certain religions and spiritual traditions, together with their characteristic expressions, were overlooked. Furthermore, a sociological trend which departed from the true psychoanalytical perspective often took over and narrowed the scope of study to only immediately observable phenomena. Thus, one spoke of ‘referential figures’ instead of ‘identification figures’, ‘repression’ became ‘suppression’, ‘cathectic’ became ‘finding important’ and so forth. Along with this, the religious system, as it presented itself in the wake of the secularization process in the West, was quasi-automatically chosen as the objective definition of the phenomenon of religion. Freudian psychoanalysis did not reflect upon its own rootedness within the Western process of secularization. Religion and psychoanalysis were viewed as two separate matters. Only in a secondary reflection did the question arise as to what one discipline could say about the other. Even the libido theory itself was often reduced to the isolated domain of mere sexuality. Based on Freud’s Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, a psychological scheme of development was drawn up presenting pre-programmed stages leading to normalcy. Sexuality was no longer considered as a much embracing problem, but rather as an instinct which was to find its discharge according to the laws of Masters and Johnson.

The question regarding the complex connections between eroticism, the experience of reality and identity was simply discarded and forgotten in this development. To be forgotten is the worst reduction which psychology could inflict upon religion. Both the person who wants to deal with the problematic of religion on a fundamental level and from a psychological perspective, and the person who sets out to clarify the ultimate possibilities of the analytical treatment, have to resume the Freud-Jung debate where it stopped. But that would be the subject of another book!