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Balancing Selfishness and Efficiency in Mobile Ad-hoc Networks: An Agent-based Simulation

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Keywords: Mesh-networks, Ad-hoc Networks, Agent-based Modelling, Wireless Networking.

Abstract: We study wireless ad-hoc networks from an agent-based perspective. In our model agents with different strategies such as being selfish, tit-for-tat or battery-based compete and cooperate. If only different levels of selfishness are allowed then being selfish is clearly the dominant strategy. However, introduction of more advanced strategies allows to some extent to combat selfishness. In particular we present a battery-based approach and a hybrid of battery-based and tit-for-tat approaches. The findings give hope that the introduction of widely available ad-hoc networks might at some point be possible. Even when users are given full control of their devices, effective strategies allow for the networks overall to be effective and feasible.

1 INTRODUCTION

When browsing websites or accessing other Internet services, it is easy to forget about the vast infrastructure that allows us to do all this. However, the Internet is in fact a highly centralised network based on physical connections that have to be managed and controlled. In this article we explore how a decentralised physical architecture affects the efficiency and usage of networks.

1.1 The Architecture of the Internet

Different technological solutions are employed in the inner workings of the Internet, including different cable connections as well as wireless technologies. With the increasing use of mobile devices, wireless technologies play an increasingly large role. Most wireless local area networks (WLAN) are based on the IEEE 802.11 standards and operate in the *infrastructure mode*. This mode uses a central base station (for example a router) through which connected devices (nodes) communicate. The base station is most often connected via a wire or fibre connection to a wider network.


A single device first communicates with its base


station, which then relays the message to another device or the wider network. This system allows millions of users to communicate with each other quickly and efficiently. However, it is highly centralised and prone to single point of failure mishaps. Any damage or successful attack on the base station cuts off access for all devices that rely on it. Another issue is the range and capacity limitations of base stations.


1.2 Mesh Networks

A solution to some of the mentioned problems may be *mesh networks* in place of the infrastructure mode. A wireless mesh network (also referred to as ad-hoc network) does not rely on central base stations. Instead, it is decentralised and the routing is done by all individual connected devices (Hekmat, 2016). A simplified model of an ad-hoc network is as follows: All participating devices keep track of other participating devices (often referred to as nodes); if data packets are to be sent, a path is determined that can connect the two communicating devices directly or via other nodes on the network. Thus the message ‘jumps’ from one device to the next, finally reaching its destination. Any number of devices on such a network can at the same time be connected to a conventional WLAN and thus potentially relay the data over even larger distances. In such a case, the ad-hoc network can still help to extend the range of the base station.

Considering that as of 2019 there are three billion

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smartphone users (Statista, 2019), it is easy to imagine ad-hoc networks becoming feasible. The potential of ad-hoc networks with the focus on smartphones as primary nodes is of special interest. All modern smartphones are equipped with bluetooth and WLAN capabilities, both of which can be employed to create an ad-hoc network. Taking into account the density of population in the large urban areas of the world, one could conclude that ad-hoc networks may be able to provide access to the Internet (or any other network for that matter) to vast numbers of people.

However, ad-hoc networks have their own problems. Firstly, for the network to be fully connected, a certain minimum number of devices need to participate. Moreover, those devices must remain within one another's range. If we consider that the devices on the network can be in constant motion, it can become quite difficult for the network to remain well connected in its entirety. Secondly, ad-hoc networks are prone to security issues which we will not discuss here. Lastly, the lack of a central node forces all devices to take part in the routing process. There exist many routing algorithms specifically designed for the purpose of ad-hoc networks. Such algorithms are usually designed with the focus on scalability, reliability, flexibility, throughput, load-balancing and efficiency (Vijayakumar, Ganeshkumar, & Anandaraj, 2012).

Only recently another factor has started to be taken into account when comparing different algorithms, namely battery life (Sangwan & Pooja, 2016; Yoshimachi & Manabe, 2016). If smartphone devices are the primary participants, then the success of a mesh network is strongly related to how participation will affect the battery life of individual devices. If the network causes the battery life of devices to decrease dramatically, the devices will turn off and thus the network will start losing nodes until it eventually becomes disconnected. We thus focus on the willingness of participants to volunteer part of their battery life of their device to other participants.

1.3 Overview of the Study

We consider an ad-hoc network on an area of a square in the centre of a densely populated city. All people within the square are part of the network, but they can choose whether to forward other people's data packets through their phones. The goal of each participant is to send and receive data packets. We are then presented with an interesting dilemma. Preventing other participants from using our device is beneficial for us, to save battery life. But if all participants become selfish, the network ceases to function and no one can send or re-

ceive data. If participants are in control of the amount of 'foreign' data that goes through their phones, is there a chance of achieving a stable network? We believe that the success and more widespread adoption of ad-hoc networks depends on the willingness of the population to use it. Moreover, it is clear that for the network to be appealing to new users, participants should not be forced into forfeiting control over their devices. Hence there is a need for investigation of potential emergent behaviours in groups of users.

This leads to our first research question: "What is the dominant strategy for participants in a mobile ad-hoc network?". It is our hypothesis that the dominant strategy will be the selfish approach, since even though selfish behaviour will ultimately lead to the destruction of the network, affecting all participants equally negatively, the selfish participant can profit before the network ceases to function.

Our second research question is: "Is there a reward/punishment system for participants that can improve the longevity of a mobile ad-hoc network?". We hypothesise that there indeed exists a system that can allow the voluntary ad-hoc network to be sustainable. Our hypothesis is based on findings in many similar game theory problems, such as the iterated prisoner's dilemma (or extensions such as public goods games). In those games there usually exists a reward system that can radically decrease the payoff of selfish behaviour and thereby limit or eradicate it (de Weerd & Verbrugge, 2011; Jurišić, Kermek, & Konecki, 2012).

We test our hypothesis with the help of a model of the ad-hoc network. We model a densely populated square in the city centre and we assume that the network is functioning perfectly and without disruption; it is only at the mercy of its participants.

The agents will have strategies ranging from fully selfish to fully altruistic. The agents will use the network at individually random intervals but the weight of data packages introduced into the network by each agent will be approximately the same. The effectiveness of each agent will be measured in terms of data packages it succeeded to send or receive. A genetic algorithm will be used to determine the agents' strategies throughout subsequent days. We run the model for 10 days, where a day is the time it takes for the battery of half of the population to become empty.

2 METHODS

We now explain the design of the simulation application used in this study and our design choices. The simulation is written in C++ and all source code is available at <https://github.com/mbkorecki/>

meshNetworkAgentModel. This repository also contains all necessary scripts to reproduce our results.

We do not claim that our model provides a realistic description of the network architecture. As long as the relevant qualities of the network affecting the behaviour of participants are well-defined, the model should be sufficient for our purpose.

The success of an ad-hoc network correlates with the number and spatial density of participants. The larger the network, the longer distances we want our data to travel, and the more participants we need. In the same way, if participants may exhibit different levels of participation, then the network requires a certain minimum number of participants who are willing to allow data of other nodes to be relayed through their devices. This is the quality of the ad-hoc network that we are mostly interested in and we will focus on implementing it in our model. Subtleties such as signal propagation and possibly radical heterogeneity of devices participating in the network are of less concern here. While it would certainly be interesting to investigate a highly realistic model of such a network, it would not help us in answering our question and is thus beyond the scope of this paper.

The main components of our model are: the agents trying to communicate and moving around a grid-shaped world; the routing algorithm deciding which path a message can take; and the evolutionary algorithm deciding which agents and thereby strategies are kept or created. The model will be turn-based and all of the actions will occur in a specific order, as explained in the following subsections.

2.1 Agents and their World

The agents in our application will stand for the mobile participants of an ad-hoc network. The function of the agents will be to move in the simulation world and to use the network. The movement of the agents will be simulated with a very simple random-walk model. We need the agents to be mobile but we do not need their mobility patterns to be representative or realistic, because we are more interested in how their strategic choices affect the network. Each turn, the agents can walk one step in each of the four cardinal directions or stay in place with an equal chance of 20%.

The world of our agents is a rectangle of any integer size and the agents always move by one unit of size. For all results described in this article we used a world of size 50×50 , populated with 80 agents. In our implementation, these parameters can easily be varied. If an agent walks over the border of our rectangle, it disappears from the network and with each subsequent turn it has an increasing chance to return

from a random side. The chance of an agent returning is 10% in the first turn, 20% in the second, up to the agent returning with 100% chance in the tenth turn after its disappearance. While the agent is gone from the world, it does not take part in any of the network activities (including message routing and receiving).

The part of the agents' behaviour that we are most interested in is their evolving strategies. For the first iteration of our study, agents have a binary choice space with two strategies possible: either completely selfless (altruistic) or completely selfish. The former will always route messages and the latter will never route messages. This simple distinction is fitting for a first step, a sort of preliminary testing of the waters. In subsection 3.3 we propose and investigate more complex and nuanced strategies.

2.2 Messages

Each turn, each agent has a 25% chance of deciding to send a message to a randomly chosen agent that is also present in the current world state. The message is considered to be sent successfully if the sender and the receiver are both connected through the network (subsection 2.3). The agents store how many messages they wanted to send and how many they sent successfully in order to calculate their effectiveness.

Each attempt at sending a message is associated with a cost paid by the sender. Here we introduce the battery life as a resource. Each agent starts a given day with a fully charged battery of 1,000 points. Each attempt at sending a message decreases the battery life by 5 points. Similarly, routing a message of another agent costs 3 points. The relation between the message sending and routing costs affects how punitive the routing is and therefore how costly it is for an agent to be selfless. The costs can be tweaked and changed in our implementation. We say that a *day* ends as soon as half of the agents' batteries are empty. Hence the costs affect how many runs the simulation of each day will take.

2.3 Routing

There is a wide variety of algorithms that can be used in ad-hoc networks. Since we do not investigate the effectiveness of the algorithms, we are not bound to any specific approach. The only requirement we pose is that our routing algorithm always provides the agents with optimal paths to the available receivers. In our simulation we use a distance-vector routing protocol, which uses the Bellman-Ford algorithm (Bellman, 1958). This is certainly not optimal, but fast enough for our purposes.

The algorithm as implemented in our simulation works as follows. Each agent has a routing table which lists all other agents in the simulation, the distance to them (or infinity if they cannot be reached) and the next agent via which messages should be sent (unless the agent is reachable directly). At the beginning of each run, after all agents have moved, each agent starts with a new table where all its neighbours get distance 1 and all non-neighbours get infinity. What follows is the crux of the algorithm: Each agent sends its table to all its neighbours, which use it to update their own tables. If they are offered a shorter route through the currently advertising neighbour than the one they are currently aware of, they will replace this line in their table. This process is repeated until no agents will make any more updates.

It is worth noting that when a selfish agent advertises its table, it only provides the other agents with routes to itself, as it disallows any other traffic to go through its device. Another important point is that for two agents to be considered neighbours, they must be within 10 units of each other.

Now if an agent wants to send a message, it looks up the receiver in its routing table. If the distance to the receiver is finite, it is possible to reach the agent, so the message is routed to the next node as provided by the table. The next node then pays the routing costs and repeats the process of looking up the receiver and the next node in the table. The process continues until the receiver node is reached.

2.4 Efficiency and Evolution

The *efficiency* of an agent is the ratio of the number of messages successfully sent by it to the number of messages it wanted to send. We use this value as the fitness function for sorting agents in our evolutionary algorithm. Hence, the maximum fitness is 1 and the minimum fitness is 0. We keep track of the global efficiency of the network, which is the average efficiency of all participating agents.

Besides efficiency we also use the battery life of each agent in our evolutionary algorithm. However, we do not use the battery life in the fitness function, but rather as a cut-off to mimic a real-world setting. Agents whose battery life drops to 0 are considered dead and removed from the world. Once half of the initial population is dead, we say that a *day* has ended. The dead half is discarded and the remaining *survivors* are ordered by their fitness. The population for the next day is then created on the basis of the surviving half. The algorithm determining the other half of the new population depends on the type of strategies and is explained in the next section.

3 THREE SET-UPS

We have done three experiments, each with a different choice of strategies. In each set-up, the model will simulate 10 days. To make sure the results are representative, 100 simulations of 10 days each will be run and their results will be averaged. The standard deviation values for selfishness and effectiveness will also be calculated.

3.1 Set-up I: Binary Agents

Our first experiment focuses on running our simulation with agents that can exhibit either a selfish or a selfless approach. The selfish agents never allow any routing to go through their devices and the selfless agents always allow routing. The selfish agents seem to be privileged in terms of the costs to their battery resources. At the start of our simulation 1% of the agents are selfish, i.e. 1 out of 80. We keep track of the ratio of agent strategies as well as the overall effectiveness of the network over time. The evolutionary mechanism in this set-up at the end of each day first allows the surviving half of the population to pass to the next day. To fill up the other half we iterate through the survivors one by one and make copies of some of them, depending on their fitness. For example, a surviving selfless agent with a fitness of 0.78, has a 78% chance to be cloned. We stop as soon as the same total population size is reached again and proceed to the next day.

3.2 Set-up II: Stochastic Agents

Our second experiment is based on the first set-up, but now the strategies are not binary but stochastic. Each agent has a level of selfishness between 0 and 1. An agent with a selfishness of 0.45 has 45% chance of refusing to route traffic through itself each turn.

This change also allows us to employ a more sophisticated evolution. In this set-up, again the surviving half of the population passes into the next day. The remaining half however is now repopulated with *crossover* agents that have the average selfishness of two surviving agents. As in Set-up I, more effective agents have a greater chance to reproduce. We also add a small chance for *mutation*: Each new agent has a 1% chance to change its selfishness by ± 0.1 .

3.3 Set-up III: Advanced Strategies

The third experiment addresses more advanced strategies and a more heterogeneous environment. Besides the stochastic strategy from subsection 3.2 we use the following three strategies.

The tit-for-tat strategy (TFT) inspired by Axelrod (1980) keeps track of previous interactions. A TFT agent will route a message if the original sender has agreed to routing in their last interaction and disagree if they disagreed. The decision is based only on the previous interaction between the two agents in question, if there was any. Otherwise, the TFT agent will trustingly allow for routing to take place.

The battery-based strategy (BB) takes into consideration energy usage. The BB agent will always route if its battery is above 500 (half the initial amount). If its battery is below 500, the BB agent will sometimes refuse to route: the lower the battery, the greater the chance of a BB agent refusing.

Finally, the hybrid strategy is a combination of the TFT and BB agent. A hybrid agent's decision is made in two steps. The first step is the same as in a TFT agent: if it is the first interaction or in previous interaction the other agent cooperated, the hybrid agent will go to step two, otherwise it will not route. The second step is the same as in the BB agent, but the battery cap is 400 instead of 500.

The evolutionary mechanism in this set-up is similar to the one in Set-up II. The first half of the new population again consists of the surviving half of the population. The second half is formed by combining two survivors, where those with higher efficiency are more likely to get chosen. The selfishness of the child is the average of the selfishness of the two parents. Additionally, the selfishness has a 1% chance to mutate by 0.1 in any direction. The type of the child will be the same as one of the parents — each of the two having 50% chance of passing its type. TFT, BB and hybrid agents have a selfishness of 0.

4 RESULTS

We now give the results of our simulation described in section 2, one set-up per section. The effectiveness of the whole system shown in the results below is the average effectiveness of all agents. The selfishness of binary and stochastic agents is their willingness to refuse routing, i.e. 0 or 1 for binary agents and a value within $[0, 1]$ for stochastic agents. The selfishness of the whole system shown in the results is the average selfishness of all agents. Entries of 0.000 mean that the value is below 0.0005.

4.1 Set-up I: Binary Agents

The first part of Table 1 and the red plots in Figure 1, show a clear relationship between effectiveness and

Table 1: Set-ups I and II (all standard deviations below 0.04).

Day	Set-up I		Set-up II	
	Effectiven.	Selfishn.	Effectiven.	Selfishn.
1	0.878	0.031	0.858	0.034
2	0.805	0.078	0.802	0.062
3	0.673	0.172	0.727	0.105
4	0.470	0.370	0.630	0.162
5	0.229	0.753	0.515	0.232
6	0.052	0.979	0.413	0.312
7	0.004	0.997	0.317	0.396
8	0.000	1.000	0.241	0.478
9	0.000	1.000	0.176	0.553
10	0.000	1.000	0.132	0.619

○ Effectiveness Set-up I ▲ Selfishness Set-up I
○ Effectiveness Set-up II ▲ Selfishness Set-up II




Figure 1: Effectiveness and selfishness for Set-up I and II.

selfishness ratios. Namely, the increase in the selfishness ratio of individual agents correlates with the decrease in the effectiveness of the network. Moreover, as the days progress, the effectiveness of the system decreases while the selfishness increases. The maximum system selfishness of 1 (meaning all agents are selfish) is reached in day 8. This correlates with the effectiveness of the system dropping to 0. This is consistent with the values of the effectiveness for a system that is run with selfishness ratio 1 as initial condition.

Higher effectiveness of the system leads to fewer runs per day. It takes on average 345.8 runs for half of the agents to die when the effectiveness is 0.878, but 821.920 runs when the effectiveness is below 0.001. This is because less or no messages get routed overall, so less energy is used.

4.2 Set-up II: Stochastic Agents

As can be seen in the second half of Table 1 and the blue plot in Figure 1, the trends occurring in Set-up 1 are apparent in Set-up II as well. Namely, the cor-

relation between the effectiveness and the selfishness remains inversely proportional. However, the relationship is weaker than in Set-up I. The fivefold increase of selfishness over the first four days affects the effectiveness less significantly than in Set-up I. However, after the selfishness reaches the 0.3 mark, the decrease in effectiveness becomes more rapid.

Even though the initial increase of the selfishness is comparable in terms of the slope, the overall pattern appears much less steep than in Set-up I. Nevertheless, when the simulation is run for a sufficient number of days, the selfishness increases to around 0.99 and the effectiveness drops to around 0.14. The number of days needed to reach such a state is significantly larger than in the case of Set-up I (around 50 days).

4.3 Set-up III: Advanced Strategies

For each strategy we want to know if it survives against selfish agents. Moreover, we want to compare all strategies together in one setting. Hence we investigate four different settings in Set-up III. In three settings half of the agents are stochastic (with 0.01 selfishness) and the others are TFT, BB and hybrid, respectively. In a fourth “tournament” setting, we start with 25% each of stochastic, TFT, BB and hybrid agents.

Tit-for-tat. The TFT agents are able to curtail the stochastic agents — see the first part of Table 2 and the orange plot in Figure 2. The stochastic agents still exhibit (just like in Set-up II) a tendency to become increasingly selfish, but the increase in selfishness and the decrease in effectiveness are slower when compared to Set-up II. The population of TFT diminishes




Figure 2: Effectiveness and selfishness for Set-up III.

slowly. The number of runs increases from around 350 to 400 over the course of the 10 days.

Battery based. Results of the second setting of Set-up III are also shown in Table 2 and plotted in green in Figure 2. The BB agents appear to have a similar effect on the stochastic agents as the TFT agents. The difference is that both initial and final effectiveness are much lower. In the early days of the simulation, however, the BB agents are able to increase their number well above the stochastic agents. The number of runs increases over the days from 435 to 500.

Hybrid. In the third setting of Set-up III, the hybrid agents dominate the stochastic agents, as shown in the third part of Table 2 and by the red plot in Figure 2. The selfishness remains stable, while the effectiveness decreases slightly from 0.6 to around 0.45 — a value consistent with a situation in which the world is populated only by hybrid agents. The number of runs needed for half of the agents to die increases over the 10 days from around 430 to 480.

Tournament. For our last setting the results are shown in the right-most part of Table 2 and plotted in blue in Figure 2. Clearly, Hybrid and BB agents dominate the rest. The number of BB agents increases from 20 to 39 and hybrid agents from 20 to 31. The selfishness increases from 0.017 to 0.031 which is just a little bit faster than in the Hybrid setting. The number of runs increases from 440 to 490.

5 CONCLUSIONS

5.1 The First Research Question

The set-ups I and II can answer our first research question, “What is the dominant strategy for participants in an ad-hoc mobile network?” The dominant strategy is a selfish one. Both in the run with binary agents and the run with stochastic agents, the population became overrun by the selfish element. This is especially striking since only 1 selfish individual out of 80 or for Set-up II a stochastic selfishness of 0.01 was enough for the selfishness of the system as a whole to become 1. This means the selfish behaviour is the dominant strategy by far, confirming our hypothesis. This situation can be understood by analysing the conditions in which the agents operate. Each agent is rated based on the number of messages it sent successfully related to the total number of messages it wanted to send. However, both sending and routing has a cost of depleting the precious resource, namely, the battery life. Hence, an agent who sends messages but does not route achieves better results than an agent who both sends and routes.

Table 2: Set-up III (all standard deviations below 0.05).

Day	Stoch. vs. TFT			Stoch. vs. BB			Stoch. vs. Hybrid			Tournament					
	Eff	Self	# TFT	Eff	Self	# BB	Eff	Self	# Hyb	Eff	Self	# Stoch	# TFT	# BB	# Hyb
1	0.880	0.017	40.00	0.579	0.024	40.00	0.595	0.017	40.00	0.569	0.017	20.00	20.00	20.00	20.00
2	0.857	0.022	36.65	0.560	0.035	43.57	0.591	0.020	43.03	0.579	0.019	19.61	18.82	22.44	19.13
3	0.843	0.028	35.55	0.512	0.050	50.25	0.555	0.022	50.00	0.544	0.021	16.32	15.64	27.22	20.82
4	0.818	0.036	35.11	0.469	0.050	50.25	0.524	0.024	50.74	0.518	0.023	13.27	12.70	30.03	24.00
5	0.787	0.045	35.16	0.438	0.085	56.79	0.502	0.024	60.40	0.494	0.024	10.77	10.37	33.09	25.77
6	0.766	0.058	35.32	0.410	0.108	56.79	0.487	0.024	64.46	0.478	0.025	8.43	8.13	35.21	28.23
7	0.733	0.072	33.79	0.387	0.137	55.50	0.478	0.023	67.16	0.460	0.027	6.80	6.27	37.72	29.21
8	0.691	0.087	33.21	0.359	0.173	52.96	0.470	0.022	69.49	0.456	0.029	6.72	5.02	38.64	29.62
9	0.659	0.106	32.00	0.333	0.221	48.61	0.462	0.022	71.75	0.447	0.030	6.59	3.94	38.84	30.63
10	0.619	0.126	31.07	0.308	0.272	43.07	0.459	0.020	73.38	0.445	0.031	6.31	2.96	39.31	31.42

The selfish agent abuses the selflessness of its less selfish colleagues.

The situation quickly changes with more selfish agents: the efficiency decreases as fewer agents are willing to route. After a critical point is passed all agents become selfish and the network becomes ineffective, allowing only direct messages. This situation is similar to games such as Prisoner’s dilemma (de Weerd & Verbrugge, 2011) and seems to reflect actual human behaviour as described by Hardin (1968).

We sought to remedy this situation by introducing more advanced strategies, namely the TFT, BB and hybrid agents. But the TFT agents did not stop the selfish agents: after 10 days, the selfishness increased ninefold. It did, however, significantly lower the expansion of the selfish element, thus limiting the decrease in effectiveness of the network. However, it is likely that, as more days passed, the selfish element would continue to increase.

The BB agents, while slowing down the expansion of the selfish agents, were not able to keep them at bay. After 10 days, the selfishness reached over 0.25 and the effectiveness was just slightly above 0.25.

The hybrid agents exhibiting a combination of the TFT and BB strategies showed an ability to combat the selfish individuals. Over the course of 10 days, the increase in selfishness was only 0.003 and the number of stochastic agents decreased from 40 to around 7.

5.2 The Second Research Question

We can now answer our second research question: “Is there a reward/punishment system for participants that can improve the longevity of a mobile ad-hoc network?”. The answer is yes, as we will now discuss.

The limited success of TFT can be explained if we consider its interaction with selfish agents. A TFT agent allows for routing at the first interaction with the selfish one and then declines to route once the selfish agent declines to route for the TFT agent. Hence self-

ish agents may abuse the trusting approach of the TFT and get a slight advantage.

The limited success of BB agents lies in their ability to recognize the battery life as a valuable resource and to base their decisions on its basis. Their behaviour leads to a less efficient but more stable situation: Because agents with low battery life will not route, the routing responsibilities are more distributed over the system. However, since the BB behaviour is strictly self preserving and not really punishing to the selfish agents, the latter are still able to take advantage and eventually dominate.

The success of the hybrid agents is a mixed blessing. They are able to keep selfish agents away efficiently. However, they also remove selfless and TFT agents regardless of their beneficial behaviour. The only agents that can potentially defeat hybrid agents are BB agents and the resulting network exhibits an effectiveness of around 0.45. This is far from optimal but it is a definite improvement over Set-up I and II.

It is worthwhile to consider the results through the lens of evolutionary game theory. We have a number of groups of individuals exhibiting different survival strategies, scarce resources, and a need for cooperation. Of special interest would be to decide if the strategies we discussed are *evolutionarily stable*. An evolutionarily stable strategy is any strategy that cannot be invaded by an initially rare, alternative strategy (Easley & Kleinberg, 2017). Given the results of Set-up III, the strategies that could be evolutionarily stable are the BB and the hybrid strategy. The TFT strategy becomes invaded by the selfish strategy. Note that for a strategy to be evolutionarily stable, it does not need to optimise the efficiency of the system. Therefore, the BB agents, even though decreasing the effectiveness of the system, cannot immediately be discarded as candidates for being evolutionarily stable. However, it is too early to say that the hybrid or BB strategy is evolutionarily stable: we would need to test them against a wider array of alternative strategies.

A recommendation to architects of mobile ad-hoc networks based on our results is that users should be allowed to control the routing done by their devices, because there are non-selfish stable strategies. This is also reasonable from both ethical and marketing perspectives. Reporting the effectiveness of different strategies to the users can easily be done and would likely improve the overall effectiveness. Since strategies such as our hybrid approach limit the effectiveness of selfish users, selfishness would be naturally discouraged. More control over the use of the network would lead to more users, which in turn allows for more routing opportunities, larger range of the network and overall robustness. Moreover, the network providers would be able to build trust in the users by not enforcing a global behaviour on all devices, thus recognising different needs and abilities of different users.

5.3 Future Work

A natural next step to continue our research would be to run simulations beyond 10 days. Another potential extension is to consider other routing algorithms, in particular taking into account the battery levels of the users. Ideas to extend the battery life in mesh networks have been discussed by Sangwan and Pooja (2016) and Anastasi, Conti, Di Francesco, and Passarella (2009).

Another idea to make our model more realistic would be to replace the square grid with a map of an actual city and to use a realistic model of human mobility patterns (Serok & Blumenfeld-Lieberthal, 2015).

An improvement that we already hinted at could be to test the BB and hybrid strategies against a larger number of alternative strategies, in order to test their potential evolutionary stability. Moreover, it seems interesting to consider the dynamics of different strategies and their evolution in mesh networks. It would also be interesting to investigate how dynamic changes of agents' strategies, from day to day or maybe even within one day, would work out in a mesh network.

Other researchers consider the importance of social learning, cooperation and individual reputation in game theory considerations (Sigmund, 2016). While those ideas have been taken into account in our study, we think that our approach is still lacking realism. It is difficult to predict the behaviour of groups of individuals in a reliable manner. Studies into crowd psychology and the evolution of collective behaviour could shed more light on the matter (Gordon, 2014).

Finally, models and simulations are great to design and test new strategies, but should then also be tested in real-life experiments. Running a study on actual smartphones as done by Schejbal (2014), but then with the additional strategy choice given to each user, could

provide us with more realistic data. Such experiments can also take into account physical intricacies of ad-hoc networks that we ignored in this study.

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