Chapter VI

The Discovery of Mythology (1909-1911)

From the Journey to the United States until the Congress at Weimar

Up until their journey to the United States, the relationship between Freud and Jung had developed within the context of their common aspiration to disseminate and expand the theory and practice of psychoanalysis. However, along with several personal problems which had arisen, they had also encountered a number of misunderstandings on the theoretical level. Yet ultimately, all of this occurred within the fundamental awareness that both men were working towards the same goal. From this point on however, the situation changed and the divergences between them constantly came more clearly to the fore.

When surveying the period extended between their journey to the United States in September 1909 and their definitive break at the congress at Munich in September 1913, the following key moments can be distinguished. It was during this period that Jung discovered and enthusiastically explored the topic of mythology with the problem of incest at its core. Freud followed Jung’s progress on this topic with much interest. At the same time, Freud was attempting to nuance his own views on dementia praecox and paranoia using Schreber’s autobiography which he had become acquainted with through Jung. Both Jung and Freud published the results of their research in the first part of the Jahrbuch which appeared in August 1911. Jung’s contribution was the first part of his Transformations and Symbolisms of the Libido while Freud submitted Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning as well as Psycho-Analytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia, which dealt

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with his study of Schreber.

From all outward appearances, a climate of close cooperation still seemed to exist. Both authors congratulated each other and voiced their mutual agreement with the obtained conclusions. After the summer and the congress at Weimar (September 1911) however, the divergences between Freud and Jung became more strongly expressed. While Jung wrote the second part of _Transformations and Symbolisms of the Libido_, Freud started his _Totem and Taboo_, a work that slowly developed into a reply to Jung. Their greatest point of difference eventually revolved around Jung’s expanding of the notion of libido.

The Discovery of Mythology

Upon his return from the United States, Jung delved eagerly into the subject of mythology and the science of comparative religions. The trip had more than likely spurred his interest in this direction. Religious sensitivity and the supernatural in all forms had never been foreign to Jung. Moreover, Ferenczi, who had accompanied Freud on the trip, was equally fascinated by parapsychological phenomena. Upon returning to Vienna, he had even convinced Freud to go along on a visit to a medium in Berlin.²

Freud applauded Jung’s interest in mythology and symbolism and took an active part in the research himself. He was not as pleased with Jung’s fascination with parapsychology and occult phenomena. Yet, due to the fact that Ferenczi was also interested in such phenomena, he allowed himself to be partially convinced that it was a worthwhile enterprise to investigate these matters with the aid of psychoanalysis. Nevertheless, he could not completely put aside his reservations.³

While Ferenczi was primarily drawn to telepathy, Jung’s main interest lay with the study of mythology and religions. Freud gladly shared these interests. Indeed, applying the psychoanalytic theory to historical material was not new. The previous year, Riklin had published the work _Wunscherfüllung und Symbolik im Märchen_ in _Schriften zur angewandten Seelenkunde_, a series edited by Freud. In the same series, Abraham’s _Traum und Mythus_ and Rank’s _Der Mythus von der Geburt des Helden_ had recently appeared.

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². See _The Freud/Jung Letters_, footnote at 158F.
³. See 254J, 255F and 260F.
In October 1909, shortly after he had begun his research, Jung reported to Freud that, by using mythology, incest could be demonstrated as being the core complex of neurosis. Jung found a very telling example in the writings of Herodotus. Ares, who was raised outside of his native country, returned home in order to sleep with his mother. The attendants however, did not recognize him and he was refused access to the city. Ares gathered some supporters, overpowered the attendants and slept with his mother. The yearly commemoration of this myth saw the fight against the attendants ritually re-enacted with such vehemence that often many people were injured. Jung moreover encountered these same elements of incest, bloody fights and even self-chastisement which could go as far as castration, in the cults of Isis, Cybele, Atargatis and Hekate. Another element which Jung discovered, was that dying and resurrecting gods could always be interpreted in a phallic manner (Orpheus, Thammuz, Osiris, Adonis).

In reply to Jung’s enthusiastic statements, Freud wrote that much of what he had reported sounded surprisingly new. Freud was especially struck by the fact that myths portrayed a desire for the mother and that self-castration could be interpreted as the punishment for this desire. Two weeks later, Jung announced that he had encountered a very archaic feature in Greek mythology, namely, the existence of the dactyls and the cabeiri who should not be regarded as phallic gods but as gods of the elements. This had left Jung with the impression that only the great gods, who were the subjects of the epic myths, were phallic. The importance of this notion becomes clear when one considers the context into which Jung situated his research on mythology and which he explicitly

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4. The \textit{Freud/Jung Letters} mention in a rather cursory manner which books Jung read in this regard. Although the matter is not without importance, the references provided are incorrect. In fact, Jung read: TH. \textsc{INMAN}, \textit{Ancient Pagan and Modern Christian Symbolism Exposed and Explained}, (1st ed.: 1869), 2nd ed.: New York, 1874. F. \textsc{CREUZER}, \textit{Symbolik und Mythologie der alten Völker}, Leipzig, 1810-1812 (2nd ed.: 1819-1822; 3rd ed.: 1836-1843; reprint: New York, Arno Press, 1978, 6 vol). (According to Creuzer (1771-1858), the religions of the ancient world stemmed from an original, pure monotheism but popular belief forced them toward polytheism. The mystery cults managed to keep them in their purest form). \textsc{R. KNIGHT}, \textit{A Discourse on the Worship of Priapus and its Connection with the Mystic Theology of the Ancients}, London, 1768 (and not 1868). This book was written by the famous Richard Payne Knight (1750-1824). It caused such a scandal that the author endeavored to purchase all of the copies of his offending publication. See \textit{The Dictionary of National Biography}, Oxford University Press, vol. XI.

5. 162J.

6. See 163F.

7. 165J.
propounded here for the first time. According to Jung, the human psyche could only be understood in light of history. As in the case of anatomy, psychology must interpret ontogeny by means of phylogeny. Although it probably escaped Freud, the following was implied. Just as the phallic gods appeared at a later stage than the gods of the elements, sexuality also originated as a differentiation of a more archaic instinctual substratum. Further in the same letter, Jung rather abruptly asked whether Freud would be so kind as to provide a definition of the notion ‘libido’ since he himself had not been able to draw up a satisfactory definition of the concept. In conclusion, he wrote just as abruptly that he had developed a rather clear opinion on dementia praecox.

With these allusions, Jung indicated in an amazingly short period of time all the elements that would later comprise the core of Transformations and Symbolisms of the Libido, although these references can only be distinguished in retrospect. Freud was puzzled at Jung’s request. He replied that he had already clearly defined the libido in the first lines of Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality:

“The libido is the analogon to hunger, for which, in the sexual context, the German language has no word except the ambiguous ‘Lust’.”

He further inquired if Jung had also noticed that insights into the theories concerning infantile sexuality were a conditio sine qua non for the understanding of mythology. Jung responded by stating that undoubtedly, one could recognize traces of infantile sexual theories in mythology but, for him, the main concern still seemed to lay in the struggle with incest which prompted sexual repression "or is it the other way round?"

This last phrase, which announced the complete reversal of Jung’s thought process, went unnoticed by Freud. Moreover, the bulk of their correspondence at that time centred around a number of practical problems, especially the organization of the Nuremberg Congress scheduled for the end of March.

During the same period between October 1909 and the beginning of 1910, Freud zealously worked on his redaction of Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood. He had begun analysis of a patient who seemed to be the exact image of the great artist and scientist, at least as

8. 169F.
9. 170F.
10. See especially 158F, 160F, 166F, 179F, 185F.
far as his transformation of sexuality into a drive for knowledge was concerned.\textsuperscript{11} This analysis offered Freud the opportunity to study Da Vinci more closely. With regard to the content of his research however, we learn very little from his correspondence with Jung. Only on one occasion did Freud express the idea which he was developing in \textit{Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood}: the ultimate basis of the need for religion was to be found in the helplessness which every person experienced as a child. The repercussion of this experience entailed that, for the rest of their lives, people could no longer conceive of a world without parents. Man "makes for himself a just God and a kindly nature, the two worst anthropomorphic falsifications he could have imagined". Reflecting upon this, Freud deemed the insight to be "very banal". Moreover, "it was derived, incidentally, from the instinct of self-preservation, and not from the sexual instinct, which adds its spice later on."\textsuperscript{12}

In his reply, Jung did not comment upon this statement. When \textit{Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood} was published in early June 1910, he again did not react to the passage in the article where Freud expressed this idea.\textsuperscript{13}

At the end of January 1910, Jung delivered a lecture on symbolism.\textsuperscript{14} In his report to Freud, he claimed that he had attempted to prove that an individual’s fantasy primarily reflected his inner conflicts but that the forms which were employed, were typically mythical. Freud congratulated him on this insight because it signaled, for him, that Jung had clearly abandoned his view of the symbol as a form of ‘vague thinking’ and was pursuing Freud’s line of thought. This line of thought led in the direction of the ‘archaic repressive’ which both men hoped to disclose by means of mythology and the development of language.\textsuperscript{15}

Thus, the various elements in their correspondence which we have touched upon until now, reveal that both authors were preoccupied with the issue of ‘religion’. Since Freud and Jung, for the most part, were

\textsuperscript{11} 158F.
\textsuperscript{12} 171F.
\textsuperscript{13} 198J.
\textsuperscript{14} 175F.
\textsuperscript{15} "Your deepened view of symbolism has all my sympathy. Perhaps you remember how dissatisfied I was when in agreement with Bleuler all you had to say of symbolism was that it was a kind of ‘unclear thinking’. True, what you write about it now is only a hint, but in a direction where I too am searching, namely, archaic regression, which I hope to master through mythology and the development of language. It would be wonderful if you could do a piece on the subject for the Jahrbuch." 177F.
dealing with organizational arrangements, their correspondence did not allow for a systematic discussion or exposition on the topic. The issue of religion became very concrete however when Freud suggested that the psychoanalysts as a group join the ‘International Order for Ethics and Culture’.16

The ‘International Order for Ethics and Culture’ was founded in 1908 at Frankfurt-am-Main with the aspiration of becoming an influential organization which would counter ‘obscurantistic and reactionary forces’ in society and which would defend a socialist ethics based on science in opposition to the classical order.17 On a practical level, the organization considered its purpose to be the moral and financial support of progressive trends, the dissemination of public statements on the occasion of important events and the education of young people by means of youth movements. Freud was drawn to the association because of its aggressive yet practical goals and he suggested that the psychoanalysts join as a group.18

Jung was not very pleased with this proposition and did not exactly hide his discontentment over what, for him, seemed to be a laicized form of religion.19 His main reproach was that an order which attempted to appeal to mankind only through reason lacked the deep, instinctual and mythical power which was operative in religion. Further, the movement, just as any ‘interest group’ ran the danger of bleeding to death within ten years:20

"Religion can be replaced only by religion. Is there perchance a new saviour in the International Order? What sort of new myth does it hand out for us to live by? Only the wise are ethical from sheer intellectual presumption, the rest of us need the eternal truth of myth.... An ethical fraternity, with its mythical Nothing, not infused by any archaic-infantile driving force, is a pure vacuum..."

However, Jung did not dispute the need for addressing the ethical issue of sexual freedom which was one of the movement’s concerns. He reflected that he himself was uncertain as to which side the scale between the Dionysian and the Apollonian aspects would best tilt. Sometimes, it

16. 174F.
18. It was stipulated that both individuals and groups could join.
19. 178J. The Order did have some traits of a pseudo-Church. The members accepted their proper jurisdiction within the order and the meetings were held with a certain ritual which was revealed only to members.
20. 178J.
seemed that it would be worthwhile to reinstate some of the ‘old cultural stupidities’, such as monasteries. Yet on the other hand, he viewed religion as not necessarily in opposition to sexuality. The enmity of religion toward sexuality, often encountered in history, evolved more as a deterioration of authentic religion. Thus a historically based need for ascesis which survived its time and which went beyond its purpose ultimately turned religion into a ‘Misery Institute’. Instead of joining a certain combative ethical movement as a group, Jung preferred to await the slow infiltration of psychoanalysis into society, starting from different centers. When this occurred, the sense of eros would also be rediscovered in Christianity.\textsuperscript{21}

"Yet what infinite rapture and wantonness lie dormant in our religion, waiting to be led back to their true destination! A genuine and proper ethical development cannot abandon Christianity but must grow up within it, must bring to fruition its hymn of love, the agony and ecstasy over the dying and resurgent god, the mystic power of the wine, the awesome anthropophagy of the Last Supper - only \textit{this} ethical development can serve the vital forces of religion."

To this presentation of affairs, Freud coolly replied that he did not intend to replace religion by anything else. "This need must be sublimated."\textsuperscript{22}

Shortly thereafter, on March 30 and 31 1910, the Congress of Nuremberg took place, during which the International Society for Psychoanalysis was officially founded. Jung was elected as president. In the meantime, Freud abandoned his plan to join the International Order for Ethics and Culture as a group.\textsuperscript{23} Following the congress, Freud and Jung spent a day together in Rothenburg where Jung introduced Freud to Schreber’s book \textit{Memoirs of my Nervous Illness}.\textsuperscript{24}

Freud was immediately fascinated with Schreber’s case. From that time on, his correspondence with Jung was frequently interspersed with Schreber’s bizarre expressions which Jung had pointed out to him.\textsuperscript{25}

\textsuperscript{21} 178J.
\textsuperscript{22} 179F.
\textsuperscript{23} A short statement was published in the \textit{Zentralblatt für Psychoanalyse}, Bd 1, nr. 3 (December 1910) announcing the possibility of joining as an individual.
\textsuperscript{25} See among other letters: 186J, 187F, 197F.
Freud however only read the book during the following summer.

By now, Jung’s interest led him to the study of Christian symbolism and of the relationship between early Christianity and the Mithras cult. Gradually, Jung came to understand that the core complex of the human psyche consisted in a profound disturbance between satisfying the libido and procreation due to the prohibition of incest. The astral religions which have the solar cycle as their central theme, poignantly expressed this problem. Just as the sun rose again after the winter season, so did mankind become fertile in spite of the prohibition of incest (and its influence on the libido).\(^{26}\)

Unfortunately, the text of the first redaction of *Transformations and Symbolisms of the Libido*, in which Jung initially attempted to formulate his insights with regard to religion, has been lost. In June 1910, Jung had sent this text to Freud, who commented upon it at length.\(^{27}\) Freud’s reply has been preserved but since the text he was referring to is no longer extant, his comments are difficult to place. However, it becomes apparent that even in this first redaction of *Transformations and Symbolisms of the Libido*, Jung employed the fantasies of Miss Miller, which would later be the guideline of the definitive version. On the theoretical level, Freud directed his criticism specifically at Jung’s expression that "sexuality destroys itself". Jung’s next letter allows a reconstruction of the discussion with regard to this point.\(^{28}\)

Jung had been particularly struck by certain images which represented various sexual symbols as being in conflict with each other. With regard to this, the key representation of the Mithras cult had especially amazed him. Mithras was depicted as sacrificing a bull. In the same presentation, a snake and a dog appeared as leaping at the wound inflicted by the sacrificial knife. Jung interpreted this as the expression of a conflict intrinsic to the sexual drive itself. The Mithras representation, just as the representation of Christ’s death on the cross, signified a sacrifice that took place both voluntarily and involuntarily.

According to Jung’s line of thought, this conflict within sexuality could only be rooted in one event: the prohibition of incest. Because of

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26. “The ‘nuclear complex’ seems to be the profound disturbance - caused by the incest prohibition - between libidinal gratification and propagation. The astral myth can be solved in accordance with the rules of dream interpretation: Just as the sun mounts higher and higher after the winter, so will you attain to fruitfulness in spite of the incest barrier (and its odious effects on your libido).” 196J.

27. 199aF.

28. *Id.*
the prohibition, the libido was cut off from the shortest and easiest route
to gratification. Consequently, the libido as such was repressed and quite
a bit of effort was needed in order to later retrieve it from this state of
repression and to make fertility possible. With regard to this process, the
religious representation of Christ and Mithras for example, portrayed a
hero who voluntarily fulfilled the demands made by the prohibition of
incest. They denied themselves an immediate sexual gratification. The
believer could then identify with this mythic example which aided him in
his struggle with his own drives. Due to this denial of direct gratification,
culture emerged.

The part of the letter in which Jung expressed these thoughts was
very concise. The original text, which Freud had read, may have been
more lucid. The text of the letter was also very ambiguous with regard to
one point in particular. Jung wrote:29

"There must be something very typical in the fact that the symbol of
fecundity, the useful and generally accepted (not censured) alter ego of
Mithras (the bull) is slain by another sexual symbol. The self-sacrifice is
voluntarily and involuntarily at once (the same conflict as in the death of
Christ) ... What it boils down to is a conflict at the heart of sexuality itself.
The only possible reason for this conflict seems to be the incest prohibition
which struck at the root of primitive sexuality. You could also say: the
incest prohibition blocks the nearest and most convenient outlet for the
libido and makes it altogether bad. Somehow the libido has to free itself
from this repression since it must reach its propagative goal ... This
conflict must have been deadly serious ... Hence the imperative need for
the prototype of a hero who understands how to accomplish of his own
free will what the repression is after - namely, temporary or permanent
renunciation of fruitfulness, ... in order to realize the ethical ideal of the
subjugation of instinct."

The ambiguity lay in situating the prohibition of incest. While Jung
stated that this prohibition formed the basis of the conflict within sexual-
ity, the examples he presented illustrated that the prohibition was not
imposed from the outside but was the expression of an antinomy which
could be intrinsic to the sexual drive itself.

Upon analyzing the Mithras representation, Jung expounded that the
religious representation of the hero who voluntarily sacrificed his libido
was intended to help people in voluntarily fulfilling the demands of re-
pression. The primary conflict was situated not so much between Mithras

29. 200J.
and the bull. Rather, it took place between the bull and the snake (or the
dog), thus between two aspects of the libido. Jung offered yet another
example along the same lines. The raven was often encountered as a
symbol in Mithraism. It was the messenger of the gods which informed
Mithras of the sacrifice demanded of him. According to Jung, this bird
could also be interpreted as the ‘force compelling one toward culture’,
which was apparently intrinsic to sexuality itself.

In any case, in *Transformations and Symbolisms of the Libido*, Jung
reduced the prohibition of incest to the symbolic expression of the inner
divergence within the sexual drive. Most likely, this notion influenced
what he wrote to Freud. The appearance of the term ‘archaic sexuality’,
which in his conflict with Freud became the polemic concept *par excel-

cence*, points in this direction.

The idea of ‘a sexuality which destroys itself’ greatly distressed
Freud. He indicated to Jung that it was superfluous to search for connec-
tions between the various sexual symbols. All the symbols involved were
merely an accumulation of images concerning the concept of castration.
If it were left up to him, Freud would remain with the theory that the
Mithras image was a mythological projection of repression. The sub-
limated part of man (the conscious ego: Mithras) sacrificed his drive (the
bull).  

Jung was not convinced that his opinion was so farfetched. He
thanked Freud for his criticism and revised his text accordingly. The first
part of the text was published more than a year later, in August 1911.
During that same period, Freud continued writing his *Formulations on the
Two Principles of Mental Functioning* which he had begun a few days
before he received the first redaction of Jung’s *Transformations and Sym-
bolisms of the Libido*. He hoped that Jung would not consider the work
plagiarism. However, Freud’s main efforts were channelled toward his
work on ‘Schreber’. The issues raised in *Transformations and Symbolisms
of the Libido* were hardly discussed in the correspondence between Jung
and Freud during this time. They merely made mention of the themes of
Jung’s research. Jung’s assumption, that Miss Miller’s fantasies in fact
represented a salvation mystery, was confirmed. Jung also discovered
a Priapus image which portrayed the god as laughingly pointing to a snake
biting his penis. He interpreted this as a confirmation of the inner conflict

30. 199aF.
31. 199F.
32. 213J.
within the libido. In passing, a few other remarks were made which nevertheless had enormous implications. Thus, in March 1911, concerning his break with Adler, Freud wrote that Adler had accused him of employing circular reasoning: "Where does repression originate? In culture. Where does culture originate? In repression." Freud simply remarked that he found Adler’s criticism to be a tasteless play on words since he could not see a contradiction if the concept was formulated in the following manner. The individual repeats the same process of repression which his ancestors endured and the residue of which could still be found in culture. In passing, Freud also asked Jung if the following definition of the symbol would be of any use to him:

"Can you do anything with this formula: the symbol is an unconscious substitute for a conscious concept; symbol formation is the initial stage of concept formation, just as repression is the forerunner of judgment."

Jung replied that he had some difficulties with the definition. How could one, in light of such a definition, explain the fact that the symbol was sometimes employed, substituting more vague notions for unequivocal notions, in order to serve repression? When an Indian myth explained the origin of first man by using the images from the art of weaving (the warp and the woof for example, derived from the loom), it did not imply the construction of a new notion. On the contrary, something already known (to the listener) was given new meaning. A certain libidinous cathexis was transferred to series of intellectual parallels.

In August 1911, the volume of the Jahrbuch containing Freud’s Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning as well as his ‘Schreber’ and the first part of Jung’s Transformations and Symbolisms of the Libido was published. In the same letter in which Freud thanked Jung for the recent issue of the Jahrbuch and in which he stated his eagerness to read Jung’s text, he also announced that, for some time, he had been active in certain research which Jung would find surprising. Without telling Jung, Freud was alluding to the fact that he had started writing Totem and Taboo.

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33. 215J.
34. 240F.
35. 241F.
36. 243J.
Fantasy and Insanity

The psychiatric problematic had not completely slipped to the background in the correspondence between Jung and Freud. The issues of Schreber and paranoia certainly formed the core of this problematic while the different ways in which both authors viewed the problem had already become clear in their correspondence following Freud’s publication of Notes upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis (hereafter referred to as ‘Ratman’). This grave case of obsessional neurosis had, among other things, revealed to Freud the importance of the sadistic components of the libido.

Jung was particularly struck by the insight that obsessive thoughts were substituted for actions in a repressive manner. He immediately found a parallel in dementia praecox where thoughts replaced reality also in a repressive manner. The context in which Jung situated this insight became evident in his reflection on the sadistic components which Freud had interpreted as constitutional elements of the libido. Jung had great difficulty accepting Freud’s interpretation because, according to him, the libido in essence was more closely related to masochism than to sadism. This led him to synthesize his thoughts on neurosis as follows:

"I don’t like the idea of sadism being constitutional. I think of it rather as a reactive phenomenon, since for me the constitutional basis of the neuroses is the imbalance between libido and resistance (self-assertion). If, at the start, the libido displayed too strong an attraction or need for love, hate would soon appear by way of compensation, and would subtract a good deal of the work of gratification from the masochistic libido (which by nature is much more nearly akin to masochism than to sadism). I think this is the basis for the immense self-assertion that appears later on in obsessional neurosis: the patient is always afraid of losing his ego, must take revenge for every act of love, and gives up the sexually destructive obsessional system only with the greatest reluctance. Obsessional neurosis never gets lost in actions and adventures as in the case of hysteria, where ego-loss is a temporary necessity. Obviously the self-assertion in obsessional neurosis is far exceeded in Dementia praecox."

Jung misunderstood the notion ‘libido’ in the same way that he misunderstood autoeroticism as we have earlier indicated. According to him,

38. 168J.
39. 168J.
the libido designated an orientation toward a real object in the outside world. In his text, the core of every neurotic conflict was defined as a disproportion between ‘libido’ and ‘resistance’ or ‘self-affirmation’ (Resistenz). Viewed in this context, masochism stood closer to the essence of the libido while sadism was the reaction of self-affirmation which feared losing itself in the objects. The constitutional basis of neuroses could then be specified as follows. Where the libido was predominant, hysteria would originate; where self-affirmation dominated, the ego would encapsulate itself against the outside world in a limited degree in cases of obsessional neurosis or more profoundly in instances of dementia praecox.

By way of concluding, Jung remarked that the quest for a specific sexual constitution for every psychic disorder appeared to him to be extremely difficult. Thus, for the present, he found it much easier to maintain the solution of posing a specific oversensitivity as the general basis of neuroses while viewing other, more abnormal conditions as reaction phenomena.40

To this, Freud replied that the constitutional character of sadism could hardly be questioned since biology sufficiently proved it to be an original component of the sexual drive.41 Concerning the issue of a disposition toward neurosis, he completely agreed with the hypothesis that neurosis essentially involved a conflict between the ego and the libido. While Adler and Jung researched the topic starting primarily from the ego, Freud preferred to approach the matter from the aspect of the libido. He did admit that he had not yet sufficiently studied the ego. Freud himself regretted this since, in instances of obsessional neurosis as in cases of dementia praecox, it was precisely the reactions formed by the ego that drew attention. Yet what really fascinated him was the way in which the libido, in a concealed manner, again made its influence felt precisely in the defence mechanism.

Although in this letter, Freud conceded that until then he had paid too little attention to the ego, he reproached Jung for his inclination to follow Adler. He also accused Jung of using his unfamiliarity with the ego as an excuse to do injustice to the libido theory.42 Freud did not delve into Jung’s concern for the relationship between the ego and the libido or,

40. 168J.
41. 169F. As in Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, Freud interpreted sadism as a form of aggression. Later on, he related sadism to the death drive (unfortunately translated as ‘death instinct’ in the S.E.) in a way very similar to the position Jung defended here.
42. 169F.
more precisely, for the question whether a too strongly developed libidinous object relation could eventually threaten the ego. In any case, this announced the problematic issue which Freud would later develop in the direction of narcissism and Jung, toward the introversion-extroversion polarity. It is therefore regretful that we no longer have Freud’s answer to the letter in which Jung dealt with his discovery of the surprisingly frequent presence of homosexuality.\textsuperscript{43}

The analysis of Schreber led Freud to establish a connection between neuropsychotic symptoms and the formation of myths. As early as October 1910, Freud shared the main lines of his interpretation with Jung without yet speaking of the theoretical considerations which he would later link with it.\textsuperscript{44} The text was completed in December 1910.\textsuperscript{45} In their correspondence, the issue was not discussed any further. Shortly before the issue of the \textit{Jahrbuch} containing ‘Schreber’, \textit{Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning} and \textit{Transformations and Symbolisms of the Libido} appeared, Jung offered some remarks on dementia praecox which foreshadowed the second part of \textit{Transformations and Symbolisms of the Libido}. He spoke of how he had slowly come to the conviction that all cases of dementia praecox were characterized by an inner fantasy world which originated due to the libido introversion. In the paranoid form of dementia praecox, this interior world suddenly broke into the outside world in a distorted manner, as was the case with Schreber. Jung further had the impression that the libido introversion not only attained the level of infantile material as was the case in hysteria, but reached much deeper, into the historical layers of the unconscious.

\textit{The Essential Publications}

The dialogue then taking place between Jung and Freud found its literary expression in their separate publications in the first part of the 1911 issue of the \textit{Jahrbuch} which appeared in August that year. Three topics were discussed: the sense of reality and its disappearance, religion and dementia praecox.

We will discuss these publications by comparing them according to themes. But first of all, we would like to briefly present them as they individually appeared. In \textit{Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{43} 180J.
  \item \textsuperscript{44} 218J.
  \item \textsuperscript{45} 225F.
\end{itemize}
Functioning, Freud further developed the representation of the psychic apparatus which he had already introduced in The Interpretation of Dreams. He now raised the question concerning the relationship between this mechanism and exterior reality. The fact that this interrelationship could more or less disappear, demonstrated that it was not self-evident. Upon closer analysis, Freud attempted to outline the transformations of the psychic apparatus which accompanied such an acknowledgment of reality. Freud’s ‘Schreber’ examined Daniel Paul Schreber’s book, entitled Memoirs of my Nervous Illness, in which he autobiographically recounted the delusion he developed during a certain period of his mental illness. In line with the divine plan of salvation, Schreber was to be changed into a woman, impregnated by God and to give birth to a new race of people. In his discussion of Schreber’s book, Freud analyzed the delusion and briefly mentioned the topic of religion - though a lot less than might be expected. He also explained the theoretical model by which he had tried to comprehend dementia praecox and paranoia as well as the distinction between them.

Just as ‘Schreber’, Jung’s Transformations and Symbolisms of the Libido was designed as a commentary on certain autobiographical material. In this work, Jung discussed the fantasies and poems of Miss Miller, an American patient of Theodor Flournoy, who herself had recorded the circumstances in which these fantasies arose and had thus attempted to gain some sort of autoanalytical insight into them. The first part of Transformations and Symbolisms of the Libido discussed two of Miss Miller’s poems: the ‘Hymn to the Creator’ and the ‘Song of the Moth’. The discussion of this material was preceded by a theoretical passage concerning two kinds of thinking, intentional and fantastic, which formed a counterbalance to Freud’s Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning.

The Sense for Reality

Freud’s Belief in the Opposition between Pleasure and Reality

Before Freud, Pierre Janet had already recognized the loss of a sense for reality as an important characteristic of neurosis. Instances of dementia praecox in which patients lost all interest for what occurred outside of them proved even more clearly that a sense for reality was not all that self-evident. In Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning, Freud raised the question as to which psychic structures this sense for reality relied upon and how these structures came into being.
In *The Interpretation of Dreams*, Freud had described the human psyche as a closed system exclusively directed at finding an outlet for feelings of discomfort caused by periodical tensions which in turn were due to organic needs. In *Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning*, Freud’s point of departure was the same. The human psyche fundamentally operated according to the principle of lust or aversion and in its original condition, it did not take into account the objective reality outside of the subject. When desires were not satisfied, they were projected onto reality as a hallucination by means of a reversed operation of the psychic apparatus. Remnants of this archaic mode of functioning could still be found in the dreams of adults.

This hallucinatory attempt at gratification was of course destined to fail. Man was necessarily compelled to submit himself to the ‘principle of reality’. Because man was forced to change reality if he wanted to obtain realistic gratification, the human psyche could deploy a number of functions in order to alter reality. One of these functions was the mind which, according to Freud, originated in the fact that the psyche was not able to take only representations into account but also the connections between these representations. Thanks to its attachments to the remnants of words, thinking evolved into conscious thinking.46

As with other psychic functions which emerged due to the reality principle, the purpose of the mind consisted in the ability to control reality and thus to ensure oneself of a lasting satisfaction. Freud defined thinking as experimental acting in miniature. Smaller affective investments were at stake and a smaller outlet for frustrated feelings was needed. Man apparently did not succeed in making his psychic system operate completely according to the reality principle. Alongside the act of thinking, we can distinguish the act of fantasizing as a type of thinking which, while it connected representations with each other, did not submit itself to the reality principle. It sought immediate fulfilment in the pure representation of what was pleasant.47

Besides this, Freud also pointed out that the ego, on the one hand, and the libido, on the other hand, separately underwent the installation process of the reality principle. While the ego submitted to this principle relatively quickly, the libido did not because in its initial stage, it was autoerotic. This fact entailed that reality was far less obstructive in the

search for fulfilment. Next, a period of latency set in which delayed the
urge toward fulfilment for quite some time. Only after that was the object
of the libido chosen. The libido thus came under the influence of the
reality principle at a much later stage than the ego drives. Since both
fantasy and the libido were controlled by the pleasure principle, they
easily combined with each other. In fantasy, erotic themes were primarily
involved. Freud indicated that although their connection could grow very
strong, genetically it was only of secondary importance.\(^{48}\)

In essence, Freud’s view can be summarized as follows. Since the
pleasure principle alone did not suffice to obtain gratification, man ac-
cepted the reality principle as ultimately being in service of the former
principle. The thought process was one of the functions prompted into
existence because of this. Yet it did not occur without difficulty since
fantasy arose at the same time, as a form of thinking which was not
willing to submit itself to the reality principle. In a second stage, fantasy
bound itself to the libido which, like fantasy yet contrary to the ego
drives, did not easily submit itself to the reality principle. The question as
to what exactly should be understood by ego drives was not touched upon
by Freud in this text.

*Jung’s Belief in the Real Efficiency of Symbolism.*

The chapter in Jung’s *Transformations and Symbolisms of the Libido*
entitled ‘Two Ways of Thinking’ departed from a position of opposition
between intentional thinking and fantasy in such a way that, at first sight,
it appeared to repeat Freud’s distinction between the principles of pleasure
and reality. Jung defined intentional thinking as logical thinking directed
toward the reality outside of the subject. Intentional thinking operated
through words and was structured as dialogue. In opposition to this,
fantasy was an easier form of thinking which spontaneously arose when
one gave up the more demanding process of intentional thinking. Linguis-
tic structures and the meaningfulness of words faded so as to make room
for a sort of automatic game of images and feelings while attention for
reality gave way to wishful thinking. The difference between Jung and
Freud concerning this issue consisted in the fact that Jung situated fan-
tastic thinking at the origin of intentional thinking. Jung had encountered
the former way of thinking in history, namely, in mythology which he
rather broadly viewed as continuing until the end of antiquity. He also

encountered fantastic thinking in children. Jung therefore concluded that these fantastic thought processes formed the archaic groundwork of intentional thinking both from the phylogenetic and the ontogenetic point of view. That was why it reappeared as a phenomenon of regression as soon as intentional thinking was given up and one sought the fulfilment of fantasy and dreams.

Jung himself synthesized his view as follows.\(^49\)

"..., we saw that phantastic thinking is a characteristic of antiquity, of the child, and of lower races; but now we know also that our modern and adult man is given over in large part to the same phantastic thinking, which enters as soon as the directed thinking ceases. A lessening of the interest, a slight fatigue, is sufficient to put an end to the directed thinking, the exact adaptation to the real world, and to replace it with fantasies."

Thus fantastic thought revealed the archaic layer of the human psyche. Jung did not see it merely as a relic. Rather, he considered it to be the substratum of a more developed form of thinking. He further specified the role of fantastic thinking as follows. It allowed the expression of wishes which could no longer or not yet be consciously acknowledged.\(^50\)

"This rule can be applied generally to mythical tradition. It does not set forth any account of the old events, but rather acts in such a way that it always reveals a thought common in humanity, and once more rejuvenated."

Elsewhere, he wrote.\(^51\)

"The conscious fantasies tell us of mythical or other material of undeveloped or no longer recognised wish tendencies in the soul."

The words ‘not yet’ in this quotation lead us away from Freud and open up a perspective on the Romantic concept of the unconscious which Jung, with explicit references to Fichte and Schelling, put forward here.\(^52\)

For Freud as well as for Jung, fantasy contained an archaism. The direct adaptation to reality was abandoned and regressive tendencies were allowed. Yet, in explaining this on a psychological level, they chose to go in different directions.

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50. Ibid., p. 20, In: Jahrbuch 3 (1911), p. 150 (italics from the original).
51. Ibid., p. 20; in: Jahrbuch 3 (1911), p. 151 (italics from the original).
52. Ibid., p. 273 (=note 37 on p. 19); in: Jahrbuch 3 (1911), p. 148.
The archaic element in fantasy, according to Freud, was the element of pleasure, not that of thinking. Insofar as fantasy was a thought process (an ordered row of representations which performed experimental actions at a low level of energy), it originated at the source of the intentional thought process, namely, in the reality principle. In abstract, the following processes could be distinguished. First, there was the mere pleasure principle which sought a substitute for missed occasions of actual gratification through the phenomenon of hallucination (and thus not in fantasy). When this attempt failed, thinking developed under the imperative of the reality principle. Nevertheless, a portion of the emerging thought process remained governed by the pleasure principle. That was fantasy. In order to explain this, Freud simply put forward the principle of the least effort. The psyche disliked abandoning its old sources of lust in order to find new ones. 53

In Freud’s view therefore, thinking and fantasy were considered as parallel phenomena. The former did not originate in the latter. Rather, both found their origin in the cooperation of two equal factors: the pleasure principle as the inner law of the psyche and the reality principle which, as an intervention from the outside, denied gratification.

Jung’s reasoning was quite different. From the fact that fantasy arose as soon as intentional thinking stopped and that it clearly contained archaic traits, Jung automatically concluded that fantasy was a lower form from which intentional thinking emerged through an evolutionary process. He clearly employed the Romantic-evolutionist scheme in which every dynamic was located in the interior of the organism. Freud, on the contrary, situated the dynamic principle in an intervention coming from outside of the organism, namely, from reality. He viewed reality as that which could be observed by the human senses in an unequivocal manner.

The distinction between Jung’s and Freud’s conceptual framework influenced their further development of the matter. Jung set out to discover the moment in history when this mutation of fantastic into intentional thinking occurred. He discovered it in the use of Scholasticism during the Middle Ages and more specifically, in its (at first sight) rather sterile discussions. One discussed for example the question whether Christ would have been able to complete the work of salvation had he come to the world in the form of a pea. According to Jung, these discussions were considered ‘dialectic gymnastics’ by which the spoken symbol, the word,

53. S. Freud, Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning, S.E. XII, p. 222, G.W. VIII, p. 234.
received a direct, absolute meaning and ultimately attained the substance which the *logos*, even at the end of antiquity, could only temporarily attain in myths. Scholasticism’s greatest contribution was the establishment of a highly intellectual sublimation which formed the *conditio sine qua non* for the development of science and technology.\(^{54}\)

Both Freud and Jung had noticed that the content of fantasies was often of an erotic nature. Freud had explained this fact by a secondary connection between fantasy and the libido both of which escaped, for the greater part, the reign of the reality principle. Jung, however, considered this connection between fantasy and libido to be intrinsic. Later, in the second part of *Transformations and Symbolisms of the Libido*, he used an evolutionist framework to outline how fantasy emerged from sexuality, which he called the ‘primordial libido’. In the first part of the work, Jung anticipated this view by stating that it was not surprising that sexuality was so often involved in fantasies since, in mythological thinking, it was so prominent.\(^{55}\) In Jung’s view, it was precisely myths and religions which were the instruments used in the development from instincts to culture.

**Religion and Projection**

*Freud: Religion Belongs to the Past*

One of the phenomena which continuously obstructed the psychoanalytical practice was the possibility of negative influence of moral and religious concepts as well as social relationships on the health of the human psyche. The temptation to think that without these cultural factors life would be much better and that a ‘return to nature’ would solve many problems, was at times very great.

From the very beginning, Freud viewed culture as a repressive factor and the libido as a repressed nature.\(^{56}\) This did not imply that Freud simply viewed culture as ‘one great farce’, as Jung wrote in his autobio-

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54. “Its whole nature lies in dialectic gymnastics which have raised the symbol of speech, the word, to an almost absolute meaning, so that it finally attained to that substantiality which expiring antiquity could lend to its *logos* only temporarily, through attributes of mystical salvation. The great work of scholasticism, however, appears to be the foundation of a firmly knitted intellectual sublimation, the *conditio sine qua non* of the modern scientific and technical spirit.” C.G. JUNG, *Transformations and Symbolisms of the Libido*, Eng. transl. (*Psychology of the Unconscious*), p. 12; in: *Jahrbuch* 3 (1911), p. 138.


56. The following should be kept in mind. During this period, the theory of identification with all its implications was not yet present in Freud’s thinking.
graphy. The main idea of *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality*, that normalcy was situated between perversion and neurosis, and the introduction of the reality principle in *Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning* pointed to the necessity of a healthy psyche in order to reconcile the pleasure principle with the acknowledgment of reality.

Freud thus deemed a certain degree of renunciation of direct gratification of one’s urges to be imperative. It was in this context that Freud, and also Jung, situated religion. In the already discussed article entitled *Obsessive Actions and Religious Practices*, Freud expounded that religion contributed in allowing mankind to renounce a direct fulfilment of constitutionally inherent drives. Socially damaging inclinations as well as the execution of revenge were entrusted to the gods. Along the same lines, Freud wrote in *Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning* that myths and religions were the articulation of the intrapsychic impressions made by the substitution of the reality principle for the pleasure principle. In a consequent manner, myths and religions attempted to dissuade mankind from every experience of pleasure by their central theme of reward in the life hereafter. According to Freud, however, this attempt failed and the pleasure principle could only be conquered by science which offered both intellectual desire and practical usefulness. Freud thus came to the following affirmation:

"The doctrine of reward in the after-life for the - voluntary or enforced - renunciation of earthly pleasures is nothing other than a mythical projection of this revolution in the mind. Following consistently along these lines, religions have been able to effect absolute renunciation of pleasure in this life by means of a compensation in a future existence; but they have not by this means achieved a conquest of the pleasure principle. It is science which comes nearest to succeeding in that conquest; science too, however, offers intellectual pleasure during its work and promises practical gain in the end."

This left many questions unanswered, especially concerning the dynamic and the efficiency of this projection, into which Freud did not delve. We learn more concerning this topic in his analysis of Schreber.

As far as religion was concerned, the central theme of this analysis was the reversal of a persecution complex (which had caused Schreber to

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view his physician, Flechsig, as trying to sexually abuse him) into megalomania. Schreber perceived himself as chosen by God to save mankind. He was therefore to be slowly changed into a woman. At the end of time, God would impregnate him and he would give birth to a new human race.

The greater part of Freud’s ‘Schreber’ was dedicated to an analysis of the content of both delusions. Freud proved that in the persecution complex as well as in the religious megalomania, homosexual desires formed the key theme. According to Freud, the homosexual elements in Schreber’s sexuality had, for some reason, been disturbed to such an extent that the homosexual (feminine) constitution, which had previously characterized Schreber’s relationship with his father, had once again come to the fore. In an initial stage, the father figure was transferred to Flechsig who, as a physician, fit this role very well since Schreber’s father had been a physician. Schreber consequently defended himself against these homosexual tendencies by means of a persecution complex. It was Flechsig and not Schreber himself, who wanted to enter into a homosexual relationship. Schreber had to continuously defend himself against this sexual aggression.

The religious megalomania formed a second phase of the defence against these same homosexual desires. An analysis of Schreber’s concept of God left no room for doubt that, when describing God’s characteristics, Schreber had his father in mind. In his relationship with this God, Schreber developed the ambivalent feelings of love and hatred which characterize every relation between a father and child. For Schreber, God was not only the object of worship but also the object of derision. He was a God who apparently did not know how to deal with people and who therefore could only offer happiness to depersonalized corpses. God’s power was limited. His mere existence was threatened when one felt extremely angry since the divine nerves, which were entwined with the human nerves, could no longer disentangle themselves from their grip.

These were the main lines of Freud’s analysis of the two delusions. Freud noted, however, that the analysis of the contents of a delusion did not necessarily explain the mechanism which aroused the delusion. Sexual wishes and fantasies relating to one’s father could be encountered in people who were not suffering from paranoia. A conceptual interpretation of symptoms did not answer the question of why wishes, whose existence had been revealed, expressed themselves in a paranoid form.  

In light of Freud’s previous writings, one would expect a discussion on projection and one is inclined to think that Freud would now apply the notion of projection, which he had earlier described as the defence mechanism of paranoia, to the phenomena of religion. Schreber’s religious delusion seemed to be cut out for Freud to further develop the ideas which he had summarily posited in *Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood*. This idea stated that the god was nothing but an enlarged father, the product of every person’s infantile need for security. Even as an adult, one could not forego an almighty, just God and a trustworthy, sheltering mother earth.\(^\text{61}\)

Freud did not fulfil these expectations. Not only did he not mention the origin of religion in his analysis of Schreber, he explicitly revoked the theory that projection was the typical defence mechanism of paranoia, which he had earlier defended in *Further Remarks on the Neuro-Psychose of Defence*. In opposition to what he had stated there, Freud now affirmed that projection was only influential in the formation of symptoms. The real mechanism of defence, which had to be clearly distinguished from the symptom formation process, consisted of the decathexis of the object.\(^\text{62}\)

When discussing projection, Freud seemed to be more hesitant than ever. After pointing out certain difficulties concerning the notion, he explicitly stated that he did not intend to deal exhaustively with the topic in the Schreber analysis but that he would devote a separate article to the problem. That article, however, which was to be part of Freud’s series on metapsychology, was never published.\(^\text{63}\) Nevertheless, from the sundry reflections which Freud could not resist making, we can gather some perspective on his opinion.

In anticipation of what we will later discuss more elaborately, we can posit that Freud perceived projection as the mechanism which exercised its proper function in the constitution of every subjectivity and which seemed to be intrinsically connected to narcissism. That projection was so conspicuous, especially as a symptom of paranoia, was a consequence of the fact that the libido, which had detached itself from the object due to the process of repression, had regressed toward narcissism.


\(^{63}\) See the editor’s introduction to Freuds *Papers on Metapsychology*, S.E. XIV, p. 106.
The symptom formation which was the reappearance of the repressed content and which could be conceived of as an attempt toward healing, employed the mechanism of projection in a renewed and strengthened manner due to the fact that projection was linked to narcissism. Initially, it was also true that, thanks to the mechanism of projection, the object-directed subjectivity could arise from narcissism.

If, for Freud, projection became a mechanism that fulfilled its proper role in the constitution of subjectivity, then it could not comprehensively explain the origin of religion in its specific form. He even gave the impression of trying to circumvent the specifically religious aspect in his interpretation. The chapter, which theoretically discussed the paranoid mechanism, was implicitly introduced as an analysis of the persecution complex and not of the religious megalomania. In passing, Freud did touch upon a few elements of religious megalomania in the chapter, such as the theme of the divine rays which were emitted and later retracted. Freud interpreted this particular theme as a projected endopsychic apperception of libidinous cathexis and decathexis. Yet he did not mention the difference in structure between the two delusions.

This left a central question unanswered. What was meant by the replacement of a persecution complex by a religious megalomania? One would think that Freud would have explicitly dealt with the question, especially since he had pointed out that the religious delusion, which had replaced the persecution complex, had brought Schreber to a certain degree of healing. Freud did indicate some elements in this context such as castration. Castration was less threatening in the religious delusion than in the persecution complex since, in a religious delusion, it was assigned to the life hereafter. For instance, Schreber was compensated for his emasculation by being given the honour of becoming the saviour of mankind. Nevertheless, Freud’s reflection remained very superficial. He did not delve into the several structuring mechanisms of a psyche involved in the religious phenomenon.

65. Ibid., S.E. XII, p. 78-79, G.W. VIII, p. 315.
Jung: The Past Spontaneously Reoccurs.

The first volume of Transformsations and Symbolisms of the Libido analyzed two poems which had spontaneously come to Miss Miller’s mind while she was falling asleep: the ‘Hymn to the Creator’ and the ‘Song of the Moth’.

The circumstances which gave occasion to the ‘Hymn to the Creator’ were the following. Miss Miller had travelled throughout Europe and, tired and overwhelmed by all her experiences, she had embarked at Odessa for a cruise. Her hectic travel schedule gave way to a quiet, dreamy sojourn aboard a ship. One evening during the cruise, she heard one of the ship’s officers sing. As she was falling asleep, she became aware of a poem, fitting the melody of his song, which praised the creator for having made sound, light and love.

By referring to several parallels and by investigating other artistic creations mentioned by Miss Miller, Jung sought to demonstrate that the figure of the creator praised in the song in fact referred to the Italian officer who, by his singing, had greatly charmed Miss Miller.

At first sight, the framework of Jung’s analysis seemed to agree with Freud’s analysis of Schreber, though with a distinct difference. Jung not only relied on Miss Miller’s personal associations for his interpretations but also on a great deal of ethnological and cultural-historical material. Contrary to Freud, who had left the problem of the origin of religion out of his analysis of Schreber, Jung did go into the question of why precisely erotic impressions communicated themselves in religious representations. In this context, Jung appealed to three closely related mechanisms: introversion, regression and projection.

Jung dealt with the notion of introversion first. Before even discussing the ‘Hymn to the Creator’, Jung devoted a chapter to demonstrating that Miss Miller’s personality was easily inclined towards introversion. She continuously and passionately directed her libido towards objects around her and was easily impressed by them. But time and again, she flinched from the possibility of achieving true satisfaction from any cathectic of the libido. Consequently, the libido withdrew itself from the cathected object and created some sort of fulfilment in fantasy by means of an imaginary interaction with an inner object which substituted for the exterior object in reality.

Jung indicated this introversion mechanism in Miss Miller’s composition of the ‘Hymn to the Creator’. She ignored the erotic impression made on her by the singing officer. This caused her fantasy to compensate for the missed opportunity of love by composing a hymn addressed to a divine man who reigns over a shiny star-filled sky, who lets his melody ring out throughout the universe and who brings the heart of every creature to life.

Up until this point in Jung’s *Transformations and Symbolisms of the Libido*, we encounter the concept of introversion as it was presented in previously discussed texts, especially in ‘Little Anna’. Introversion was the process by which an intensified activity of fantasy tried to compensate for the need created by the decathexis of an object in reality. With regards to this, we have often pointed to the misunderstanding between Jung and Freud concerning the ‘libidinous decathexis of the object’. What was new in the first part of *Transformations and Symbolisms of the Libido* was the fact that Jung closely related introversion to regression and projection.

The ‘Hymn to the Creator’, which was the result of introversion, did not portray the singing officer as the object of fantasy. Rather, a substitute, the divine creator, represented the fascinating sailor, as became unequivocally clear from the context. The mere occurrence of this substitution implied the presence of still other mechanisms. It was here that Jung introduced the topics ‘regression’ and ‘projection’.

The mechanism of regression consisted of the replacement of the actual object of the libido, the singing officer, by an earlier object, namely, the father. In the wake of this replacement, projection occurred causing the father to be replaced in turn by the god who, according to Jung, had been a projection of the father image from time immemorial.

The process can be synthesized as follows. The consequence of introversion, regression and projection was that the father, whose memory was tenderly called to mind because of a regressive moment triggered by Miss Miller’s unfulfilled love for the officer, revealed himself in fantasy as the image of God.

More than likely, we are representing Jung’s thoughts much more sharply in this summary than they would have appeared to the reader of the often drawn out passages in *Transformations and Symbolisms of the Libido*. Jung frequently interchanged the terms ‘introversion’, ‘regression’ and ‘projection’, giving us the impression that, ultimately, he understood them as three aspects of one and the same process. Jung’s intention, in any case, was not to develop a detailed analysis of the several mechanisms. Rather, he was preoccupied with the question of whether the process
of introversion, as it deployed itself in the individual, was not a repetition of some sort of hereditary scheme which also exercised its proper function in phylogeny. One of the most clear and concise passages of *Transformations and Symbolisms of the Libido*, in which Jung expounded this thought, started with an explicit reference to the historical stratification of the human mind.68

"A further peculiarity which seems to rest upon the historic strata of the unconscious, is this - that an erotic impression, to which conscious acknowledgment is denied, usurps an earlier and discarded transference and expresses itself in that. Therefore, it frequently happens, for example, that among young girls at the time of their first love, remarkable difficulties develop in the capacity for erotic expression, which may be reduced analytically to disturbances through a regressive attempt at resuscitation of the father image, or the 'Father-Imago'.

Indeed, one might presume something similar in Miss Miller’s case, for the idea of the masculine creative deity is a derivation, analytically and historically psychological, of the 'Father-Imago', and aims, above all, to replace the discarded infantile father transference in such a way that for the individual the passing from the narrow circle of the family into the wider circle of human society may be simpler or made easier."

In the light of this reflection, we can see, in the poem and its 'Praeludium', the religious, poetically formed product of an introversion depending upon the surrogate of the 'Father-Imago'."

What can be found on the topic of religion in this text was, for the greater part, a repetition of what Freud had written in *Obsessive Actions and Religious Practices* and of what Jung had written complementing this in *The Significance of the Father in the Destiny of the Individual*. Religion was viewed as offering symbolic fulfilment to those instincts which could not be satisfied directly. Religion thus allowed culture to arise. Prohibited wishes were primarily incestuous by their nature which meant that one could state.69

"In religion the regressive reanimation of the father-and-mother imago is organized into a system."

Jung frequently reconsidered the notion that religious projection, since it had been operative for so many centuries, must have clearly fulfilled an important function and thus could not be perceived of as a mere accidental phenomenon. According to Jung, not much was achieved when one only pointed out the instinctual foundation of religion. One needed to take notice of the goal pursued by the complex transformations of the libido:

"I think that one should view with philosophical admiration the strange paths of the libido and should investigate the purposes of its circuitous ways. It is not too much to say that we have herewith dug up the erotic root, and yet the problem remains unsolved."

With regard to the function of religion within the evolution of culture, Jung called to mind the fact that religions, especially Christianity and the Mithras cult, originated as a reaction against a decadent culture which had revealed the destructive aspect of a mere instinctual lifestyle all too clearly. For our generation, which is confronted with the reactive strength of Christianity that has developed to an exaggerated dimension during the past two millennia, it seems hard to imagine the significance of unbridled desires. Sexuality however, was capable of destroying man and thus itself. The instincts were able to avoid this fate by being projected and giving rise to myths, religion and culture and thus, by sublimation.

This same process, phylogenetically operative at the root of different religions, was encountered on an individual level as well, as could be seen in Miss Miller’s case. An erotic impression, with which she could not cope, was transposed into a ‘Hymn to the Creator’. It seemed as if the mechanism was ready for use as soon as there was the slightest occasion, both in the individual and in collective history. This, however, did not imply that the value which could be attributed to the process of religious formation was the same in both cases. In the main religious systems, dangerous drives were sublimated while, at the same time, the importance of relationships with others, the ‘brothers’, was explicitly stressed. Religious formation did not isolate people. Quite the contrary! The de-sexualization achieved by religion acted to the advantage of social relationships. This could not be said of Miss Miller’s spontaneous religious expression. Out of her lonesome reverie, which isolated her from

70. Ibid., p. 39; in: Jahrbuch 3 (1911), p. 178.
human contact, she sang the praises of the creator. Yet the erotic impulse which she vented in this composition should have had a real place in normal life.73

The notion that ontogeny repeated phylogeny and the application of this notion to the phenomenon of religion brings us to the core of the first part of Transformations and Symbolisms of the Libido. Underneath the often unclear accumulation of religious and cultural-historical material lay Jung’s central conviction that only a profound insight into history would allow for the comprehension of the fundamental, inner core of the individual, since the individual constituted only one element of this broader historical process. We encounter an explicit affirmation of Jung’s conviction in the very first pages of his work. In opposition to previous psychoanalytical studies which intended to disclose historical problems, starting from knowledge gained through the analysis of the individual’s unconscious, Jung now wanted to shed new light on the individual history, starting from his insights on collective history.74 The purpose of his method was to give “a glimpse away from the incoherent multiplicity of the present to a higher coherence in history.”75

For the reader who critically studies Jung’s text, the precise way in which Jung conceived of this connection between the individual psyche and a broader historical process is still very unclear, especially in the first part of Transformations and Symbolisms of the Libido. With enthusiastic intuition, Jung compiled a vast amount of material which was to demonstrate that the phenomenon of religion was a ‘product of nature’. It was the result of mechanisms connected to the instincts from the very beginning which engraved the broad finality of the cosmos on the individual. As part of an intentional process of nature, the individual participated time and again in the inner logic of the cosmos’ evolution. In his haste to pursue this interest, Jung forgot to analyze these mechanisms in detail, both on the individual level and on the level of cultural development.

One has the impression that Jung situated the integration of the individual psyche along with the broader developmental history within heredity. The notion that this integration might occur in any manner other than by man’s participating in the biological order, seemed not to have been influential. Jung appeared to spontaneously presuppose that the psyche, or rather the pattern which caused the psyche to emerge from the

73. Ibid., p. 43-44; in: Jahrbuch 3 (1911), p. 188.
74. Ibid., p. 2-3; in: Jahrbuch 3 (1911), p. 122-123.
75. Ibid., p. 1; in: Jahrbuch 3 (1911), p. 121.
physical aspect, was transmitted from individual to individual as an innate capacity by means of heredity. Thus, after considering projection as an important mechanism since it had functioned in religion throughout the ages, Jung wrote that, ‘biologically speaking’, an exercise of psychic projection must have been important. Jung reasoned as follows. Throughout the ages, new religions came into being and demonstrated the operation of the introversion - regression - projection triad. It was inconceivable that this process was senseless. That the process was an intrinsic capacity of human drives was exemplified in the fact that, even now, it could spontaneously occur in individuals. We must admit that these individual creations did not necessarily possess the greatness of the religions present in history and also that they were sometimes rather morbid phenomena.

According to Jung, the origin of the dynamic which initiated this process must be sought within the structure of the libido itself and not in the dialectic between the libido and cultural history which, as exterior reality, forced itself on the individual and possessed its own substance. This was also the meaning of Jung’s rather obscure statement that ‘passion destroys itself’. That sentence concluded the analysis of Miss Miller’s second poem, the ‘Song of the Moth’, by which Jung intended to prove that sexuality yielded both creativity and self-destruction. By his analysis, Jung hoped to point out that sexuality, viewed as a drive, found within itself the tendency to transcend itself.

**Conclusion**

Freud hardly dealt with the question of the origin of religion. The mechanism of projection, which he had initially conceived of as a rather simple defence mechanism, had developed into such a complex phenomenon that he intended to set it aside for further study. This implied that from then on, religion, insofar as it was conceived of as the result of the projection mechanism, could only be discussed with reticence.

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76. "There is to be seen biologically in this ideal an exercise of psychological projection (of the paranoidian mechanism, as Freud would express it)." *Ibid.*, p. 39; in: Jahrbuch 3 (1911), p. 179.

77. "The power of God is threatened by the seduction of passion: a second fall of angels menaces heaven. Let us translate this mythological projection back into the psychological, from whence it originated. Then it would read: the power of the good and reasonable ruling the world wisely is threatened by the chaotic primitive power of passion; therefore passion must be exterminated; that is to say, projected into mythology. ... for passion destroys itself. The libido is God and Devil". *Ibid.*, p. 65; in: Jahrbuch 3 (1911), p. 222.
All of the texts which Freud devoted to the topic of religion, spoke of projection. As early as in the article *Obsessive Actions and Religious Practices*, which was written before there was any contact between Jung and Freud, Freud affirmed that, in religion, the gods assumed socially damaging tendencies and thus, emancipated mankind. In other words, human vindictiveness created for itself a revengeful god. Since such a god claimed the sole right to acts of vengeance, the belief in a vindictive god put an end to the chain of violent revengeful acts among people. This was basically the idea which Jung further developed. Projection, although Freud did not use this term, was a mechanism which exercised its proper function in the development of culture.

When we read the few passages which Freud devoted to religion during the period we have just discussed, it is conspicuous that Freud grew more and more cautious about attributing a necessary place to religion in the development of culture. The notion, found in a letter to Jung as well as in *Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood*, that religion was rooted in the helplessness of a child who, later as an adult, still needed a heavenly father and mother, hardly expressed anything positive concerning religion. In *Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning*, Freud advanced the opinion that religion helped believers to relinquish the pleasure principle and to accept the reality principle by presenting them with a reward in the life hereafter. However, Freud immediately added that religion was unsuccessful in this attempt and that only science could satisfactorily reconcile man with reality.

In opposition to Freud, Jung further developed Freud’s first conviction, that the phenomenon of religion fulfilled a well-defined function within cultural history. In doing this, Jung outlined a broad evolutionist framework in which the Romantic philosophy of nature became explicitly clear. Just as he had interpreted fantasy as the preliminary stage of intentional thought, he also presented religion as the fertile ground from which human culture sprang. In both cases, the same idea was fundamentally present. What Jung had written concerning religion in the first part of *Transformations and Symbolisms of the Libido* was generally repeated in the second part where he discussed the imagination. The drives, which vented themselves on the instinctual level as a blind discharge of energy, were at a certain moment objectified into representations. This exchange

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of direct gratification for fulfilment through a representation could be viewed as a moment of mutation (although Jung did not employ this term) by which the spirit emerged from the biological instincts.

The Structure of the Psyche

Jung: Introversion is the Mother of True Identity

Introversion, whose role in the origin of religion we have already discussed, became the concept *par excellence* to express the intrapsychic dynamic of the individual. Jung placed introversion in dialectic opposition to transference. This constituted the initial impetus toward the introversion-extroversion polarity which was to become the core of the later Jungian system.

Originally, Jung employed the term ‘introversion’ in relation to schizophrenia. He used the term for the first time when, in a survey of psychoanalytical literature, he reviewed Riklin’s article *Ueber Versetzungsbesserungen* in the 1910 edition of the *Jahrbuch*. In this review, Jung did not limit himself to a matter-of-fact presentation of Riklin’s text. Without explicitly stating so, Jung placed the data of Riklin’s article into a theoretical framework which was clearly his own and which had been lacking in Riklin’s writing. It was here that Jung utilized the term ‘introversion’ without any further specification, as if such terminology was already widely in vogue.80

A letter to Freud, which Jung wrote during the period when he was compiling his reviews of Swiss psychoanalytical literature, also clearly revealed that, from the very beginning, he linked dementia praecox with

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80. Riklin’s *Ueber Versetzungsbesserungen* described how the condition of a number of people suffering from dementia praecox suddenly improved when they were moved from one building to another within the psychiatric clinic, due to renovation work. The change of environment apparently agreed well with them. Riklin also briefly described the design of the new buildings and pointed out, among other things, that the new surroundings were more suitable than the old ones for applying work therapy which, at that time, was becoming popular. Jung reviewed the text as follows. “Especially in the commonest case, dementia praecox, this draws the patient out of his introversion and transfers his interest to reality.” That was why work therapy obtained better results than the bed treatment which, quite to the contrary, enhanced the patient’s ‘introversion’ and daydreaming. Jung further stated that Riklin, by means of the two case studies, had well shown ‘how the introversion comes about, where the transference of interest to the outside world fails, and how the process of introversion goes much further than simple wish-fulfilment in fantasy would require.” C.G. JUNG, *Abstracts of the Psychological Works of Swiss Authors*, C.W. XVIII, § 1007-1025.
This letter dealt with Johann Honegger (1885-1911), who had earlier consulted Jung when he was suffering from psychosis. Jung wrote:

"The young man is very intelligent and subtle-minded; wants to take up psychiatry, once consulted me because of loss of reality-sense lasting a few days. (Psychasthenia = libido introversion = Dem. praec.)"

From these texts, it becomes clear that Jung was now frequently using the notion of ‘introversion’ although he had not yet presented a thorough definition of the concept. Such a definition was finally provided in the article *Psychic conflicts in a Child*, which we have already mentioned. Strangely enough, in this text, Jung did not relate introversion to schizophrenia as he had done in his previous writings. The term seemed to now receive a broader significance. Jung designated introversion as a ‘typical process’. When an obstacle inhibited the venting of the libido into the outside world, the libido withdrew within a fantasy world. For example, the mechanism of introversion deployed itself in ‘little Anna’ because she compensated for her shaken trust in her parents by means of dreams.

Both Jung’s review of Riklin’s article and the already examined analysis of ‘little Anna’ create the suspicion that Jung was speaking of the same phenomenon when he used the terms introversion and ‘autoeroticism’. He had always employed ‘autoeroticism’ in a rather broad sense which Freud disliked. Our suspicion is confirmed by an explicit note in Jung’s short article, *A Criticism of Bleuler’s Theory of Schizophrenic Negativism*, which he published in the same issue of the *Jahrbuch* in which the first part of *Transformations and Symbolisms of the Libido* appeared. He wrote:

"Autism (Bleuler) = autoeroticism (Freud). For some time I have employed the concept of *introversion* for this condition."

In *Transformations and Symbolisms of the Libido*, two new elements were added regarding the concept of introversion. First, dementia praecox was explicitly called introversion neurosis. Further, Jung stated that

81. 148J.
82. For further information, see *The Freud/Jung Letters*, note 2 concerning letter 148J.
83. 148J.
introversion could reach as deep as the ‘historical layers of consciousness’.

In reply to the criticism which one could direct at Bleuler’s concept ‘schizophrenia’, Jung suggested the terminology ‘introversion neurosis’.\(^{85}\) He was opposed to the term ‘schizophrenia’ because it far too closely reflected a dissociative process along the lines of hysteria. Jung placed hysteria and dementia praecox in opposition to each other. In hysteria, transference was dominant while in dementia praecox, introversion was the prominent mechanism.

Jung thus placed ‘transference’ and ‘introversion’ in polar opposition to each other. Transference consisted in the cathexis of an object located in the outside world. Introversion, on the other hand, signalled the decathexis of such an object which resulted in the search for compensating fulfilment within the inner world of fantasy.

Since for Jung, it was evident that introversion was accompanied by regression and since he was convinced that the psyche, innate in every individual, still contained traces of the developmental stages from a distant past, it also appeared self-evident that a profound introversion descended into the historical stratification of the human mind until it reached its most primitive moments. This explained how schizophrenics could attain the level of mankind’s latent capability of forming myths: \(^{86}\)

"From all these signs it may be concluded that the soul possesses in some degree historical strata, the oldest stratum of which would correspond to the unconscious. The result of that must be that an introversion occurring in later life, according to the Freudian teaching, seizes upon regressive infantile reminiscences taken from the individual past. That first points out the way; then, with stronger introversion and regression (strong repressions, introversion psychoses), there come to light pronounced traits of an archaic mental kind which, under certain circumstances, might go as far as the re-echo of a once manifest, archaic mental product."

\(^{85}\) The English translation gives wrongly: "These case fall under Bleuler’s description of Schizophrenia, a name which connotes a psychological fact, and might easily be compared with similar facts in hysteria", while Jung meant "...and might easily be confused with similar facts in hysteria" ("...Schizophrenie, welcher Name allerdings eine psychologische Tatsache impliziert, die mit ähnlichen Tatbeständen bei Hysterie leicht verwechselt werden könnte"). C.G. Jung, *Transformations and Symbolisms of the Libido*, Eng. transl. (*Psychology of the Unconscious*), p. 274-275 (=note on p. 26); in: Jahrbuch 3 (1911), p. 159.

\(^{86}\) Ibid., p. 19; in: Jahrbuch 3 (1911), p. 149. The English ‘re-echo’ translates the German ‘Wiederbelebung’, which is stronger: ‘to live it through for a second time’.
THE FREUD/JUNG DEBATE

Viewed in itself, introversion was thus not necessarily a schizophrenic process. That which caused dementia praecox was not so much the specificity of the mechanism but rather the fact that introversion reached so deeply. Although Jung did not say this in so many words, he did imply that there was only a gradual difference between a regular daydream and schizophrenia.

It is unnecessary to repeat that, in the background of the theory concerning the schizophrenic process, we can once again detect Jung’s concept of the unconscious. Jung immediately applied the notion that ontogeny repeated phylogeny to the similarities discovered between mythology, a child’s world and the expressions of a schizophrenic. At the same time, these observations were placed within the framework of the philosophy of nature which, in an obvious manner, interpreted such convergences as the repeated awakening of hereditarily transmitted seeds.

Within this same context, our attention should not only be drawn to the notion ‘introversion’, which was introduced by Jung as a substitute for ‘autoeroticism’ and which he moreover had given a completely different content in comparison to Freud. Less conspicuous but just as important was the way in which Jung reversed the meaning of the term ‘transference’. By placing transference in opposition to introversion and by interpreting introversion as a regression toward more archaic forms which the psyche previously used in order to function, transference was in fact presented as a mechanism which was of secondary importance with regards to these archaic layers of the psyche. Moreover, transference continued to be dependent on these archaic layers in order to operate. Thus, the notion ‘transference’ designated an exposition of the unconscious heritage and thus a deployment aimed at reality of what was inherent to the individual as a structured capacity. Compared to the content of the unconscious, which was transmitted by means of hereditary processes, transference established a second moment. This representation takes us very far from Freud’s point of view.

*Freud: Identity is Established by Narcissism*

At the basis of Freud’s analysis of Schreber, we find the conviction, which had gradually developed, that homosexuality was the core problem of paranoia. Both Jung and Ferenczi had also reached the same conclusion
in their respective analytical practices. Moreover, homosexual components seemed to exercise an influential role in other disorders as well. This became very clear in Freud’s analysis of the ‘Ratman’s’ obsessional neurosis. A reflection on homosexuality was thus deemed necessary.

Nothing is more complex than the way in which Freud slowly endeavoured to gain some insight into the phenomenon of homosexuality. Throughout his life, he continued to distinguish various types of homosexuality while also placing limits upon his own attempts to explain the phenomenon. Originally, he departed from a rather clear position which formed the basis of the logic behind Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality. In this work, he had divided sexual deviations into ‘inversions’ and ‘perversions’. The former concerned the sexual ‘object’ or the person to whom someone addressed his or her sexual drive. The latter dealt with the sexual ‘goal’ or the type of pursued erotic behavior. Freud presented us with a rather lengthy discussion on homosexuality in the very first pages of Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality. However, upon reading this more closely, it becomes clear that Freud did not elaborate on homosexuality because he held a specific interest in the topic nor because he experienced it as a particularly problematic issue. Quite the contrary! In this text, Freud merely criticized all of the then current explanations of the phenomenon. First of all, he demolished the theory of degeneration. Then, he pulverized the position of the contemporary homo-activists who held that a homosexual’s intimate life was of a gender different than his or her body. Freud did not compose an explanation of his own but, apparently, that was not the purpose of the text. The fact that homosexuality existed established for him proof that the selection of a sexual object took place according to a process which was completely independent from the process that determined the preference of a certain

87. See S. Freud, Psycho-Analytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia, S.E. X, p. 59, G.W. VIII, p. 295. See also 70 F, 110 F, 117 J, 214 F. Ferenczi’s article Ueber die Rolle der Homosexualität in der Pathogenese des Paranoia was published in the same issue of the Jahrbuch (August 1911) as the articles we are discussing now.
89. In much of the literature, one encounters a vulgarized cliche image of Freud’s thoughts on sexuality which could easily be disputed. It would indeed be very worthwhile to systematically examine Freud’s tentative search and the way in which he, time and again, abandoned his previous theories. It would also prove interesting to compare these theories to what later psychoanalysts wrote about sexuality. The most fascinating book concerning homosexuality written from a psychoanalytical point of view is that of J. Durandeaux, Du renoncement homosexuel au double jeu du charme, Paris, 1977.
sexual behavior (the sexual goal). Introversion and perversion were thus
two radically different matters. In the rest of *Three Essays on the Theory
of Sexuality*, Freud dealt with the theory of erogenous zones, infantile
sexuality and the growth toward maturity during which one had to
discover the happy medium between sublimation and suppression. Within
the framework of Freud’s then primary object of study, hysteria, this was
very understandable. Jung was more than likely correct when he stated
that the concept of ‘erogenous zones’, as developed by Freud in *Three
Essays on the Theory of Sexuality*, still depended on the theory of the
‘spasmogenic zones’ which were encountered in hysteria.\(^{90}\)

While in his analyses he constantly encountered the phenomenon of
homosexuality in its diverse appearances, Freud’s thoughts on the topic
remained unclear. Contrary to what one might conclude from contempor-
ary vulgarized literature, it was not the special relationship between the
homosexual and his mother which initially caught Freud’s attention. He
was far more fascinated by the relationship between father and son and,
more specifically, by the ‘fear of castration’ which constituted part of that
relationship. This had proven to be the main issue in ‘Little Hans’. Freud
further observed the presence of such ‘father complexes’ in many adults,
for example in the analysis of the ‘Ratman’. Often, these same complexes
proved to be detrimental in the relationship between Freud himself and his
followers.

In writing his analysis of Schreber, Freud tried to combine various
parts of his research under the phenomenon of homosexuality. Up until
then, he had not sought for an explanation of the problem of the selection
of the sexual object. He had devoted his complete attention to the
evolution of the sexual goal and the problematic integration of the poly-
morphous-pervert infantile sexuality. Indubitably, Freud had discussed the
influence of parental figures but only in a general way. The attempt to
comprehend neurosis as well as dementia praecox by means of psychoan-
alysis had sharply confronted him with the following question. How did
the cathexis of an object occur? Gradually, it dawned on him that the
phenomenon which appeared as homosexuality in so many analyses, in
fact originated in the first object choice a person made in his life. Homo-
sexuality revealed a stage of development between the choice of an object
and the preceding moment, when only autoerotic pleasure existed. This
insight led Freud to introduce the notion ‘narcissism’ into the 1910 edition
of *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality* and in ‘Schreber’.

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By means of narcissism, Freud later established a connection between the developmental route of the object selection and of the organization of the sexual goal. The scheme then went as follows. Once the erogenous zones were united under the primacy of the genital zone, the individual perceived his own body as an object of love for a period of time. Within this love for oneself, the genitals occupied an important place. This stage, called narcissism, constituted a necessary moment of development. When this stage was lacking, the individual would not be capable of becoming really attached to an object. The next step, from narcissism toward object choice, passed through a homosexual stage in which a person of the same gender was loved. Only after this homosexual phase could a heterosexual object choice occur. The homosexual components did not simply disappear. They were diverted from the sexual goal and rerouted into social relationships.

The analysis of Schreber was the first publication where Freud dealt with the notion of ‘narcissism’ rather extensively. The concept, however, had already been discussed within the context of the meetings of the Viennese psychoanalysts. The same notion was briefly referred to in Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood and, as mentioned, added in a footnote in the 1910 edition of Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality. Although these texts were very brief, they well complemented the exposition in ‘Schreber’.

On 10 November 1909, I. Sadger (1867-194?) presented to the Viennese psychoanalysts a case study in which homosexuality played an important role. In the discussion following the presentation, Freud offered some reflections concerning narcissism as Sadger had dealt with it in the case study. Freud advanced that narcissism was not an isolated phenomenon but a necessary moment within the development from autoeroticism toward object love. There had to be a moment when one was in love with oneself, which Freud further defined as being in love with one’s own genitalia, in order to progress toward loving other, yet similar objects. In the normal evolution of this process, one substituted the father figure for

91. Perhaps we should further explain the phrase: "because it feels too vulnerable". We must also call to mind that Jung had pointed out to Freud that the schizophrenic patient experienced everything as ‘too gripping’. Freud however was not yet that explicit here.
94. H. Nunberg and E. Federn, Minutes of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society, (Meeting 86) vol. II; p. 312-313. I. Sadger disappeare during World War II.
oneself as the object of love. Very soon afterwards, the father became the object of feelings of rivalry. According to Freud, this signalled the delicate point of departure from which the homosexual development started to follow its own course. Recapitulating, Freud concluded that every person originally had two sexual objects: himself and the woman (mother). Future sexual orientation depended on the way in which the person would or would not free himself from these ties.

More clearly than in his text on Schreber, Freud’s comments on Sadger’s case study allow us to observe how narcissism prepared the way for identification with the father. This touched upon a second, important fact established by narcissism. Not only did it make the object choice possible but narcissism also established a person’s identity. This element was very important in light of the further development of Freudian thought of which the Oedipus complex gradually became the core. More specifically, concerning the father identification, we can discern in Freud’s remarks a clear distinction between identification on a narcissistic basis and a later, constitutive identification which neutralized the oedipal rivalry. This distinction will be explicitly stated in the ‘Wolfman’ analysis.95

It is therefore indeed remarkable that in the two other texts, *Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood* and the footnote of the 1910 edition of *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality*, we encounter a somewhat different presentation of matters where the father figure is not to be found. Both of these texts stated that future homosexuals had experienced very intense ties with their mothers during childhood. Later, when repressing their love toward the mother figure, they identified themselves with the mother and extended this love to members of their own sex in order to love them in the same way that they were loved by their mothers.96 According to Freud, this love relationship was in fact a re-regression toward narcissism.97

97. There is of course no absolute contradiction between the intervention following Sadger’s exposition and these texts, especially when one takes into account Freud’s reflection that mothers of future homosexuals were often very mannish (*Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood*, S.E. XI, p. 99, G.W. VIII, p. 169) and when one called to mind the castration complex. We merely wish to point out to the reader that, at this time, Freud did not attempt to articulate these elements in a systematic manner.
Was it precisely because Freud, on the one hand, had observed that Schreber’s father was so overwhelmingly present in Schreber’s inner world while, on the other hand, in *Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood*, he had written that homosexuals had lacked an energetic and virile father, that he did not mention the connection between narcissism and the identification with the father in his analysis of Schreber? Or was it because he was of the opinion that paranoia resulted from repressing homosexuality so that a paranoiac was the exact opposite of the manifest homosexual who had allowed his preference to infiltrate consciousness? In any case, in ‘Schreber’, Freud superficially characterized Schreber’s homosexuality as fostering ‘feminine’ (passive homosexual) desires with regard to his father. These desires were in fact the consequence of previously feared, yet now sought after phantasms of castration. In the theoretical chapter with which Freud concluded his study and in which he introduced the notion ‘narcissism’, he no longer mentioned the influence of either the father or the mother. He merely posed that in the development of the individual, there was a stage where that individual perceived himself as the object of love. The further evolution toward a heterosexual phase passed through a homosexual phase, where someone of the same sex was desired. Finally, Freud’s attention was drawn to the fact that these homosexual feelings later found an outlet in social relationships. He pointed out that a paranoiac usually succumbed to the disorder the moment his or her social recognition was affected. As a consequence, homosexual feelings no longer found an outlet and threatened to inundate consciousness.

**Projection, Fixation on the Past and the Theory of Drives**

In his theoretical reflection based on the case of ‘Schreber’, Freud did not go into the origin of religion nor did he undertake a more precise analysis of the formation process of identity as it passed through the stage of narcissism. Instead, he examined the complementary relationship between narcissism and object love. Remaining faithful to the schemes which he had developed in his correspondence with Jung, Freud intended to prove that the core process of psychosis consisted in the fact that the cathexis of the object was removed and consequently, the libido was directed to the ego.

In this libidinous cathexis of the ego, Freud further distinguished an autoerotic and a narcissistic cathexis. To this, Freud linked another distinction which he had previously rejected, namely, the distinction between paranoia and dementia praecox. In cases of dementia praecox, according to Freud, regression reached the level of the truly archaic autoeroticism while paranoia only went as deep as narcissism. Freud therefore concluded that the aetiology of paranoia was to be found in a fixation on narcissism. The point of departure for dementia praecox however, lay in a much earlier fixation, the earliest development from autoeroticism toward narcissism.

At this point in the exposition, we are suddenly confronted with the issue of projection once again. After dealing with the specific process of the disorder (the decathexis of the object), Freud devoted a few words to the return of the repressed content, namely, the symptom formation process or delusion. According to Freud, delusion should be understood as an attempt, although failing, to reconstruct the world which had been lost due to the libidinous decathexis. He further discovered that there were two types of delusions depending on the specific point of fixation of both disorders. In cases of dementia praecox, delusion took on the form of a hallucination and therefore of wish fulfilment. Remarkably enough, Freud spoke of a ‘hysterical’ mechanism in such cases. In instances of paranoia, on the other hand, delusion was established by means of the projection mechanism. When considering this reflection in all its implications, one would tend to conclude that, in Freud’s view, hallucination had to be a mechanism which in essence was related to autoeroticism and that projection was connected to narcissism. Hallucination and projection thus would both be mechanisms which, in a consecutive order, exercised a specific function in the constitutive process of the ‘ego’. In a failed attempt at recovery, these mechanisms would then be called up again in the symptoms. In light of the connection between narcissism and identification in Freud’s logic, one would also expect to find a relationship

100. Slowly, we can start using the term ‘schizophrenia” instead of ‘dementia praecox” without any fear for anachronisms. The term, coined by Bleuler who would introduce it into the general psychiatric language by means of his handbook (1911), was already known to psychoanalysts. Freud, however, still employed ‘dementia praecox” when writing ‘Schreber’ and even attempted to introduce ‘paraphrenia” instead of ‘schizophrenia’. Ibid., S.E. XII, p. 76, G.W. VIII, p. 312-313.

101. Ibid., S.E. XII, p. 61, 72, G.W. VIII p. 298-299, 309-310.

102. Ibid., S.E. VIII, p. 71, G.W. VIII, p. 308.

103. Ibid., S.E. XII, p. 77, G.W. VIII, p. 313.
between projection and identification. Freud, however, was not that explicit in ‘Schreber’.

What did the notion ‘fixation’ entail here? Was neurosis really determined by the past to such a degree that the patient was always restricted by it? Or rather, was it not the case that a patient reinterpreted his past on the basis of a pathological ‘regression’ determined by a conflict in the present? Because the latter view was presented by Jung in *The Theory of Psychoanalysis* as a criticism addressed to Freud, we should briefly examine Freud’s notion of ‘fixation’.

It was his reflection on the notion of repression which led Freud to the concept of fixation. It had quickly become apparent to him that repression formed the core of all neuroses. Freud was then faced with the questions why some people became neurotic and others did not and why different forms of neuroses were chosen as a defence. He searched for the answer to these questions in a certain weakness within the psychic constitution which had existed from the very first years. The patient remained fixated on one of the stages of the libido’s development.

Freud distinguished three moments in repression. First, there was fixation which was the condition for, as well as the precursor of, repression. A specific drive or a component of a drive failed to go the anticipated normal path of development and therefore ‘behaved like one belonging to the system of the unconscious, like one that is repressed’. Second, actual repression took place by means of the activity of the higher conscious systems of the ego. This was an active process. However, the already present unconscious forces were drawn in and influenced it. Finally, there was a return of the repressed contents. This aspect expressed itself in pathology: repression failed and, consequently, the libido returned to the point of fixation.

This scheme, the problematic of which was again taken up by Freud in 1923 in *The Ego and the Id*, contained many tacit implications which Jung would later develop. Freud’s main purpose in introducing the notion of fixation was to establish a connection between the actual conflict of neurosis and the infantile moments which activated it. He hoped to relate each case of neurosis to a different stage in the human psyche’s development. In the meantime however, Freud had mentioned an ‘anticipated normal path of development’. He had also suggested that a drive which was maintained on the infantile level ‘behaved like one belonging to the

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system of the unconscious’. This statement implied the emergence of consciousness from the unconscious according to certain internal laws as Jung had already described it. As mentioned above, Freud did state that repression was an active process initiated by the ego. However, he also added that the already present unconscious forces cooperated with the process. This raised the question as to what actually caused a psychic conflict. The unconscious acted as both the consequence and the cause of repression. It could even be perceived of as the consequence of a primary repression which produced the unconscious ex nihilo. Freud’s distinction between the principles of pleasure and reality argued in favor of this. Nevertheless, one could also think along the lines of the Romantic concept of the unconscious as Jung had employed it. This line of thinking was supported by the notion of a normal path of development and the idea that a drive which did not develop, behaved like one belonging to the system of the unconscious.

The consideration of the conceptual model evoked by fixation was not simply an academic concern. The complete concept of therapy was at stake here. Should the true cause of a psychic disturbance be situated in the past so that tracing this past acted to remove the obstacles found within it? This became the theory which Freud defended and in which he propounded the idea of the ‘timelessness’ of the unconscious. One could also pose that the disorder was initiated by a conflict in the present and that the subsequent regression reprocessed old memories, making them appear to be at the root of the psychic disorder. Jung held this latter opinion, concluding that tracing more and more infantile memories actually enhanced the pathological disorder.

One important issue in ‘Schreber’ is still left for discussion, namely, the theory of drives. This was exactly the point at which Jung directed his criticism in Transformations and Symbolisms of the Libido. Concerning Schreber’s experience of a ‘destruction of the world’, Freud had raised the question whether such a total loss of interest in outside reality could really be sufficiently explained by the withdrawal of the libido and its residue in the ego. Voices had warned Schreber that the accomplishments of 14,000 years of world history were lost and that the world had a future of only 212 years. Schreber was already discovering traces of this impending destruction. People surrounding him were only ‘miracled up, cursorily improvised’.106 He even felt as if he were the only true human still alive. Could such a rupture with reality be sufficiently explained by a

106. Ibid., S.E. XII, p. 70, G.W. VIII, p. 307.
libidinous decathexis? In this context, Freud clearly understood ‘libido’ as ‘sexuality’. He immediately posed that there had to be still other drives which kept the connection with reality intact. In *Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning*, Freud had discussed the ego drives, the drives *par excellence* which forced the acceptance of an autonomous reality. What stopped these drives from keeping the relation with reality in order?

With much hesitation, Freud wondered whether the distinction between the ego drives and the libido was as clear-cut as he had originally presumed. It is obvious why he hesitated. His distinction was used to explain why such a phenomenon as repression even existed. There had to be an opposition between the ego-drives and the libido. Freud himself posed the question whether or not he should develop a more complex structure in which the processes unfolding within the libido had secondary repercussions on the ego. Freud’s text on this matter, extensively quoted by Jung in his criticism, went as follows:107

"Are we to suppose that a general detachment of the libido from the external world would be an effective enough agent to account for the 'end of the world'? Or would not the ego-cathexes which still remained in existence have been sufficient to maintain rapport with the external world? To meet this difficulty we should either have to assume that what we call libidinal cathexis (that is, interest emanating from erotic sources) coincides with interest in general, or we should have to consider the possibility that a very widespread disturbance in the distribution of the libido may bring about a corresponding disturbance in the ego-cathexes. But these are problems which we are still quite helpless and incompetent to solve. It would be otherwise if we could start off from some well-grounded theory of instincts; but in fact we have nothing of the kind at our disposal. We regard instinct as being the concept on the frontier-line between the somatic and the mental, and see in it the psychical representative of organic forces. Further, we accept the popular distinction between ego-instincts and a sexual instinct; ... We can no more dismiss the possibility that disturbances of the libido may react upon the ego-cathexes than we can overlook the converse possibility - namely, that a secondary or induced disturbance of the libidinal processes may result from abnormal changes in the ego."

Thus, Freud was aware of the fact that the relationship between the ego and the libido still remained a completely unsolved mystery. He concluded with the suspicion that, in cases of paranoia, a disturbance

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within the libidinous realm was primarily involved which also had repercussions within the ego. Proof of this was found in the fact that reality did not completely disappear. The patient continued to relate to it as can be seen in his attempts at explaining his perception of ‘miracled up, cursorily improvised people.’ According to Freud, the changing relationship to the outside world probably had to be ascribed to the libidinous decathexis. This, however, did not take away the fact that the ego drives remained unexplained.

Some Biographical Notes

During the period between their journey to the United States and the publication of the first part of Transformations and Symbolisms of the Libido, many things occurred between Freud and Jung which, because of their personal repercussions, should be pointed out.

First of all, there was the issue of the father complex between them which continued to influence their relationship. Although in this period, it seemed to be less of a problem than before their journey to the United States.108 More important in the meantime however, were the difficulties with Bleuler.109

When the International Association for Psychoanalysis was founded at the Congress of Nuremberg in March 1910, Bleuler initially refused to join it. This created a difficult situation since Bleuler was a coeditor of the Jahrbuch. However, both parties agreed that the Jahrbuch should remain a forum for open discussions. Bleuler then published Die Psychoanalyse Freuds, a long and nuanced article in the second volume of the Jahrbuch in 1910.110 He later met Freud in Munich at Christmas that year and the controversial disagreements between them seemed to be tentatively resolved. Bleuler subsequently joined the association.111 In the meantime however, another article by Bleuler appeared, entitled Zur Theorie des schizophrenen Negativismus, in which he introduced the notion ‘ambivalence’. By means of this concept, he was searching for an explanation concerning the schizophrenic’s negativism in the face of contrasting representations within the association process. According to Bleuler, every representation in the human psyche was associatively connected to its

108. See 155J, 156F, 180J, 182F, 205F, 231J.
110. See with regard to this context, 226F.
111. Once Bleuler had left Munich, Jung used the occasion to meet Freud. See The Freud/Jung Letters, note after 229J.
opposite. In normal situations, this would aid to subject in acting cautiously without disturbing the regular course of the association process. In instances of schizophrenia however, this mechanism was disorganized so that the contrasting representation could prevail upon the ordinarily prevalent representation for no apparent reason.\textsuperscript{112}

Freud requested that Jung compose a critical reply to this article.\textsuperscript{113} In April 1911, Jung published \textit{A Criticism of Bleuler’s Theory of Schizophrenic Negativism} in which he reproached Bleuler for treating a schizophrenic’s negativism as a secondary phenomenon which neglected the fundamental psychoanalytical insight that defences were always located at well-defined points within the psyche.\textsuperscript{114}

The relationship between Bleuler and Jung, in the meantime, had grown very tense. In July 1911, Jung wrote to Freud that his personal ties with Bleuler had almost completely been severed.\textsuperscript{115}

Besides the break with Bleuler, Jung also had to cope with the tragedy of Johann Jakob Honegger’s suicide. Honegger had consulted Jung during a period when he was suffering from psychosis. Jung had grown very fond of him and had supported him in his decision to specialize in psychiatry and psychoanalysis. Jung had even contemplated establishing a joint practice with Honegger. However, in March 1911, Honegger committed suicide.\textsuperscript{116} During this same period, Freud had become acquainted to a young man of Honegger’s age, Victor Tausk (1879-1919). Freud felt that Tausk was destined for a brilliant career in psychoanalysis. Unfortunately, his life would also end in suicide.\textsuperscript{117}

During the period which we are now surveying, the rupture with Alfred Adler also weighted heavily upon Freud. He wrote to Jung that this

\textsuperscript{112} Jung especially reacted against Bleuler’s statement: “Negativistic phenomena can arise directly on the basis of these propensities, since positive and negative psychisms are substitutes for one another indiscriminately.” Quoted in C.G. Jung, \textit{A Criticism of Bleuler’s Theory of Schizophrenic Negativism}, C.W. III, § 425.
\textsuperscript{113} 216F.
\textsuperscript{114} This text was then published in the first volume of the 1911 \textit{Jahrbuch}, Jung wrote: “Psychoanalysis has shown to our satisfaction that resistance is never ‘indiscriminate’ or meaningless, and that, consequently, there is no such thing as a capricious playing with opposites. The systematic character of resistance holds good, as I think I have shown, for schizophrenia as well.” C.G. Jung, \textit{A Criticism of Bleuler’s Theory of Schizophrenic Negativism}, C.W. III, § 426.
\textsuperscript{115} 265J.
\textsuperscript{116} See especially 162J, 170J, 175J, 180J, 193J, 196J, 246J.
incident had once again torn open the wounds which he had sustained in his dispute with Wilhelm Fliess. The break between Adler and Freud did not personally affect Jung though. Adler had been the leader of the Viennese group and as such, he had always regarded the dominance of the Swiss within the psychoanalytical association with feelings of jealousy. However, on a theoretical level, the rupture with Adler gave Freud the occasion to make a few sarcastic remarks concerning certain psychoanalysts who allowed themselves to be completely duped by a ‘clown’, which was ultimately all that the ego was. Indirectly these remarks could also be applied to Jung’s interest in the ego.

During these same months, both Jung and Freud discovered their ‘myths’. As time passed on, Freud grew more and more fascinated by the Oedipus myth. In November 1910, Freud indicated to Jung that he had learned that Oedipus was originally a phallic demon, such as the dactyls, and that his name had merely meant ‘erection’. Later, in May 1911, Freud attended a performance of Oedipus Rex in Vienna. Jung, at this time, had become strongly impressed by Goethe’s Faust. He had seen a performance of the play in January 1911 and the rumour that he was a natural great grandchild of Goethe, contributed to the fact that he recognized himself in the play.

Since February 1911, Freud had alluded several times to the fact that he had started a new and elaborate project. However, it was only after the publication of the first part of Transformations and Symbolisms of the Libido in August 1911 that Freud explicitly told Jung that he was researching the problem of the origin of religion just as Jung. He had commenced writing Totem and Taboo.

In many ways, the summer of 1911 constituted an important turning point for the psychoanalytic movement. The break with Adler became definitive; the first part of Jung’s Transformations and Symbolisms of the Libido was published; Freud had started Totem and Taboo; the relationship between Bleuler and Jung came to an end; and moreover, Bleuler’s

118. See 223F, 228F.
119. "I would never have expected a psychoanalyst to be so taken in by the ego. In reality the ego is like the clown in the circus, who is always putting in his oar to make the audience think that whatever happens is his doing.” 238F.
120. 160F.
121. 255F.
122. 234F, 268F.
123. 270F.
124. 230J.
book *Dementia Praecox or the Group of Schizophrenias* was to be published in early October.\(^{125}\)

Nevertheless, the understanding between Freud and Jung seemed to be optimal at the Association’s congress at Weimar in September 1911.\(^{126}\) Freud sincerely congratulated Jung for *Transformations and Symbolisms of the Libido*\(^{127}\) just as Jung had congratulated Freud upon the publication of ‘Schreber’.\(^{128}\) Freud wrote that he had hardly any comments concerning *Transformations and Symbolisms of the Libido* since both he and Jung had come to the conclusion that the Oedipus complex constituted the root of all religious feelings.\(^{129}\) Yet, at a Wednesday evening meeting of the Viennese group, it became clear that Freud could not simply accept the core of Jung’s theory, namely, the intrinsic conflict within the sexual drive.

On that Wednesday, 29 November, 1911, Sabina Spielrein presented a lecture on the topic of ‘transformation’.\(^{130}\) Spielrein had first been Jung’s patient, then his mistress and finally, a student. Under his direction, she had written the article *Die Destruktion als Ursache des Werdens* in which Jung’s principle of competition within sexuality formed the central theme. She had recently moved from Zurich to Vienna where she joined the group and presented an outline of the article to the Viennese group.

The most interesting aspect of Spielrein’s exposition was that, in agreement with the biologist Mechnikov, she explicitly spoke of a ‘death wish’ in order to indicate the destructive component of the libido. By means of several examples, she then attempted to prove that, in various myths, the notions of death and sacrifice were related to the creation of new life.

Freud made use of this discussion to criticize Jung’s *Transformations and Symbolisms of the Libido*. First of all, he criticized Jung’s mere accumulation of mythological material without making any distinction between

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125. See 272J.
127. 270F and notes about the congress in *The Freud/Jung Letters* after 270F.
128. 243J.
129. 270F.
the original form of a myth and its later derivations. Concerning the	onotion of an intrinsic opposition within the sexual drive itself, Freud stated
that, in essence, he was not opposed to the idea but he would like to see
it proven on the basis of individual analyses.

Conclusion

Can it be said that Freud and Jung were truly concerned with the
notion of religion in their analyses of Schreber’s and Miss Millers’ fantasy
worlds? At this point, we should view all the facts which we have gleaned
in light of the distinctions made at the beginning of this study.

When Freud spoke of religion, he was primarily referring to moral-
ity. This became apparent from the very first pages of the work Obsessive
Actions and Religious Practices, published in 1907. Here, he interpreted
religion as the instrument by which society succeeded in repressing so-
cially damaging tendencies and channelled them toward a symbolic fulfil-
ment. Placed in this context, the discussion between Freud and Jung
correcting whether or not the newly founded International Society for
Psychoanalysis should join the International Order for Ethics and Culture
was characteristic. Freud was opposed to religion because, according to
him, it exercised its moral function in an overly oppressive manner. With-
out a doubt, social order and morality were necessary but they should be
grounded on a scientific basis. Jung, on the contrary, spoke of the mystical
power of religion. Any sort of organization for the promotion of ethics
and culture which based itself on mere reason would eventually grow into
a syndicate of special interests which would necessarily bleed to death
after a short while.

As an initial interpretation of these two approaches, we could pose
that Jung made a clear distinction between religion and morality, just as
Schleiermacher had done. Freud, however, made no such distinction. One
wonders whether Freud’s Jewish background, which left little room for
such a distinction, influenced his view. Mystical tendencies were even less
popular in Judaism than in Christianity. Or was Freud merely influenced
by the 19th century scientism which based its polemics on the inter-
wovenness of religion and morality, typical of the time? In any case, in
the work Totem and Taboo (1912-13), written as a reply to Jung, Freud
still spoke of religion as morality’s instrument. It was only in The Future
of an Illusion (1927) that Freud finally approached religion as a separate
type of experience. In this work, he admitted to Romain Rolland (1866-
1944) that if indeed an experience such as an ‘oceanic experience’ existed,
then religion probably consisted of a unique experience of reality as well.
If that were the case, then religion should not be merely understood as a system of representations to which people adhered because it produced a moral effect. All of this however did not impede Freud from concluding that religion was an ‘illusion’. Nevertheless, in his later works, such as *Civilization and its Discontents* (1930) and *Moses and Monotheism* (1939), the moral interpretation of religion and the theme of the ‘renouncement of drives’ were once again the key issues.

In Jung’s statements concerning religion, it became clear that he did not consider the concept to be fundamentally a system of representations upholding a certain set of morals, although that interpretation was not completely absent from his writings. He did mention the development of culture and the renunciation of the instinct. However, he did not primarily attempt to reconstruct the origin of a social morality by means of these notions. He devoted his attention to the specific character of the experience of an ‘inner’ world which he claimed to have observed in the fantasies of children as well as in schizophrenic delusion and religious symbolism.

The distinction between both of these approaches to religion probably explains why Freud, as opposed to Jung, reacted only slightly to the rather conspicuous element of ‘religion’ when analyzing the process of schizophrenic delusion. Yet all of the components employed by Jung in his interpretation of religion were present in Freud’s analysis of Schreber though Freud clearly experienced some difficulty in fitting them together coherently.

The initial questions raised by Freud concerning Schreber’s delusion were the same questions posed in the very beginning of his correspondence with Jung. What constituted the relationship with ‘reality’ and what caused it to rupture? Freud maintained the distinction between rupture (decathexis) and repair (projection). Yet he admitted that he was at a loss as far as projection was concerned. It seems justified to ask if he did not have the same difficulties with decathexis. Jung criticized Freud with regard to this issue. Freud himself must have sensed that something was lacking in his explanation. If that had not been the case, he probably would not have reopened the discussion on the issue of decathexis after the famous passage of his text where paranoia was explained by means of linguistic formulations capable of denying the awareness ‘I love him’ (I love her, I hate him, etc.), upon which Lacan later vividly commented.

The question that needed to be answered with regard to the process of decathexis concerned the sexual nature of the instincts which determined the relationship with reality. Freud apparently remained faithful to
the model of transition from autoeroticism to object love which he had employed from the very beginning. He merely complemented it with the intermediary stages of narcissism and homosexuality. In fact, Freud profoundly confused the dichotomy, introduced in *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality*, between sexuality as the experience of pleasure of a creature which perceived itself as an individual (the original issue of the sexual purpose), on the one hand, and the sexual attachment to another human being (the sexual object), on the other hand.

Thus, a person’s relationship with reality was, in a way, characterized by an experience of identity which in turn was involved with some sort of sexual pleasure. The problem had become complicated yet one thing was certain. Perception did not constitute the cornerstone of the human relationship to reality. Freud, in fact, had come across a problematic issue here which went far beyond the issue of religion, namely, the credibility of any theory. One had to abandon a simplistic explanation for the ‘reality principle’. The fact that people were affected by a ‘theory’ could not be explained by stating that specific theory referred to representations which, supposedly, everyone could personally verify. Rather, people were affected by a theory because the belief in that theory relied on some sort of awareness of one’s identity or on some process such as the cathexis of reality by means of the ‘libido’.

These same elements were also encountered in Jung’s writings, although he spoke more explicitly about religion. Yet one wonders if he allowed himself to be blinded by the similarities, as far as content was concerned, between a child’s fantasy world, schizophrenic delusion and religious symbolism. Without questioning these respective experiences of reality, he employed their similarities in order to postulate a mechanism responsible for different developments at the same time, such as the reversal of sexuality into culture, the creation of human identity and the production of a world full of symbols. The way Jung expanded the notion of ‘autoeroticism’ until he could replace it with ‘introversion’ was characteristic of this quest for a single mechanism which established ‘all of this’ in people. Later, within his own framework, Jung referred to the problematic of identification, and even of homosexuality, as being the consequences of such a mechanism. Jung distinguished archetypes within the inner world which nourished the individual while he was engaged in the introversion process. In his own conceptual framework, he integrated Freud’s concept of identification, using the notion ‘persona’, and Freud’s thoughts on the problem of homosexuality, or, at least one aspect thereof, by the concept of ‘anima(-us)’.
Although Jung, as opposed to Freud, clearly distinguished religion from morality, one still wonders what he understood by ‘religion’. It seemed as if the question posed at the beginning of his correspondence with Freud, concerning the difference between the experiences of ‘reality’ in psychosis and in neurosis, had disappeared. It was precisely this question which he should have posed with regard to the fantasy world of a child, the delusions of a schizophrenic and religious symbolism. Besides the similarities concerning content between the employed representations, it is questionable whether, in all three cases, the same type of relationship toward ‘reality’ was involved. One can justifiably wonder whether this type of relationship does not constitute the specific character of religion.

It was precisely this question, which at first sight seemed to be the object of their profound discussions, that noticeably disappeared from their dialogue. Starting with the interpretation of the schizophrenic rupture with reality and Schreber’s experience of the ‘destruction of the world’, Freud and Jung began their last theoretical debate. Very soon afterwards however, they abandoned the subject of the sense for reality and commenced discussing the sexual significance of the libido and the relationship between fixation and repression. Yet, what was the specific character of religion? This question which had presented itself so stringently, was now being covered up.