University of Groningen

The Two Types of Man in Philo of Alexandria and Paul of Tarsus

van Kooten, G.H.

Published in:
Philosophische Anthropologie in der Antike

IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from it. Please check the document version below.

Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record

Publication date:
2010

[Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database](#)

Citation for published version (APA):

van Kooten, G. H. (2010). The Two Types of Man in Philo of Alexandria and Paul of Tarsus: The Anthropological Trichotomy of Spirit, Soul and Body. In C. Jedan, & L. Jansen (Eds.), *Philosophische Anthropologie in der Antike* (pp. 263-309). Ontos.

Copyright

Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).

The publication may also be distributed here under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the "Taverne" license. More information can be found on the University of Groningen website: <https://www.rug.nl/library/open-access/self-archiving-pure/taverne-amendment>.

Take-down policy

If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.

Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): <http://www.rug.nl/research/portal>. For technical reasons the number of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.

The Two Types of Man in Philo of Alexandria and Paul of Tarsus. The Anthropological Trichotomy of Spirit, Soul and Body¹

I Introduction

Today probably the best known expression of philosophical anthropology in antiquity is Plato's differentiation between body and soul.² It is perhaps less well known that already in Plato the features of a tripartite anthropology shine through alongside this dichotomic anthropology.

What is virtually unknown, however, is that by the first century AD this tripartite anthropology, which distinguishes between mind, soul and body, was being received and reworked by Jewish and Jewish-Christian authors such as Philo of Alexandria (fl. AD 40), Paul of Tarsus (fl. AD 50) and Flavius Josephus (fl. AD 75–95). Especially for Philo and Paul, this type of anthropology, reshaped by their Jewish interpretation, strongly coloured their understanding of man.

The further differentiation of soul into soul and mind already takes place, if only incipiently, in Plato. In several passages Plato points out that mind (*nous*) is a quality of the soul (*psychê*): mind (*nous*) is one of the good aspects of the soul, together with other virtues such as courage (*andreia*) and self-restraint (*sôphrosynê*; *Philebus* 55b).³

¹ This paper has now also been incorporated into George H. van Kooten (2008b). *Paul's Anthropology in Context. The Image of Assimilation to God, and Tripartite Man in Ancient Judaism, Ancient Philosophy and Early Christianity*. Tübingen (= Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament 232). For Christian theological reflections on this issue, see, *inter alia*, the first chapter of Dietrich Bonhoeffer's *Gemeinsames Leben*; Bonhoeffer 1939, chap. 1, 12, 16–22 (I owe this reference to the Rev'd René van den Beld, Biltoven).

² On the mind-body dichotomy in Plato, see, e.g., Robinson 2002.

³ For mind as a quality of the soul, see further *Laws* 12.961d, 967b.

In the *Phaedrus*, the mind even rises to prominence within the soul, since it is called »the pilot of the soul«, the *psychês kybernêtês* (*Phaedrus* 247c).⁴

In a cosmological context, Plato remarks that the »by no means feeble cause which orders and arranges years and seasons and months« is justly called »mind« (*nous*) and that this mind could never come into being without soul (*psychê*)⁵: »in the nature of Zeus you would say that a kingly soul (*psychê*) and a kingly mind (*nous*) were implanted [...]. It confirms the utterances of those who declared of old that mind (*nous*) always rules the universe« (*Philebus* 30c–d). In the *Cratylus*, these utterances are attributed to Anaxagoras: »Do you not believe the doctrine of Anaxagoras, that it is mind (*nous*) and soul (*psychê*) which orders and holds the nature of all things?« (*Cratylus* 400a).

According to Plato, it is the cosmic soul, »in conjunction with mind«, which »runs aright and always governs all things rightly and happily« (*Laws* 10.896d–897b). In his *Timaeus*, Plato clearly locates this cosmic mind within the cosmic soul, which is again constructed within the body of the cosmos: »mind cannot possibly belong to any apart from soul. So because of this reflection He [i.e. the Demiurge] constructed mind within soul and soul within body as He fashioned the All. [...] This cosmos has verily come into existence as a living creature endowed with soul and mind« (*Timaeus* 30b–c).

Implicitly, then, Plato states here that a living human being also consists of mind, soul and body. The dominance of the mind within this tripartite anthropology is confirmed by the above passage from the *Phaedrus*, where Plato explicitly calls it »the pilot of the soul«. In this way, already in Plato the outline of a tripartite anthropology begins to emerge.⁶ The aim of this paper is to show how this trichotomy was adopted by Philo of Alexandria and Paul of Tarsus, Jews living in the first century AD, and how they reworked it on the basis of the Jewish Scriptures.

In Paul, these anthropological views on the constitution of man are unfolded in a notoriously difficult chapter of his First Letter to the Corinthians, the well-known passage on the nature of the post-resurrection body (1 Cor 15). Paul had briefly ex-

⁴ All translations of classical authors are taken from the Loeb Classical Library, sometimes with minor modifications; the English translation of the New Testament is normally taken from the Revised English Bible.

⁵ Cf. *Timaeus* 46c: »the one and only existing thing which has the property of acquiring *nous* is Soul«.

⁶ Scholars have pointed out that this incipient trichotomic anthropology is boosted by Aristotle who clearly distinguished between mind and soul. See, e.g., Dillon 2001, 36–37; Roig Lanzillotta 2005, 445–447.

pressed his view on man's trichotomous constitution prior to that, as we shall see (in 1 Thess 5.23), but it is in 1 Cor 15 that he has reason to expound his views on the issue and it is here that we can grasp the full range of his thought. In this chapter, Paul gives us an insight into his anthropological views by distinguishing between »the first man« (*ho prôtos anthrôpos*), Adam, and »the second man« (*ho deuterios anthrôpos*), Christ.

Following a quotation from the narrative about the creation of man in Genesis 2.7 LXX (the Septuagint version), which tells of God blowing into man's face a breath of life by which man »became a living soul« (*kai enepsysên eis to prosôpon autou pnoên zôês, kai egeneto ho anthrôpos eis psychên zôsan*), the »first man« is identified as »soul« (*psychê*) and, for that reason, is regarded as belonging to the sphere of »that which is psychic« (*to psychikon*). The »second man«, however, is identified as »spirit« (*pneuma*) and belongs to »that which is pneumatic« (*to pneumatikon*). The first man, moreover, is characterized as »earthly« (*choïkos*), whereas the second man is depicted as »from heaven« (*ek ouranou*) and »heavenly« (*epouranios*). The first man has a »psychic body« (*sôma psychikon*), whereas the second man possesses a »pneumatic body« (*sôma pneumatikon*). Their bodily status seems to differ in accordance with their characterization as »psychic« and »pneumatic« respectively. Until now, according to Paul, we have worn the image of the earthly man, and only after the resurrection shall we shall (fully) wear the image of the heavenly man – *kai kathôs ephoresamen tên eikona tou choïkou phoresomen kai tên eikona tou epouraniou* (1 Cor 15.44–49). It is important to note that here, too, Paul alludes to the creation narrative, this time not to Gen 2.7 but to Gen 1.26–27 which speaks about the image (*eikôn*) in which man was created. Although Paul's prime concern in this section on the resurrection is the bodily status of man before and after the resurrection, his full anthropological views can easily be discerned, although they remain difficult to understand in the absence of analogies.

There is general consensus in current scholarship that the earthly, »psychic« and the heavenly, »pneumatic« pair distinguished in 1 Cor 15 does not derive from proto-Gnosticism.⁷ Considerable debate continues, however, about the relevance of Philo's differentiation between the two types of man, a heavenly and an earthly man, for a proper understanding of 1 Cor 15. Most of those who do regard Philo's writings as relevant for discerning the meaning of 1 Cor 15 construe a *difference* between Paul and Philo, assuming that Paul is in fact arguing *against* a Corinthian version of the two

⁷ For a profound criticism of a gnosticizing interpretation of Philo's notion of the heavenly man, see Wedderburn 1973, esp. 301, 310–311, 323–326.

types of man anthropology also known from Philo.⁸ On this understanding, Paul's Corinthian opponents are »Philonic«. This argument is based on the fact that Paul seems to deliberately invert Philo's sequence of the first, pneumatic-heavenly man and the second, psychic-earthly man: »Observe, the pneumatic does not come first but the psychic, and only subsequently the pneumatic« – *all' ou prôton to pneumatikon alla to psychikon, epeita to pneumatikon* (1 Cor 15.46). This line is read as an expression of Pauline polemic against a Philonic, ontological priority of the ideal, heavenly man over the earthly man – a priority which, it is believed, is deliberately reversed by Paul. The ontological priority is turned into a chronological order in which the earthly man comes first and is followed, eschatologically, by the heavenly man, who comes last.⁹

In this article I wish to show, however, that Philo (section 2) and Paul (section 3 on page 295) do not differ in their understanding of the heavenly and earthly man, but both adopt the same tripartite anthropology which distinguishes between body, *psychê* and *pneuma*. Philo, too, is of the opinion that the pneumatic man is subject to degeneration and that, for this reason, the psychic man should be restored to his original ideal, the heavenly man. This transition from psychic to pneumatic man is fundamentally identical to that in Paul. Both thinkers develop a soteriological tripartite anthropology which aims at man's re-spiritualization. We shall first look in detail at Philo's view on *the relation between the heavenly and earthly man at Creation*, as expressed in his exegesis of the creation narrative of Gen 1–2 (section 2.1). Subsequently, we shall focus on Philo's thoughts about *the degeneration of man* (section 2.2 on page 283), to be followed by his views on *the restoration of man* (section 2.3 on page 289). Finally, we shall compare Philo's view of the two types of man with Paul's (section 3 on page 295).

2 Philo of Alexandria

2.1 *The relation between the heavenly and earthly man at Creation*

2.1.1 *Double creation – Gen 1 and 2*

Before we look at Philo's interpretation of the creation of man, and at his detailed views on the anthropological constitution of man, it is important to examine the

⁸ For an extensive bibliography on those »who argue that the Corinthians with whom Paul argues are significantly guided by a Philonic type of thinking«, see Hay 2004, 127, note 1.

⁹ Cf. a similar critical reconstruction of these common views in Schaller 2004, 149–151.

general framework of Philo's understanding of creation in Gen 1–2. In Paul we have already encountered two important anthropological passages from Gen 1 and 2 respectively. According to Gen 1.26–27 LXX, man was created »in the image of God« (1 Cor 15.49); Gen 2.7 LXX tells how »God formed man by taking clay from the earth, and breathed into his face the breath (*pnoê*) of life, so that he became a living soul« (1 Cor 15.45).

The same key passages from Gen 1–2 are constitutive for Philo's anthropology. The creation of man in Gen 1 is taken as the creation of the *heavenly man*, whereas Gen 2 is understood as an account of the creation of the *earthly man*. In Philo's Platonizing interpretation, the creation in Gen 1 is about the creation of the *invisible*, ideal, »archetypical« man, whose *visible* creation is then narrated in Gen 2 – a double creation. Gen 1, in Philo's view, still concerns the design phase, the creation of models, as he says explicitly:

He [God] conceived beforehand *the models* of its parts, and [...] out of these He constituted and brought to completion *a world discernible only by the mind*, and then, with that for a pattern, the world which our senses can perceive (*On the Creation* 19).¹⁰

The remark at the beginning of Gen 2, »Thus the heavens and the earth and everything in them were completed« (Gen 2.1), is understood as a remark about the completion of the ideal, paradigmatic word, on the pattern of which the visible world was created:

He [Moses] does not say that either the individual mind or the particular sense-perception have reached completion, but that *the originals (all' ideas ...)* have done so, that of mind and that of sense-perception (*Allegorical interpretation* 1.1).

Philo's reading of Gen 1 and 2 is not entirely the product of his own Platonizing interpretation. The LXX text of Gen 1.1–2 already speaks of the earth as »invisible«, *aoratos*, thus suggesting a Platonic interpretation of the first creation account of Gen 1 in terms of the creation of a paradigmatic, true reality, to be followed by the creation of a visible reality, narrated in Gen 2.¹¹

¹⁰ Translations from Philo are taken from the Loeb Classical Library (F. H. Colson and G. H. Whitaker), with minor alterations when needed. For a running commentary on Philo's *On the Creation*, see Runia 2001.

¹¹ This is how Gen 1–2 was interpreted by Philo and Clement, but also by John the Evangelist, as his terminology of »the true light« indicates. See van Kooten 2005.

2.1.2 The heavenly man – Gen 1.26–27

It is within this framework that Philo understands the creation of the heavenly and the earthly man. According to Philo, the creation of the former is the subject of Gen 1.26–27, which speaks of God's deliberations to »make human beings in our image, after our likeness«: *Poiêsômen anthrôpon kat' eikona hêmeteran kai kath' homoiôsin*. Philo comments on this phrase as follows:

After all the rest [...], man was created after the image of God and after His likeness (Gen 1.26). [...] nothing earth-born is more like God than man. Let no one represent the likeness as one to a bodily form [...]. No, it is in respect of the Mind, the sovereign element of the soul, that the word image is used; for after the pattern of a single Mind [...] the mind in each of those who successively came into being was moulded (*On the Creation* 69).

Philo explains that the common denominator between man and God, which establishes the likeness between them, is the mind (*nous*), which he calls »the sovereign element of the soul«. The underlying view is that man consists of three parts – body, soul, and mind, as becomes clear from the following comparison:

For indeed the wise man is the first of the human race, as a pilot in a ship or a ruler in a city or a general in war, or again as a soul in a body and a mind in a soul (*kai psychê men en sômati, nous d' en psychêi*), or, once again, as heaven in the world or God in heaven (*On Abraham* 272).

The basic distinction is that between body and soul, but within the soul the dominating principle is that of the mind, which rules the lower, irrational soul, made up of the senses:

the soul [...] is a whole consisting of two parts, the rational and irrational, as if it were a property shared by two persons, who have partitioned it out between them. One class has taken as its portion the rational part, that is the mind (*nous*); the other has taken the irrational, which is subdivided into the senses (*The Special Laws* 1.333).

Mind is what God and man have in common. At the level of man, mind is located in the top part of the soul, and modelled on the single Mind of God:

after the pattern of a single Mind [...], the mind in each of those who successively came into being was moulded (*On the Creation* 69).

As a consequence, man is indeed closer to God than is anything else created on earth:

But man, the best of living creatures, through that higher part of his being, namely, the soul, is most nearly akin [...] to the Father of the world, possessing in his mind (*nous*) a closer likeness and copy than anything else on earth of the eternal and blessed Archetype (*The Decalogue* 134).

This is what constitutes the likeness between God and man. Our reason is modelled on the divine reason (*logos*) and, for that reason, is not itself »the image of God«, but is created »in, or after the image«. There are two forms of reason (*logoi*):

One is the archetypal reason (*logos*) above us, the other the copy of it which we possess. Moses calls the first the »image of God«, the second the cast of that image. For God, he says, made man not »the image of God« but »after the image« (Gen 1.27). And thus the mind (*nous*) in each of us, which in the true and full sense is the »man«, is an expression at third hand from the Maker, while between them is the Logos which serves as model for our reason, but itself is the representation of God (*Who is the Heir* 230–231).

In this view, (the cast of) the divine image is born within the upper part of the soul, the mind, mediated by the Logos by which it is shaped.

For a man's soul is a precious thing, and when it departs to seek another home, all that will be left behind is defiled, deprived as it is of the divine image. For it is the mind (*nous*) of man which has the form of God, being shaped in conformity with the ideal archetype, the Logos that is above all (*The Special Laws* 3.207).

At this point, let me draw attention to the broad similarities with several aspects of Paul's anthropology in 1 Cor: (a) the same ascending hierarchy of man – Logos / Christ – God is found in 1 Cor 11: »every man has Christ for his head«, and »Christ's head is God« (11.3). Within this hierarchy, »man is the image of God, and the mirror of his glory« (11.7). This implies that this image and glory are mediated through Christ.

(b) The mediating role of Christ (Philo's Logos) in the creation of man is also explicitly expressed in 1 Cor 8: »there is one Lord, Jesus Christ, through whom are all things, and we exist through him« (8.6). As the preposition »through« in the formula »through him« should be taken against the background of the language of prepositional metaphysics, as Sterling has convincingly argued¹², Christ's role is indeed that of Philo's paradigmatic Logos on which the human mind is modelled.

¹² Sterling 1997.

(c) For this reason, it can scarcely be a coincidence that Christians not only possess a human *nous* (1 Cor 1.10) but are also said to possess »the *nous* of Christ«: *hêmeis de nous Christou echomen* (1 Cor 2.16). This is not just a manner of speaking, but makes sense if indeed, in Philo's wording »it is the mind (*nous*) of man which has the form of God, being shaped in conformity with the ideal archetype, the Logos that is above all« (*The Special Laws* 3.207). It seems that Paul and Philo share basic anthropological convictions. This shall become clearer as we now address Philo's view on the creation of the earthly man and his composition.

2.1.3 *The earthly man – Gen 2.7*

Although the creation of the heavenly man does indeed precede that of the earthly man, it is important to understand that Philo, without exception, calls the earthly man »the first man«, *ho prôtos anthrôpos*. As in Paul, »the first man« means »the first man fashioned«. Despite many scholarly claims to the contrary,¹³ the expression »the first man« in Philo does not refer to the heavenly man.¹⁴ The first insight which will transpire from a close reading of Philo's passages on the creation of the earthly man is that Philo and Paul use the expression »the first man« in the same sense.

The second insight is that, for their views on the constitution of the first man, both authors equally focus on Gen 2.7 LXX, the text about God breathing his breath into man: *kai eplasen ho theos ton anthrôpon choun apo tês gês kai enephysêsen eis to prosôpon autou pnoên zôês, kai egeneto ho anthrôpos eis psychên zôsan* – »And God moulded the man of dust from the earth and blew into his face a breath of life, and man became a living soul (*psychê*).«

We shall look at two extensive passages in Philo about the constitution of the first man, one from *On the Creation*, the other from *Allegorical interpretation*. The first passage will be of help in establishing the meaning of »the first man« in Philo, the second in drawing a more detailed outline of Philo's anthropology.

¹³ For such claims, see, e.g., Sellin 1986; cf. Betz 2001, 51, note 32.

¹⁴ Cf. Schaller 2004, 149: »Macht man sich die – nicht einmal große – Mühe, den philonischen Sprachgebrauch zu verfolgen, dann zeigt sich, dass bei Philo an keiner einzigen Stelle der himmlische, »der pneumatische Urmensch« als *ho prôtos anthrôpos* bezeichnet wird. Das wird zwar in der Forschung immer wieder behauptet, trifft aber nicht zu. Erst in späteren gnostischen Texten lässt sich dieser Gebrauch nachweisen. Im philonischen Schrifttum selbst begegnet *ho prôtos anthrôpos* durchgehend als *terminus technicus* für den irdischen Adam, für den *gêgenês*.«

(i) Taking his starting point in Gen 2.7, Philo first points out the difference between the creation of the heavenly man, already narrated in Gen 1.26–27, and that of the earthly man:

By this also he [Moses] shows very clearly that there is a vast difference between the man thus formed [as described in Gen 2.7] and the man that came into existence earlier after the image of God [as described in Gen 1.26–27] (*On the Creation* 134).

Whereas »he that was after the (divine) image« was by nature incorruptible (*aphthartos*), the earthly man, who consists of body and soul, is by nature mortal (*thnêtos*). The formation of the latter is »the formation of the individual man«. In his description of this formation Philo replaces the LXX term »breath« (*pnoê*; Gen 2.7 LXX) with *pneuma*, which better suits his anthropological interest. The formation of the earthly man is

a composite one made up of earthly substance and of divine breath (*pneuma*, rather than the *pnoê* of Gen 2.7 LXX); for it says that that the body was made through the Artificer taking clay and moulding out of it a human form, but that the soul was originated from nothing created whatever, but from the Father and Ruler of all: for that which He breathed in was nothing other than a Divine breath (*pneuma theion*) that migrated hither from that blissful and happy existence (*On the Creation* 135).

Having alluded to Gen 2.7, Philo states that »that first man (*ekeinos d' ho prôtos anthrôpos*), earthborn (*ho gêgenês*), ancestor of our whole race, was made [...] most excellent in each part of his being, in both soul and body« (*On the Creation* 136). Philo proposes several reasons why the first man was excellent both in soul and body. The Creator excelled in skill to bestow on man a body with a beautiful form, »desiring the first man (*ton prôtan anthrôpon*) to be as fair as could be to behold« (138). But also the soul of the first man was most excellent:

for the Creator [...] employed for its making no pattern taken from among created things, but solely, as I have said, His own Word / Reason (*logos*). It is on this account that he says that man was made a likeness and imitation of the Word (*logos*), when the Divine Breath was breathed (*empneusthenta* < *empneô*, instead of the verb *emphysaô*, »to blow in«, in Gen 2.7 LXX) into his face [...]. Such was the first man (*ho prôtos anthrôpos*) created, as I think, in body and soul (*kata te sôma kai psychên*), surpassing all the men that now are (*On the Creation* 139–140).

In this passage Philo also links the creation of the heavenly man with that of the earthly man and shows how they relate from the perspective of the latter. When

the divine *pneuma* is breathed into the face of the first man (Gen 2.7) he is made a likeness of the divine image (Gen 1.26–27), the Logos. This interconnection between the two men is also highlighted elsewhere in Philo's œuvre, in a passage in which Philo criticizes the Aristotelian view »that our human mind (*nous*) is a particle of the ethereal substance«¹⁵. This would render man only »a kinship with the upper air«, which is still part of creation. Instead, Philo argues, Moses

likened the fashioning of the reasonable soul (*tês logikês psychês to eidos*) to no created thing, but averred it to be a genuine coinage of that dread Spirit (*pneuma*), signed and impressed by the seal of God, the stamp of which is the eternal Logos. His words are »God in-breathed (again the verb *empneô*, instead of the LXX verb *emphysaô*) into his face a breath of life« (Gen 2.7); so that it cannot but be that he that receives is made in the likeness of Him who sends forth the breath. Accordingly we also read that man has been made after the image of God (Gen 1.26–27), not however after the image of anything created (*Noah's work as a Planter* 18–20).¹⁶

As in *On the Creation*, Philo shows how, in his understanding, the creation of the first, earthly man relates to that of the heavenly man: by receiving God's *pneuma* (Gen 2.7) the first man »is made in the likeness (Gen 1.26–27) of Him who sends forth the *pneuma*«. We also note, in passing, that in Philo, the terminology of »mind« (*nous*), »reasonable soul« (*logikê psychê*), and »spirit« (*pneuma*) are near-synonyms.

What is clear from the extensive passage from *On the Creation* is that Philo here understands the phrase »the first man« in the sense of the »ancestor of our whole race« (136). Or, as he explicitly says further on in *On the Creation*, as »the man first fashioned« (140 – *ho prôtos diplastheis anthrôpos*), »the first-made man« (145 – *tou men oun prôtou phyntos anthrôpou ...*). In this, there is no difference between Philo and Paul. The latter also takes »the first man« to mean »the first man, Adam«, the ancestor of the entire human race. Despite the fact that Philo uses the expression »the first man« frequently, he remains consistent in its meaning and application.

¹⁵ See also Philo, *The Special Laws* 4.123: »And clearly what was then thus breathed (Gen 2.7) was ethereal spirit, or something, if such there be, better than ethereal spirit, even an effulgence of the blessed, thrice blessed nature of the Godhead«; *Allegorical interpretation* 3.161: »The body, then, has been formed out of earth, but the soul is of the upper air«; and *The Unchangeableness of God* 46–47: the mind »was allotted something better and purer, the substance, in fact, out of which divine nature [i.e. the stars] was wrought.«

¹⁶ Cf. perhaps also Philo, *The Worse Attacks the Better* 90: »the mind of man ... [is] an inseparable portion of that divine and blessed soul«. But it could also be that, as in *The Unchangeableness of God* 46–47, Philo has the divine nature of the stars in mind (see previous footnote).

There is only one passage in Philo that seems to contravene this otherwise consistent usage. When Philo's interpretation reaches the story of the creation of Eve, and he needs to comment on Gen 2.18, »It is not good that *any* man should be alone«, Philo applies the text to both men we have so far encountered, the heavenly and the earthly man:

For there are two races of men, the one made after the (divine) image (Gen 1.26–27), and the one moulded out of the earth (Gen 2.7). For *the man made after the image* it is not good to be alone, because he yearns after the Image [...]. Far less is it good for *the man moulded of the earth* to be alone. Nay, it is impossible [...]. With *the second man* (*tôi de deuterôi anthrôpôi*) a helper is associated ... (*Allegorical interpretation* 2.4–5).

In this passage, the earthly man is referred to as »the second man«. This, however, is no breach of Philo's consistent reference to Adam as »the first man« but is due to the specific order of the two men in this specific exposition. »Second« here clearly means the second of both men which were enumerated in this passage. That Adam is called »the second man« in this context cannot be used as evidence that, as a matter of fact, »the first man« is the heavenly man in Philo. The contextual nature of the need to call Adam this time »the second man« is confirmed by the fact, that further on in *Allegorical interpretation*, Adam is again called »the first generated [man]«, *ho prôtos genomenos* (2.15).

At the same time, it is telling that the passage just discussed is the only instance, in Philo's entire oeuvre, in which he uses the phrase »the second man«. As the extensive passage from *On the Creation* has shown, Philo, like Paul, applies the phrase »the first man« to the first generated man, Adam. And, as another extensive passage from *Allegorical interpretation* will show, again like Paul, Philo refers to the two men as the »heavenly« and the »earthly« man respectively. This passage will also deepen our understanding of Philo's anthropology.

(ii) Elsewhere in his *Allegorical interpretation*, Philo gives a detailed interpretation of Gen 2.7, »And God formed man by taking clay from the earth, and breathed into his face a breath (*pnoê*) of life, and the man became a living soul«. According to Philo,

There are two types of men; the one a *heavenly* man, the other an *earthly* (*ditta anthrôpôn genê: ho men gar estin ouranios anthrôpos, ho de gêinos*). *The heavenly man*, being made after the image of God (Gen 1.26–27), is altogether without part or lot in corruptible and terrestrial substance; but *the earthly one* was compacted out of matter [...]. For this reason he [Moses] says that *the heavenly man* was not moulded, but

was stamped with the image of God (Gen 1.26–27); while *the earthly* is a moulded work (*Allegorical interpretation* 1.31).

In his interpretation of Gen 2.7 proper, Philo rather bluntly states that we »must account the man made out of the earth *einai noun eiskrinomenon sômati, oupô d' eiskekri-menon*, to be mind mingling with, but not yet blended with, body« (1.32). The »body« is of course implied in the »clay of the earth«, from which the first man was formed (Gen 2.7), but it remains unclear whence Philo derives »the mind«, which he regards as being, at the point of Gen 2.7, in the yet unfinished process of »mingling with [...] body«. Philo calls this mind the »earthlike mind«. It is, in all likelihood, the mind which is modelled on the »heavenlike« mind of the heavenly man, which functions as its archetype. Yet, interestingly, Philo makes clear that, during its formative phase, this earthlike mind is still corruptible as long as it has not yet been breathed into by God:

But this earthlike mind is in reality also corruptible, were not God to breathe into it a power of real life (*ho de nous houtos geôdês esti tôi onti kai phthartos, ei mê ho theos empneuseien autôi dunamin alêthinês zôês*); when He does so, it no longer undergoes any moulding, but becomes a soul (*tote gar ginetai ... eis psychên*), not an inefficient and imperfectly formed soul, but one endowed with mind and actually alive (*all' eis noeran kai zôsan ontôs*; *Allegorical interpretation* 1.32).

This means that at his creation, the first man was breathed into by God. As Philo explains, this expression, »breathed into«,

implies of necessity three things, (1) that which inbreathes, (2) that which receives, (3) that which is inbreathed: that which inbreathes is God, that which receives is the mind (*nous*), that which is inbreathed is the spirit / breath (*pneuma*). What, then, do we infer from these premises? A union of the three comes about, as God projects the power that proceeds from Himself through the mediant breath till it reaches the subject (1.37).

From this passage it becomes possible to determine the exact relation between »mind« (*nous*) and »spirit« (*pneuma*) in Philo. The »mind« is the highest part of the soul, as it is in contemporary Greek philosophy: man consists of body and soul, and within the soul the leading part, the *nous*, is differentiated from the lower soul, made up of the senses. This tripartite thinking is adopted by Philo, but under the influence of his exegesis of Gen 2.7 he is able to link the *nous* with the *pneuma*.¹⁷ Properly speaking,

¹⁷ This has also been noted by Festugière 1932, 212–217.

the *nous* is not identical with the *pneuma* (*nous* ≠ *pneuma*). Rather the *pneuma* is greater than or equal to the *nous* (*pneuma* ≥ *nous*) because, in Philo's view, it is within the *nous* that the *pneuma* is received, the *nous* is the receptacle. The *nous*, in turn, mediates this *pneuma* to the rest of the soul so that this spirit dominates both *nous* and (the rest of the) *psychê*:

the mind [is] the dominant element of the soul (*psychês hêgemonikon estin ho nous*): into this only does God breathe (*toutôi monôi empnei ho theos*). [...] the mind imparts to the portion of the soul that is devoid of reason a share of that which it has received from God, so that the mind was besouled by God (*hôte ton men noun epsychôsthai hypo theou*), but the unreasoning part by the mind (*to de alogon hypo tou nous*; *Allegorical interpretation* 1.39–40).

If the *nous* is indeed inbreathed by, and filled with the divine *pneuma* it becomes synonymous with the *pneuma*. This shows that Philo not only knows the triad *nous*, *psychê* and *sôma*, in accordance with Greek philosophy, but also, under the influence of his exegesis of Gen 2.7, the similar triad *pneuma*, *psychê* and *sôma*. This latter triad does not occur in Greek philosophers,¹⁸ but is found in Jewish authors such as Philo, Flavius Josephus, and Paul. Its occurrence in Paul will be the subject of section 3, but I should like first to look briefly at the situation in Josephus. He, too, appears to understand Gen 2.7 in terms of the dichotomy of *pneuma* and *psychê*. In his retelling of the Pentateuch in the *Jewish Antiquities*, Josephus even explicitly inserts the term *pneuma* in his alleged quotation of Gen 2.7: »Moses begins to interpret nature, writing on the formation of man in these terms: »God fashioned man by taking dust from the earth and instilled into him *pneuma* and *psychê*.« Now this man was called Adam« (1.34; cf. 3.260).

This shows that the triad *pneuma*, *psychê* and *sôma*¹⁹ is the Jewish equivalent of the Greek tripartite division of man in terms of *nous*, *psychê* and *sôma*,²⁰ which is read from the perspective of Gen 2.7. Since this passage is explicitly quoted by Philo, Paul

¹⁸ »Pneuma« does occur in relation to *nous* and *psychê* in *Corpus Hermeticum* X.16, but there *pneuma* is not equivalent with *nous* and not superior but inferior to *psychê* since, as Dillon explains, it is taken »in the sense of the basic life-force, which forms a sort of »cushion« for the soul when united to a body (the »the pneumatic vehicle« of later Platonism)«; Dillon 2001, 42.

¹⁹ For another early Christian differentiation between *pneuma* and *psychê*, see the author of Hebrews 4.12 about the word of God »piercing so deeply that it divides soul and spirit« – *diïknoumenos achri merismou psychês kai pneumatos*.

²⁰ For another Jew differentiating between *nous* and *psychê*, see the Jewish author of the *Pseudo-Orphica*, Recension C, lines 11–12: »... and him [God] no one among | Mortals sees with

and Josephus, their interpretation seems to reflect a common Jewish understanding of Gen 2.7 LXX in the first century AD.²¹ This is an important finding, I believe, which indicates that the allegedly Gnostic distinction between the pneumatic, psychic and sarkic man (see section 3 on page 295) is not a Gnostic invention, but rather a development of this Jewish-Hellenistic interpretation of Gen 2.7 and its consequent tripartization of man.

According to Philo, the reason why God breathes the *pneuma* into the human *nous* is as follows:

And for what purpose save that we may obtain a conception of him? For how could the soul have conceived of God, had He not breathed into it and mightily laid hold of it? For the mind of man would never have ventured to soar so high as to grasp the nature of God, had not God Himself drawn it up to Himself (*Allegorical interpretation* 1.37–38).

As we have seen, Philo's reflections on the relation between *pneuma* and *nous* are based on his interpretation of Gen 2.7. There is, however, one complication which threatens to blur Philo's exegesis: the fact that the text of Gen 2.7 LXX – as I have already pointed out in passing – does not read *pneuma* (»breath« or »spirit«) but *pnoê* (»breath«). Only here in *Allegorical interpretation* does Philo raise awareness of this textual problem. Everywhere else Philo interprets Gen 2.7 LXX as if the text read *pneuma*. The reason that Philo draws attention to the actual Septuagint reading in *Allegorical interpretation* is that, in his understanding of Gen 1–2, it is only in the case of the creation of the earthly man (Gen 2.7), and not in that of the heavenly man (Gen 1.26–27), that Moses seems to speak of the inbreathing of the divine *pneuma*. Given the importance of this *pneuma* it would seem odd that Moses fails to mention it when describing the creation of the *heavenly* man:

The question might be asked, why God deemed the earthly and body-loving mind (*ton gēgenēi kai philosōmaton noun*) worthy of divine breath (*êxiōsen ... pneumatos*

the soul, but he is seen with the mind – *oude tis auton eisoraai psychēn thnētōn, nōi d' eisoraatai* (ed. Holladay 1996, 194–195).

²¹ For pagan philosophical familiarity with Gen 2.7, see Porphyry, *Ad Gaurum* 11: »the animation takes place after the conception and formation of the body. The theologian of the Hebrews [Moses] also seems to signify this when he says that when the human body was formed, and had received all of its bodily workmanship, God breathed the spirit into it to act as a living soul« – *hotan peplasmēnou tou anthrōpinou sōματος kai apeilēphotos pasan tēn sōmatikēn dēmiourgian emphysēsai ton theon autōi eis psychēn zōsan legēi to pneuma* (Stern 1974–1984, No. 466).

theiou) at all, but not the mind which had been created after the original (*ton kata tèn idean gegonota*; *Allegorical interpretation* 1.33).

This question is answered, Philo suggests, when closer scrutiny reveals that Moses, in speaking of the creation of the earthly man, does not speak of the divine *pneuma*, but rather of the divine *pnoê*:

He uses the word »breath« (*pnoê*) not »spirit« (*pneuma*), implying a difference between them; for »spirit« is conceived of as connoting strength and vigour and power, while a »breath« is like an air of peaceful and gentle vapour. The mind that was made after the image and original (Gen 1.26–27) might be said to partake of spirit (*pneuma*), for its reasoning faculty possesses robustness; but the mind that was made out of matter (Gen 2.7) must be said to partake of the light and less substantial air (*Allegorical interpretation* 1.42).

In this way, Philo makes sense of the LXX reading »*pnoê*« in Gen 2.7. In his view, the qualitative difference between the mind of the heavenly man and that of the earthly man is reflected in the fact that the latter is said to have received the divine *pnoê*, whereas the former »might be said to partake of *pneuma*«. ²² In his *Allegorical interpretation* Philo offers an unusual, very close reading and interpretation of Gen 2.7. The problem-generating, rather than problem-solving nature of the passage just discussed serves to show that Jewish authors such as Philo did indeed face textual difficulties when they tried to develop the Graeco-Roman trichotomy of *sôma* – *psychê* – *nous* into a Jewish trichotomy of *sôma* – *psychê* – *pneuma*. Normally, however – in other writings but also elsewhere in his *Allegorical interpretation* – Philo does not hesitate to say that God's *pneuma* (not his *pnoê*) was received by the *earthly* man: »that which inbreathes is God, that which receives is the mind (*nous*), that which is inbreathed is the spirit (*pneuma*)« – *to men oun empneon estin ho theos, to de dechomenon ho nous, to de empneomenon to pneuma* (*Allegorical interpretation* 1.37).

This is confirmed by many other passages which suggest that it is the divine *pneuma* which is breathed into man. Man is akin (*syngenês*) to God, ²³ »since the divine Spirit (*pneuma*) had poured into him in full flow« (*On the Creation* 144). The human mind (*nous*) is closely linked to the divine *pneuma*: »it would be strange if a light substance like the mind (*nous*) were not rendered buoyant and raised to the utmost height by

²² Cf. Philo, *Noah's Work as a Planter* 44: »the man stamped with the Spirit [...] is after the image of God.«

²³ On the notion of man's kinship (*syngeneia*) with God, see Des Places 1964 and Thom 2005, 61, 62–67.

the native force of the divine Spirit (*pneuma*)« (*Noah's Work as a Planter* 24). An interesting case is a passage in *The Special Laws*, in which Gen 2.7 and Gen 1.26–27 are merged into a single view: »our dominant part [is] the rational *pneuma* within us (*en hêmin logikon pneuma*), which was shaped according to the archetypal form of the divine image« (1.171).

2.1.4 *Spirit and blood*

In a special set of passages in Philo, the *pneuma*, as the substance of the *nous*, is clearly and persistently contrasted with the blood, which is considered to be the substance of the rest of the soul. In these passages Philo aims to do justice to what he regards as another important anthropological assertion in the Jewish scripture, that of Leviticus 17.11: »the soul of every flesh is his blood« – *hê gar psychê pasês sarkos haima autou estin*. We shall now consider these passages, as the contrast which Philo draws between »*pneuma*« on the one hand, and »flesh« and »blood« on the other is very similar to Paul's language.

Philo's challenge is to reconcile two different, and seemingly contradictory views on the substance of the soul – (1) that of Gen 2.7, according to which, at least in Philo's understanding, the soul consists of *pneuma*; and (2) that of Lev 17.11, which contends that the soul consists of blood. Philo's solution is to distinguish between two types of soul: the leading part of the soul, the *nous*, and the rest of the soul, which is simply called »soul«. This is brought out in the following passage in *Who is the Heir*, which also shows that Philo, in the construction of his anthropology, refers to the three key texts of Gen 1.26–27, Gen 2.7, and Lev 17.11:

We use »soul« in two senses (*psychê dichôs legetai*), both for the whole soul (*hê te holê*) and also for its dominant part, which properly speaking is the soul's soul (*kai to hêgemonikon authês meros, ho kuriôs eipein psychê psychês esti*).²⁴ [...] And therefore the lawgiver [Moses] held that the substance of the soul is twofold (*Edoxe ... dittên kai tèn ousian einai psychês*), blood being that of the soul as a whole (*haima men tês holês*), and the divine spirit (*pneuma*) that of its most dominant part (*tou d' hêgemonikôtatou pneuma theion*). Thus he says plainly »the soul of every flesh is the blood« (Lev 17.11). [...] On the other hand he did not make the substance of the mind (*tou de nou tèn ousian*) depend on anything created, but represented it as

²⁴ Cf. the term *dipsychos* in James 1.8 and 4.8 which probably also reflects the differentiation between the whole *psychê* (1.21, 5.20) and its dominant part, the *pneuma* (2.26, 4.5). In this I differ from Seitz 1958, 1947, 1944 and Marcus 1982, who understand *dipsychos* primarily against the background of the Hebrew concept of »double-heartedness«.

breathed upon by God (*hypo theou katapneustheisan*). For the Maker of all, he says, »blew into this face the breath of life, and man became a living soul« (Gen 2.7); just as we are also told that he was fashioned after the image of his Maker (Gen 1.26–27) (*Who is the Heir* 55–56).

The *pneuma* is clearly depicted as the substance of the *nous*, the leading part of man's soul. Basing himself on the three Scriptural passages from Genesis and Leviticus, Philo reaches the following conclusion:

So we have two kinds of man (*hôte ditton eidos anthrôpôn*), those who live by reason, the divine *pneuma* (*to men theiôi pneumatī logismôi biountôn*), and those who live by blood and the pleasure of the flesh (*to de haimatī kai sarkos hêdonêi zôntôn*). This last is a moulded clod of earth, the other is the faithful impress of the divine image (*Who is the Heir* 57).

As we shall see in due course, Philo's distinction between »those who live by the divine *pneuma*« and »those who live by blood and the pleasure of the flesh« resembles that in Paul between the *pneumatikoi* (»those who live by the *pneuma*«) on the one hand and the *psychikoi* (»those who live by the lower *psychê*«) or the *sarkinoi* / *sarkikoi* (»those who live by the flesh«) on the other. Although, as Philo clearly indicates, the substance of the soul is twofold (*Who is the Heir* 55–56) and consists of *pneuma* (for the *nous*) and blood (for the rest of the soul), the two layers which are as such present in every man are nevertheless exemplified in two distinct types of man (*Who is the Heir* 57). »Those who live by the *pneuma*« have their soul directed by the divine *pneuma* which has been breathed into man's *nous*, whereas »those who live by the flesh« limit the effectiveness of their soul to its lower part, that of the senses.

This might be a good point to note that, whereas in *Who is the Heir* Philo distinguishes between two types of man, elsewhere, in *On the Giants*, the tripartite nature of man is made manifest in three distinct types of man:

some men are earth-born, some heaven-born, and some God-born (*hoi men gês, hoi de ouranou, hoi de theou gegonasin anthrôpoi*). The earth-born are those who take the pleasures of the body (*sôma*) for their quarry [...]. The heaven-born are the votaries of the arts and of knowledge, the lovers of learning. For the heavenly element in us is the mind (*to gar ouranion tôn en hêmin ho nous*), as the heavenly beings are each of them a mind. [...] But the men of God are priests and prophets who [...] have risen wholly above the sphere of sense-perception and have been translated into the world of the intelligible (*to de aisthêton pan hyperkypsantes eis ton noêton kosmon metanestêsan*). [...] But the sons of earth have turned the steps of mind out of the path of reason (*hoi de gês paides ton noun ekbibasantes tou logizesthai*) and transmuted

it into the soulless and inert nature of the flesh (*kai metalloïdsantes eis tèn apsychon kai akinêton sarkôn physin*) (*On the Giants* 60–61, 65).

This passage, together with the combined evidence of the previous passage from *Who is the Heir*, shows that Philo's tripartition of man develops into a theory of three kinds of man.²⁵ As John Dillon has shown, this scheme of three classes of man predates but is essentially similar to schemes in ancient philosophers such as Plutarch (*On the Sign of Socrates* 591d–592c) and Plotinus (*Enneads* 5.9.1), schemes which have also been adopted in Gnostic anthropology (Clement of Alexandria, *Excerpta ex Theodoto* 54; see further in section 3 on page 295 below).²⁶ One illustration of the similarity between Philo and Plutarch can be found in the latter's *On the Sign of Socrates*:

Every soul partakes of *nous* (*psychê pasa nou meteschen*); none is irrational or unintelligent. But the portion of the soul that mingles with the flesh (*all' hoson an autês sarki michthêi*) and passions suffers alteration and becomes in the pleasures and pains it undergoes irrational. Not every soul mingles to the same extent: some sink entirely into the body (*all' hai (men) hilai katedysan eis sôma*) [...]. Others mingle in part, but leave outside what is purest in them. This is not dragged in with the rest, but is like a buoy attached to the top, floating on the surface in contact with the man's head, while he is as it were submerged in the depths [...]. Now the part carried submerged in the body is called soul (*to men oun hypobrychion en tõi sômati pheromenon psychê legetai*), whereas the part left free from corruption is called by the multitude the *nous* (*to de phthoras leiphthen hoi polloi voun kalountes entos einai*) (*On the Sign of Socrates* 591d–e).

On this basis, Plutarch distinguishes between three classes of man. In ascending order, (1) »the souls that sink entirely into the body« (591f); (2) the souls that do not coincide with their bodies but have difficulty in pulling on »the tie which is like a bridle inserted into the irrational part of the soul« (592b); (3) and the souls that really »possess *nous*« (591f). This differentiation between various types of man can clearly be recognized in the passages from Philo examined above – the three types of man in *On the Giants*, the two types of man in *Who is the Heir*. In Philo, the difference between the highest type of man and the lower one is buttressed by his references to Gen 2.7 and Lev 17.11 respectively: whereas *pneuma* is the substance of the *nous*, blood is the substance of the (lower, irrational) *psychê* which is devoid of *pneuma*.

In another similar passage dealing with Lev 17.11, Philo states: »the fleshly nature (*hê sarkôn physis*) has received no share of mind (*nous*)«. Man is a »living creature with

²⁵ Cf. Mendelson 1982, chap. 3 on »Philo's typology of mankind«, esp. chap. 3.1 and 3.2.

²⁶ Dillon 2001, 40–41 with 40, note 22.

two natures (*to diphyes zôion*)«; he is a »composite mass«, which consists of (1) »the highest form in which life shows itself«, the mind (*nous*), reason or spirit (*pneuma*), »that God-like creation with which we reason«, whose »nourishment [is] celestial and imperishable (*aphthartos*), not perishable (*phthartos*) and earthly«, and of (2) »the fleshly nature«, whose life is the blood (Lev 17.11) (*The Worse Attacks the Better* 83–85).

This lower part of the soul, as another passage makes clear, is the soul which »gives the life which we and the irrational animals possess in common« and »operates through the senses«. ²⁷ This passage merits quoting in full because it combines various important notions outlined so far. The divine *pneuma* is clearly depicted as the substance of the mind. And at the same time, the »first man« unambiguously stands for the »founder of our race«, Adam:

Blood is prohibited for the reason which I have mentioned that it is the essence of the soul (Lev 17.11), not of the intelligent and reasonable soul, but of that which operates through the senses (*ousia psychês estin – ouchi tês noeras kai logikês alla tês aisthêtikês*), the soul that gives the life which we and the irrational animals possess in common. For the essence or substance of that other soul is divine spirit (*pneuma*), a truth vouched for by Moses especially, who in his story of the creation says that God breathed a breath of life upon the first man (*anthrôpoi tôi prôtôi*) (Gen 2.7), the founder of our race (*kai archêgetêi tou genous hêmôn*), into the lordliest part of his body, the face, where the senses are stationed like bodyguards to the great king, the mind (*nous*) (*The Special Laws* 4.123).

The *pneuma*, then, is the substance of the human *nous*, as other passages confirm:

Now the divine Spirit is the substance of the rational (part) according to the theologian [i.e. Philo], for in (the account of) the creation of the world, he says, »He breathed the breath of life into his face« (as) his cause. But blood is the substance of the sense-perceptive and vital (soul) [...]. [...] the substance of the soul is truly and infallibly spirit (*Quaestiones in Genesin* 2.59).

Before we come to the next section, on the disintegration and downfall of man, it is important to underline that what we have seen of Philo's anthropology in key

²⁷ For the differentiation of the soul into (a) a rational and intelligent soul and (b) a sense-perceptive and vital soul, see also Philo's *Quaestiones in Genesin* 2.59, a commentary on Gen 9.4: »Flesh in the blood of the life you shall not eat«; »the blood is the substance of the soul, but of the sense-perceptive and vital soul, not of that which is called (soul) *kat' exochên*, (namely) that which is rational and intelligent. For there are three parts of the soul: one is nutritive, another is sense-perceptive, and the third is rational.« See also *The Special Laws* 3.99: »the baser kind of soul, the irrational, which the beasts also share«, as opposed to reason, »the better part of the soul«; without the latter, man is »transformed into the nature of a beast, even though the outward characteristics of his body still retain their human form«.

passages presented so far is confirmed in many other, often short passages in which his anthropological views come to the surface. Despite their brevity, we can recognize in them the anthropology outlined above. In these passages Philo differentiates between »a man, this compound animal in which soul and body are woven or intertwined or mingled (use any word you will)«, the earthly man of Gen 2.7, and »the mind pure and unalloyed«, the heavenly man of Gen 1.26–27 (*On Drunkenness* 101).

The latter is called »the real man, who is absolutely pure mind (*nous katharôtatos*)«, »he who is man in the special sense«, »that invisible reasoning faculty free from admixture« whereas the earthly man is the »man so-called, one that has an admixture of sense-perception«, he »in whom an irrational and rational nature are woven together« (*On Flight and Finding* 70–72). Consequently, »the mind [...] is the real man in us« (*Noah's work as a Planter* 42); it is »the man within the man, the better part within the worse, the immortal within the mortal« (*The Preliminary Studies* 97), »the man in us, the ruling mind« (*On Dreams* 2.267), »the invisible man«, »the veritable man« (*Every Good Man is Free* 111).

In some passages Philo focuses only on the basic dichotomy between body and soul:

For there are two things of which we consist, soul and body. The body, then, has been formed out of earth, but the soul is of the upper air, a particle detached from the Deity: »For God breathed into his face a breath of life, and man became a living soul« (Gen 2.7) (*Allegorical interpretation* 3.161).

In other passages Philo is more detailed in his description of man and distinguishes between the soul and its leading part, the mind: »To crown all [...] He made man and bestowed on him mind *par excellence*, the soul of the soul (*noun exhaireton edôreito, psychês tina psychên*)« (*On the Creation* 66). This mind, »the ruling part of the soul« (*On Dreams* 2.207), is »a fragment of the Deity«:

among created things, that which is holy is, in the universe, the heavens [...]; in man it is mind, a fragment of the Deity (*nous, apospasma theion ôn*), as the words of Moses in particular bear witness, »He breathed into his face a breath of life, and man became a living soul« (Gen 2.7) (*On Dreams* 1.34).

In some passages Philo even distinguishes between three layers within the soul:

Our soul, we are told, is tripartite, having one part assigned to the mind and reason, one to the spirited element and one to the appetites – *trimerous hêmôn tês psychês hyparchousês to men nous kai logos, to de thymos, to de epithymia keklêrôsthai legetai* (*The Confusion of Tongues* 21).

This is a further differentiation of the human soul under the influence of Plato's *Timaeus*:

They [i.e. the philosophers] had made researches into the nature of the soul and observed that its components were threefold: reason, high spirit and desire (*to men logou, to de thymou, to d' epithymias*) (*The Special Laws* 4.92; cf. Plato, *Timaeus* 69e–f).²⁸

In these passages, the differentiation between, on the one hand, the mind (*nous*) and reason (*logos*), and, on the other, the faculties of the lower soul are still discernible.

Now we have seen the manifold expressions of Philo's anthropological views, I shall demonstrate that, according to Philo, man has been subject to degeneration because the pneumatic-noetic part of his soul has been lost. For this reason, the soul (i.e. the lower soul) should be restored to its original archetype, the heavenly man.

2.2 *The degeneration and fall of man*

Speaking about the current descendants of the first earthly man, Philo is both positive and critical. Having described »the beauty of the first-made man (*Tou men oun prôtou phyntos anthrôpou to ... kallos*) in each part of his being, in soul and body«, Philo remarks:

It could not but be that his descendants, partaking as they did in the original form in which he was formed, should preserve marks, though faint ones, of their kinship with their first father. Now what is this kinship? Every man, in respect of his mind (*dianoia*), is allied to the divine Reason, having come into being as a copy or fragment or ray of that blessed nature (*On the Creation* 145–146).

Despite this positive resemblance between us and the first earthly man, in other passages Philo stresses the degeneration and fall of man. This degeneration is partly due to natural developments since creation. In this Philo follows particular views on the physical degeneration of the world and its inhabitants due to the ageing of the world (»mundus senescens«).²⁹ According to Philo,

²⁸ See further Philo, *Allegorical interpretation* 1.70: »our soul is threefold, and has one part that is the seat of reason, another that is the seat of high spirit, and another that is the seat of desire: *estin hêmôn trimerês hê psychê kai echei meros to men logikon, to de thymikon, to d' epithymêtikon*«; and cf. also *On Dreams* 1.25. On this tripartition in Philo, see Whittaker 1996. For reflections on »the truth of tripartition« of the soul in Plato, see Burnyeat 2006.

²⁹ Cf. Aulus Gellius, *Attic Nights* 3.10.11: »the men of old were larger and taller of stature, but now, because the world is ageing, as it were (*et nunc, quasi iam mundo senescente*), men

Such was the first man created, as I think, in body and soul, surpassing all the men that now are, and all that have been before us. [...] the man first fashioned was clearly the bloom of our entire race, and never have his descendants attained the like bloom, forms and faculties ever feebler having been bestowed on each succeeding generation (*On the Creation* 140).

To illustrate this natural process of degeneration, Philo points to the received wisdom in the arts, in sculpture and painting, that »the copies are inferior to the originals«. He also uses the example of the magnet which gradually looses its hold over the objects which depend from it:

Much the same appears in the case of the magnet: for the iron ring which touches it is held most forcibly, but that which touches this one less so. A third hangs on to the second, and a fourth on to the third, and a fifth on to the fourth, and so on in a long series, all held together by one attracting force, only not all alike for those removed from the starting-point get looser all the time, owing to the attraction being relaxed and losing its power to grip as it did before (*On the Creation* 141).

This illustrates Philo's point that mankind goes through a similar process in which the original force diminishes through time:

Mankind has evidently undergone something of the same kind. As generation follows generation the powers and qualities of body and soul which men receive are feebler (*On the Creation* 141).

Although »the sovereignty with which that first man was invested was a most lofty one«, many generations later, »owing to the lapse of ages, the race had lost its vigour« (*On the Creation* 148).

But Philo does not give only physical reasons for the degeneration of man. He also speaks about the first *moral* lapse of man in the garden of Eden. In Philo's view, at the very beginning, the garden was populated by two men, the heavenly man and the

and things are diminishing in size.« On this theme of the loss of the world's original vitality, see Bartelink 1970 and 1983, who characterizes this view as Epicurean, with reference to Lucretius, *On the Nature of Things* 2.1173–1174: »... all things gradually decay, and go to the reef of destruction, outworn by the ancient lapse of years (*spatio aetatis defessa vetusto*)« (Bartelink 1970, 91–93). Unlike Bartelink, I believe the concept is also Stoic, because irrespective of the fact that the cosmos is eternally recurrent, the present cosmos is fading away. Unlike Plato and Aristotle, the Stoics regarded the world as admitting of deterioration and destruction (cf. Furley 1999, esp. chap. 12.3.2, 434–439). Cf. also Paul, 1 Cor 7.31: *paragei gar to schêma tou kosmou toutou*; see Adams 2000, 134–136 for a cosmological interpretation.

earthly one, and it was the latter who was cast out. Philo justifies this view of two different inhabitants of Eden by referring to two different phrases in the account of Gen 2 on the garden. According to Gen 2.8 LXX, God »placed there the man *whom He had moulded*« (*kai etheto ekei ton anthrôpon, hon eplasen*), whereas Gen 2.15, at least according to Philo, reads as follows: »The Lord God took the man *whom He had made*, and placed him in the garden to work on it and to guard it« – *elabe kurios ho theos ton anthrôpon hon epoiêse kai etheto auton en tõi paradeisôi, ergazesthai auton kai phylassein* (*Allegorical interpretation* 1.53).³⁰ According to Philo, the latter

is a different man, the one that was made after the image and archetype, so that two men are introduced into the garden, the one a moulded being, the other »after the image« (*Allegorical interpretation* 1.53).

Whereas the latter is received by God, the former is cast out of the garden of Eden: »the moulded mind (*ho de plastos nous*) [...] soon runs away and is cast out« (*Allegorical interpretation* 1.55); he is »the more earthly mind«, as opposed to the less material, pure mind (1.88–89). Because of his constitution, it is the earthly man, Adam, »the earthly and perishable mind«³¹, who needs to be commanded by God. This is not necessary for the »mind that was made after the image«, which is »not earthly but heavenly« – »the being created after [God's] image and after the original idea« (1.90–92). In a passage which is highly relevant for our study of 1 Cor in section 3 on page 295, this heavenly mind is called »the perfect man« and contrasted with the bad man and the child, who do need commandments and instruction:

There is no need, then, to give injunctions or prohibitions or exhortations to the perfect man formed after the (divine) image (*tõi teleiôi tõi kat' eikona*), for none of these does the perfect man (*ho teleios*) require. The bad man³² has need of injunction and prohibition, and the child (*tõi nêpiôi*) of exhortation and teaching (*Allegorical interpretation* 1.94).

This way of thinking is very similar to that of Paul who, as we shall see in section 3 on page 295, considers his Corinthian opponents as »children« (*nêpioi*; 1 Cor 3.14), and not as »perfect men« (*teleioi*; 1 Cor 2.6), because they fail to live up to their pneumatic potential and are therefore not *pneumatikoi* (2.13, 15; 3.1) but simply *psychikoi* (2.14) and *sarkinoi* (3.1, 3).

³⁰ As a matter of fact, however, Gen 2.15 LXX also reads *eplasen* (like Gen 2.8), not *epoiêse*.

³¹ Cf. *Who is the Heir* 52: »the earthly mind, called Adam«.

³² Cf. *On Dreams* 2.237: »the wicked mind (*ho phaulos ... nous*)«.

Philo subsequently explains how the earthly mind can experience downfall if it fails to give heed to God's commandments:

Quite naturally, then, does God give the commandments and exhortations before us to the earthly mind who is neither bad nor good but midway between these. [...] Should he obey the exhortations, he may be deemed worthy by God of His benefactions; but [...], should he rebel, he may be driven from the presence of the Lord (*Allegorical interpretation* 1.94).

The last option, that of a rebellious earthly mind, is the one which materializes, as Philo makes clear in another writing. Despite the »nobility of birth« of the »first and earth-born man«, »moulded with consummate skill into the figure of the human body by the hand of God [...], and judged worthy to receive his soul [...] through the breath of God (*empneusantos theou*)« (*On the Virtues* 203), he made the wrong moral choice:

his father was no mortal but the eternal God, whose image he was in a sense in virtue of the ruling mind within the soul (*oun tropon tina genomenos eikôn kata ton hêgemonia noun en psychêi*). Yet though he should have kept that image undefiled and followed as far as he could in the steps of his Parent's virtues, when the opposites were set before him to choose or avoid, good and evil, honourable and base, true and false, he was quick to choose the false, the base and the evil and spurn the good and honourable and true, with the natural consequence that he exchanged mortality for immortality, forfeited his blessedness and happiness and found an easy passage to a life of toil and misery (*On the Virtues* 204–205).

This moral lapse is repeated every time the mind comes to love the body and the passions:

there is a different mind which loves the body and the passions (*philosômatos kai philopathês nous*) and has been sold in slavery to [...] pleasure (*The Unchangeableness of God* III).

Following his tripartite division of man into body, soul, and mind, Philo portrays the degeneration of man as a consequence of the soul which wavers in the middle, to the detriment of the mind:

when the soul (*psychê*) is swaying and tossing like a vessel, now to the side of the mind (*nous*) now to that of the perception by the senses (*aisthêsis*), owing to the violence of the passions and misdeeds that rage against her, and the billows rising mountains high sweep over her, then in all likelihood the mind (*nous*) becomes waterlogged and sinks; and the bottom to which it sinks is nothing else than the body (*sôma*) (*On Husbandry* 89).

Or, alternatively, Philo can portray the earthly mind as the medial or neutral mind, as we have already seen in his *Allegorical interpretation*: »the earthly mind [...] is neither bad nor good but midway between these« (1.94). This mind is played upon by the opposing forces of good and evil:

the middle or neutral mind (*ho mesos nous*) [is] played upon by forces drawing it in opposite directions and given the high calling to decide between them, that it might be moved to choose and to shun, to win fame and immortality should it welcome the better, and incur a dishonourable death should it choose the worse (*Noah's work as a Planter* 45).³³

In many passages Philo sketches the negative outcome of this strife between body and mind, »the cycle of unceasing war ever revolving round the many-sided soul« (*On Dreams* 2.14) – the *kyklos peri tēn polytropon psychēn aīdiou polemon*. In one of them, he talks, in a »Pauline« fashion, about »the order of the flesh«:

when that which is superior, namely Mind, becomes one with that which is inferior, namely Sense-perception, it resolves itself into the order of the flesh (*to sarkos genos*) which is inferior (*Allegorical interpretation* 2.50).

Philo sees the downfall of the mind illustrated in many stories in the Bible. The ground which opened to receive the blood of Abel (Gen 4.11), shed by Cain, symbolizes how »the mind, swallowed up by the huge inpouring (Gen 4.11), is found at the bottom, unable so much as to rise to the surface and look out« (*The Worse attacks the Better* 100). And in his commentary on the fall of the angels in Gen 6, Philo highlights God's decision that his »Spirit will not remain in a human being for ever«:

Nothing is harder than that it [i.e. the divine Spirit] should abide for ever in the soul with its manifold forms and divisions (*en poluschidei kai polymorphōi psychēi*) – the soul which has fastened on it the grievous burden of this fleshly coil. It is after that spirit [i.e. after the Spirit has gone] that the angels or messengers go in to the daughters of men (*The Unchangeableness of God* 2).

This story of the fall of the angels is about the souls of those who

have abandoned themselves to the unstable things of chance, none of which has aught to do with our noblest part, the soul or mind, but all are related to that dead

³³ Cf. also *On Rewards and Punishments* 62ff. in a passage which reads like a Philonic counterpart to the *Treatise of the Two Spirits* in *The Community Rule*, 1 QS III–IV, among the Dead Sea Scrolls.

thing which was our birth-fellow, the body, or to objects more lifeless still [...]. [They, the children of the earth] have turned the steps of the mind out of the path of reason (*nous*) and transmuted it into the lifeless and inert nature of the flesh. (*On the Giants* 15, 65).

This is the third class of man, which, as we have seen before, takes the lowest rank in Philo's tripartite division of man (see section 2.1 on page 266).

Furthermore, Philo also sees the downfall of the mind at work in the story of Sodom (*The Sacrifices of Abel and Cain* 122) and in the story of the Midianites, who »flood the ruling mind and sink it to the lowest depths, so that it cannot float up to the top or rise ever so little« (*On the Change of Names* 107). In another context, the pagan gods are considered »obstacles and the cause of stumbling, by which the mind is lamed and falls short of the natural road [...] which ends in the Father« (*Quaestiones in Exodum* 2.26).

The main threats to the human mind, in Philo's view, are posed by false opinions and the bodily senses:

The human mind [is] imprisoned as it is amid all the thronging press of the senses, so competent to seduce and deceive it with false opinions, or rather entombed in a moral body which may be quite properly called a sepulchre (*The Special Laws* 4.188).

Philo's repetitive remarks on the loss of man's pneumatic-noetic identity also serves a concrete polemical purpose. This becomes clear in two passages in which Philo attacks the sophists (and Protagoras in particular), who are of the opinion that the human mind is the measure of all things. In Philo's time the Second Sophistic movement was just taking off and becoming a dominant cultural force.³⁴ Philo poses the following rhetorical question and immediately answers it:

Of what sort than is an impious man's opinion? That the human mind is the measure of all things, an opinion held they tell us by an ancient sophist named Protagoras, an offspring of Cain's madness (*The Posterity of Cain* 35–37).

This opinion is contrasted with that of Moses: »But Moses held that God, and not the human mind, is the measure and weighing scale and numbering of all things« (*On Dreams* 2.193–194). As I shall suggest below, it is perhaps no coincidence that Paul's polemic in 1 Cor 1–4 and his criticism of the *psychikoi*, who lack inner pneumatic identity, seem also to be addressed against Corinthian sophists.

³⁴ On Philo and the sophists, see B. W. Winter 2002 and van Kooten 2008a, chap. 3, 220–24.

2.3 Restoration of the human mind and spirit

As we have already seen in section 2.1 on page 266 on the creation of the earthly man, »the earthly and body-loving mind« was inbreathed by God's *pneuma* at the very moment of creation. The reason stated for this was that »the mind of man would never have ventured to soar so high as to grasp the nature of God, had not God Himself drawn it up to Himself« (*Allegorical interpretation* 1.37–38). One could argue that here there is already a primordial restoration of the human mind while its creation is still taking place (1.32). The earthlike mind, which in Philo's view is modelled on the mind of the heavenly man, would have remained corruptible if God's *pneuma* had not breathed into it. This sets the model for Philo's considerations about the restoration of the mind in other parts of his writings: the earthlike mind needs the breath of God's *pneuma* to become »a soul, not an inefficient and imperfectly formed soul, but one endowed with mind and actually alive« (1.32).

The biblical narrative which, according to Philo, is all about the restoration of the human mind, is the story of Abraham's migration from Haran; this migration symbolizes the mind's departure from the dominance of the lower soul and the senses:

When the mind (*nous*) begins to know itself and to hold converse with the things of mind, it will thrust away from it that part of the soul (*psychê*) which inclines to the province of sense-perception, the inkling which among the Hebrews is entitled »Lot«. Hence the wise man [i.e. Abraham] is represented as saying outright, »Separate thyself from me« (Gen 13.9). For it is impossible for one who is possessed by love for all that is incorporeal (*asômata*) and incorruptible (*aphtharta*) to dwell together with one who leans towards the objects of sense-perception doomed to die (*The Migration of Abraham* 13).

Abraham and Lot are presented as contrasting figures which symbolize, respectively, the mind and the soul. According to Philo, the migration of the mind occurs in several stages, the most important of which are accurate self-knowledge and knowledge of God himself (*The Migration of Abraham* 194–195). This is a gradual process of migration:

The mind gradually changing its place will arrive at the Father of piety and holiness. [...] It will stay no longer in Haran, the organs of sense, but withdraw into itself. For it is impossible that the mind whose course still lies in the sensible rather than the mental should arrive at the contemplation of Him that Is (*The Migration of Abraham* 194, 195).

Indeed, as Philo himself summarizes his account of Abraham's migration, towards the end of his treatise: »To resume: the mind [...] has gone forth from the places about Haran ...« (216). The entire migration of Abraham is interpreted as a restoration of the mind and its journey towards God.

From some passages in Philo, one gets the impression that his soteriology, his view on how the human mind is restored, is closely related to education. In one passage, for instance, Philo states that parents benefit their children by having their bodies trained in the gymnasium, and that they

have done the same for the soul by means of letters and arithmetic and geometry and music and philosophy as a whole *which lifts on high the mind («nous») lodged within the mortal body* and escorts it to the very heaven and shows it the blessed and happy beings that dwell therein (*The Special Laws* 2.230).

The educational nature of this soteriology is confirmed by Philo's somewhat elitist remark about the small number of those who despise vanity:

This kind is few in number. [...] After investigating the whole realm of the visible to its very end, it straightway proceeds to the immaterial and conceptual, not availing itself of any of the senses but casting aside all the irrational parts of the soul (*psychê*) and employing only the part which is called mind (*nous*) and reasoning (*On Rewards and Punishments* 26).

This selective attitude differs considerably from the popularizing potential of Paul's theory about Christ as the heavenly man, in whose identity all are invited to join and experience a transformation of the mind.

Yet, Philo's educational drive clearly serves an ethical purpose. As we have already seen,

there is no need, then, to give injunctions or prohibitions or exhortations to the perfect man formed after the (divine) image, for none of these does the perfect man require. The bad man has need of injunction and prohibition, and the child of exhortation and teaching (*Allegorical interpretation* 1.94).

Instead of describing Philo's soteriology as »educational«, it is perhaps more appropriate to call it a »psychological soteriology«. This soteriology is built on the tripartite definition of man in terms of mind (or spirit), soul and body, and entails the view that the mind, purified and restored by the divine spirit, influences (the rest of) the soul which, in its turn, transforms the body. This soteriology comes to the fore in

three passages. In his commentary on Gen 28.14, »in thee shall all tribes be blessed«, Philo says:

if the mind which is in me (*ho en emoi nous*) has been rendered pure by perfect virtue, then the »tribes« [Gen 28.14: »in thee shall all tribes be blessed«] of that which is earthly in me are sharers of its purifying, those I mean which pertain to the senses (*hai aistheseis*) and to that chiefest container, the body (*to sôma*) (*On Dreams* 1.177).

In this passage the purified mind clearly influences and purifies the lower soul of the senses, and also the body. For this reason, Philo warns against the dominance of the concerns of soul and body over what should be the guiding principle, the mind:

If we hold that moral beauty is the only good, the end we seek is contracted and narrowed, for it is bound up with only one of our myriad environments, namely, with the dominant principle, the mind (*nous*). But if we connect that end with three different kinds of interests, the concerns of the soul (*psychê*), those of the body (*sôma*) and those of the external world, the end is split up into many dissimilar parts and thus broadened (*On Sobriety* 60).

That God's spirit influences both soul and body is also shown in a passage about Abraham:

The divine spirit which was breathed upon him from on high made its lodging in his soul, and invested his body with singular beauty (*On the Virtues* 217).

That Philo uses the language of Gen 2.7 about the inbreathing of God's Spirit not only with regard to Adam, but also with regard to his descendants, such as Abraham, shows that his reflections on the creation of Adam are more broadly applicable. Although the singular beauty of Abraham's body is doubtlessly exceptional, it nevertheless demonstrates that, in Philo's anthropology, *pneuma* influences the soul, and the soul, in turn, the body.

Once this psychological soteriology is understood, it can easily be recognized in Paul. Already in 1 Thess, Paul warns the Thessalonians not to suppress the Spirit (5.19: *to pneuma mê sbennyte*) and wishes that God himself may keep them sound in spirit, soul, and body, free from any fault: *kai holoklêron hymôn to pneuma kai hê psychê kai to sôma amemptôs ... tērêtheiê* (5.23). As in Philo, the link between God's Spirit (*Pneuma*) and the spirit of man (*pneuma*) is not coincidental but shows that man's spirit was inbreathed by God's Spirit.³⁵

³⁵ On the issue of the identity, or rather correspondence between the human and divine *pneuma*, cf. Vollenweider 2002.

Against the ancient philosophical and Philonic background outlined in this article, it is clear that Paul's trichotomy of *pneuma*, *psychê* and body in 1 Thess 5.23 is equally technical. This triad has been misunderstood by Udo Schnelle in one of the few anthropologies of the New Testament which have been written. Schnelle explicitly denies that the triad should be taken in a technical Hellenistic sense: »The trichotomous sounding phrase *to pneuma kai hê psychê kai to sôma* reflects no Hellenistic anthropology according to which a person is divided into body, soul, and spirit. Paul is merely emphasizing that the sanctifying work of God concerns the whole person«.³⁶ Schnelle is apparently unaware of the parallels which Paul's contemporary fellow-Jews Philo and Josephus provide in differentiating between *pneuma* and *psychê* on the basis of Gen 2.7, in this way establishing a Jewish counterpart to the Greek differentiation between *nous* and *psychê*. In this light, Schnelle's comments on the meaning of *pneuma* in 1 Thess 5.23 become artificial and incomprehensible: »in 1 Thessalonians *pneuma* is for Paul not a component of the human essence but the expression and sign of the new creativity of God in humankind. With *psychê* and *sôma* Paul is only adding what constitutes each person as an individual. What is actually new and determinative is the Spirit of God.«³⁷

This is clearly mistaken, even though it may reflect a common view in New Testament scholarship. In Paul's triad *pneuma*, *psychê* and body, the *pneuma* is a component of man, as the comparisons with Philo unequivocally show. It is part of the triad which characterizes man as a trichotomous being. Of course it is true that elsewhere in 1 Thess the *pneuma* does denote the spirit of God. As Paul reminds the Thessalonians, God has given them his holy *pneuma*: anyone who flouts particular ethical rules »is flouting not man but the God who bestows on you his holy Spirit« (1 Thess 4.8). Therefore, at the end of the letter, the Thessalonians are warned not to suppress the spirit, i.e. the Spirit of God: *to pneuma mê sbennyte* (1 Thess 5.19). But the gift of the Spirit results in the reconstitution of man's own *pneuma*, and for this reason he should keep sound »in *pneuma*, *psychê* and body« (1 Thess 5.23). By partaking in the Spirit of God, man possesses a *pneuma* which is part of his own constitution. Against the background of Philonic and Hellenistic trichotomous anthropology, this is perfectly clear. Classicists, incidentally, have no difficulty in recognizing the philo-

³⁶ Schnelle 1996, 104–105 at 104 (italics mine).

³⁷ Schnelle 1996, 104. Heckel 2002, 130, note 36 seems to be aware of the Greek background of »the tripartite body-soul-pneuma synthesis in 1 Thess. 5:23«, but stresses Paul's free interpretation of it, without further explanation.

sophical nature of Paul's anthropology. André-Jean Festugière, for instance, devotes an extensive excursus to the ancient philosophical background of 1 Thess 5.23 in his *L'idéal religieux des grecs et l'évangile* (1932).³⁸

The presupposition at work in Schnelle's interpretation is that 1 Thess, as Paul's first letter, contains only a simple, rudimentary theology which will be developed further over the years:

As the oldest document of Pauline theology, the First Letter to the Thessalonians shows rather that the continuing passage of time was of great significance in the formation of the apostle's anthropology. This letter lacks all the important anthropological terms of later letters, such as *sarx* (‘flesh’), *hamartia* (‘sin’), *thanatos* (‘death’), *eleutheria* (‘freedom’), *zôê* (‘life’).³⁹

Yet although 1 Thess is indeed Paul's first preserved letter, this view neglects the fact that, prior to his visits to the cities of the Eastern Mediterranean, Paul had already spent about fourteen years in the Roman provinces of Syria and Cilicia, in cities such as Antioch and Tarsus, where he must already have tested the reception of his gospel by the Hellenized world (Gal 1.21–2.2). It is misleading to state that in 1 Thess »all the important anthropological terms are lacking«,⁴⁰ as the important trichotomy *pneuma*, *psychê* and body does occur. In a later letter, 1 Cor, Paul shows that he is able to expand on it when he distinguishes between different classes of man, those who have a *pneuma*, the *pneumatikoi*, and those who have not, the *psychikoi* (1 Cor 2.13–3.1).

It is far more natural then, to interpret the triad of spirit, soul and body in Paul's first letter in the technical, Hellenized sense in which it was also used by Philo. Likewise, against the background of Philo, the descending hierarchical order of *pneuma*, *psychê* and body is not haphazard either, but implies that the restored and purified spirit-mind influences the rest of man's soul and his body.

In Philo, the purification of the mind is an important motif. We have already seen that the mind which has been rendered pure by perfect virtue, in its turn, purifies the lower soul of the senses and the body (*On Dreams* 1.177). To phrase it differently,

the wholly purified mind [...] disregards not only the body, but that other section of the soul which is devoid of reason and steeped in blood, aflame with seething passions and burning lusts (*Who is the Heir* 64).

³⁸ Festugière 1932, Excursus B, 196–220. For a different philosophical reading of Paul's concept of *pneuma* in Stoic terms, see Engberg-Pedersen 2010.

³⁹ Schnelle 1996, 41.

⁴⁰ Schnelle 1996, 44.

As a consequence, »the purified mind (*ho kekatharmenos nous*) of the wise man preserves the virtues free from breach or hurt« (*On Flight and Finding* 112).

This complex of ideas can be rightly called a soteriology, a doctrine of salvation. As a matter of fact, Philo himself stresses that the mind (*nous*) is »brought back by the mercy of its Saviour (*sôtêr*)«:

The mind (*nous*) which has strayed everywhere in prolonged vagrancy, maltreated by pleasure and lust, the mistresses it honoured so unduly, may well be brought back by the mercy of its Saviour (*sôtêr*) from the pathless wild into a road wherein it is resolved to flee straight on, a flight [...] of one banished from evil to salvation. [...] This mind [...] has been honoured with the gift of quietude by God, who willed that it should be undistracted, never affected by any of the troublesome sensations which the distresses of the body engender (*On Rewards and Punishments* 117, 121).

Only then, when the mind has been granted quietude, can there be an end to the *kyklos peri tèn polytropon psychên aïdiou polemou*, »the cycle of unceasing war ever revolving round the many-sided soul«, the strife between body and mind (*On Dreams* 2.14). That war »the mind (*nous*) is wont to leave, when, filled with the divine, it finds itself in the presence of the Existent Himself and contemplates the incorporeal ideas« (*On Drunkenness* 99).

This psychological soteriology is implied in many shorter passages throughout Philo's writings. Again, despite their brevity, they are an expression of Philo's thoughts about the restoration of man. In several passages, Philo talks about the mind leading the soul and being followed by the senses. In one passage, which we have already quoted on the matter of the disintegration of man, Philo goes on to state the opposite, salutary development:

When that which is superior, namely Mind (*nous*), becomes one with that which is inferior, namely Sense-perception, it resolves itself into the order of the flesh (*to sarkos genos*) which is inferior [...]. But if Sense the inferior follows Mind the superior, there will be flesh (*sarx*) no more, but both of them will be mind (*Allegorical interpretation* 2.50).

In a similar passage Philo explains:

Most profitless is it that Mind should listen to Sense-perception, and not Sense-perception to Mind: for it is always right that the superior should rule and the inferior be ruled; and Mind is superior to Sense-perception [...]. Just so, when Mind, the charioteer or helmsman of the soul, rules the whole living being as a governor does a city, the life holds a straight course (*Allegorical interpretation* 3.222–224).

For that reason, the Mind (*nous*) is characterized as »the ruler of the flock, taking the flock of the soul (*psychê*) in hand« (*On Husbandry* 66). The road along which the mind travels is that of wisdom – a road derided by those who are fleshly:

Wisdom is a straight high road, and it is when the mind's (*nous*) course is guided along that road that it reaches the goal which is the recognition and knowledge of God. Every comrade of the flesh (*pas ho sarkôn hetairos*) hates and rejects this path and seeks to corrupt it (*The Unchangeableness of God* 143).

When the mind decides to follow this path, it »turns away from pleasure and cleaves to virtue« (*The sacrifices of Abel and Cain* 45). This is clearly characterized as a conversion:

If the mind be safe and unimpaired, free from the oppression of the iniquities or passions which produce the frenzy of drunkenness, it will renounce the slumber which makes us forget and shrink from the call of duty (*On Sobriety* 5).

It shows that the mind does not necessarily »remain for ever deceived nor stand rooted in the realm of sense« (*On Abraham* 88), but that it can be »mastered by the love of the divine« (*On Dreams* 2.232). Those who turn back to God have the image of God in them restored. They are those »who do not deface with base practices the coin within them which bears the stamp of God, even the sacred mind (*nous*)« (*The Unchangeableness of God* 105).

3 Paul of Tarsus

There are many similarities between Philo and Paul with regard to the differentiation between the heavenly man, who is identified with *pneuma*, and the earthly man, who is identified with the *psychê*. Moreover, in both authors the »first man« is the earthly Adam. Nevertheless, many scholars have assumed that there is an implicit criticism of Philonic views in Paul's statement that »the pneumatic does not come first but the psychic, and only subsequently the pneumatic« – *all' ou prôton to pneumatikon alla to psychikon, epeita to pneumatikon* (1 Cor 15.46).⁴¹

However, as we have seen above, for Philo too the term »first man« (*ho prôtos anthrôpos*) refers to the earthly Adam. This being the case, the chances are slight that the phrase »the pneumatic does not come first« (*all' ou prôton to pneumatikon*) entails a criticism of Philonic views on this matter. It is important to note that the discussion in 1 Cor 15 is not about the psychic (*to psychikon*) and the pneumatic (*to pneumatikon*)

⁴¹ Cf. Schaller 2004, 149–151, already referred to above.

in general, but about the psychic and pneumatic *body*. What is at issue is the *sôma psychikon* and the *sôma pneumatikon*. In Paul's view, it is not that the pneumatic reality (*to pneumatikon*) as such belongs to the future, but rather that the pneumatic *body* only becomes a reality after the eschatological resurrection. Paul's reflections have wrongly been taken to mean that, in opposition to Philonic ideas, the pneumatic is only a future reality. This cannot be true, since the pneumatic already occurs in the present, as Paul makes clear in a different polemical setting in 1 Cor 1–4. In this section 1 Cor Paul already reckons with the existence of the *pneumatikoi*, those who are characterized by *pneuma* (1 Cor 2.13, 15; 3.1; cf. Gal 6.1). This is Paul's designation of true, mature men, as opposed to the *psychikoi* (1 Cor 2.14) and *nêpioi* (the children; 1 Cor 3.14). This is reminiscent of the passage from Philo discussed in section 2.2 on page 283, in which Philo, on the basis of his tripartite division of man, calls the mind (*nous*) »the perfect man« and contrasts it with the bad man and the child, who need commandments and instruction:

There is no need, then, to give injunctions or prohibitions or exhortations to the perfect man formed after the (divine) image (*tôi teleiôi tõi kat' eikona*), for none of these does the perfect man (*ho teleios*) require. The bad man has need of injunction and prohibition, and the child (*tôi nêpiôi*) of exhortation and teaching (*Allegorical interpretation* 1.94).

As in Philo, in Paul, too, those who have had their *nous* or *pneuma* restored, the *pneumatikoi*, are a present type of man, not a future one. In response to this view on the restoration of man's *pneuma*, however, one could object that according to Paul there is no question of the *restoration* of man's *pneuma*: in 1 Cor 15, the passage from Gen 2.7 is applied in such a way that, whereas the first Adam possesses only a *psychê*, the last Adam will be granted a *pneuma*: »It is in this sense that Scripture says: »The first man, Adam, became a living soul«, whereas the last Adam has become a life-giving spirit« (1 Cor 15.45). If the passage is read this way, man's *pneuma* is not *restored*, but rather *pneuma* is bestowed for the first time in man's existence. Whereas the first man possessed *psychê*, only the second man will possess *pneuma*.

This, however, cannot be true. It would imply that whereas the original anthropology was dipartite, consisting of *psychê* and body, only future anthropology will become tripartite, consisting of *pneuma*, *psychê* and body. This, in turn, would imply that man was created as an incomplete human being. Although the context in 1 Cor 15 is indeed a debate about the future – or, more specifically about the future, post-resurrection constitution of the body – the underlying logic must be that, as

a consequence of the birth and apparition of Christ, the second and last man from heaven, man's *pneuma* is restored to him, not granted for the first time. Although theoretically the first man had a tripartite structure, effectively man failed to keep his *pneuma*, so that it needs to be restored. That man as such does possess *pneuma* is confirmed by Paul in 1 Cor 2.11 where, in a generalizing way, he speaks about man's *pneuma*: »Who knows what a human being is but the human spirit (*pneuma*) within him? In the same way, only the spirit (*pneuma*) of God knows what God is«. ⁴² In this generalizing passage, Paul reveals his view about the standard composition of man in general, a constitution which also encompasses *pneuma*. Naturally, in Paul's view, whereas, technically speaking, every human being has *pneuma*, only the Christians can have their *pneuma* really and effectively restored.

The same ambiguity is found in Plutarch when, in *On the Sign of Socrates*, he reflects on the three kinds of man. Although Plutarch emphasizes that »every soul (*psychê*) partakes of mind (*nous*); none is irrational or without mind (*a-nous*)« (591d), he nevertheless goes on to state that the lowest class of man sinks entirely into the body (*hai (men) holai katedysan eis sôma*), as if into the depths of the terrible, deep, water-filled abyss of the Styx. Unlike the intermediate class, whose *nous* »is not dragged in with the rest, but is like a buoy attached to the top, floating on the surface in contact with the man's head, while he is as it were submerged in the depths« (591e), the lowest class seems, in the words of John Dillon, »to have souls that are completely immersed in the body, in such a way as to leave no ›nous‹ floating as a ›buoy‹ above them.« ⁴³ As Dillon asks: »Does this mean that they have effectively no *nous*?« Indeed, he answers, »they have no *nous* remaining above«. ⁴⁴ In this way a picture emerges of »souls breaking loose on their own, quite devoid of intellect«; »some souls are left wholly devoid of *nous*«. ⁴⁵

Plutarch thus shows the same ambiguity as Paul: although, strictly speaking, all souls possess *nous*, ⁴⁶ effectively some have none. To put it in Paul's terminology: although originally man was created with a trichotomous identity of *pneuma*, *psychê* and body, effectively, after the degeneration and fall of man, man had no *pneuma* till it was restored to him by means of his unification with Christ, the second man

⁴² I owe this observation to Dr Edward Adams, London.

⁴³ Dillon 2001, 39 (italics mine).

⁴⁴ Dillon 2001, 40.

⁴⁵ Dillon 2001, 42, 43.

⁴⁶ Cf. De Lacy and Einarson 1959, 473 note a: »All souls, strictly speaking, possess understanding« (*nous*).

from heaven. It is from this perspective of restoration that Paul quotes Gen 2.7 in 1 Cor 15.45: »It is in this sense that Scripture says: »The first man, Adam, became a living *psychê*, whereas the last Adam has become a life-giving *pneuma*.« Paul does not mean that man was originally created as a dichotomic being, consisting only of *psychê* and body, but rather that, though man was created as a trichotomic being, made up of *pneuma*, *psychê* and body, it is only Christ who restores the *pneuma* which had effectively become lost. In his quotation of Gen 2.7, Paul forgets about the brief period in which, between his creation and almost instantaneous fall, man did effectively possess *pneuma*. Rather he attributes the bestowal of *pneuma* to its definitive endowment by Christ as an act of recreation (cf. 2 Cor 5.14–17). This gift of *pneuma* is a fruit of realized eschatology. The restoration of man's *pneuma* is a result of the eschatological gift of the Spirit which is already operative (e.g. 1 Thess 4.8; 2 Cor 1.22, 5.5; Rom 5.5, 8.15, 8.23). In the context of 1 Cor 15, however, Paul stresses that, although already at work, the Spirit is not yet fully effective. Only at the end of time will the Spirit also transform the psychic body into a pneumatic body (1 Cor 15.44–49).

For a proper understanding of 1 Cor 15, it is important to distinguish the different kinds of oppositions which Paul addresses throughout 1 and 2 Cor, as well as the positions with which Paul agrees in principle, but still deems necessary to modify. At least three kinds of oppositions and of positions in need of further modification can be distinguished in 1 Cor alone, (1) those who »say there is no resurrection of the dead«, (2) the *psychikoi*, and (3) those *pneumatikoi* who are too excessive in their spiritualization.

3.1 »Some [...] say there is no resurrection of the dead«

To start with 1 Cor 15, the first kind of opposition consists of »some« of the Corinthians who »say there is no resurrection of the dead« (15.12) and are concerned with the questions of how the dead are raised and in what kind of body (15.35). Who are these »some«? For the moment we shall leave this question open, and return to it later. As we have seen, what is clear is that in his polemic Paul focuses on the body. His answer is about the pneumatic body (*sôma pneumatikon*), not about the pneumatic (*to pneumatikon*) as such. Due to a particular kind of opposition, in 1 Cor 15 the focus is on the body, the third and lowest layer of tripartite man. Apparently what Paul is saying is that it is only eschatologically that the *pneuma* influences the *psychê* to such an extent, and the *psychê*, in its turn, the body, that the body will turn into a *pneuma*-

dominated body, a pneumatic body. Only then we will bear the image of the heavenly man to the fullest extent – *kai kathôs ephoresamen tēn eikona tou choïkou, phoresomen kai tēn eikona tou epouraniou* (1 Cor 15.44–49).

2 Cor provides confirmation for the supposition that in 1 Cor 15 Paul focuses on the future body, but that this does not preclude the present manifestation of the pneumatic and the present relevance of bearing the image (*eikôn*) of the heavenly man. In 2 Cor it is clear that the bearing of the image of the heavenly man is *not* a future event, but already a present reality. Already before the end of time, man may experience a gradual transformation into God's image, Christ: *hēmeis de pantes ... tēn autēn eikona metamorphoumetha apo doxēs eis doxan, kathaper apo kyriou pneumatos* (2 Cor 3.18–4.4 at 3.18). At present we carry the image of the first man (1 Cor 15.59a), but, as 2 Cor suggests, also increasingly the image of the heavenly man, although not to such an extent that the *pneuma* already transforms *the body* into a *pneumatic* body, a *sōma pneumatikon*. That, but only that, is a future reality according to 1 Cor 15.

3.2 *The sophists/psychikoi versus the pneumatikoi*

That the pneumatic body (*sōma pneumatikon*) but not the pneumatic (*to pneumatikon*) as such is a future reality is also apparent from a different polemical section of 1 Cor, in chapters 1–4. In this section Paul differentiates between two types of man and assumes that the *pneumatikoi* are already present now and differ from the *psychikoi*. The section of 1 Cor 1–4 is addressed, as Bruce Winter has convincingly shown, to the sophists who advocate an outward rhetorical *modus operandi*; they are interested in the public impression they make and in public opinions, not primarily in inner conviction or truth.⁴⁷ It is therefore very apt for Paul to characterize them as *psychikoi* who lack the inner spirit.

This is again reminiscent of Philo, according to whom, as we have seen, the main threats to the human mind are posed by false opinions and the bodily senses: »the human mind [is] imprisoned [...] amid all the thronging press of the senses, so competent to seduce and deceive it with false opinions« (*The Special Laws* 4.188). Philo, too, applied his thoughts about the loss of man's pneumatic identity in his polemics with the sophists: »Of what sort then is an impious man's opinion? That the human mind (*ton anthrôpinon noun*) is the measure of all things, an opinion held they tell us by an ancient sophist named Protagoras« (*The Posterity of Cain* 35–37). Like

⁴⁷ Cf. B. W. Winter 2002, chaps. 8–10.

Philo, Paul criticizes those who forget their inner pneumatic identity and limit their existence to their lower soul. For that reason, they are well characterized by Paul as »*psychikoi*«, as opposed to the »*pneumatikoi*« whose life is dominated by the *pneuma*. This comes out in 1 Cor 2.13–3.4 in particular.

In this passage, Paul compares his opponents to a *psychic man*, a *psychikos anthrôpos*, who »refuses what belongs to the Spirit of God; it is folly to him; he cannot grasp it, because it needs to be judged in the light of the Spirit« (2.14). Paul, however, aims to communicate »spiritual truths to those who have the S/spirit«, the *pneumatikoi* (2.13). Unlike a psychic man, the spiritual person (*ho pneumatikos*) »can judge the worth of everything, yet is not himself subject to judgement by others« (2.15). The way Paul continues this passage is most revealing: »Scripture asks, ›Who can know the mind of the Lord (*tis gar egnô noun kyriou*), which will advise him?« (Isaiah 40.13 LXX as quoted by Paul in contracted form) Yet we do possess the mind (*nous*) of Christ – *hêmeis de noun Christou echomen*« (2.16). This bold, confident statement makes sense in the context of Philo's and Paul's thinking about tripartite man, whose mind (*nous*) is inbreathed by God's *pneuma*. The *pneumatikoi* have their *nous* restored and, by being modelled on the heavenly man, Christ, are in fact in the possession of his *nous*: *hêmeis de noun Christou echomen*.

Paul criticizes his opponents for the fact that he is not able to speak to them as »*pneumatikoi*«, persons who are dominated by the S/spirit, because they are »*sarkinoi*« or »*sarkikoi*«, dominated by the flesh, and are still infants (*nêpioi*) (3.1–3). This all neatly fits the tripartite model which we have explored in Philo. The ambiguity about whether we should translate *pneumatikoi* as »those who are dominated by the *Pneuma*« or »those who possess *pneuma*« (in addition to their lower *psychê*) seems to be intrinsic to Philo's and Paul's tripartite anthropology. The human *pneuma* is called *pneuma* because it has been bestowed by, and, for this very reason, corresponds with the divine *Pneuma*. It is both simultaneously. Philo, like Paul, depicts the opposite lifestyle as a life dominated by the flesh and as childish.

At this stage it is perhaps important to note that Paul's tripartite division of man into *pneumatikoi*, *psychikoi* and *sarkinoi/sarkikoi* is neither Gnostic nor proto-Gnostic,⁴⁸ but precedes Gnosticism, so that the dependence is the other way around. As Elaine Pagels stated, »Some of what has been described as ›Gnostic terminology« in the Pauline letters may be explained more plausibly instead as Pauline [...] terminology in

⁴⁸ For Paul's alleged dependence on Gnosticism in this respect, see, e.g., M. Winter 1975.

the *Gnostic* writings.⁴⁹ This certainly applies to the division of man into *pneumatikoi*, *psychikoi* and *sarkinoi/sarkikoi*. As we have seen from Philo, the differentiation between *pneuma* and *psychê* is nothing other than the Jewish interpretation of the Greek opposites of *nous* and *psychê*. As we saw in section 2.1 on page 266, Philo and Plutarch, too, distinguish three classes of man. When Gnostics, in turn, also use this distinction they reveal their dependence on this debate.⁵⁰ Moreover, by referring to these three classes in terms of the pneumatic, psychic and sarkic man, they demonstrate particular acquaintance with Paul's specific colouring of this tripartite classification.⁵¹

The expressions of this tripartite anthropology can be discerned in several passages in 1 Cor. The word »pneuma« is used, in a double sense, to depict both the divine *pneuma* (1 Cor 2.4, 10–14; 3.16) and the human *pneuma* (1 Cor 2.11). Likewise, the word »nous« can refer either to the human *nous* (1 Cor 1.10; 14.14–15, 14.19) or to the *nous* of Christ (1 Cor 2.16). These passages also show that, as in Philo, in Paul too the words »pneuma« and »nous« can be synonymous.

To conclude, the present reality of the pneumatic (to *pneumatikon*) is visible in the type of men referred to as *pneumatikoi*. Paul contrasts this type with that of the *psychikoi*, who have forgotten their highest and most important constituent, that of *pneuma*. Paul is prompted to apply this contrast by the fact that his opponents, the Corinthian sophists, are only interested in outward, public opinion and appearance and not in man's inner self. It need not surprise us that Paul develops such a full tripartite anthropology, since, as we saw in section 2.3 on page 289, 1 Thess 5.23 already shows that he was familiar with it. In the context of Corinth, however, there is a need to apply it further.

3.3 *The excessive pneumatikoi*

Although Paul's ideal type of man is that of the *pneumatikos*, he recognizes the dangers inherent to this concept. The danger is posed by *excessive pneumatikoi*. To this threat, which results from his own endorsement of the *pneumatikoi*, Paul devotes 1 Cor 10–

⁴⁹ Pagels 1975, 164.

⁵⁰ Cf. also Pearson 1973, 82–83.

⁵¹ See the Valentinian-Gnostic distinction in Celsus apud Origen *Contra Celsum* 5.61; Irenaeus, *Adversus haereses* (edn W. W. Harvey 1857) 1.1.9, 11, 13–14, 16 (with explicit evidence that the Valentinians claim Paul as their authority); Clement of Alexandria, *Stromateis* 2.3.10.3 and *Excerpta ex Theodoto* 54. See also Clement of Alexandria, *Paedagogos* 1.6.31.2. It is equally anachronistic to draw upon rabbinic literature as Hultgren 2003 does.

14. In this section he makes clear that one should beware of excessive spirituality. Although the sophists are rightly portrayed as *psychikoi* and the right attitude is that of the *pneumatikoi*, the latter should not overdo it. They are not opponents of Paul, but represent a position which needs modification.

Indeed, they should learn about pneumatic things: »About the pneumatic things (*ta pneumatika*), my friends, I want there to be no ignorance.« (12.1) But at the same time, Paul warns them that even those who have experienced pneumatic gifts such as pneumatic food (*to pneumatikon brôma*) and pneumatic drink (*to pneumatikon poma*), as the Israelites did during their journey through the wilderness, may in the end nevertheless not be accepted by God and may perish (10.2–5). Even if, as *pneumatikoi*, they are eager for the pneumatic things (*ta pneumatika*), they should not forget love, which is more important than trust and hope: *de menei pistis, elpis, agapê, ta tria tauta: meizôn de toutôn hê agapê, zêloute de ta pneumatika* (13.13–14.1).

That Paul, despite his promotion of the *pneumatikos*-type of man, finds fault with a possible excess of *pneuma*, is clear from what follows. Although the pneumatic things also include speaking in tongues, Paul strongly dissuades the *pneumatikoi* from exercising this spiritual activity to the detriment of *nous*: »If I pray in tongues, my *pneuma* prays, but my *nous* is barren« (14.14). The juxtaposition of *pneuma* and *nous* in this passage fits what we have seen in Philo's tripartite anthropology, in which *pneuma* and *nous* are near-synonyms: *pneuma* is greater than or equal to *nous* because the divine *pneuma* is received within the human *nous*.

According to Philo, in the case of prophecy the influence of the *pneuma* upon the *nous* is even greater. The *nous* is then inspired (*The Migration of Abraham* 84) or guided (*The Life of Moses* 2.265) by the *pneuma*: »prophecy finds its way to what the *nous* fails to reach« (*The Life of Moses* 2.6).⁵² Moses is even depicted as »the mind of purest quality« (*ho katharôtatos nous*) who, by divine inspiration, received the art of prophecy:

This is Moses, the mind of purest quality (*ho katharôtatos nous*), the truly goodly, who, with a wisdom given by divine inspiration, received the art of legislation and prophecy alike (*The Preliminary Studies* 132).⁵³

⁵² On the *pneuma* and prophecy in first-century Judaism and Graeco-Roman conceptions of prophecy, see Levison 2002, chap. 5, 99–130 and chap. 10, 244–254.

⁵³ See also *On the Giants* 24, 27: »Such a divine spirit, too, is that of Moses. [...] The spirit which is on him is the wise, the divine, the excellent spirit«; and *Moses* 2.40: »the purest of spirits, the spirit of Moses«. Cf. also *On the Change of Names* 123: »For we have read »there

In one passage, however, Philo even describes prophecy not merely as inspiration or guidance of the *nous* by the *pneuma*, but as the *complete withdrawal* of the *nous* in favour of the *pneuma*:

While the radiance of the mind (*nous*) is still all around us, when it pours as it were a noonday beam into the whole soul (*eis pasan tēn psychēn*), we are self-contained, not possessed. But when it [i.e. the mind, the *nous*] comes to its setting, naturally ecstasy and divine possession and madness fall upon us. For when the light of God shines, the human light sets; when the divine light sets, the human awakes and rises. This is what regularly befalls the fellowship of the prophets. The mind (*nous*) is removed from his home (*exoikizetai*; LSJ 596 *exoikizō remove from his home, eject, banish; empty*) at the arrival of the divine Spirit (*pneuma*), but when that departs, the mind (*nous*) returns to its tenancy (*Who is the Heir* 264–265).

The complete withdrawal of the *nous*, however, is exactly the position which Paul criticizes. For this reason, he urges the *pneumatikoi* to pray with the *pneuma*, but also with the *nous*; to sing hymns with the *pneuma*, but at the same time with the *nous*: *tis oun estin? proseuomai tōi pneumati, proseuomai de kai tōi noi: psalō tōi pneumati, paslo de kai tōi noi* (14.15). The use of *pneuma* should be balanced with *nous*, because this is what the ideal *pneumatikos*-type of man is about: not annihilating one's *nous* but receiving the *pneuma* within one's *nous*.

This is why, in the congregation, Paul prefers to speak five words with his *nous* rather than thousands of words in tongues (14.19). Although Paul promotes the way of life of the *pneumatikoi*, the *pneumatikos* should acknowledge that there are limits to his independence within the community: »If anyone claims to be a prophet or a *pneumatikos*, let him recognize that what I write has the Lord's authority« (14.37).

From this perspective, the position which Paul modifies in 1 Cor 12–14 is the corrective supplement to his endorsement of the *pneumatikos* way of life in 1 Cor 1–4 in the face of the influence of the sophists.

Now that we have defined the various types of opponents in 1 Cor 1–4 (the sophists, labelled »*psychikoi*« and »*sarkinoi*« or »*sarkikoi*«) and 12–14 (the opposite extreme of *pneumatikoi* who overdo it), we return to the still undecided question of who the opponents of Paul are in 1 Cor 15. These are the »some« who »say there is no resurrection of the dead« (15.12) and raise questions about how the dead are raised and in what kind of body (15.35). It seems that those who deny the resurrection in 1 Cor 15 could be

was another spirit in him« (Num 14.24), as though the ruling mind in him was changed to supreme perfection.«

either the sophistic *psychikoi* or the excessive *pneumatikoi*. The former, in Paul's view, could be falsely content with their present *psychic body* (*sôma psychikon*), which they, in their rhetorical performance, wished to be strong and not weak (cf. their criticism of Paul's weak physical appearance and performance in 2 Cor 10.10).⁵⁴ The latter, in overrating their spiritual existence, might perhaps be inclined to deny their bodily existence altogether. This inclination might be illustrated by reference to Philo, who also has a tendency to be critical about the body and to subsume it into a spiritual reality, that of the mind. This is nicely illustrated in a passage on the transformation of Moses' body at his death, a passage in which Philo argues that the dichotomy of body and soul is resolved in death. According to Philo,

afterwards the time came when he [i.e. Moses] had to make his pilgrimage from earth to heaven, and leave this mortal life for immortality, summoned thither by the Father Who resolved his twofold nature of soul and body into a single unity, transforming his whole being into mind, pure as the sunlight (*metharmozomenos eis noun hêlioidestaton*) (*Moses* 2.288).

This view comes close to annihilation of the body, Philo uses the language of resolving and changing the twofold nature of man into a single unity. To some extent, Paul, too, goes in the same direction, since the psychic body (*sôma psychikon*) is said to be transformed into a pneumatic body (*sôma pneumatikon*). Although he continues to talk of »body«, it is not entirely clear what a »pneumatic body« is. Perhaps we should draw on Stoic views to explain it, as this term is used by Chrysippus to describe the pneumatic and ethereal body of God himself (*sôma de pneumatikon kai aitherôdes*), which is entirely dominated by his *pneuma* (Chrysippus, *SVF* 1054 apud Origen, *Commentary on the Gospel of John* 13.21.128).⁵⁵

This would accord very well with Paul's Stoicizing description of the *eschaton* in 1 Cor 15.28, when finally God will be »all in everything«. ⁵⁶ If all of creation is ultimately

⁵⁴ On the sophists' insistence on the importance of physical performance, see Philostratus, *Lives of the Sophists* 492, 572, 618; Plutarch, *On Listening to Lectures* 41d.

⁵⁵ Origen, *Commentary on the Gospel of John* 13.21.127–128: »God, too, if he is material, must be mutable and subject to variation and change. Those who hold this view are not ashamed to say that since God is a body he is also subject to corruption, but they say his body is spiritual and like ether, especially in the reasoning capacity of his soul. Furthermore, they say that although God is subject to corruption he is not corrupted, because no one exists who might corrupt him« (transl. R. Heine, *The Fathers of the Church: A New Translation series*).

⁵⁶ For this translation and its philosophical background, see van Kooten 2003, chap. 2.2.4 (b), 104–107.

identified with God, it is no wonder that the psychic body (*sôma psychikon*) is turned into a pneumatic body (*sôma pneumatikon*). This seems to constitute a small but not insignificant difference between Philo and Paul. Whereas Philo, following his Platonic predilections, seems to abrogate the body and to conceive of the afterlife only in terms of mind, Paul seems to apply the Stoic terminology of a pneumatic body to express both: the enduring existence of the body and its spiritual transformation.

Despite this difference, Philo's and Paul's anthropology of tripartite man is very similar. Inasmuch as they call the highest part of man not only *nous* but, on account of their exegesis of Gen 2.7, preferably *pneuma*, one might also suggest that they stressed the identical, pneumatic nature of God and man in a far more egalitarian and accessible way than is the case in the Greek equivalent anthropology. In order to experience fellowship with God, man did not have to improve the intellectual abilities of his *nous* but felt connected through the *pneuma*. In Plutarch, as John Dillon explains, the highest class of people, who possess *nous*, is rather restricted: »Intellect [*nous*] thus becomes something rather special, not readily accessible to the mass of humankind.«⁵⁷ Both Philo and Paul make transition from *nous* to *pneuma*, although, as we saw in section 2.3 on page 289, Philo's soteriology still remains somewhat elitist, in line with its ancient philosophical counterparts. According to Festugière, it is the difference between *nous* and *pneuma* that is the characteristic mark of Christianity.⁵⁸ More than in pagan philosophy, participation in God himself is open to all:

Our soul is already its *pneuma*. Very naturally, therefore, it becomes a seat of grace, *hê charis meta tou pneumatatos hymôn* [the grace be with your spirit], – thus the conclusion of the letters to the Galatians 6.18, the Philippians 4.23 and to Philemon 25, – the container of the *hagion pneuma*, the Holy Spirit. [...] Thus, thanks to Paul, thanks to Christianity, that what was the best part of the heathen soul finally finds its true meaning. [...] The intellect has become spirit.⁵⁹

The free accessibility of this pneumatic identity is an aspect of Paul's »Adam Christology«, as James Dunn calls it.⁶⁰ By participating in Christ's death and resurrection in baptism (Rom 6.3–11), the human identity starts to fuse with that of Christ, the second Adam, the second man who, in contrast to the first man, is from heaven.

⁵⁷ Dillon 2001, 44.

⁵⁸ »Du *nous* au *pneuma*, voilà toute la différence, ce qui [...] distingue spécifiquement le christianisme« (Festugière 1932, 217).

⁵⁹ Festugière 1932, 219–220.

⁶⁰ See Dunn 1998, §§ 4, 8.6, 10.2. The principle passages containing Adam Christology are Rom 5.12–6.11; 1 Cor 15.20–28; 1 Cor 15.45–49.

Whereas man still bears the image of the first, earthly Adam (1 Cor 15.49), Christians increasingly bear the image of the heavenly man and are increasingly transformed into his likeness (2 Cor 3.18). In this way their *pneuma* is restored and they turn again into trichotomous human beings, the *pneumatikoi*. For this reason they can boldly claim to possess the *nous* of Christ (1 Cor 2.15–16), the *nous* of the heavenly, archetypal man. Whereas in Plutarch the highest class of human beings, who possess *nous*, is sparsely populated, this possession is within reach for all Christians. The more they share in the *pneuma* and *nous*, the more their outer man decreases and their inner man, the *esô anthrôpos*, develops. This is pointed out in 2 Cor and in Romans, which is not part of the present article. Nevertheless, Paul's use of the Platonic notion of the inner man, applied in 2 Cor 4.16 and Rom 7.22,⁶¹ further underlines what we have already found, that Paul's anthropology is truly addressed to the Graeco-Roman world. Here, in Paul's anthropology, more than anywhere else, Nietzsche's description of Christianity as »Platonismus fürs Volk« is fully justified.⁶²

References

Sources

- Colson, Francis Henry, George H. Whitaker, and Ralph Marcus, eds. and trans. *Philo*. 12 vols. Cambridge, MA 1929–1962.
- Philo of Alexandria. *On the Creation of the Cosmos According to Moses*. Ed., trans., and comm., with an introd., by David T. Runia. Leiden 2001 (= Philo of Alexandria Commentary Series 1).
- Rahlfs, Alfred and Robert Hanhart, eds. *Septuaginta, id est Vetus Testamentum Graece iuxta LXX interpretes*. 2nd ed. Stuttgart 2006. (Cited as LXX).

Suggested Reading

- Kamesar, Adam, ed. (2009). *The Cambridge Companion to Philo*. Cambridge.
- Schenck, Kenneth (2005). *A Brief Guide to Philo*. Louisville, KY.

Commentaries on Philo's writing appear in the Philo of Alexandria Commentary Series, published by Brill (Leiden/Boston). There is also a scholarly journal devoted to Philo, *The Studia Philonica Annual* (published annually by the Society of Biblical Literature, and edited by David T. Runia and Gregory E. Sterling).

⁶¹ Betz 2000; Burkert 1998; Heckel 1993; Marksches 1994, 1995, 1997; van Kooten 2008b, chaps. 7.2.2–7.2.3, 358–374.

⁶² See his *Jenseits von Gut und Böse* (1885).

Other Works Cited

- Adams, Edward (2000). *Constructing the World. A Study in Paul's Cosmological Language*. Edinburgh (Studies of the New Testament and Its World).
- Bartelink, Gerard J. M. (1983). »Le thème du monde vieilli«. In: *Orpheus* 4, pp. 342–354.
- (1970). »Mundus senescens«. In: *Hermeneus* 42, pp. 91–98.
- Betz, Hans Dieter (2001). »Der Mensch in seinen Antagonismen aus der Sicht des Paulus«. In: *Der neue Mensch in Christus. Hellenistische Anthropologie und Ethik im Neuen Testament*. Ed. by J. Beutler. Freiburg im Breisgau (= Quaestiones disputatae 190), pp. 39–56.
- (2000). »The Concept of the ›Inner Human Being‹ (ὁ ἑσω ἀνθρώπος) in the Anthropology of Paul«. In: *New Testament Studies* 46.3, pp. 315–341.
- Bonhoeffer, Dietrich (1939). *Gemeinsames Leben*. München (= Theologische Existenz heute 61).
- Burkert, Walter (1998). »Towards Plato and Paul. The ›Inner‹ Human Being«. In: *Ancient and Modern Perspectives on the Bible and Culture. Essays in Honor of Hans Dieter Betz*. Ed. by A.Y. Collins. Atlanta, GA, pp. 59–82.
- Burnyeat, Myles F. (2006). »The Truth of Tripartition«. In: *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 106, 1–23.
- De Lacy, Phillip Howard and Benedict Einarson (1959). *Plutarch's Moralia*. Vol. 7. Cambridge, MA and London (Loeb Classical Library).
- Des Places, Édouard (1964). *Syngeneia: La parenté de l'homme avec Dieu d'Homère à la patristique*. Paris (= Études et commentaires 51).
- Dillon, John (2001). »Plutarch and the Separable Intellect«. In: *Estudios sobre Plutarco: Misticismo y Religiones Místicas en la Obra de Plutarco*. Ed. by A. Pérez Jiménez and F. Casadesús. Madrid and Málaga, pp. 35–44.
- Dunn, James D. G. (1998). *The Theology of Paul the Apostle*. Edinburgh.
- Engberg-Pedersen, Troels (2010). *Cosmology and Self in the Apostle Paul. The Material Spirit*. Oxford.
- Festugière, André-Jean (1932). »La division corps—âme—esprit de 1 Thessal. 5.23 et la philosophie grecque«. In: *L'idéal religieux des grecs et l'évangile*. 2nd ed. (Études bibliques). Paris, 196–220.
- Furley, David (1999). »Cosmology«. In: *The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy*. Ed. by Keimpe A. Algra et al. Cambridge. Chap. 12, pp. 412–451.
- Hay, David M. (2004). »Philo's Anthropology«. In: *Philo und das Neue Testament. Wechselseitige Wahrnehmungen – Internationales Symposium zum Corpus Judaico-Hellenisticum, 1.–4. Mai 2004, Eisenach/Jena*. Ed. by Roland Deines and Karl-Wilhelm Niebuhr. Tübingen (= Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament 172), pp. 127–142.
- Heckel, Theo K. (2002). »Body and Soul in Saint Paul«. In: *Psyche and Soma. Physicians and Metaphysicians on the Mind-Body Problem from Antiquity to Enlightenment*. Ed. by J. P. Wright and P. Potter. Oxford. Chap. 5, pp. 117–131.
- (1993). *Der Innere Mensch. Die paulinische Verarbeitung eines platonischen Motivs*. Tübingen (= Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament 2.53).

- Holladay, Carl R. (1996). *Fragments from Hellenistic Jewish Authors*. Vol. 4: Orphica. Atlanta, Georgia (= Pseudepigrapha Series 10).
- Hultgren, Stephen (2003). »The Origin of Paul's Doctrine of the Two Adams in 1 Corinthians 15.45–49«. In: *Journal for the Study of the New Testament* 25, pp. 343–370.
- Levison, John R. (2002). *The Spirit in First-Century Judaism*. Boston and Leiden.
- Marcus, Joel (1982). »The Evil Inclination in the Epistle of James«. In: *Catholic Biblical Quarterly* 44, pp. 606–621.
- Markschies, Christoph (1994). »Die platonische Metapher vom ›inneren Menschen‹. Eine Brücke zwischen antiker Philosophie und altchristlicher Theologie«. In: *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte* 105, pp. 1–17.
- (1995). »Die platonische Metapher vom ›inneren Menschen‹: eine Brücke zwischen antiker Philosophie und altchristlicher Theologie«. In: *International Journal of the Classical Tradition* 1.3, pp. 3–18. [slightly amended version of Markschies 1994.]
- (1997). Art. »Innerer Mensch«. In: *Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum*. Ed. by Ernst Dassmann, Theodor Klauser, Franz Joseph Dölger, et al. Vol. 18. Stuttgart, cols. 266–312.
- Mendelson, Alan (1982). *Secular Education in Philo of Alexandria*. Cincinnati, Ohio (= Monographs of the Hebrew Union College 7).
- Pagels, Elaine H. (1975). *The Gnostic Paul. Gnostic Exegesis of the Pauline Letters*. Philadelphia, Penn.
- Pearson, Birger A. (1973). *The Pneumatikos-Psychikos Terminology in 1 Corinthians. A Study in the Theology of the Corinthian Opponents of Paul and Its Relation to Gnosticism*. Missoula, Montana (= Dissertation series; Society of Biblical Literature 12).
- Robinson, Thomas M. (2002). »The Defining Features of Mind-Body Dualism in the Writings of Plato«. In: *Psyche and Soma. Physicians and Metaphysicians on the Mind-Body Problem from Antiquity to Enlightenment*. Ed. by J. P. Wright and P. Potter. Oxford. Chap. 2, pp. 37–55.
- Roig Lanzillotta, F. Lautaro (2005). »Devolution and Recollection, Deficiency and Perfection: Human Degradation and the Recovery of the Primal Condition according to Some Early Christian Texts«. In: *The Wisdom of Egypt. Jewish, Early Christian, and Gnostic Essays in Honour of Gerard P. Luttikhuisen*. Ed. by A. Hilhorst and George H. van Kooten. Leiden and Boston (= Ancient Judaism and early Christianity 59), pp. 443–459.
- Schaller, Berndt (2004). »Adam und Christus bei Paulus«. In: *Philo und das Neue Testament. Wechselseitige Wahrnehmungen – Internationales Symposium zum Corpus Judaico-Hellenisticum, 1.–4. Mai 2004, Eisenach/Jena*. Tübingen (= Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament 172), pp. 143–153.
- Schnelle, Udo (1991). *Neutestamentliche Anthropologie. Jesus – Paulus – Johannes*. Neukirchen-Vluyn (= Biblisch-theologische Studien 18).
- (1996). *The Human Condition. Anthropology in the Teachings of Jesus, Paul, and John*. Trans. by O.C. Dean Jr. Edinburgh.
- Seitz, Oscar J. F. (1958). »Afterthoughts on the Term ›Dipsychos‹«. In: *New Testament Studies* 4, pp. 327–334.
- (1947). »Antecedents and Signification of the Term ΔΙΨΥΧΟΣ«. In: *Journal of Biblical Literature* 66, pp. 211–219.

- (1944). »Relationship of the Shepherd of Hermas to the Epistle of James«. In: *Journal of Biblical Literature* 63, pp. 131–140.
- Sellin, Gerhard (1986). *Der Streit um die Auferstehung der Toten. Eine religionsgeschichtliche und exegetische Untersuchung von 1 Korinther 15*. Göttingen (= Forschungen zur Religion und Literatur des Alten und Neuen Testaments 138).
- Sterling, Gregory E. (1997). »Prepositional Metaphysics in Jewish Wisdom Speculation and Early Christian Liturgical Texts«. In: *Wisdom and Logos. Studies in Jewish Thought. FS D. Winston*. Ed. by David T. Runia and Gregory E. Sterling. Atlanta, Georgia (= The Studia Philonica Annual, Studies in Hellenistic Judaism 9), pp. 219–238.
- Stern, Menahem, ed. (1974–1984). *Greek and Latin Authors on Jews and Judaism. Edited with Introductions, Translations and Commentary*. 3 vols. Jerusalem (Publications of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, Section of Humanities; Fontes ad res Judaicas spectantes).
- Thom, Johan C. (2005). *Cleanthes' »Hymn to Zeus«. Text, Translation, and Commentary*. Tübingen (= Studies and Texts in Antiquity and Christianity 33).
- van Kooten, George H. (2008a). »Balaam as the Sophist Par Excellence in Philo of Alexandria. Philo's Projection of an Urgent Contemporary Debate onto Moses' Pentateuchal Narratives«. In: *The Prestige of the Pagan Prophet Balaam in Judaism, Early Christianity and Islam*. Ed. by George H. van Kooten and Jaques T. A. G. M. van Ruiten. Leiden and Boston (= Themes in Biblical Narrative 11), pp. 131–161.
- (2003). *Cosmic Christology in Paul and the Pauline School*. Tübingen (= Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament 2.171).
- (2008b). *Paul's Anthropology in Context. The Image of Assimilation to God, and Tripartite Man in Ancient Judaism, Ancient Philosophy and Early Christianity*. Tübingen (= Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament 232).
- (2005). »The »True Light which Enlightens Everyone« (John 1:9): John, Genesis, the Platonic Notion of the »True, Noetic Light«, and the Allegory of the Cave in Plato's Republic«. In: *The Creation of Heaven and Earth. Re-Interpretations of Genesis 1 in the Context of Judaism, Ancient Philosophy, Christianity, and Modern Physics*. Ed. by George H. van Kooten. Leiden and Boston (= Themes in Biblical Narrative 8), pp. 149–194.
- Vollenweider, Samuel (2002). »Der Geist Gottes als Selbst der Glaubenden: Überlegungen zu einem ontologischen Problem in der paulinischen Anthropologie«. In: Samuel Vollenweider. *Horizonte neutestamentlicher Christologie: Studien zu Paulus und zur frühchristlichen Theologie*. (= Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament 144). Tübingen, pp. 163–192.
- Wedderburn, Alexander J. M. (1973). »Philo's »Heavenly Man««. In: *Novum Testamentum* 15, pp. 301–326.
- Whittaker, John (1996). »The Terminology of the Rational Soul in the Writings of Philo of Alexandria«. In: *The Studia Philonica Annual* 8, pp. 1–20.
- Winter, Bruce W. (2002). *Philo and Paul among the Sophists. Alexandrian and Corinthian Responses to a Julio-Claudian Movement*. 2nd ed. Grand Rapids, Michigan.
- Winter, Martin (1975). *Pneumatiker und Psychiker in Korinth. Zum religionsgeschichtlichen Hintergrund von 1. Kor. 2,6–3,4*. Marburg (= Marburger theologische Studien 12).

Ludger Jansen, Christoph Jedan (Hrsg.)

Philosophische Anthropologie in der Antike

ontos

verlag

Frankfurt | Paris | Lancaster | New Brunswick

TOPICS IN ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY
Themen der antiken Philosophie

Herausgegeben von / Edited by

Ludger Jansen • Christoph Jedan • Christof Rapp

Band 5 / Volume 5

Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek

The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available in the Internet at <http://dnb.d-nb.de>.

North and South America by
Transaction Books
Rutgers University
Piscataway, NJ 08854-8042
trans@transactionpub.com

United Kingdom, Ireland, Turkey, Malta, Portugal by
Gazelle Books Services Limited
White Cross Mills
Hightown
LANCASTER, LA1 4XS
sales@gazellebooks.co.uk

Livraison pour la France et la Belgique:
Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin
6, place de la Sorbonne ; F-75005 PARIS
Tel. +33 (0)1 43 54 03 47 ; Fax +33 (0)1 43 54 48 18
www.vrin.fr

©2010ontosverlag
P. O. Box 15 41, D-63133 Heusenstamm nr. Frankfurt
Tel. ++(49) 6104 66 57 33 Fax ++(49) 6104 66 57 34
www.ontosverlag.com

ISBN 978-3-86838-101-6

2010

No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in retrieval systems or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording or otherwise without written permission from the Publisher, with the exception of any material supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use of the purchaser of the work

Printed on acid-free paper
ISO-Norm 970-6
FSC-certified (Forest Stewardship Council)

Printed in Germany
by CPI buch bücher.de