The future of relics from a military past

A study to the history, contemporary role and future development of 20th century military heritage at the waterfront of Tallinn, Estonia

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Abstract

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In comparison to Western Europe, the countries in Central- and Eastern Europe witnessed a complex 20th century from a geopolitical perspective, whereas numerous wars, periods of occupation and political turnovers took place. Consequently, the contemporary landscapes are bearing the military imprint of different political formations and face problems regarding the reuse and domestication of the military remnants. In this thesis, the post-military landscape at the inner-city coast of Tallinn, Estonia, has been studied. The main objective was to get insight in the historical background, contemporary role and future development of military heritage in the Tallinn Waterfront area. The research consists out of two parts. First of all, the historical layering of the Tallinn Waterfront area has been unfolded by elaborating a landscape-biographical approach and making an inventory of military remnants. Secondly, the post-military reuse of military heritage, both in terms of matter and meanings, has been studied by elaborating three case studies at the waterfront. Important sources for the empirical research were historical maps, inventories, expert interviews, policy study and fieldwork.

The landscape biography of the Tallinn Waterfront area revealed the influence of the geopolitical context and military activity in the area’s spatial development. Especially the military harbour constructed at the coast of Tallinn by imperialist Russia in the 1910s can be ascribed such a determinative role. As the most recent and relatively long period of foreign occupation, the Soviet era heavily imprinted the landscape as well, since the coast was closed for almost fifty years. Therefore, the physical imprint of the 20th century military history of Tallinn lies to a large extent in the obstruction of urban regeneration. Also, the absence of human intrusion in areas like Paljassaare had a positive effect on nature values. Furthermore, a large amount of physical military relics remain of various types and origin.

In terms of legal protection, it mainly is the imperialist Russian and Estonian ones that are listed as national monuments, whereas the Soviet remnants evoke much more dissonance and alienation. The study to the present fate of these military remnants revealed that different post-military reuse strategies are applied in the Tallinn Waterfront area. It was found that the military-historical background of the remnants strongly determines their present role at the waterfront. Some remnants, like those at Paljassaare, are abandoned and in decay. Both in terms of matter and meanings, those remnants are insidiously erased from the landscape, which can be explained by their dissonant, non-Estonian character as relics from a foreign military force. Other heritage sites are converted, like the Battery and the Maarjamäe Memorial. Due to its dark history as a notorious prison, the Battery and its meanings cannot simply be erased. Instead, the dissonant and ambiguous meanings at are slowly being rewritten through museumification. In the case of the Maarjamäe Memorial, a commemorative version of conversion takes place. New commemorative meanings are attached to the site, encompassing the older and formerly contested ones. Instead of erasure of rewriting, the dissonant meanings at Maarjamäe are co-written.

The case studies at the Tallinn Waterfront area illustrate the processes of both material and discursive rearrangement of heritage with a dissonant military background. When certain parts or layers in the physical landscape do not fit to the dominant social landscape, we can speak of a mismatch between matterscapes of powerscapes. Besides a material transition, a conversion of meanings is crucial for domesticating the alienated relics, whether this is achieved by a co-writing, rewriting or erasure strategy.
Preface

It actually all started ten years ago, during a holiday on the Dutch Wadden Island of Terschelling. Our stay was a cottage in the dunes, no more than 200 metres away from the North Sea beach. My younger brother and I made a discovery: dozens of bunkers and trenches, hidden in the dunes. The area turned out to be an ideal playground, not in the last place for our fantasies. Of course, maps were made in the days after and we tried to imagine how the bunkers had been used in the past. Years later, these experiences proved to be inspirational when a bachelor thesis topic within the realm of tourism geography had to be thought of, because just as fascinating as its past is the present and future use of military heritage. Or to be precise: its disuse, its abandonment, its decay. Why had my brother and I to ‘discover’ the bunkers, why were they covered with sand and taken over by nature, why were they denied? The result up to that point: a thesis called ‘Dark tourism on the Wadden Islands’.

Military heritage like the Atlantic Wall bunkers at Terschelling can be found everywhere in Europe and even worldwide. When the master thesis for the Landscape History master came into view, the idea came up to study military imprinted landscapes elsewhere in Europe, preferably in the eastern half where the Soviet occupation ended just twenty-five years ago. With the help of Tiina Peil and a fruitful seminar in Aarhus in November 2014, plans were set for a combined research internship and master thesis project at the Tallinn University. Part of the plan was to spend spring 2015 in the capital city of Estonia. A little more than a year after I set foot on Estonian ground for the first time, the project is completed by finishing this thesis.

The three months spent in Tallinn were interesting and instructive thanks to the many people who in one way or the other helped or guided me while exploring Estonia and its rich landscape, history, heritage and culture. That is why want to thank the people who I was able to consult or interview during my stay; they are all mentioned at the end of the thesis. Special thanks to Robert Treufeldt who showed me around at Paljassaare and was willing to read early texts, to the colleagues at the Institute of Ecology at the fifth floor for their hospitality and involvement, to Ann-Leena and Martin Miller for taking me to some of the finest Soviet military heritage sites, to Liis for being such a nice and open-minded housemate and to my family who was digitally engaged all the time and even came to visit me. Most of all, nevertheless, I need to say dankjewel or tänan to Tiina Peil, my daily mentor in Estonia, for her dedicated, patient, pointed and always inspiring supervision from the end of 2014 in Aarhus up to the present day.

The Estonian expedition was only one part of the process, however, which means that in and around Groningen, I got indispensable support as well. Support from supervisor Theo Spek, of course, who I’d like to thank for the sharpness, proficiency and unceasing enthusiasm by guiding me through the Landscape History master. Thanks to Peter Groote as well for the willingness to be the second reader of the thesis. Thanks to my colleague students or landschappers for the engagement and the joint writing sessions. And, finally, sweet thanks to Roos for your hourly faith and your help in both the product and the process; it must have felt like a second thesis for you as well.

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# Table of contents

1. **Introduction** .................................................................................................................................................. 9  
   1.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................................ 11  
   1.2 Research of post-military landscapes: a state of the art .......................................................................... 13  
   1.3 Research set-up ......................................................................................................................................... 17  
   1.4 Theoretical framework .............................................................................................................................. 19  
   1.5 Methods and sources ................................................................................................................................. 27  
2. **Landscape biography of the Tallinn Waterfront area** ............................................................................... 34  
   2.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................... 34  
   2.2 Historiography of the Tallinn Waterfront area .......................................................................................... 35  
   2.3 Physical geography and early history of Tallinn ...................................................................................... 37  
   2.4 Russian defence dreams (1900-1918) ....................................................................................................... 41  
   2.5 The interwar period (1918-1940) .............................................................................................................. 46  
   2.6 The curtained coasts of the ESSR (1940-1991) ....................................................................................... 49  
   2.7 The post-military waterfront of Tallinn (1991-now) .............................................................................. 53  
   2.8 Inventory of the waterfront’s military imprint .......................................................................................... 56  
   2.9 Conclusion .................................................................................................................................................. 60  
3. **Military heritage: contemporary use and future development** ................................................................. 63  
   3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................... 63  
   3.2 Protection and reuse of military heritage ................................................................................................. 64  
   3.3 Paljassaare: abandonment and absence ................................................................................................... 66  
   3.4 The Battery: conversion of ambiguous heritage ..................................................................................... 71  
   3.5 Maarjamäe: towards a multi-memorial landscape ................................................................................... 75  
   3.6 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................... 78  
4. **Conclusion** .................................................................................................................................................. 81  
   4.1 Answering the research questions ........................................................................................................... 81  
   4.2 Recapturing the problem definition ........................................................................................................ 82  
   4.3 Discussion and recommendations .......................................................................................................... 83  

References .......................................................................................................................................................... 85  

Attachment 1 – List of historical topographical maps ..................................................................................... 92  
Attachment 2 – List of interviewees ................................................................................................................ 93  
Attachment 3 – Interview manual ................................................................................................................... 94  
Attachment 4 – Cartographic appendix .......................................................................................................... 96
1. Introduction

1.1 Introduction

Military and post-military landscapes
Landscapes are often compared with palimpsests, as they bear ‘the multi-layered imprint of numerous generations of human authors’. Also in times of war or preparation for war, military layers are added to this palimpsest, containing a military imprint like battlefields, bunkers, defence batteries, closed reserves, military industries and bomb shelters. Rachel Woodward uses the term post-military landscapes when the landscape has an ‘imprint of a former military function [that] remains too pervasive to enable the erasure of their military origins’. Because these military origins are often tense and turbulent geopolitical and historical periods characterized by (the threat of) war, they are likely to evoke complex and possibly negative feelings. This is especially the case when the ‘human author’ is an occupying force: the enemy.

Military traces from periods of occupation are good examples of what Ashworth and Tunbridge mean with their notion of dissonant heritage. The presence of dissonant elements in post-military landscapes raises interesting questions regarding the contemporary use and the dynamic interpretive frames related to such heritage. The simple fact that a past is unwanted does not erase the memories and relics that remind us to it. ‘The past is everywhere’, as the first sentence of Lowenthal’s The Past is a Foreign Country sounds, and so is the occupied or military past: ‘whether it is celebrated or rejected, attended to or ignored, the past is omnipresent’. Especially because of the interesting cultural and economic-geographical issues regarding their re-use, Woodward considers further research of post-military landscapes as highly prospective.

Central and Eastern European palimpsests
The majority of current research of both military and post-military landscapes is conducted by an Anglophone community of researchers and focuses on landscapes and histories in the Western world. The former military landscapes of Central- and Eastern European countries, for instance, are relatively underexposed in the academic literature. As Palang et al. state, however, Central and Eastern European landscapes differ fundamentally from Western European ones regarding their temporal diversity, having witnessed at least four political periods and numerous decades of occupation in the 20th century. Each of these political and socio-economic formations has left its own imprint in the landscape, including a variety of military and defensive traces. The military inheritance of the Soviet era is exemplary in this respect. It faces the formerly Soviet occupied countries with a huge challenge, both physically regarding the redevelopment of the remnants and mentally in the light of the ‘redomestication’ or revaluation of the dissonant heritage.

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1 Palang et al., 2011: 345.
3 Ashworth and Tunbridge, 1996.
4 Lowenthal, 1985: XV.
6 Ibid.: 46.
7 Palang et al., 2006: 347.
The Estonian example
This research focusses on Estonia, a country in Northeast Europe and the most northern of the three Baltic States (figure 1.1). The country’s geopolitical history is a complex one. From medieval times onwards, numerous foreign powers have dominated the country. When just looking at the 20th century, five different flags waved in on top of the Tall Hermann, the highest tower of the Toompea castle in the Old Town of Tallinn that symbolises the government in force. It is barely twenty-five years ago that the Soviet occupation, as the most recent period of foreign dominance, came to an end. The different geopolitical periods can all be characterised by a degree of militarisation of both societies and landscapes. In the Estonian capital of Tallinn only, 174 Soviet military units were based on 872 hectares of military area. In the 1980s, the 122,480 Soviet soldiers and officers, together with families, formed more than 10% of the city’s population.9 Almost the whole coastline and the islands were under military control, became depopulated and were closed for locals during the German and Soviet occupation, as the Baltic coast was part of the Iron Curtain.10

Figure 1.1 – Basic map of Estonia.

The Soviet era is only the most recent chapter in a long narrative on the history of defensive and military landscapes of Estonia. Earlier in the 20th century, parts of Estonia’s northern coast were designated to the Peter the Great Naval Fortress. This military structure, believed to be one of the largest in the world, was built to protect St. Petersburg, the capital of the Russian Empire.11 As Russian naval base, Tallinn was a strategic node in this fortified network. Partly because of the multi-layered military imprint and the clustering of different types of dissonant heritage objects in Tallinn, each with specific post-military reuse strategies and revaluation issues, the waterfront of Tallinn is chosen to function as the case study area in this research (figure 1.2).

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9 Raukas, 1999: 121.
Research of post-military landscapes: a state of the art

Post-military landscapes and the military heritage within have been studied by different scientific fields, including economic geography and cultural geography, heritage and tourism studies, ecology, history and political sciences. Also, research has been conducted on a wide variety of spatial scales. The state of the art of this thesis is divided in three parts, starting at an international scale and then zooming in to the national and local level. In this paragraph, first, a brief overview is sketched from the kind of research to post-military landscapes across the world. Secondly, studies to former military areas and military heritage in Estonia are addressed. The research to the military history on the level of Tallinn is represented in paragraph 2.2, as a prelude to the landscape biography of the Tallinn Waterfront area.

International research to post-military landscapes

Much of the research to former military areas is conducted from the angle of economic geography and focusses on the economic opportunities and difficulties that go with the redevelopment or conversion of those sites. In her book on *Military Geographies*, Rachel Woodward adopts this approach in describing the conversion of former military areas in the

![Figure 1.2 – Selection of military remnants at the waterfront of Tallinn: the Russian artillery battery at Paljassaare (top left), the Soviet Maarjamäe Memorial (top right) and Patarei Prison or ‘the Battery’ (below).]
United Kingdom and the United States. Samer Bagaeen conducted a comparative study to military base redevelopment by studying cases in the United Kingdom, Germany and Jordan. Bagaeen particularly wrote about the governance models and strategies relating to redevelopment and pleas for the involvement of the different parties and the local community in such processes. The role of participatory planning and local stakeholders in preserving and/or developing former military landscapes is also emphasized by Vervloet et al., although in a considerably different historical context. Their case concerned a 400 years old historical military defence line and its role in spatial planning, based on which they illustrated how a compromise between conservation and restoration of military heritage on the one hand and (re)development of the landscape for other purposes on the other hand can be reached through extensive cooperation with stakeholders.

Former military areas are also frequently studied from an ecological and environmental perspective. In a special edition of the GeoJournal named Military natures: militarism and the environment from 2007, editor Sasha Davis describes the complex relationship between nature and the environment. He argues that militarism can both destroy and produce nature. David Havlick further investigated the so-called production of nature in former military bases in the United States, which he refers to as ‘military-to-wildlife conversions’. A conservationist approach to nature in former military areas is adopted by Burkart and Anders in their study to former military areas in Germany. In the Baltic Green Belt project, which is described for Estonia in in specific below, the ecological richness of the former militarized areas of the Iron Curtain has been assessed, including the effect of militarization of the environment on the preservation of cultural heritage.

Finally, numerous studies exist to the touristic reuse and heritage-related aspects of post-military landscapes. John Tunbridge, for instance, has studied the potential of British colonial naval heritage on Malta as a resource for the tourism economy and local identities. In the case of military heritage from periods of occupation, the notions of ‘dark tourism’ and ‘dissonant heritage’ are applied to the military remnants in some studies. Gilly Carr, for example, studied the German bunkers on the British Channel islands from such an angle and found that a number of conflicting issues were ongoing regarding these bunkers, like concerning the ownership (who’s heritage), their historical interpretation and present-day commodification.

Estonian research to post-military landscapes and military heritage

Early research
Also on the Estonian level, a numerous studies have been conducted to former military areas and post-military landscapes in the last two decades. An early contribution to the discussion on the role of the Soviet history in the newly created national identity of the country is from Merlin Waterson in 1992. Waterson mainly looked at the cultural identity, preservation of architecture and conservation and story-telling in for example museums and not that much at tangible military heritage. One relevant conclusion of her is that ‘the search for historical truth’ – and the

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14 Vervloet et al., 2005: 163.
16 Havlick, 2007: 151.
18 Baltic Green Belt, 2009.
19 Tunbridge, 2008.
20 Carr, 2010: 81-82. Multiple comparable studies have been conducted to the reuse of Atlantic Wall remnants across the western coast of continental Europe.
related preservation practices concerning cultural history – ‘is a particularly difficult, emotive and dangerous task’.

Here, she already hints on the role of dissonance in heritage creation and management.

One of the first geographical accounts of the post-military landscape is the paper of Jussi Jauhiainen, who provides a map of Soviet military locations and spends a part of his research on the topic of re-use of former military bases, using Raadi airfield in Tartu as an example (figure 1.3). Jauhiainen mentions the problems that the re-use of former Soviet military areas entail, like environmental, social and political matters, although he ends his paper with stressing the potential of military areas for re-use. Research focused on the environmental and ecological pollution caused by the Soviet military activities has been conducted by Anto Raukas, who edited two extensive reports on the size and nature of the pollution and the clean-up activities in the 1990s. Together with Raukas, Henri Järv co-published an article on the ambiguous Soviet military heritage in coastal Estonia by analysing both the environmental pollution and the protection of nature in military areas due to absence of human and economic activity.

**Figure 1.3 – Soviet military areas in Estonia (map derived from the Jauhiainen article).**

**Mapping the military legacy**

In his reports, Raukas also gives an inventory of Soviet military heritage for the whole of Estonia. Although it is highly detailed, this inventory is rather instrumental to the evaluation that Raukas gives of the environmental pollution and clean-up operation. More general and contextual research to cultural heritage is done within the Estonian Green Belt project. This project ran from 2009 to 2012 and was part of the broader Baltic Green Belt project, a regional development project funded by the European Union, featuring partners from the Baltic States, Russia, Poland and Germany. The Baltic Green Belt aims to set up a network for sustainable development and conservation of the Baltic Sea coast, both regarding the cultural and natural heritage values alongside the former Iron Curtain or ‘Green Belt’ (figure 1.4).

As result of the Estonian Green Belt project, two research reports were published. The first, the Estonian Green Belt book which is compiled by Kalev Sepp, gives a description of the history of

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25 Järv et al., 2013.
26 Baltic Green Belt, 2009.
the Soviet occupation as well as information on the cultural and natural heritage along the Ethiopian coastline. The second report contains a detailed inventory of the objects of cultural heritage in the coastal areas of Estonia. Under the umbrella of the Estonian Green Belt project, history, cultural heritage, nature conservation and current planning practices along the Estonian coast have been mapped and described, leading to useful insights concerning the former Soviet military landscape and the heritage that is left there. The reports only mention Tallinn on a general level, however, whereas in the inventory report, the Harju county in which Tallinn lays is left out at all because coastal cities were less restricted in the past and consequently excluded from the inventory.

**Cultural geographical research to Estonian post-military landscapes**

More recently, a number of cultural geographers wrote about military heritage and post-military landscapes. Tiina Peil has examined military landscapes on Estonian islands and its coast by elaborating on the landscape and heritage concepts, firstly in 1999 by writing on the landscape history of the Osmussaar Island. In 2005, she studied the influence of the Soviet past in heritage creation in Estonia, with the Pakri Peninsula and the city of Paldiski as a case. Her conclusion was that, although the Soviet past and its heritage are contested, ignorance is no option. Paldiski, for example, lying in a former Soviet military area, fits into Estonian heritage as

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27 Sepp, 2011.
28 Löhmus and Sapelkov, 2011.
29 Ibid.: 11.
30 Peil, 1999.
31 Peil, 2005.
representing ‘the contradictory other’ or the ‘non-Estonian’ in the country’s history.\textsuperscript{32} Another paper of Peil about Paldiski was published a year later, this time by focusing on the role of maps as representing meaningful landscapes.\textsuperscript{33} By elaborating this cartographic approach, Peil exposed the interpretative nature of maps and their role in creating Paldiski as a heritage site. The most recent article of Peil on Estonia’s military landscapes is a study of the ethics, politics and practices at the Soviet border zone of Estonia.\textsuperscript{34} Based on analysing the procedures on gaining access to the border zone in the 1960s and 1970s, she concludes that they were much more than just physical barriers but mental barriers as well.

In 2010, Rammo contributed to the understanding of post-military landscapes by studying the possibilities for the redevelopment of two former military areas. Based on in-depth interviews with locals at two sites, one of her conclusions is that the Soviet military areas are often regarded as the product of an unknown and alienated past. Therefore, the ‘re-domestication’ of this heritage by the local communities is a favourable approach in order to ‘socially restore’ those post-military landscapes.\textsuperscript{35} Beate Feldmann Eellend has also studied the ongoing dynamics of post-military landscapes and their consequences for the everyday life.\textsuperscript{36} In her dissertation, she uses case studies in Saaremaa (Estonia), Gotland (Sweden) and Rügen (Germany) and stresses the importance of acceptance by locals in order to make transformative policies successful. From the angle of tourism studies and land use planning, Mart Reimann and Hannes Palang conducted research to the re-use of a former military area for touristic purposes, taking into consideration its designation as a nature reserve. In their paper, they show and analyses how a former military area at the North-Estonian coast faces land-use conflicts and plans for touristic reuse.\textsuperscript{37}

**Sum up: knowledge gaps**
Research to post-military landscapes has been conducted from a range of different angles and in different spatial contexts. The majority of studies, however, were elaborated in Western Europe or North America. Furthermore, military-geographical studies often focus on the conversion of national military areas instead of military sites and structures from a period of occupation. In Estonia, a rough distinct can be made between two clusters of research that deal with post-military landscapes and their military imprint. One the one hand, a number of reports and inventories have been composed that focus on the description and inventory of military heritage objects and environmental effects. On the other hand, a number of particular sites, most often former Soviet military areas, have been studied by geographers with specific attention to their contemporary use and future redevelopment opportunities. In most cases, these studies focused on the military remnants and their present meanings for the Soviet time layer only. Besides, military heritage in an urban context has received relatively little attention compared to sites and structures in rural areas.

### 1.3 Research set-up

**Problem definition**
The post-military landscape and the contemporary role of military heritage within form the core of this master thesis. The dissonant and unwanted character of such heritage is problematic in terms of heritage management, raising pressing questions on how to reuse the physical remnants, whether or not to invest in protection or conservation and which interpretative

\textsuperscript{32} Peil, 2005: 54, 62.
\textsuperscript{33} Peil, 2006.
\textsuperscript{34} Peil, 2013.
\textsuperscript{35} Rammo, 2010: 1954.
\textsuperscript{36} Feldmann Eellend, 2013.
\textsuperscript{37} Reimann and Palang, 2000.
frames to use or create. In the example of Estonia, recent studies already pointed out that numerous post-military reuse strategies exist and that the redevelopment of former military sites and complexes is generally a halting and uncertain process. A general aim in this thesis is to gain insight in the ‘why’ and ‘how’ behind the problematic role of military heritage in post-military environments.

The waterfront of Tallinn is chosen to function as a case for getting insight in the issues addressed above. The coastal area of Estonia’s capital city is especially interesting because of the multiple historical military layers that the contemporary landscape has. Next to the complex and dissonant military history of the area, the waterfront of Tallinn also is the setting of numerous military heritage objects and structures. They are reused and valued in varying ways and illustrate the problematic and contested role that military heritage plays nowadays. Both the general and site-specific issues put forward here have been translated into the following problem statement:

*PD What role does the 20th century military-historical background of the Tallinn Waterfront area play in the contemporary use and future development of military heritage?*

**Research objectives**

Based on the historiography and the problem definition as formulated above, a number of research objectives are drawn. First of all, an aim of this thesis is to apply the Anglophone concepts from the fields of cultural geography, military geography and heritage studies to the Central- and Eastern European context and to Tallinn in specific, where the landscape has many military imprints that come from different periods of occupation and militarisation during the 20th century. Another objective is to gain insight in the influence of occupation and militarized pasts for the contemporary use and meanings of military heritage, including an exploration of the determinants underlying economically and culturally successful reuse of military heritage. In doing so, both Tallinn’s present post-military landscape and its military past are coherently studied. This links up to a third objective: to explore the benefits of a landscape-biographical method by studying the topic of heritage management and creation in the Tallinn Waterfront study area. Besides, a last and more concrete goal of this research is simply to map the military remnants that can be found in the Tallinn Waterfront area, as a prerequisite for the more profound analysis of the heritage.

**Research questions and sub questions**

The empirical research is divided into two parts, each aligned to a research question. Research question one, covered in chapter two, entails a historical-geographical analysis of the study area and the role of military activity and militarism within. A landscape biography is compiled for the period from 1900 onwards, by which the multi-layered military imprint on the Tallinn Waterfront area is mapped and analysed. For the landscape-historical part of the empirical research, three sub questions are raised:

*RQ1 How has the Tallinn Waterfront area been shaped and imprinted by military activity from 1900 onwards?*

  a. *What spatial-historical development has the Tallinn Waterfront area gone through from 1900 onwards?*

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38 Jauhiainen, 1997; Peil, 2006; Rammo, 2010.
39 In paragraph 1.5, the motivation behind the choice for the Tallinn Waterfront area as a case and the territorial, temporal and thematic demarcation of the thesis are discussed in more detail.
40 Also the dual empirical set-up of the research and the related methodologies and sources are covered in detail in paragraph 1.5.
b. How do these changes relate to military activities throughout the various geopolitical periods of Estonian history?

c. Which physical military imprint can be found in the contemporary post-military landscape of the Tallinn Waterfront area?

With the landscape biography and the inventory of Tallinn’s military imprint as a crucial fundament, the research continues by investigating the role of 20th century military heritage in the post-military waterfront of Tallinn. This stands central in the second research question, covered in chapter three and split up in three sub questions. The first deals with the role of military heritage for the study area in general. For the remaining two sub questions, the focus shifts to three specific military sites or structures within the Tallinn Waterfront area. By conducting these case studies, the physical and functional redevelopment of the military heritage as well as the rearrangement in terms of meanings is investigated, taking their dissonant character and landscape-historical background into consideration.

RQ2 How is 20th century military heritage reused and valued in the contemporary Tallinn Waterfront area, both in terms of matter and meanings?

a. To what extent is 20th century military heritage at Tallinn’s waterfront reused and legally protected and managed?

b. How can the post-military reuse of military heritage at the Tallinn Waterfront area be explained by its historical background?

c. What effect do the post-military reuse strategies have on the rearrangement of meanings attached to the military heritage?

1.4 Theoretical framework

By taking the post-military landscape as a the central concept in this thesis as a starting point, two conceptual implications can be made: first, the current landscape should be placed in a military-historical context and secondly, this military past is left as an imprint in the current landscape and still defines today’s landscape and the dynamics within. This conceptual twofold has been translated into two respective research questions in the previous paragraph. The theoretical research framework that is constructed in this paragraph is built around three central concepts: landscape, (dissonant) heritage and ‘the military’.

Landscape as a palimpsest of powerscapes

Defining landscape
In the post-military landscape concept, landscape functions in the first place as a spatial entity that transcends an object-based view. ‘Landscape is the broadest scale at which the influence of military activity can be felt and assessed’ according to Schofield, who continues by stating that ‘it is also the scale at which the impact of conflict can best be appreciated, whether upon the form of physical landscape, or on the psychology of its inhabitants’.41 Behind the apparently simple concept of landscape lurks an enormous ontological debate within geography and related disciplines. Three features can be distinguished that many definitions of landscape have in common: holism, relativity and dynamics.42 The holistic feature is strikingly reflected in the definition by Sauer, who refers to landscape as a ‘cohesive assemblage of natural and cultural

42 Antrop, 2007: 11.
The second feature – relativity – means that a landscape is observed by a subject: ‘die wahre Landschaft ist im Kopf’, to cite Löfgren. The feature of dynamics indicates that landscapes are changing and becoming. The definition of the Council of Europe is relatively complete, ex- or implicitly covering all three features in defining landscape as ‘an area, as perceived by people, whose character is the result of the action and interaction of natural and/or human factors’.

**Landscape ontology**

When discussing military heritage, the relative character of landscapes and its subjective and intersubjective perception are important to emphasize. Jacobs’ theory on the experience of landscapes conceptualises this assumption. Based on Habermas, Jacobs distinguishes matterscapes, powerscapes and mindscape, respectively linked to the physical, social and inner reality (figure 1.5). Matterscape refers to the physical and objective reality: to the material world in which concrete batteries and bunkers, iron walls, fences and ecosystems can be found. Matterscapes are studied by physics, geology, ecology, physical geography and environmental sciences. Powerscape is the social reality that contains cultural norms and rules and is intersubjectively constructed. Powerscapes are the décor of the restrictedness of military areas, museums that teach us history, ownership of land, political borders and the crops that earn a farmer his living. Powerscapes are studied from fields like social geography, economy, anthropology, planning theory and political sciences. Mindscape refers to the mental landscape as experienced by individual subjects and is studied by experience sciences like environmental psychology, cultural geography and arts. Mindscape refer to the place you feel at home, to getting goose bumps at a cemetery or a war memorial and to the beauty of a rosy sunset.

**Figure 1.5** – Visualisation of the three dimensions of landscape according to Jacobs.

Within the field of geography, the discourse on landscapes moved from a physical to a more mental and social approach. The cultural turn that unfolded in the 1970s and 1980s can be seen as culmination of the trend towards a more intersubjective understanding of landscape: ‘landscape was defined less as an external, physical object, or as a mixture of ‘natural’ and ‘cultural’ elements, and more as a particular, culturally specific way of seeing or representing the world’. The New Cultural Geography (NCG) tradition originated within this context, approaching landscape as a representation or a way of seeing. In reaction, cultural Marxist scholars stressed how landscapes are not just passive representations, but also actively produced. Don Mitchell, for instance, argues that ‘the landscape (in all its senses) is both an outcome and the medium of social relations, both the result of and the input to specific relations of production and reproduction’. Here, Mitchell illustrates how landscapes can be seen as powerscapes, that is, as a reflection of social relations, cultural norms and ideologies.

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43 Oakes and Price, 2008: 150.
48 Mitchell, 2005: 49.
Powerscape dynamics
A convincing illustration of landscapes as powerscapes is provided by Blomley and his writings on the geographies of property law. Blomley shows how legal meanings, restrictions, rules and values – in short: power relations – are spatially communicated.\textsuperscript{49} Maandi uses the example of a property map to stress this point, emphasizing that maps not only express how reality looks like: they indicate how reality should look like (figure 1.6).\textsuperscript{50} At Paldiski – a former Soviet military town at the north-western coast of Estonia – Peil conducted a thorough map study titled \textit{Maps of meanings} in which she illustrates how maps are a reflection of powerscapes and contain numerous values, interpretations and selections. As she puts it: ‘\textit{mapping geographical space and attributing meaning to it are cultural acts, and cultural contextualization is a key point in map analyses}’.\textsuperscript{51} Peil her research, in short, shows how military landscapes are a perfect example of the power dimension of landscapes.

\textbf{Figure 1.6} – The ‘landscape of property’ according to Maandi. The three layers above the material landscape are examples of ways in which land ownership is articulated. The material landscape matches with the physical dimension or matterscape, whereas the top three layers represent social dimensions of landscape and fit to the powerscape.

The historical layering of landscapes
The theoretical exploration of the landscape concept is concluded by adding the temporal dimension to the representative approach to the landscape concept. ‘\textit{Landscape is the history of a way of seeing, or, better, of representing landscape}’, as Cosgrove and Jackson state.\textsuperscript{52} Or, repeating the first sentence of this chapter, landscape is a palimpsest that reflects the imprints of various ‘\textit{generations of human authors}’.\textsuperscript{53} In much more general terms, Cosgrove refers to such human authors as wider ‘\textit{socio-economic formations}’, shaping landscapes which can therefore be seen as social products (figure 1.7).\textsuperscript{54} Cosgrove uses the examples of feudalism and capitalism as two ways of organizing society that simultaneously affect the material ordering of landscapes. An analysis of how socio-economic developments lead to landscape change in Western Europe is provided by Antrop, distinguishing pre-19\textsuperscript{th} century traditional landscapes, post-modern landscapes from after the Second World War and the landscape of the revolution age in between.\textsuperscript{55} The landscapes of Central and Eastern European landscapes are especially interesting in this respect, as they bear the imprint of four different socio-economic and political periods for the 20\textsuperscript{th} century only.\textsuperscript{56}

\textsuperscript{49} Blomley, 2005: 281-283.
\textsuperscript{50} Maandi, 2009: 456.
\textsuperscript{51} Peil, 2006: 110.
\textsuperscript{52} Cosgrove and Jackson, 1987, in Wylie, 2007: 69.
\textsuperscript{53} Palang \textit{et al.}, 2011: 345.
\textsuperscript{54} Cosgrove, 1984: 14.
\textsuperscript{55} Antrop, 2005: 23.
\textsuperscript{56} Palang \textit{et al.}, 2006: 348-350.
Powerscapes, heritage and dissonance

Defining heritage

Ashworth simply defines heritage as the contemporary use of the past in order to create imagined features. Calling something heritage is an example of the cultural-geographical act of ascribing meanings or values to the physical landscape or features within. Therefore, heritage representations or meanings belong to powerscapes and mindscapes rather than matterscapes. A military remnant like a concrete bunker, for instance, is not by definition heritage: it is humans who ascribe such heritage values to the soulless concrete. The heritage concept illustrates how landscape can be seen as ‘both material and discursive mediator of cultural values’. Or, as Don Mitchell puts it: ‘[the] landscape as a concretization and maker of memory’.

Similar to how representations of landscapes are being produced, one can speak of a production of heritage. Graham et al. emphasize, in line with Don Mitchell, that such representations are not passively transmitted: the present produces and manages heritage. When following such an economic approach, heritage can be defined as a ‘commodified product using a selection of the resources of the past for the construction of products to satisfy modern demands’. Relics are the most obvious example of such resources, but both memories in the mental realm and history in the social domain likewise function as sources of past knowledge that can be utilized for contemporary purposes. A selection of these past resources is used as an input for the heritage production process, subsequently packaged with values and interpretation and finally commodified (figure 1.8). Commodification, defined as ‘transforming elements of tourism experience into something that can be purchased as a good’, explains how a heritage product is created, which is traded by heritage or tourism industries.

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57 Ashworth, 2014.
60 Graham et al., 2000: 2.
61 Ashworth and Larkham, 1994: 47.
63 Williams, 2009: 137.
Dissonant heritage in contested landscapes

The production, management and protection of heritage are highly selective and political processes. To designate certain objects as heritage by definition means that others are not listed, conserved and passed on to future generations. In the modern era in which the world is politically divided in nation states, heritage production is mostly a national affair. National heritage is used to passively represent and actively produce a national identity; thereby producing national landscapes as well. One might as well say that a country’s heritage logically matches with – to use Cosgrove’s terminology again – the present socio-economic and political formation, or the present powerscape. But in every present-day landscape, remnants of former formations of powerscapes can be found. The logical consequence is a discrepancy between the matterscape and mind- and powerscapes, as the remnants do not correspond with the dominant cultural values and meanings as projected on space. Examples of such materially and socially disordered relics are the German bunkers along the Dutch coastline and the Soviet kolhozes in Estonia (figure 1.9). Both were established in periods of occupation, the first representing foreign military presence whereas the latter symbolises a socialist economy and collective farming.

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64 Jones, 2006: 60.
65 Cosgrove, 1984: 47.
66 Edensor studied industrial ruins and the way they are materially and socially disordered, because they not reproduce and sustain the dominant cultural values (Edensor, 2005: 312).
Tunbridge and Ashworth speak of dissonant or contested heritage when talking about relics representing pasts that constrain the present. They argue that one way how dissonance of heritage can be caused is by a mismatch between the dominant cultural norms and values in society on the one hand and the meanings evoked by heritage on the other. Besides the notion of dissonant heritage, there are numerous other ways to appoint a degree of contestedness of heritage and landscapes. The term ‘traumascapes’ as coined by Tumarkin, for instance, referring to ‘a distinctive category of places transformed physically and psychically by suffering, part of a scar tissue that stretches across the world’. Comparable are ‘incomplete landscapes’ or ‘silent landscapes’, both used by Studio Kopp in an artistic project, mapping and photographing the remnants of the Iron Curtain along the Baltic coastline.

The Dutch painter Armando introduced the term ‘guilty landscapes’ by which he refers to landscapes that were the settings of terrible events like wars, murders and suffering.

Especially landscapes or heritage objects that are imprinted by the First or Second World War are well-studied from the angle of memory politics and heritage studies. Van der Laarse, for instance, wrote about Holocaust sites as ‘terrorscapes’, whereas Pearson coined the term ‘scarred landscape’ in the context of Vichy France during the Second World War. A concept relevant when studying the touristic activities at dissonant or contested heritage sites is dark tourism as dropped by Foley & Lennon in the 1990s, defined as ‘the presentation and consumption (by visitors) of real and commodified death and disaster sites’. Numerous authors elaborated on the different degrees of the darkness of such sites, like Stone who makes a distinction between sites of death and suffering on the one side of the spectrum and sites indirectly associated with death and suffering on the other.

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69 Studio Kopp, 2014.
72 Foley and Lennon, 1996: 198.
73 Stone, 2006: 151.
Military heritage and post-military landscapes

By default, military heritage and post-military landscapes evoke a certain extent of dissonance. Its strategic and non-civilian character forms one part of an explanation for this, whereas the context of war or preparation for war and war-related atrocity make another. Furthermore, the fact that (the threat of) war often corresponds with a change of political formation strengthens the likeliness of dissonance regarding its relics under the successive stabilized formation. This is especially the case when the previous formation was one of occupation and repression of national identities, like in the case of many Central- and Eastern European countries during the Cold War.74

Military and post-military landscapes

Woodward describes military landscapes as spaces in which control is exerted, either by military forces during and after armed conflicts or militarism and military activity in non-conflict situations.75 Woodward argues that war, as the direct and active engagement of armed forces in a conflict, is the apex of the pyramid of military activity and militarism. Her notion of the military, therefore, goes beyond warfare, instead enfolding ‘the continual preparations which states make in order to be able to wage war and engage in military operations’.76 Here Woodward, just like Pearson, makes the important distinction between war-related military landscapes and military landscapes that are related to the preparation of war.77 Strongly related to the concept military landscape concept is the landscape of defence, defined by Gold and Revill as ‘shaped or otherwise materially affected by formal or informal strategies designed to reduce the risk of crime, or deter intrusion, or cope with the actual or perceived threats to the security of the area’s occupants’.78 In contrast to military and militarized landscapes, the definition of landscapes of defence is broader and stretches further into civilian spheres.

In her recent review of military geographical research, Woodward puts the study of former or post-military landscapes – defined as landscapes bearing ‘imprint of a former military function [that] remains too pervasive to enable the erasure of their military origins’ – high on the agenda for further research.79 Well-known post-military landscapes are, for instance, those featuring the Cold War constructions in Europe and the US, the Atlantic Wall structures built by the Nazi-Germans during the Second World War along the western and northern European coast and the former Soviet military training areas in Eastern Europe. Inherent to post-military landscapes is that they have undergone a process of demilitarisation or disarmament. The reuse of demilitarised landscapes in the contemporary formation, referred in this thesis as post-military reuse strategies, may take various forms of which the four main ones are distinguished and identified here (figure 1.10).

74 Palang et al., 2006: 348-350.
75 Woodward, 2004: 3.
76 Ibid.: 4.
78 Gold and Revill, 2000: 3.
A first post-military reuse strategy is remilitarization of the former military site by the armed forces of the new ruler, as has happened in many occasions in Central- and Eastern-European countries after the withdrawal of the Soviet army. The logical alternative is the transformation of the military object or site into the civilian sphere, referred to as conversion. Both a rooted and unrooted type of conversion is distinguished here. Unrooted conversion means redevelopment into civilian use without an explicit connection to the site’s former military function, like the redevelopment of former barracks into residential housing or a factory. In the case of rooted conversion, the new civilian use does explicitly connect to the former military function and its historical context. In practice, rooted conversion often goes hand in hand with touristic reuse and museumification. In terms of Tunbridge and Ashworth, the site’s military history functions as a resource and is commodified into an attractive heritage product, ready to be consumed by tourists. Carr gives the example of the German bunkers on the British Channel Islands which serve as popular dark tourism sites nowadays. A special type of rooted conversion is commemorative conversion and applies to the reuse of military memorials of a previous formation for contemporary commemorative uses.

The fourth post-military reuse strategy is disuse and abandonment, with intentional or unintentional obsolescence and ruination as the likely effect. As many scholars who studied the reuse of former military sites have recognized, for different reasons, successful conversion proves to be difficult to achieve in many cases. A consequence can be that nature takes over and the area becomes interesting and worth conserving from an ecological point of view. Both in writings on military and post-military landscapes, the role of the military as the 'new defender of wildlife' is put forward. A convenient example is given in the Baltic Green Belt project report, wherein the former Iron Curtain along the Baltic coast is valued both because of its military heritage and the ecological values that have developed during fifty years of minimal human intrusion.

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82 Tunbridge and Ashworth, 1996: 7.
83 Carr, 2010.
84 Jauhiainen, 1997; Bagaeen, 2006; Rammo, 2010.
86 Sepp, 2011.
Material and discursive rearrangement

Supported by the main argument of this thesis, the post-military reuse of former military landscapes or objects is approached as a process that goes beyond a just material transition. A shift of political and/or socio-economic formations leads to change of the landscape in all of its ontological dimensions: matterscapes, mindscapes and powerscapes. In other words: the presence of military heritage not just faces society with the challenge of physical and functional reuse, but also of a conversion of meanings (figure 1.11). This is referred to in this thesis as the process of discursive rearrangement. If and how such a rearrangement is achieved depends amongst others on the degree of dissonance evoked by the remnants, the post-military reuse strategy that is applied and a range of site-specific circumstances.

In general, two ideal types of rearrangement can be distinguished on both ends of a spectrum. The first is alienation of society from the dissonant elements in the contemporary landscape. Edensor considers such alienated and abandoned ruins as socially and materially disordered constructs of which the utility and meaning have evaporated.\footnote{Edensor, 2005: 312-313.} The objects found in ruins, he writes, are creating ‘absent presences’ that show ‘the otherness of the past, which is tactile, imaginative and involuntary’.\footnote{Ibid.: 330.} When military remnants stay unused and alienated, they become ‘terra nullius’ or non-places: present in matterscapes, but absent in powerscapes.\footnote{Davis, 2005: 614.} The alternative on the other end of the spectrum is to overcome alienation by adopting the remnants in the present powerscape. Rammo refers to such discursive rearrangement as ‘redomestication’, which means that they are both physically and socially restored.\footnote{Rammo, 2010: 1954.} A prerequisite for doing so is that the previous formation and the latest transformation are accepted by society as part of history, for example by adapting the role of the ‘contradictory other’, as suggested by Peil in her study to Paldiski.\footnote{Peil, 2005: 62.}

Figure 1.11 – Material reuse and discursive rearrangement.

1.5 Methods and sources

Now the theoretical framework – the ‘shoulders of giants’ to stand on – is set, it is time to clarify the instrumental aspects of the thesis. The research aims are operationalised by conducting empirical research to the example of Tallinn, Estonia. Hence, a case study methodology is used and discussed in this paragraph. Furthermore, both research questions have a distinct set of methods and sources, which are sequentially introduced below.
Methodology and demarcation

The case study as an approach
Post-military landscapes and military heritage both exist in a tremendous amount and variety, for instance in terms of size, function, age, physical condition and geography. Only in the example of former Soviet military sites in Estonia, Raukas identified 1565 military objects and estimated the total amount of military areas at 87,000 hectares. In order to study post-military landscapes and their military history in a nuanced and contextual manner, this research adopts a case study methodology. An advantage of this approach is the possibility to study phenomena in an in-depth and idiographic manner, taking contextual influences into consideration. The reliability and validity of case-studies have been criticised because of their inability to generate generalizable knowledge. However, this has been refuted by numerous social scientists including Bent Flyvbjerg, who advocates in favour of ‘the power of example’ and argues that studying a single-case is an appropriate scientific method without any doubt. Case studies are especially valued for their usability in both corroborating and falsifying existing theories and hypotheses, as well as in developing new explanatory concepts. Case study methodologies, both comparative and single-case (N=1), have been widely applied in studies to post-military landscapes.

Why the Tallinn Waterfront area?
The Estonian capital of Tallinn and its coastal landscape – in short: Tallinn Waterfront – is suitable as a case in this research for a number of reasons. First of all, an overlay or palimpsest of numerous historical layers with military remnants can be found in this area, ranging from the Peter the Great fortifications to the restricted areas in the Soviet area, with the traces from the First and Second World War in between. As the capital city throughout the whole 20th century, Tallinn has had a significant strategic function for almost all of the geopolitical periods in this century. Secondly, the waterfront features different post-military reuse strategies regarding its military heritage. A number of military-historical ‘hotspots’ are located in Tallinn with have gained national or even international attention and illustrate both the challenges and chances regarding the post-military reuse of military remnants. The Seaplane Hangar and the former Patarei Prison or the Battery are examples of such well-known military heritage objects. The first has recently been redeveloped into successful museum that opened its doors in 2012, whereas for the Battery, plans exist for touristic reuse as well. Other objects, like those at the Paljassaare Peninsula, are not reused and at all, with abandonment and decay as the material consequences.

Furthermore, recent studies within the realm of spatial planning and urban studies stress – although most of the time in an implicit way – the relevance of the military past in the urban development of present-day Tallinn, for example when it comes to the lack of accessibility and attractiveness of the waterfront. Finally, more than at the countryside, the Tallinn case illustrates how military remnants can clash with or complement to urban developments, especially when taking into consideration the recent plans of the city government to transform the waterfront into an attractive residential and touristic area. The ongoing spatial development of the area means that choices are being made regarding the post-military

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92 Raukas, 1999: 121.
95 Baxter, 2010: 82.
96 Jauhiainen, 1997; Peil, 2005; Bagaeen, 2006; Rammo, 2010; Feldmann Eellend, 2013.
98 Ruoppila, 2007; Cerrone, 2012; Unt et al., 2014.
99 Tallinn City Council, 2013.
management of military remnants, revealing present-day approaches to the relics of military and occupied pasts.

Demarcation: territory, time, theme

The boundaries of this graduate research are drawn in the dimensions of territory, time and theme. To start with, the study area is the waterfront from and including Paljassaare Peninsula in the west to the mouth of the Pirita River in the east and reaches between the 200 and 500 metres landward (figure 1.12, map 5). This territory is chosen because this coastal zone is covering the most significant military remnants within the city’s district. Furthermore, the area concerns the ‘original’ coastline of Tallinn where the city’s oldest coastal structures and settlements can be found. Focusing on this specific study area is further justified because this coastal strip includes the most dynamic part of Tallinn’s coast, wherein quite some spatial redevelopments take place that have or might have strong implications for the future use, meaning and existence of military remnants.

Looking at the temporal dimension, the focus lies on the 20th century, starting from 1900 when Estonia was still part of tsarist Russia until the current Republic of Estonia and all geopolitical phases in between. These boundaries are chosen because most of the military remnants in the area can be placed within this period of more than 115 years. The choice to include the last eighteen years of the tsarist Russian period (1900-1918) instead of taking the First World War as the point of departure was made because of the impressive and influential military structures that the Russians constructed within the boundaries of the study area in the 1910s. The decision to take the whole of the 20th century instead of a more specific time layer is the explicit aim of this research to understand the current landscape as a palimpsest, imprinted by not just one but numerous historical layers. Furthermore, many of the remaining military objects and areas have been functional in more than just one period. The Battery is a striking illustration, having

Figure 1.13 – Map of the surroundings of Tallinn. The red square indicates the contours of the Tallinn Waterfront study area. Map 5 in the attachments provides a more detailed demarcation.
The third boundary is a thematic one. Within the boundaries of time and space as set above, the historical and military geography of the study area and role of military heritage within are studied.

Research question 1 – Landscape biography

Research question one and chapter two deal with the spatial-historical development of the Tallinn Waterfront area and the way the study area is shaped and imprinted by military activity from 1900 onwards. Table 1.1 gives an overview of the sub questions, methods, sources and products for this part.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub questions</th>
<th>$</th>
<th>Methods</th>
<th>Sources</th>
<th>Products</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1a. What spatial-historical development has the Tallinn Waterfront area gone through from 1900 onwards?</td>
<td>2.3-2.7</td>
<td>Landscape-biographical method - Historical map analysis</td>
<td>- Secondary literature - Historical maps</td>
<td>- Landscape biography - Historical land use maps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1b. How do these changes relate to military activities throughout the various geopolitical periods of Estonian history?</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>Inventory of military remnants</td>
<td>- Historical map analysis - Secondary literature and existing inventories - Expert interviews - Fieldwork (own observations and pictures)</td>
<td>- Map and inventory of military remnants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1c. Which military imprint can be found in the contemporary post-military landscape of the Tallinn Waterfront area?</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>Inventory of military remnants</td>
<td>- Historical map analysis - Secondary literature and existing inventories - Expert interviews - Fieldwork (own observations and pictures)</td>
<td>- Map and inventory of military remnants</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.1 – Methods and sources connected to research question 1.

The landscape-biographical method

To answer the first research question, a spatial-historical analysis of the spatial development of Tallinn Waterfront is made by embracing the landscape-biographical method. This method is based on the idea that ‘cultural landscapes bear the multi-layered imprint of numerous generations of human authors: landscape as a palimpsest’. According to Palang et al., all three of Jacob’s ontological dimensions should be taken into account in a landscape biography. They further stress the role of landscape biographies in exploring landscape changes, which is especially relevant in regions with rapid political changes like the Eastern European countries. In the landscape biography that is composed in chapter two, the focus lies on the cultural landscape and the formations from the 20th century onwards, hence only briefly covering the physical pre-conditions and early history of the area. The chronology that is followed in the biography is explained in paragraph 2.1.

Historical map analyses

The landscape biography of Tallinn Waterfront is not just composed based on written sources, but has the analysis of historical maps an important method as well. Maps made by different rulers in different political periods are used and analysed to get insight in the landscape changes on the one hand and the landscape layers where the Tallinn Waterfront palimpsest consists of

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100 Treufeldt, 2015b: 14.
101 Palang et al., 2011: 345.
102 Ibid.
on the other. Moreover, a set of 20th century topographical maps are used for the creation of a five-part land use map series (map 7 of the cartographic appendix provides an overview). Next to topographical maps, also touristic, thematic and pre-19th century ones are used as input for the landscape biography. Most maps have been derived from the digital map register of the Estonian National Archives and from online map server of the Estonian Land Board. Additional sources on the maps and their background are found in a number of scientific articles and in the book ‘Maps of the city of Tallinn’ by Tõnu Raid. An overview of the most important maps that have been used for the analysis is displayed in attachment 1.

A brief history of Estonian topographical mapping
In general, the Estonian maps from the 19th century onwards were created with military, juridical and economic incentives. In varying degrees, the production and the use of these maps have been imbued with secrecy and control. Moreover, the majority of cartographers that mapped Estonia were foreigners with limited local knowledge and Estonian-speaking abilities, considerably affecting the accuracy and reliability of many maps. Estonian topographical mapping started in the early 19th century when the Mapping Department of tsarist Russia carried out the first surveys, with newer ones to follow in the 1860s and the 1890s. Both in 1918 and in 1925, adjusted reprints of latest Russian maps were made by respectively the German Army and the Republic of Estonia. Between the two World Wars, national cartography rapidly developed, with new national surveys being carried out in the 1930s.

During the Soviet occupation, the compilation, publication and use of almost all kind of topographic and thematic maps was generally highly secret and featured a manipulated coordinate system. Nevertheless, numerous detailed topographical maps have been published between 1939 and the 1988, partly based on wide-scale surveys carried out by Soviet institutions and partly by reprinting earlier maps. Soviet maps intended for public use were often remarkably inaccurate and intentionally distorted. Already in 1985, the prohibitions became less strict, as part of Gorbachev’s glasnost and perestroika policy, leading to ‘Renaissance of Estonian cartography’. The cartography from after 1991 rapidly took over Western European methods and standards.

Inventory of military remnants
The map analyses conducted in order to compose the landscape biography already provide useful information on which military remnants have been preserved at Tallinn Waterfront. Besides, a number of other sources are used to complete the inventory. One is the registry of cultural monuments of the National Heritage Board of Estonia. Others are the existing inventories of military remnants, like the reports by Raukas and some non-scientific Estonian and Russian web sources. Also, two academics with particular expertise on Estonia’s military history and heritage were consulted in April and May 2015. With historian Robert Treufeldt, a road trip, a walk and an in-office consultation were made. Also art historian Oliver Orro was consulted during the process. Finally, own observations and pictures have been helpful for identifying and categorising the military remnants.

103 Raid, 2011.
105 Jagomägi and Mardiste, 1994: 82.
106 Ibid.: 84.
110 National Heritage Board, 2016a.
Research question 2 – Heritage studies

To answer research question two, a mixed arsenal of common methods and sources within the social sciences are used to be able to describe and analyse the contemporary role of 20th century military heritage at Tallinn Waterfront (see table 1.2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub questions</th>
<th>$</th>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Sources</th>
<th>Products</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.1 To what extent is 20th century military heritage at Tallinn’s waterfront reused and legally protected and managed?</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>Policy study</td>
<td>Fieldwork and own observations</td>
<td>Overview of heritage management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 How can the post-military reuse of military heritage at the Tallinn Waterfront area be explained by the historical background of the heritage?</td>
<td>3.3-3.5</td>
<td>Threefold case study, mixed methods</td>
<td>Semi-structured interviews, Policies, Secondary literature, Products from chapter 2</td>
<td>Three military heritage case studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 What effect do the post-military reuse strategies have on the rearrangement of meanings attached to the military heritage?</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.2 – Methods and sources connected to research question 2.

A threefold study to the reuse of military heritage

At Tallinn Waterfront, three more detailed case studies are conducted for studying the contemporary and future role of military heritage. It concerns the former Paljassaare Islands, the Battery and the Maarjamäe site. A number of considerations played a role in selecting these three cases. One is that all three heritage sites somehow have a problematic position in the urban landscape: Paljassaare as wasteland, the Battery as a former notorious prison and endangered heritage and the Maarjamäe Memorial as dissonant symbol of the Soviet occupation. Secondly, three different types of military heritage are studied, as it concerns former military reserve on the landscape level, a former fortification on the object level and a memorial complex as an ensemble. Finally, all three examples of heritage are in transition in a particular way, both in terms of reuse and heritage values.

Figure 1.14 – The case study areas on a land use map of the study area.
Semi-structured interviews
As an important source for answering the second research question, six interviews have been conducted with experts that are professionally familiar with the Tallinn Waterfront area. In concerns – in random order – an urban ecologist, a local activist and urbanist, two officials from the City Planning Department, an architecture historian, a representative of the Estonian War Museum and a member of the National Heritage Board. Important themes during the interviews were the contemporary use, function and meaning of 20th century military heritage, possible clashes or combinations with other land uses or developments and the future prospects of the remnants. In every interview, the three heritages cases were explicitly discussed. Besides a general set of questions, a row of customized questions was prepared for every interviewee based on his or her specific interests or expertise. Both a list of interviewees and an interview manual are annexed (attachment 2 and 3).

The interviews were conducted in a semi-structured manner, giving the interviewee a chance to ask predetermined and standardized questions, together with deepening and more spontaneous questions to highlight certain topics and issues. For all the interviews, detailed notes were made during and after the interview and an interview report was written no later than three days after the interview. Besides, the interviews have been recorded in close consultation with the interviewee. The interviews were held in May 2015, are between 43 and 80 minutes of length and were all conducted in English.

Policy study
For all three sub questions under research question two, policy documents, laws and reports have been an additional source. Especially the Heritage Conservation Act, the official register of cultural monuments, the development plans of both the City Government and heritage management organizations and a number of statements released by the Estonian Government were of use in getting insight in the contemporary protection and management of military heritage in the study area. The references of these reports and webpages have been documented in a similar way as and together with the ‘regular’ literature.

2. Landscape biography of the Tallinn Waterfront area

2.1 Introduction

Compared to earlier centuries, the 20th century was a turbulent and dynamic one for Tallinn from different angles. It was the century in which Estonia’s capital city saw its population increase with factor 7.3, from 65,000 in 1897 to over 480,000 inhabitants in 1989. Rapid urban expansion was the logical consequence. It also was a restless period in terms of geopolitics, as the country faced two wars and five distinct periods of foreign occupation, counting for a total of two-thirds of the century. Partly as a consequence of these two circumstances, it was also a century in which the coast of Tallinn vastly changed due to urbanisation, industrialisation, militarisation and natural processes. By elaborating a landscape-biographical methodology, the landscape history of Tallinn from 1900 onwards is described and analysed layer by layer in this chapter.

The aim of the first research question of this thesis is to get insight in how militarism and military activity during the different time layers have shaped and imprinted the Tallinn Waterfront area from 1900 onwards. As the historiographical account in paragraph 2.2 will confirm, a historical-geographical perspective to the Tallinn Waterfront area is what is lacking in existing studies. Furthermore, whereas many other accounts are object-based or focused on just one time layer, the aim here is to apply a landscape-based approach and to study the landscape changes during the different political periods from 1900 onwards comprehensively. The landscape biography not only functions as a means to unfold the spatial-historical development...
of the study area and the role of military activity within. It also helps to gain a contextual understanding – both spatially and historically – of the military heritage that is left in the current landscape, useful for the heritage-related analyses in the next chapter.

Chronology of a century

The landscape biography consists out of five chronological parts. The first is a brief account on the landscape history of coastal Tallinn before 1900. The next four parts are structured in accordance with the four time layers and three turnovers that can be distinguished in Central and Eastern European countries (figure 2.1 and 2.2). Until the end of the First World War, it were the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires who were at their peaks in the eastern part of Europe. After these empires disintegrated, a second period started in which nation states emerged. In Estonia, this first turnover is marked by the War of Independence. The next turnover took place during the Second World War and resulted in the transition from nationalist to socialist states in the whole of Central and Eastern Europe. During this third political period, Estonia was occupied by the Soviet Union, Germany and again by the Soviets, the latter lasting from 1944 to 1991. The last turnover is the disintegration of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, marking the start of a new and ongoing period of independent Central- and Eastern European nation states. The last paragraph covers an overview of how the current post-military waterfront has been military imprinted its military past.

2.2 Historiography of the Tallinn Waterfront area

The historiography in paragraph 1.2 deals with international and European research to post-military landscapes. Because the landscape biography zooms in to the Tallinn Waterfront area and its former military landscapes of 1900 onwards, an overview of literature on the military-historical geography of the study area is presented in this paragraph. It is important to note that this state of the art has been compiled mainly based on the available English literature, except of a number of highly relevant Estonian writings and reports.

The research to Tallinn’s 20th century military history and geography is limited. One might paradoxically state that the defence of Tallinn in the medieval period is easier to study than

\[114\] Palang et al., 2006: 349-350.
during the military situation during Soviet occupation that ended less than twenty-five years ago.\textsuperscript{115} Whereas extensive books and articles have been published on the medieval fortifications by archaeologists and architecture historians like Rein Zobel and Ragnar Nurk, the military-geographical situation in the Soviet era barely covered.\textsuperscript{116} The fact that the medieval city centre of Tallinn is a UNESCO World Heritage site which counts as a popular touristic attraction fits in this observation.

\textbf{Research to Tallinn’s coastal defence}

One of the most comprehensive writings about the defensive fortifications from before the Second World War is the Estonian book \textit{Merekindlused Eestis 1913-1940} by the historian Heino Gustavson (figure 2.3).\textsuperscript{117} In his book, he provides an overview of the architecture and functioning of both the tsarist Russian Peter the Great Defence Fortress and the later Estonian defence systems in the whole of Estonia and Tallinn in particular, with detailed descriptions, drawings and maps of the military sites and the artillery of that time. Military historian Mati Ŭun wrote about the coastal of the First Republic of Estonia in his book \textit{Eesti merekindlused ja nende suurtükid 1918-1940}.\textsuperscript{118} He also published about Estonian warships, the Estonian armed forces and the military organization in this period. Because no Estonian defensive fortifications were located in the study area like during earlier Russian times, Ŭun’s publications are less relevant for the biography than Gustavson’s book.

More recent accounts on construction and use of the Russian fortifications in the 19\textsuperscript{th} and early 20\textsuperscript{th} century are written by art and architecture historian Robert Treufeldt. In 2005, Treufeldt published a short article on the history of ‘the Battery’ or Patarei Prison, a fortress built by the Russians in 1837 that has been reused as a notorious prison in the 20\textsuperscript{th} century.\textsuperscript{119} For studying the military landscapes of Tallinn, the Battery is a very interesting object because of its different and sometimes dark uses under different governments. More recently, in the year 2013, Treufeldt wrote a more contextual article about the military past of Tallinn’s coastal area that

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure23.png}
\caption{Cover and snapshots from the Gustavson book from 1993. The map and sketch are from the coastal batteries at the island of Naissaar.}
\end{figure}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{Sepp} Sepp, 2011: 17.
\bibitem{Nurk} Nurk \textit{et al.}, 2011; Zobel, 2009.
\bibitem{Gustavson} Gustavson, 1993.
\bibitem{Oun} Ŭun, 2001.
\bibitem{Treufeldt} Treufeldt, 2005.
\end{thebibliography}
also highlights the Battery.\textsuperscript{120} In 2013, historical archaeologist Paul Belford wrote about the history of the Battery as well and particularly on current heritage issues and its popularity as a dark heritage site.\textsuperscript{121}

Research to other 20\textsuperscript{th} century military structures

The book \textit{Tallinn’s seaplane hangar: from plane shed to museum} is the most recent written source of information on the early 20\textsuperscript{th} century military landscapes in the city of Tallinn. Published in 2015 and edited by architecture historian Mihkel Karu, the book bundles a number of articles on this topic.\textsuperscript{122} Two are from Robert Treufeldt: one about the above-mentioned Battery and one with a history of the Russian Peter the Great Defence Fortress in and around Tallinn.\textsuperscript{123} In contrast to Gustavson’s book, however, Treufeldt especially focuses on the building process of these Russian fortifications. Karu’s book further contains several articles on the Seaplane Hangar itself, built as a part of the Russian military harbour at Tallinn and recently successfully redeveloped into a maritime museum. These articles cover its architecture, engineering and construction history, its former military functions and its current function as a museum. A last author that is worth mentioning in this historiography is local historian Robert Nerman, who has published a large amount of books and articles on the history, architecture heritage conservation and cultural history of Tallinn and surroundings. His bibliography includes books on coastal neighbourhoods like Northern Tallinn, Kalamaja, Kadriorg and Pirita.\textsuperscript{124}

Research to Tallinn’s post-military landscape

On the level of Tallinn, no research has been conducted that explicitly focusses on the post-military landscapes of the city and the military heritage within. Some articles, however, conclude that the current underdevelopment of the waterfront of Tallinn can be understood by knowing its history as a military-industrial and largely closed area for almost fifty years. This proposition is put forward by, for instance, Merje Feldman, Vaike Haas, Triin Ojari and Damiano Cerrone, of whom the latter states that the current challenge for planners is to open the formerly closed seaside.\textsuperscript{125} Next to Feldman, also Sampo Ruoppila and Antti Roose \textit{et al.} focus on the transformation of the urban planning system and the property legislations, shifting from a socialist state model to a market model.\textsuperscript{126} A consequence of this shift is the lack of steering in redeveloping the underdeveloped seaside and the wastelands within. The specific problems of regenerating the wastelands of Tallinn Waterfront are studied by Unt \textit{et al.} and Unt and Bell, with the Kalamaja neighbourhood as a case.\textsuperscript{127}

\section*{2.3 Physical geography and early history of Tallinn}

\textbf{Coastal geography of Tallinn}

To understand the geological setting of Tallinn, two layers are important. The first is the bedrock of sedimentary rocks with an age of 550 to 350 million years. Secondly, the bedrock is overlain by Quaternary deposits – loose sediments and tills – from the periods of glaciation.\textsuperscript{128} Along the northern coastline of Estonia, the Baltic Sea has eroded the bedrock with a \textit{klint} as the result. In Swedish and Danish language, \textit{klint} means coastal escarpment. The Baltic Klint, with a length of

\textsuperscript{120} Treufeldt, 2013.
\textsuperscript{121} Belford, 2013.
\textsuperscript{122} Karu, 2015a.
\textsuperscript{123} Treufeldt, 2015a; 2015c.
\textsuperscript{124} Nerman, 1996; 2006; 2008; 2011.
\textsuperscript{125} Haas, 2006; Ojari, 2007; Feldman, 2010; Cerrone, 2012.
\textsuperscript{126} Ruopilla, 2007; Roose \textit{et al.}, 2013.
\textsuperscript{127} Unt \textit{et al.}, 2014; Unt and Bell, 2014.
\textsuperscript{128} Soesoo, 2010: 15.
1200 kilometres, forms the most characteristic geomorphological feature of Estonia’s northern coastline and runs from Öland, Sweden to Lake Ladoga, Russia. Due to the erosion of the Ordovician limestone that forms the upmost layer of the bedrock, older Cambrian terraces are now exposed between the limestone plateau and the sea. It concerns both higher sandstone terraces and lower ‘blue clay’ terraces (figure 2.4). Next to the impressive escarpments that can be found on the edges of the limestone plateau like the Lasnamägi Klint (figure 2.5), some of the Cambrian terraces also show notable escarpments, as in the case of the Kopli Klint Peninsula. The oldest parts of Tallinn are located on Cambrian terraces, whereas the harbours western from the Old Harbour have been constructed on the northern slope of the Kopli Klint.

Figure 2.4 – Geological map of Tallinn. The red lines indicate the four Klint units in the city of Tallinn. From left to right: Kopli Klint Peninsula, Toompea Klint Island, Ülemiste Klint Plateau and Lasnamägi Klint Plateau.

Figure 2.5 – Lasnamägi Klint seen from Tallinn Bay. In the foreground, Maarjamäe Memorial (left) and Maarjamäe Palace (right) are located, with the highway from Tallinn to Pirita (Pirita Tee) running along the shoreline.

An important characteristic of Tallinn coast is that it is rising with two millimetre annually as a counter-effect of coverage by land ice during the last glacial. As a notable side effect, the shoreline has shifted towards the sea in the last thousands of years. The natural process has been one of the reasons that Suur- and Vaike-Paljassaare Islands have merged and now form the Paljassaare Peninsula. The shorelines of Tallinn Bay are mostly foreklint lowlands with a flat topography, although the scarps at the higher capes – for example at the tip of Suur-Paljassaare – are subject to wave erosion. In the city centre of Tallinn, the shore is mostly artificial and exists out of harbours with docks, quays, breakwaters and other coastal protection structures.

129 Suuroja, 2010: 143.
130 Ibid.: 144.
131 Povilinskas, 2002: 3.
133 Ibid.: 225.
First coastal settlement

Toompea Hill, a so-called klint island that exists out of Ordovician limestone on top of a Cambrian terrace, is well-known as the historical centre of Tallinn (figure 2.6). The highly strategic hill and its surrounding areas got inhabited some 5000-6000 years ago. The first archaeological traces of urban settlement on and around Toompea reach back to the 10th century. Based on the Danish Book of Land Taxation, no coastal villages are presumed to have existed until at least the 13th century, probably because of the danger of raiders from the Baltic Sea. This does not close out the existence of summer settlements inhabited by merchants and fishermen, however. The first written account of the existence of such a settlement or neighbourhood is from 1421 and concerns Kalamaja, which means 'fish house' in Estonian. In the 15th and 16th century, the inhabitation of the coast north from the Old Town became more structural and several smaller neighbourhoods and harbours merged into one settlement referred to as Kalamaja. The oldest still existing landmark in Kalamaja is the Kalamaja Cemetery, originated in 15th or 16th century.

Figure 2.6 – Toompea Castle, situated on the Toompea Hill in the Old Town of Tallinn. The hill is geologically referred to as Toompea Klint Island.

Next to the development of the Old Town and its coastal suburbs in the 13th and 14th century, a harbour developed at the coastline directly northeast from the Old Town. Nowadays, that coast has shifted to more than a kilometre distance from the Old Town as a result of the land uplift and the filling of the sea near the coast. In the 18th and 19th century – partly for military and defensive reasons – the Old Harbour of Tallinn expanded rapidly (figure 2.7).

Early coastal defence structures

Already during the Middle Ages, fortifications and other defensive structures were built along the coast near the Old Town to protect the city and its seaport. The northwest part of the so-called ‘Bastion Belt’ – the group of fortifications around the Old Town from the 17th century – bordered the Kalamaja neighbourhood. Later, during the Great Northern War (1700-1721), the Swedish authorities built an additional fortification called Stuart’s Redoubt, a dominating structure even more close to the seaside. The Russians took over the power in Tallinn after they won the Great Northern War. Initially, they planned a large military harbour in Tallinn, but those plans faded away in the years after. What the Russians did do was building a battery out of stone, known as the Western Battery or Fort Kalarand, which was completed in 1715. Next to

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134 Suuroja, 2010: 155.
this battery on at the Kalarand coast, an off-shore fort was erected called the Double Battery, some 500 metres away from the coastline (figure 2.7, 2.8).\textsuperscript{139}

In the early 19\textsuperscript{th} century, Russia adopted a new defence plan and as part of that, the Western Battery fortification was reconstructed into a three storey artillery house between 1829 and 1837. The fort became known as Fort Kalarand or the Defence Barracks because of its joint defensive and lodging function. Besides, a cannon tower was built at Väike-Paljassaare, called the White Tower.\textsuperscript{140,141} During the Crimean War halfway the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, both the Defence Barracks and the Double Battery got largely demolished and deserted. In 1869, some years after the war and when Tallinn was already removed from the list of Russian fortified cities, the Russians reconstructed the Defence Barracks into regular barracks. The Double Battery remained destroyed and abandoned and still is today.\textsuperscript{142} The Defence Barracks, currently simply known as ‘the Battery’, is one of the largest historical fortifications in Estonia. The next phase in the history of coastal defence at the waterfront of Tallinn starts in the early 20\textsuperscript{th} century with the Russian aims for establishing a military harbour in Tallinn and is addressed in the next paragraph.

\textbf{Figure 2.7} – A German map from Reval (Tallinn) in 1822, featuring the Old Town, its Bastion Belt and the urban development at the outskirts of the inner city. Also the Western Battery (K) and the Double Battery (F) are displayed on the map, as is the ongoing extension of the Old Harbour (M, N, B).

\textsuperscript{139} Treufeldt, 2013: 101.
\textsuperscript{140} Ibid.: 102-103.
\textsuperscript{141} Ümar, 2015: 13.
\textsuperscript{142} Treufeldt, 2013: 104.
2.4 Russian defence dreams (1900-1918)

Political-historical preface
Until the end of the First World War, the Baltic States and Finland were part of the tsarist Russian empire. The Russian control over the Baltic region goes back to 1710, the year that Sweden was defeated in the Great Northern War against Russia, and lasted for more than 200 years. The first signs of impeding change came between 1860 and 1880, when nationalist movement gained support in Estonia. During this period of ‘national awakening’, the basis for an autonomous and modern Estonian culture was laid. At the beginning of the 20th century, the Russian empire underwent great internal struggles, including the 1905 revolution and the start of the First World War in 1914. As this paragraph will show, the geopolitical instability had severe impacts on the outlook of the Tallinn Waterfront area.

Point of departure: Tallinn in 1900
Before describing the spatial developments in the period of 1900-1918, some words are spend on Tallinn and its state at the beginning of the century (figure 2.9). Already in the last decades of the 19th century, Tallinn was rapidly developing into practically all wind directions. An essential infrastructural achievement in this respect was the completion of the Paldiski-Tallinn-St. Petersburg railway. In the years after the railway became operational, the Old Harbour expanded by gaining land from the sea and much industrial activity settled at the surroundings of this harbour. Also the demographic development was as rapid: the population of Tallinn almost doubled between 1871 and 1897. In 1897, approximately 58,810 people were living in Tallinn or 6% of Estonia’s total population of almost a million inhabitants. Nowadays, around 440,000 people are living in Estonia’s capital, which is more than 30% of the countries’ total population.

Figure 2.8 – View of Tallinn from Tallinn Bay. On the right of the ship, the Western Battery or Fort Kalarand is located and on the right, the Double Battery can be seen. The churches and buildings in the background are part of the Old Town of Tallinn. Painting by Luigi Premazzi, 1851.

143 Raun, 2001: 37, 57-59, 81.
146 Tallinn City Government, 2016.
A map that gives a proper image of the size of Tallinn in 1900 is the 1-verst map, one of the first topographical maps of Estonia, published in 1899 (see cartographic appendix, map 1). The 1-verst map uses the verst, a Russian measure of length, as its scale (1 inch per 1 verst)\(^\text{147}\). The fieldwork for this map was done by Russian military topographers in the 1890s. The map clearly shows that the coastline of Tallinn is largely natural, except for the artificial structures that are part of the Old Harbour. Residential and industrial development near the coast did not stretch beyond the Kalamaja neighbourhood in the west and Kadriorg Park in the east. At the start of the century, Suur- and Väike-Paljassaare were still islands, separated from the mainland by a shallow seabed. A brick factory, the Battery, the Kalamaja Cemetery, the Old Harbour and the Russian-owned Maarjamäe Palace summer mansion were the most notable constructions at the coast at that time.

**Russian military imprint**

Besides the ongoing expansion of Tallinn, the construction of the Russian military harbour was without any doubt the most influential spatial development at the waterfront of Tallinn between 1900 and 1918. From the beginning of the 20\(^\text{th}\) century, Russia heavily invested in its Baltic Fleet, which was strongly reduced in the Russo-Japanese war ending in 1905. In 1908, as part of the defence plans from a year earlier and in order to protect St. Petersburg, the Russian

\(^{147}\) Raid, 2011: 96.
authorities announced plans for the erection of a new military harbour in Tallinn for hosting this fleet. The military harbour was no isolated military structure. To protect the naval base of Tallinn, artillery batteries and other defensive structures were built in and around Tallinn. Those structures were part of the Peter the Great Naval Fortress, a huge network of defensive positions at both the Finnish and Estonian side of the Gulf of Finland with as main goal the protection of St. Petersburg from a sea-based attack (figure 2.10). Below, the military harbour or naval base and the Peter the Great Naval Fortress are discussed separately.

**Peter the Great military harbour**
The military harbour of Tallinn, also called the Peter the Great Naval Base, was planned at the coastline western from the Old Harbour, stretching from the Battery to the forerunner of the Paljassaare peninsula. This part of the coastline of Tallinn is formed by an elevated Cambrian terrace referred to as Kopli Klint Peninsula. The construction of the harbour meant that the coastline was artificially extended by newly built breakwaters, docks and quays. Furthermore, the seabed had to be deepened in order to make the harbour accessible for the fleet. The extracted sand was deposited at the low seabed between Väike-Paljassaare Island and the mainland, which led to the merger of both and the emergence of Paljassaare Peninsula. The northern border of the military harbour was the quay at the eastside of Väike-Paljassaare Island, realised in 1910 by the Belgian holding Ackermans & van Haaren and currently known as the Katarina Breakwater. The beginning of the construction work for the military harbour was celebrated in July 1912, when Emperor Nicholas II placed the cornerstone of military harbour. Workforce for the construction of the harbour was mainly derived from Russia, together with a minor group of local employees.

On the 1:25.000 Estonian topographical map of Tallinn from 1926-1929, the contours of the military harbour as constructed a decade earlier are well visible (map 2). The most eastern part of the new military harbour was the Seaplane Harbour western from the Battery that hosted the seaplanes of the Naval Air Force, used for carrying out communicative and observational tasks. The seaplanes were stored in seaplane hangars of which the construction started in July 1916. Since the harbour and the hangars were under construction during the last years of the Russian era, the Naval Air Force instead operated on the west bank of Pirita River near Pirita town, eastern from Tallinn and just inside the study area. Western to the Seaplane Harbour, Noblessner Shipyard was located, a civil cooperation carrying out military commissions (figure 2.11). The most western and largest harbour was the Mine Harbour, where mines were stored. To connect the new harbours and industries to the existing railway infrastructure, the Russians extended the railway system of Tallinn westwards. Although the naval base at Tallinn was never finished as once projected by the Russians, the waterfront was nevertheless transformed from a natural and undeveloped coastal area into a military-industrial zone in less than a decade.

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149 Also the existing Old Harbour became part of the Naval Base, just like some of the harbours of towns eastern and western from Tallinn.
150 Treufeldt, 2015a: 8-9.
152 Orro, 2015: 18.
154 Treufeldt, 2008: 2-4.
155 Treufeldt, 2015a: 8-10.
Figure 2.10 – Map of the St. Petersburg naval defences in the Gulf of Finland. Tallinn is located in position II, also referred to as the Peter the Great Naval Fortress.

Figure 2.11 – The Noblessner Shipyard in 1918-1921. On the right, in the background, the Seaplane Harbour including the Seaplane Hangar.
Peter the Great Naval Fortress

To protect Tallinn’s naval base, both coastal fronts and land fronts were designed in the 1910s, being part of the much larger Peter the Great Naval Fortress in the Gulf of Finland. The land front consisted out of a number of positions located outside the study area, in a belt south from Tallinn at a distance between 10 and 20 kilometres from the city centre. The coastal front formed the northern half of the defensive belt around the harbour, where positions could be found on the Naissaar and Aegna islands and on peninsula’s east and west from Tallinn (figure 2.12). Most of the batteries are headed westwards as the potential enemy was expected to approach St. Petersburg by the Gulf of Finland.

The only one of the seventeen batteries within the boundaries of the study area is battery number 12 at the former Suur-Paljassaare Island. This battery was installed as a last line of defence to support the batteries at Naissaar and battery number 5 on Kakumäe peninsula, ten kilometres westwards from Tallinn. The battery at Paljassaare consisted out of a fire command post and four concrete gunyards with 130-millimetre guns, built in 1915 (figure 2.13). Besides, two search lights, some warehouses, a power plant and a variety of smaller buildings for other military purposes were built on the Paljassaare Islands. Although most of the proposed Peter the Great Naval Fortress structures on Paljassaare peninsula were indeed built, it is doubtful if they have ever been in function, due to the ongoing war and the shift of regime in March 1918.

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157 Ibid.: 42.
The interwar period (1918-1940)

Estonia’s War of Independence

During the First World War, the Russians fought against the Germans in the Baltic region. In the first years of the war, the front remained a few hundred kilometres south from Estonia. The course of events changed when the February revolution of 1917 made the Russian tsarist regime fall. In the northern Baltic region, this gave Estonian political forces the chance to realise local self-government within the spatial contours of the present-day country. In February 1918, however, the German troops invaded the whole of Estonia and kept in force until the end of the First World War in November that year. Soviet Russia, supported by the Estonian and Latvian Bolsheviks, started an offensive to export the communist revolution to the West. This led to the first period of Soviet occupation in the eastern part of Estonia, with the front lying at thirty kilometres distance of Tallinn. In this period between 1918 and 1920, the provisional Estonian government fought against the Soviets in what is called the War of Independence. The Estonians won this war as in February 1920 the Treaty of Tartu was signed. This marked the peaceful start of the First Republic of Estonia.\textsuperscript{159}

\textsuperscript{158} Raun, 2001: 94-95, 100-105.
\textsuperscript{159} Ibid.: 106-110.
Spatial changes during the Estonian era

The 1:25,000 Soviet topographical map from 1939 gives an impression of Tallinn Waterfront as developed during the 1920s and 1930s (map 3 and figure 2.14). The shape of the Russian military harbour – from here on referred to as the Tallinn’s New Harbour – did not change radically in this period. Moreover, the New Harbour was continuously used for military activities the period of the Republic of Estonia. In the 1920s and 1930s, the area of Tallinn northwest from the city centre, including the Kopli Peninsula, became industrial districts with an advanced network of roads and railways.\(^\text{160}\) This development hardly affected the newly gained lands of the Paljassaare Peninsula, however, which remained mainly undeveloped and only featured some small-scale and low quality residential development.\(^\text{161}\) On the eastern side of the Old Town, expansion did not stretch beyond the Kadriorg Park, since most residential expansion of Tallinn was heading southwards. The coastline between Kadriorg Park and Pirita Town remained relatively open and green throughout the 1920s and 1930s.

German military imprint

During the period of roughly nine months in 1918 that the Germans ruled Estonia, they protected Tallinn by installing nine batteries in and around the city, partly by reconstructing

\(^{160}\) Haas, 2006: 34-35.

\(^{161}\) Nerman, 2007.
existing Russian batteries. Reconstruction was needed because of the simple fact that the Russian enemy came from the east, therefore changing the required direction of the batteries with 180 degrees. In Tallinn Waterfront area, the only German battery was newly built on the east coast of Väike-Paljassaare with two pieces of artillery. Opposite to this battery, at the coast northern from Pirita Town at the other side of Tallinn Bay, another German battery was located (figure 2.#). Presumably, the larger military infrastructure in the New Harbour of Tallinn was reused by the Germans forces during their short presence in Tallinn.

![Figure 2.15 - German military map from 1918. The two German batteries are indicated by the black arrows and were installed to protect Tallinn Bay. The western one is located within the boundaries of the study area, at the eastern side of Väike-Paljassaare.](image)

**Estonian military imprint**
Tallinn’s military harbours were mainly defended from the Naissaar and Aegna Islands during the Estonian era, where nine of the fifteen active batteries were located. The role of the waterfront of Tallinn in the coastal defence of Tallinn Bay was minimal, as no Estonian batteries where located in the study area. The former Russian battery at Suur-Paljassaare lost its function in 1918 after the Russians left. An important circumstance in the obsolescence of the westwards-oriented batteries at the Paljassaare and Kakumäe Peninsulas from the Estonian era onwards was the fact that the west was not the only direction from where a potential enemy was expected anymore. In contrast to some of the other unused Russian batteries, the one at Paljassaare stayed intact during the War of Independence. Only the weaponry and other valuable equipment and materials were removed. Although Paljassaare lost its defensive function, Suur-Paljassaare Island remained in military use as an area where mines were stored. In 1921, a narrow-gauge railway was built between the Katarina Breakwater and the northern tip of Suur-Paljassaare for this purpose. Fort Kalarand or the Battery – the 19th century Russian fortification eastern to the Seaplane Harbour, lost its function as military barracks during the War of Independence. In 1919, the complex was turned into Tallinn’s central prison following a shortage of prisons after the First World War (figure 2.16).

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163 National Heritage Board, 2015.
165 Ibid.: 106.
166 Treufeldt, 2008: 4.
2.6 The curtained coasts of the ESSR (1940-1991)

Estonia and the Second World War
At the beginning of the Second World War, the first twenty independent years of the Republic of Estonia ended. In June 1940, Estonia was invaded by the Red Army, in August 1941 the Germans conquered the country for the second time in a century and between 1944 and 1991, Estonia was again occupied by its eastern neighbour. The 1940s represent a decade full of terror and repression for Estonian society. Both in 1941 and 1949, ten-thousands of people were deported to Siberia by the Soviets. Also during the occupation by Nazi Germany, thousands of people have been executed or perished in prison camps and the majority of the Jewish and Romany minority was murdered. Furthermore, the heavy battles at the Eastern border between the Red Army and the German forces in 1944 – in which many Estonians took part at both sides – inflicted the heaviest losses in Estonian history. After the withdrawal of the Germans in September 1944, the Red Army took over most of the Estonian mainland, marking the start of almost fifty more years of Soviet occupation.167

During the Second World War, many of the former Estonian military structures at Tallinn Waterfront were continuously used by the occupational forces. Soviet and German naval aviation units, for instance, were based at the Seaplane Harbour and the Battery kept functioning as a prison during the different periods of occupation.168 One of the most influential spatial consequences of the war was the large-scale damage due to bombing. In total, half of Tallinn and one tenth of the Old Town were destroyed throughout the war, mainly due to Soviet bombing in March 1944 (figure 2.17).169 At the coastline in the direction of Pirita, a German Cemetery has been erected where soldiers on the side of the Germans who fell during the fights against the Red Army are buried.

168 Türk, 2015: 44; Treufeldt, 2013: 104.
Figure 2.17 – Examples of destruction in Tallinn during the Second World War. On the left, the largely destroyed Old Harbour due to German bombings in 1941. On the right, the effects of Soviet bombing on the St. Nicholas church in March 1944.

Figure 2.18 – Land use at the Tallinn Waterfront area between 1947 and 1987.
Spatial changes during the Soviet era
Between 1934 and 1989, the population of Tallinn increased with factor 3.5 from 140,000 to 480,000, mainly due to urban expansion to the southwest, south and east of the city. No major changes took place at the city’s waterfront, although some smaller spatial changes are worth mentioning (map 4). To start with, in the neck of Paljassaare peninsula a new industrial harbour area was finished, replacing most of the earlier residential plots that originated in the Estonian era. Also a new railway, new roads and a large sewage treatment installation were developed at the peninsula. The former Paljassaare Islands, used as a military reserve by the Soviets, remained free of further development. Between the Battery and Tallinn’s Old Harbour, the Linnahall – a sport- and concert venue – was built in 1980 for the occasion of the Summer Olympic Games in that year in Moscow. The sailing event of these Olympics was hosted in Pirita and sailing itself took place in Tallinn Bay.\textsuperscript{170}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure29.png}
\caption{Soviet border control. An overview of the restricted areas and border stations along the Estonian coast during the period of Soviet occupation.}
\end{figure}

The Estonian coast as Soviet border zone
Between 1944 and 1991, the coast of Estonia was part of the north-western border of the Soviet Union with Western European bloc and thus belonged to the so-called Iron Curtain. This explains why the country’s coastline has strongly been military imprinted during the Soviet occupation. Most rigorous in this respect were the physical restrictions that were raised in the coastal areas, where border security zones were installed. In most of these zones, permits were required and no access was provided to the shore-line for all non-productive activities. These restrictions were applied to a depth of twenty-five kilometres from the coast (figure 2.19). Large scale depopulation took place in these areas and only three types of activity existed: fishing, mineral extraction and military presence.\textsuperscript{171} Especially during the first years of the Soviet occupation, the period before Stalin’s death in 1953, border control was relatively strict. Latter

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{170} Kurg, 2006: 46.
\textsuperscript{171} Sepp, 2011: 7-10, 12-14.
\end{flushright}
decades included times with weakening physical restrictions.\textsuperscript{172} Tallinn, as an urban environment, formed one of the enclaves in this zone. Nevertheless, direct public access to the waterfront of Tallinn’s inner city was limited as well.

**Soviet military imprint**

During the Soviet occupation, most military presence was concentrated at the northern coast and on the western islands of Estonia because of strategic considerations. One consideration is that these coasts were forming the approach funnel to both Tallinn and Leningrad, which made it necessary to install a defensive barrier against a possible invasion. This barrier covered 70 artillery batteries at both sides of the Gulf of Finland.\textsuperscript{173} Many of them were originally built in previous decades by previous rulers and reused by the Soviets. Thirteen medium and large calibre coastal batteries could be found in the Tallinn Coastal Defence Sector in 1945. No batteries were located within the boundaries of the Tallinn Waterfront study area, however.\textsuperscript{174}

Many other Soviet military activities were centred in Tallinn. Three Soviet border guard troops were active at the Estonian coastline, of which one was based in Tallinn together with the Border Guard Navy and a border guard construction company.\textsuperscript{175} The border guards were armed military forces who were directly coordinated by the KGB – the Committee for State Security.\textsuperscript{176} Although no batteries were located in the proximity of the city centre, the border guards were present at different locations to keep watch of the activities in the coastal areas. During the period of Soviet occupation, the border guards were active at the eastern side of the Paljassaare Peninsula, near the Katarina Breakwater, where they had numerous facilities including two observation posts with search lights. One was built at the end of the breakwater, whereas the other could be found near the ruins of the Russian White Tower (figure 2.20). Only the latter one still exists.

\textbf{Figure 2.20} – The former Border Guard observation post at Katarina Breakwater.

The Soviet military presence in Tallinn left a considerable imprint at the Paljassaare Peninsula, which functioned as a military reserve. Mine and weapon storages, repair workshops and some other facilities were located on the former islands, where the Soviets furthermore used the narrow-gauge railway that the Estonians constructed in the 1920s. Some parts of the peninsula’s coastline were fenced off conform the Soviet border control (figure 2.21). Also at Tallinn’s New Harbour and at the Kalarand beach eastern from Fort Kalarand, wired fences existed of which the remains are still present at today’s shoreline. Fort Kalarand or the Battery continuously functioned as a prison during the Soviet occupation, housing more than 4500 – often political –

\textsuperscript{172} Peil, 2013: 1.
\textsuperscript{173} Although Finland was not under a Soviet sphere of influence during the Cold War, the Soviet Union agreed with the Finnish government on the lease of a naval base and the presence of Soviet coastal artillery in the coastal district of Porkkala at the southwestern coast of Finland (Sepp, 2011: 16, 22).
\textsuperscript{174} Sepp, 2011: 22.
\textsuperscript{175} Ibid.: 26.
\textsuperscript{176} Peil, 2013: 5.
prisoners at some time. Throughout the Soviet period, several Soviet Navy units were stationed in Tallinn’s New Harbour. The Seaplane Harbour with its hangar, for instance, hosted navy construction units, a mine- and torpedo base and storage and servicing for floating tools like buoys.

Figure 2.21 – Fences at the shore of Suur-Paljassaare. This picture was made in 1994, shortly after the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Estonia.

2.7 The post-military waterfront of Tallinn (1991-now)

Political-historical context
From 1985 onwards, the political tide in the Soviet Union and the ESSR changed. In March 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev became the leader of the Soviet Union and introduced his politics of perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (openness). In the turbulent years that followed, nationalist activism intensified in Estonia and many demonstrations were organised, together referred to as the singing revolution and with the Baltic Chain protest as one of the most remarkable manifestations. Following the August coup in Moscow that started on August 19, 1991, the Republic of Estonia was officially restored, although it took until August 1994 before all the Soviet military troops finally left Estonian territory. In 1992, both a new constitution and parliamentary elections were approved. The newly chosen government choose for an aggressive free market policy, radically distancing from the socialist state-led economy that had been imposed by the Soviets. Both politically and economically, the country strengthened its relations with the European Union. In 2004, Estonia joined the NATO and the EU and in 2011, Estonia adopted the euro. The political relationship with Russia, on the other hand, remained complex and tense during the last decades.

Demilitarisation of Tallinn waterfront
After the Estonians regained independence in 1991, it took three years before the Soviet Army had totally left the country. In first instance, all former Soviet military areas became under the rule of the Defence Ministry, but since the number of areas exceeded the needs of the Estonian army, a number of them were given to local authorities. At Tallinn Waterfront, the only area that is still in active military use is the Mine Harbour where the Estonian Navy is in force nowadays. The other parts of the coastline are all in civil use from 1994 onwards. From this moment onwards, the waterfront of Tallinn might be referred to as a post-military landscape instead of a military landscape. The military imprint in the present-day post-military landscape

177 Treufeldt, 2015b: 15.
178 Treufeldt, 2015c: 64.
180 Jauhiainen, 1997: 122-123.
is further addressed in the next paragraph. Here, some attention is paid to recent struggles to overcome this legacy of a militarized and occupied past within the realm of urban planning.

**Spatial changes**

Map comparison reveals no radical changes in the spatial outlook of the Tallinn Waterfront area during the last two or three decades (figure 2.22 and map 5). The most important changes are land use related, as the inner city coastal area transformed from a foremost military or military-industrial to an industrial and – to an increasing extent – residential area. Many plans, both official and unofficial, exist to further restructure the city’s coastline into an attractive residential environment; some industrial neighbourhoods have already undergone such a metamorphosis.\(^{181}\) Moreover, one of the city councils aims is to create more public space in the waterfront. Unless the Soviet border control is history for more than twenty-five years already, public access to the sea is still limited. In many cases, redevelopment of former closed-off, military-industrial sites is steered by private development and has private instead of public access as a consequence.

![Figure 2.22 – Land use at the Tallinn Waterfront area between 1987 and 2014.](image)

Another development at the Tallinn Waterfront area is the increasing role of tourism and recreation at the city’s coastline, taking off the recreational monopoly that Kadriorg Park and

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\(^{181}\) Tallinn City Council, 2013: 6.
Pirita have had for decades. Well-known examples are the beach and Katarina Breakwater at Paljassaare, popular by recreants and fishermen. Other examples are the successful and internationally acknowledged Seaplane Harbour museum, the temporary Prison Museum at the abandoned Battery and the Kalarand Beach western from the Linnahall (figure 2.23). Furthermore, the nature reserve at the former military area at Paljassaare is attractive for nature and bird watching tourists. Since the demilitarization of the peninsula, this area is largely managed as a Nature2000 designated nature reserve. Although the popularity in the area amongst inhabitants of Tallinn increases, no clear vision exists on how to combine recreational and ecological values at Paljassaare and to utilize its potential as unique urban green space.

Spatial-economic dynamics at Tallinn Waterfront: opening the seaside

The spatial developments at the Tallinn Waterfront area can hardly be understood without knowledge of some crucial economic, political and urban planning developments ‘behind the map’. The period after Estonia regained independence in the beginning of the 1990s is characterized as one of ultra-liberal economic policy, land reform (restitution and privatization) and a lack of general and master plans. In Tallinn, all land had been state owned and allocated rent-free to users during the Soviet era. City development was totally steered by master plans from the state. When market-oriented planning was re-introduced in the 1990s, master planning only got a minor role in the urban planning practice, wearing a bad name after almost fifty years of Soviet occupation. Most developments took place on the level of detail plans, with a huge role for private agents and developers. This system has been referred to as *ad hoc urban planning*. A similar tendency can be observed in almost all Central and Eastern European countries after state socialism disappeared. Concerning the by origin military and industrial Tallinn Waterfront, many attempts have been done to regenerate the area from the 1990s

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182 Haas, 2006: 82.
183 Reimann et al., 2013: 155
184 Roose et al., 2013: 79.
onwards, but most were unable to change the tide. Although in 2004, a master plan for the Urban Waterfront was announced and building restrictions gradually increased in recent years, the locals and their government are still looking how to shake off the Soviet legacy and 'to respond to the challenge to open the city towards the sea'.

## 2.8 Inventory of the waterfront’s military imprint

In comparison to earlier decades, the role of military activity and militarism in shaping the waterfront of Tallinn shrank vastly since Estonia regained its independence. But as the previous paragraph already hinted, the spatial-economic development of the area is nevertheless strongly influenced by its occupied and militarized past. Before concluding this chapter, the military imprint at the coastal landscape of Tallinn in terms of environment and ecology, land use and physical remains is discussed here. By doing so, an indication can be given regarding the extent to which the study area can be characterized as a post-military landscape.

### Environmental effects: green and brown heritage

In the whole of the former Soviet Union, examples can be found of environmental pollution due to Soviet industrial, agricultural and military activities. Pollution in Estonia mainly concerns waste like oil, metals, mineral construction debris, chemicals, explosives and untreated sewage that have affected surface water and top soils. Large-scale assessment and liquidation of the Soviet pollution took place in between 1992 and 1998, initiated by the Ministry of the Environment. In the Tallinn Waterfront area, no large-scale pollution has been identified. Most significant were nineteen shipwrecks that the Soviets left sunken on the bottom of the Mine Harbour. The clean-up activities were completed by 1997. The Soviet army also left numerous explosives in the Mine Harbour which were made harmless in the 1990s.

\[\text{Figure 2.24} - \text{Leftovers of the Soviet forces at Paljassaare (picture from 1994). The picture on the left is showing mines and/or depth charges. On the right barbed wire and a warning sign with a skull.}\]

As Järv et al. already concluded in their 2013 study to the Soviet environmental inheritance in Estonia, the environmental consequences of the Soviet military presence are two-sided. Besides pollution or 'brown heritage', the strong military control and conservation of coastal areas during the Soviet area led to an increase in nature values along the so-called Estonian Green Belt Zone. The existence of almost forty nature protection areas along the Estonian coastline

\[\begin{align*}
187 & \text{Ruoppila, 2007: 421; Cerrone, 2012: 4-7.} \\
188 & \text{Sepp, 2011: 33.} \\
189 & \text{Raukas, 1999: 120.} \\
190 & \text{Ibid.: 125.} \\
191 & \text{Järv et al., 2013: 579.}
\end{align*}\]
reflects this ‘green heritage’. The Natura2000 designated nature reserve at Paljassaare Peninsula is the best example of such ‘heritage of absence’ in the study area. In paragraph 3.3, the interesting relation between military heritage and its conservation on the one and nature conservation on the other is further analysed.

Effects on land use: path or past dependency
A century full with military activity and militarism does not just have environmental effects or leaves behind physical remains, but also to a high extent determined the shape and use of the city’s coastline today. Concerning the shape, the construction of the military harbour by the Russians in the 1910s has without doubt been most influential. Due to the decision to build this harbour at the by then undeveloped Cambrian terraces north western from the Old Town, the future of that area as a military-industrial district with an artificial harbour-rich shoreline was determined. Besides, the Russians fastened the natural process of the rise of the seabed between the Paljassaare Islands and the mainland with the Paljassaare Peninsula as the result. Another example that has already been mentioned above is how the use of Paljassaare as a military reserve has led to the some important circumstances that make the area suitable as a nature conservation area nowadays.

Secondly, the military-industrial land use at the city’s waterfront and the strong restriction of coastal access during the Soviet era has strongly influenced the lack of accessibility and attractiveness of the coastline nowadays. The ongoing ambition of politicians, developers and planners to ‘open the seaside’ can only be understood by taking into consideration the fact that this seaside has been highly closed for the public during most of the 20th century. A third and last example are the wastelands, blank spaces or – in terms of Unt et al. – derelict sites in the Tallinn Waterfront area, like in the neck of Paljassaare Peninsula and in and around Tallinn’s Old Harbour. The existence of such wastelands can be explained by the rapid economic and political changes in the early 1990s, leading to relocation of closure of many industrial enterprises at the waterfront and the vacancy of numerous plots of land. Unt et al. found that next to this physical legacy, a mental legacy is haunting at the industrial waterfront and its wastelands, as the area has a negative image that strongly relates the military past in the Soviet era.193

Military remnants: an inventory
Post-military landscapes are most directly military imprinted by the physical remains that relate to military pasts. In the remainder of this paragraph, an inventory is presented that makes the military imprint at the Tallinn Waterfront area more tangible. The sources that have been used

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193 Unt et al., 2014: 269, 277.
to compile this overview are described and discussed in paragraph 1.5. A map that covers all remnants is attached as map number six. The remnants are divided into three spatial clusters: the former Paljassaare Islands, the industrial shoreline from the Katariina Breakwater to the Old Harbour and the coastline between the Old Harbour and Pirita River. Each of these regions has its own post-military characteristics. The role of the military remains in the current landscape and heritage creation in each of these regions are studied in more detail in chapter three, that also includes a case study for each of the three regions.

**Paljassaare Peninsula**

The former Paljassaare islands most clearly fit into Woodward’s characterization of a post-military landscape, as military activity has been the primary and almost the only ‘developer’ in the former military reserve. Since the area is not facing large-scale human intrusion nowadays but is largely managed as a nature conservation area since 2005, many physical traces of its militarized past are still visible, most often in an obsolescent and ruined state. The military remnants at Paljassaare are listed in table 2.1 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Name and description</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Origin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>Peter the Great battery consisting out of one command bunker and four cannon bases.</td>
<td>Defence structure</td>
<td>RUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>Four mine storages</td>
<td>Storages or other buildings</td>
<td>EST1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td>Numerous warehouses, storages and workshops; multiple rows of fence posts</td>
<td>Storages or other buildings; fences</td>
<td>SOV3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d</td>
<td>Narrow-gauge railway line and dam.</td>
<td>Railway</td>
<td>EST1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e</td>
<td>Small machine gun bunker</td>
<td>Defence structure</td>
<td>SOV3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f</td>
<td>Border guard garage and observation post</td>
<td>Observation post</td>
<td>SOV3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g</td>
<td>Barracks and workshops, surrounded by fence posts</td>
<td>Storages or other buildings; fences</td>
<td>SOV3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h</td>
<td>The Katariina Breakwater – the northern border of the military harbour of Tallinn – with traces of a narrow-gauge railway.</td>
<td>Naval structure; railway</td>
<td>RUS, EST1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i</td>
<td>Border guard facilities.</td>
<td>Storages or other buildings</td>
<td>SOV3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.1 – Military remnants at Paljassaare, = listed as cultural monument.

![Figure 2.26](image-url) – Military remnants at the Paljassaare region. Left: machine gun bunker (e), middle: Katariina Breakwater (h), right: fences at Suur-Paljassaare (c).
**Industrial inner-city waterfront**

The part of the waterfront from the Katariina Breakwater in the northwest to the Old Harbour in the east is a primarily industrial area. From the 1910s, when the Russians started the construction of the military harbour in Tallinn, to the end of the Soviet era at the early 1990s, this segment of the waterfront has had a strong military imprint as well. Today, only the Mine Harbour is in active military use, but the area as a whole still contains numerous military structures – mainly naval and industrial of origin – from earlier geopolitical eras. The military remnants in this region are listed in table 2.2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Name and description</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Origin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>j</td>
<td>Numerous bomb shelters in Laevastiku, a Soviet residential area.</td>
<td>Bomb shelters</td>
<td>SOV3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k</td>
<td>The Mine Harbour, built as part of the Russian military harbour, including six warehouses or other buildings that still exist (اكتِر).</td>
<td>Naval structure; storages or other buildings</td>
<td>RUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>l</td>
<td>The former Noblessner Shipyard, including a harbour and a factory complex with numerous historical military buildings (اكتِر).</td>
<td>Naval structure; industry</td>
<td>RUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m</td>
<td>The Seaplane Harbour with the seaplane hangar, part of the Russian military harbour (اكتِر).</td>
<td>Naval structure;</td>
<td>RUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>The Battery, used by the Russians as military barracks and later functioning as a prison (اكتِر).</td>
<td>Storages or other buildings; prison</td>
<td>RUS, EST1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o</td>
<td>Fence posts near the Kalarand Beach.</td>
<td>Fences</td>
<td>SOV3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p</td>
<td>Soviet storages at Lootsi street</td>
<td>Storages or other buildings</td>
<td>SOV3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 2.2 – Military remnants at the inner-city waterfront, (اكتِر) = listed as cultural monument.*

**Pirita coastline**

The waterfront between the Old Harbour and the Pirita River has always been a relatively open and green area from 1900 onwards. The coast is dominated by Pirita Street and its promenade that follow the shoreline. Due to the narrowness of the land between the street and the North-Estonian Klint and the location of Kadriorg Park, the area proved to be unattractive for large-scale urban sprawl. Taking these circumstances into consideration, it can be understood that four out of the six identified military objects in region are commemorative landmarks. In table 2.3, all the relics in this part of the study area are listed.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Name and description</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Origin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>q</td>
<td>Small German bunker from the Tobruk Panzerstellung type.</td>
<td>Defence structure</td>
<td>GER2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>r</td>
<td>Concrete fundament where the Nikonov statue once stood on, a Soviet war hero.</td>
<td>Memorial</td>
<td>SOV3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>s</td>
<td>The Russalka memorial from 1902, named after an Imperialist Russian battleship that wrecked in 1893, none of the 177 crew members survived (¶).</td>
<td>Memorial</td>
<td>SOV3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>t</td>
<td>Maarjamäe Palace, a 19th century mansion that was used by the Estonians in the 1930s as a Flight School (¶).</td>
<td>Storage or other building</td>
<td>EST1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>u</td>
<td>Soviet Maarjamäe Memorial complex.</td>
<td>Memorial</td>
<td>SOV3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v</td>
<td>German cemetery from the Second World War (¶).</td>
<td>Cemetery</td>
<td>GER2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.3 – Military remnants at the Pirita coastline, ¶ = listed as cultural monument.

Figure 2.28 – Military remnants at the Pirita coastline Left: German Tobruk bunker (q), middle: Maarjamäe Palace (t), right: Russalka memorial (s).

2.9 Conclusion

Throughout this chapter, research question one on the spatial- and military-historical development of the Tallinn Waterfront area has been addressed. A summary of the multi-layered history of the study area is given in table 2.4.

Military considerations have proved to be of major importance in the spatial development of Tallinn’s waterfront from 1900 onwards. As the Estonian capital and due to its strategic position at the most narrow part of the Gulf of Finland, Tallinn formed a strategic city during most of the 20th century, with considerable military and defensive presence as a logical consequence. Not only the two wars that were fought in this century led to the militarisation of the coast of Tallinn, but particularly the periods of preparation for war and military threat, like by the Russians in the 1910s, the Estonians in the 1930s and the Soviets during the Cold War had a militarizing effect. The most rigorous way in which military considerations have shaped the coast is by the construction of the Peter the Great Naval Base by the Russians in the 1910s. The cornerstone that Nicolas II laid in 1912 turned out to be the cornerstone of the current outline and function of the Tallinn Waterfront area. Later, during the Soviet era, the area was turned into a closed and restricted coast for almost fifty years, with a spatial status quo as the result. Whereas Palang et al. have stressed the substantial effects of the political modifications in Central and Eastern Europe on the rural landscape, this chapter has shown that the military activity related to these
modifications has likewise strongly influenced spatial development in coastal and urban environments.\textsuperscript{194}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Layer</th>
<th>Geopolitics</th>
<th>Spatial changes</th>
<th>Military landscape</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| RUS 1900 | Estonia is part of the Russian empire until the end of the First World War. | • Construction of artificial harbours western from the Battery.  
• Military-industrial expansion westwards from the Old Town.  
• Extension of railway system in western direction.  
• Land reclamation between the Paljassaare Islands and the mainland. | • The construction of the Peter the Great Naval Base, as part of the protection of the Gulf of Finland and St. Petersburg.  
• Erection of land and sea fronts to defend Tallinn (Peter the Great Naval Fortress), including a battery at Paljassaare. |
| EST2 1918 | After a period of war and two short periods of foreign occupation, Estonia gains independence. | • Further urban sprawl, but not Tallinn’s Waterfront remains mainly military-industrial.  
• Small-scale (residential) development at Paljassaare Peninsula. | • Removal of coastal defence batteries from Paljassaare.  
• Construction of a narrow-gauge railway and mine storages at Paljassaare.  
• Further use and development of the New Harbour. |
| GER1 + SOV3 1940-1991 | From 1994 to 1991, Estonia is occupied by the Soviet Union and referred to as the ESSR. | • Industrial development at the neck of Paljassaare Peninsula, including the Paljassaare Harbour and small-scale residential development.  
• Urban expansion in western (Kopli) and eastern coasts (Lasnamäe and Pirita).  
• Construction of the Linnahall in the 1980s. | • Closed coastline in most of the study area, with strict border control by the Soviet Border Guards.  
• Paljassaare Peninsula used as a military reserve.  
• Coastal defence batteries are situated outside Tallinn.  
• Erection of Soviet memorials and a German cemetery at the Pirita coastline. |
| EST1 1991 | Estonia officially becomes an independent Republic again in 1991 and joins the EU in 2004. | • Slow process of ‘opening the seaside’, with redevelopment of former military-industrial neighbourhoods at the inner-city waterfront.  
• Increase of touristic and recreational use and facilities at the waterfront.  
• Designation and management of Paljassaare as nature area. | • Demilitarization of the waterfront and withdrawal of Soviet military forces in 1994.  
• Only the Mine Harbour remains in military use (Estonian Navy). |

\textbf{Table 2.4} – Summary of the history of the Tallinn Waterfront area from a geopolitical, spatial and military point of view.

Besides geopolitical and military-historical factors, the physical geography of the coastal landscape of Tallinn has likewise influenced the spatial development during the last century. The military-industrial district that the Russian constructed in the 1910s, for instance, is located on the elevated Cambrian terraces on which the Old Town and other historical neighbourhoods are located as well. The fact that urban expansion eastern from the Old Harbour has been limited can be explained by the fact the North-Estonian Klint runs very close to the shoreline here, only

\textsuperscript{194} Palang \textit{et al.}, 2006.
leaving a narrow strip of developable land. Regarding the coastal defence of Tallinn, the city is strategically surrounded by a number of peninsula’s and islands. From these forefronts, of which Paljassaare is the closest to the city centre, the city can well be protected from threats from sea. Finally, the merger of the Paljassaare Islands with the mainland has been fastened by artificial land reclamation, but is in essence a natural process caused by the uplift of Estonia. Due to this post-glacial phenomenon, the former seabed in between the islands was already very shallow, as the Russian 1-verst map from around 1900 perfectly illustrates.

Following the inventory of the physical imprint of military activity throughout the 20th century, three conclusions can be drawn. First of all, environmental pollution is limited. At Paljassaare Peninsula, the effect is even the opposite since the closure of the reserve has led to an increase in nature values. The military past been more influential in Tallinn by determining the way the inner city coastline has been used, namely as an artificial military-industrial harbour area. Urban planners of today are still struggling to overcome the physical and institutional legacy of the military past in this respect. Finally, the study area is military imprinted by numerous military remnants of all types. When labelling the Tallinn Waterfront area as a post-military landscape as defined by Woodward, three sub-landscapes should be distinguished: Paljassaare as a former military reserve and nature area, the inner city waterfront as industrial harbour area with a military signature and the coastline in the direction of Pirita with a strong green and commemorative imprint.
3. Military heritage: contemporary use and future development

3.1 Introduction

In chapter three, the focus moves from the historical layering of the Tallinn Waterfront area to the contemporary and future use of the military heritage. This does not mean that the landscape biography as compiled in the previous chapter loses relevance. As stated earlier, heritage is about the contemporary usage of past resources. In other words: actual meanings and values are attached to military remnants in the present, fuelled by – amongst others – memories and histories of their military past. The prime goal of this chapter is to study the way how the military heritage from Tallinn’s turbulent 20th century is used and today, both in terms of matter and meanings. By doing so, the perspective moves beyond the military imprint in the physical landscape or matterscape as studied and mapped in the military remnants inventory in paragraph 2.7. The domain of powerscapes and mindscapes is entered, which means that the interplay between matter and meanings will be studied.

This is primarily done by analysing the way how military heritage is reused and managed at in the study area (figure 3.1). Paragraph 3.2 features such an analysis for the area as a whole. Subsequently, three case studies are elaborated: Paljassaare as a former military reserve (3.3), the Battery as a former fortification and notorious prison (3.4) and the Soviet Maarjamäe Memorial in combination with the German Second World War cemetery (3.5). In these three case studies, the heritage dynamics are analysed from two perspectives. The first concerns the way how the historical background of military heritage is determining its post-military reuse. Secondly, the extent to which different reuse strategies contribute to the transition of meaning-giving to the heritage is investigated. In the paragraph 3.6, the case studies are interpreted according to this conceptual model and by using the theoretical framework as provided in paragraph 1.4.

Figure 3.1 – The paragraphs of chapter 2 aligned to the conceptual model of heritage production
3.2 Protection and reuse of military heritage

Estonian heritage policy: cultural monuments
Before jumping to the analysis of heritage dynamics at the waterfront of Tallinn, the Estonian heritage policies are briefly discussed. In Estonia, the cultural monuments are the clearest manifestation of the country’s official national heritage. Cultural monuments are designated by the National Heritage Board of Estonia (NHB), a governmental institution set up in 1993 and affiliated to the Ministry of Culture. Its primary function is to organise conservation work, to exercise state supervision over cultural monuments and heritage conservation areas and to maintain a national register of all monuments. The conservation work is organised in association with rural municipalities and city governments.195 The protection of cultural monuments and heritage conservation areas is ensured in the renewed Heritage Conservation Act that entered into force in 2002.196

The NHB defines a cultural monument as ‘an immovable or movable, a part of it or a collection of objects or an entire group of buildings protected by the state and having historical, archaeological, ethnographic, urban construction related, architectural, artistic, scientific, religious or other cultural value’.197 Five thematic types of cultural monuments are distinguished by the NHB: next to historical monuments, these are architectural monuments, archaeological monuments, artistic monuments and industrial or technical monuments. No specific class of military or war-related monuments has been appointed, but some criteria explicitly refer to military-related objects or structures. One of the criteria for historical monuments stresses the protection of monuments that have a ‘link with historical events or processes (including military activities)’.198 Within the specifications of this criterion, the common burial sites of both World Wars and the War of Independence are explicitly named, as well as battlefields and other sites that played a significant role in those wars. Under the heading of industrial and technical monuments that relate to notable developments in engineering or technology, military-industrial objects might well be listed. Of course, military objects can also be designated under the umbrella of broader architectural, artistic and historical criteria.

The military remnants from the inventory that are – at least partly – designated as a cultural monument are displayed in figure 3.3. In some cases, registration as a monument was conducted based on characteristics that do not relate to the military use or activities at all. Whether a direct link with between the designation and the military history of the object exists or not makes no difference in practice, however.

197 National Heritage Board, 2004: paragraph 2.
198 National Heritage Board, 2016b.
Table 3.1 – Identification of cultural monuments at Tallinn Waterfront.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Registry number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>Peter the Great battery nr.12</td>
<td>RUS</td>
<td>¥8516</td>
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<tr>
<td>d</td>
<td>Narrow-gauge railway line and dam</td>
<td>EST1</td>
<td>¥8792</td>
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<td>h</td>
<td>The Katarina Breakwater</td>
<td>RUS, EST1</td>
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<td>Mine Harbour</td>
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<td>l</td>
<td>Noblessner Harbour and factory complex</td>
<td>RUS</td>
<td>¥8596-8613</td>
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<td>m</td>
<td>Seaplane Harbour</td>
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<td>n</td>
<td>The Battery or Patarei Prison</td>
<td>RUS, EST1</td>
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<td>Russalka memorial</td>
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<td>Maarjamäe Palace</td>
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<td>v</td>
<td>German cemetery</td>
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Paljassaare Peninsula

The large number of military objects and structures at the former Paljassaare Islands are basically all unused and in an obsolescent or ruined state. Most of the area has been designated as a nature conservation area some years ago. The reserve, the beach near the Katarina Breakwater and the breakwater itself are popular by recreants and fishermen. The four Russian remnants in the area – all former Peter the Great Defence Fortress structures except for the White Tower – have been designated as cultural monuments at the end of the 1990s. No significant conservation work has been done except for the placement of two information
boards. Furthermore, no plans exist to make the role of the military remnants more significant in the near future.

**Inner-city waterfront**

The military remnants at the inner-city waterfront region are strongly clustered at the New Harbour. Most of the buildings and structures have undergone conversion and are reused for varying purposes. Remilitarization took place at the Mine Harbour where the Estonian Navy is hosted. Some of the Russian storages in the closed military area are abandoned, however.\(^{199}\)

Noblessner Shipyard is in the middle of a conversion process as the former industrial complex is being revitalised into a cultural and residential neighbourhood, just like other former industrial complexes western from the Old Town.\(^{200}\) In the case of the Seaplane Harbour and the Battery, the buildings have been or are planned to be converted into museums and thus are used for touristic purposes, both partly by drawing on their architectural and military history. All these examples of conversion fit in the ongoing aim of the city government to turn the industrial inner-city waterfront into public space and an attractive residential area.\(^{201}\)

Many of the military relics at the inner-city waterfront have been designated as cultural monuments. In short, it concerns practically all the buildings or structures that were built by the Russians in the 1910s as part of the military harbour, including the Seaplane Harbour, three buildings at the Mine Harbour and a total number of eighteen buildings that are part of the Noblessner Complex. Also the Battery is listed in its shape as a 19\(^{th}\) century fortification.

**Pirita coastline**

The majority of the military-imprinted relics at the coastline between the Old Harbour of Tallinn and Pirita, namely four of six, fit in the commemorative category and besides have a strong scenic value. For that reason, they are well embedded in the green and open coastline in this region. Also the German Tobruk bunker in Kadiorg Park fits well in the surrounding landscape, mainly due to its small size. Since these objects are not conventional buildings but rather can be labelled as landmarks with mainly scenic value, reuse is not an issue. It is for Maarjamäe Palace, a 19\(^{th}\) century summer mansion that was used as a military aviation school in the previous century. The mansion is listed because of its 19\(^{th}\) century history and architecture and now hosts exhibitions of the Estonian History Museum.

### 3.3 Paljassaare: abandonment and absence

Paljassaare is one of the numerous former Soviet military areas at the Estonian coast and has a history of military presence that goes back to the 18\(^{th}\) century (see figure 3.4).\(^{202}\) Military remnants of different ages can be found on the peninsula, but generally do not play a significant role today (figure 3.5). More of influence for Paljassaare is the ‘heritage of absence’: the former closedness of the area and the lack of urban development have been crucial for its current designation as a nature reserve. Recreation and nature conservation are most likely to remain the main land use of the peninsula in the near future, provisionally conserving the decaying military remnants only as a side effect.

\(^{199}\) Treufeldt, 2008: 2.

\(^{200}\) Globe Newswire, 2015.

\(^{201}\) Tallinn City Council, 2013: 6.

\(^{202}\) The name Paljassaare is used in this paragraph to refer to the area as displayed in figure 3.#. This area matches the Paljassaare Peninsula northern from the former Estonian railway and includes the two former Paljassaare Islands (Väike-Paljassaare and Suur-Paljassaare).
Paljassaare is the most rigorous example of how military considerations have affected the coastal outlook of Tallinn Waterfront. Due to the military harbour that the Russians constructed in Tallinn in the 1910s, Väike-Paljassaare Island got connected to the mainland. The cannon tower that was built at the island in 1824 called the White Tower was already in an abandoned state by some decades at that time. Next to the Katarina Breakwater as the most northern border of the military harbour, the Russians built several structures at the islands as part of the Peter the Great Defence Fortress, including a power plant, barracks, search lights and a battery. In 1918, also the Germans took advantage of the strategic positioning of the islands by situating one of their batteries there. After the Estonians gained independence, Paljassaare lost its function in the coastal defence of the city. The railway that the Estonians constructed between Katarina Breakwater and Suur-Paljassaare in 1921 further determined its current state as a nature reserve. The railway dam between the islands fastened their merger and affected the sea currents, creating the conditions for the development of eutrophic wetlands that are highly attractive as feeding grounds for migrating birds.

When Estonia became an independent Republic, the neck of Paljassaare and parts of the former islands got inhabited by some dozens of people, including a number of fishermen that moved into the old military barracks. In 1925-1926, the Estonians built a row of four mine warehouses directly southern from the Russian battery at Suur-Paljassaare. Almost all latter construction work at Paljassaare took place in the Soviet period, when the whole area northern from the Katarina Breakwater became a closed military reserve for almost fifty years and the inhabitants were forced to leave. Paljassaare had no defence function during that period. Instead, the area was used to locate a number of military storages and workshops. Also, the Border Guards were active on and around the breakwater. In comparison to the previous periods, knowledge of the precise military activities at Paljassaare and Tallinn Waterfront in general is scarce. Pictures from directly after the withdrawal of the Soviet forces in 1994 provide the most objective information, together with the decaying remnants themselves (figure 3.6).

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203 Treufeldt, 2013: 102, 104.
206 Nerman, 2007.
207 Treufeldt, 2008: 2-4.
Nature values as heritage of absence

After the demilitarization of Paljassaare, ecologists and bird watchers discovered its ecological richness and almost the whole area got designated as a European Natura2000-reserve in 2005. Meelis Uustal, urban ecologist at an Estonian research institute, stresses the importance of the area’s military past for its present-day ecology and nature values. In contrast to the neck of Paljassaare Peninsula, where rapid industrial development took place in the second half of the 20th century, Paljassaare kept abstained from urban sprawl. Uustal confirms that ‘because the military area was extensively used by the Soviets, it was in fact managed as a nature area during a period of fifty years’.

The importance of former military areas for nature conservation is a common phenomenon in both Estonia and Europe. Despite the excessive cases of heavy environmental pollution due to Soviet military activities in Eastern Europe, the majority of the Estonian coastal areas have experienced a similar lack of human activity, with a positive ecological legacy as the accidental outcome. Also nowadays, nature conservation and heritage conservation do not clash, as both the urban ecologist and the member of the National Heritage Board that were interviewed confirm. Uustal adds that ‘the monuments are mainly neutral and sometimes even beneficial for the area’s biodiversity, like at the Katariina breakwater where a colony of birds is nesting in the skeleton of the pier’.

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208 Haas, 2006: 82.
Relics and ruination
Unless the seemingly peaceful coexistence of nature and heritage at Paljassaare, many of the military remnants are abandoned and in an advanced stage of ruination (figure 3.6 and 3.7). The Russian battery, the railway dam, the Katariina breakwater and the White Tower are the only objects that are listed as cultural monuments, whereas none from periods is. Since registration as a monument does not imply active conservation but a reactive approach instead, it is currently mainly a symbolic measure. The only visible consequences that listing has had is the placement of two information boards, one at the White Tower and one at the Russian battery, although the last one recently disappeared. Indirectly, the restrictions connected to the nature reserve are protecting the military remnants from removal for the purpose of new developments. The reverse is that insidious decay due to biological erosion, coastal erosion, weathering and vandalism continues (figure 3.6).

Figure 3.6 – Military remnants at Paljassaare.

At this moment, nature is – at least temporary – taking over both the remnants themselves as their fate regarding future existence. As a consequence, most Soviet and Estonian remnants – mainly buildings from bricks that are poorly built – are largely ruined. The only Soviet remnant that is reused and has been reinforced is the former Border Guard garage that now functions as a bird-watching tower. The Russian battery, as a military object built to last forever, is made out of reinforced concrete and therefore relatively less vulnerable and less threatened in its existence. Although the lack of conservation seems to equalize the different remnants, the everyday consequence is natural selection, and the Russian remnants have proven to be the fittest.

Physical presence, mental absence
The unimpeded obsolescence and disuse of the military remnants at Paljassaare is much more than just a material process. In terms if Edensor, the abandoned and decaying remnants became waste that has lost any meaning and utility.211 This is indicated by the fact that most of them are not listed as a monument, not permanently used, not conserved and not marked. What plays a

211 Edensor, 2005: 313.
role in the loss of utility is – first of all – the specific shape of some of the military constructions, making them unsuitable for and hardly transformable into new functions. Also the poor building quality of mainly the Soviet remnants makes reuse unattractive and expensive. A third factor of influence is the fact that hundreds of former Soviet military areas of varying size can be found in Estonia and that generally no lack of space exists in the country.212

![Figure 3.8 – Satellite images of Suur-Paljassaare from 1977-1980 (left) and 1995 (right).](image)

The absence of meanings attached to the military remnants at Paljassaare can best be understood by analysing the Soviet military presence as the most recent and long-lasting one. For almost fifty years, Paljassaare was, like almost the whole Estonian shoreline, a closed area with no public access.213 Moreover, it was an area that the Soviets even wanted to close off for people’s minds, as manipulated maps and aerial photos of that time show (figure 3.8). In short, memories or mindscapes of Paljassaare during the Soviet era are scarce. Secondly, no major historical events took place in the military reserve during the last century, especially when compared to iconic landmarks or areas like battlefield, graves and notorious prisons like the Battery. Also here, the abundance of Soviet military areas spread over Estonia – around 87,000 hectares in total – is of importance: Paljassaare is all but unique.214

**Dissonant heritage or not heritage at all?**

Another possible explanation is the fact that Soviet remnants in general are being valued as less neutral and more negative or dissonant then, for instance, the much older Russian ones. Soviet remnants symbolize a period of occupation, restricted access to the coast and sometimes even acts of repression. Since it is less than twenty-five years ago that the Estonia regained independence, such meanings are still present in people’s minds due to both autobiographical and collective memories. From this perspective, again in terms of Edensor, military ruins once built by the Soviet occupier do not fit in the current ‘*normative ordering of the material world*’ in which ‘*objects sustain dominant cultural values*’.215 In other words: the remnants are alienated from society in the current powerscape and seen as waste or are not being seen at all, with ruination as the unavoidable result.

**Future prospect**

What makes Paljassaare as former military area and nature reserve unique is its close proximity to the city centre of Tallinn. Nevertheless, the peninsula has not faced urban renewal, is hardly

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214 Raukas, 1999: 121.
accessible by public transport and a rather unattractive area for residence at the moment: ‘today’s Paljassaare does not seem to belong to people at all’. Its recreational potential is high and not without reason, the city government has plans to turn to whole peninsula – including the industrial neck – into an ‘attractive living and recreational environment and an area of eco-tourism’. The question is what role military heritage, if at all, has in this utopian prospect. When looking at its current visitors, a recent survey shows that most of them visit Paljassaare to walk through nature or to go to the beach. Heritage-related visiting is not named at all in the concerning article and seems to be reserved for a particular interested and well-informed minority. The availability of online information of the military remnants at Paljassaare is illustrative in this respect, as it is mainly provided by amateur websites and barely through official pages. It adds up to the conclusion that the military remnants at Paljassaare are heading a dissolving future, unless current society is able to revalue the former waste. For now, the monument-designated Russian remnants seem the only ones that might be able to overcome alienation.

3.4 The Battery: conversion of ambiguous heritage

The largest and, in terms of size and fortification architecture, one of the most impressive military fortifications at Tallinn Waterfront is the Battery, also referred to as the Defence Barracks, Patarei Prison or Fort Kalarand (figure 3.10, 2.16 and 1.2). The fortification is also one of the most problematic examples of military heritage at the coast of Tallinn, due to its dark and dissonant history as a prison during the 20th century and the challenge to redevelop the complex. Currently, hopes are pinned on the tourism industry as a sustainable engine to maintain the buildings and to streamline its ambiguous heritage values, but uncertainty concerning its future conversion remains until today.

History: fortress, barracks, prison, ...?

The history of the Battery can roughly be divided into four periods as outlined in figure 3.9, starting with the initial use as a Russian fortification. The Russians built the fort between 1829 and 1840 as part of Russian defence plans in for the protection of St. Petersburg. Although its position might not appear to be exceptionally strategic in today’s urban landscape, it certainly was in the time when it was built. In those days, the area southern from the fort was largely uninhabited. Maps from before 1910 also show the fortification is located on an elevated bulge in the coastline, which is hardly visible today due to the construction of the Russian military harbour westwards. Following the Crimean War, the building lost its defence function and became used as ordinary military barracks until the end of the tsarist Russian domination of Estonia. Besides barracks, the military complex also hosted facilities like a Russian Orthodox military church, a music company and a bakery in that period.

217 Tallinn City Council, 2013: 62.
218 Reimann et al., 2013: 154.
In 1919, during the War of Independence and when Tallinn was already ruled by the Estonians nationalists, the Battery was turned in Tallinn’s central prison. The darkest period of the prison began in June 1940, when the Soviets invaded Estonia. Patarei Prison functioned as a transit camp for the thousands of people that were deported to the Siberian Gulags in March 1941. During the post-war Soviet occupation, a repressive regime was applied in the prison, illustrated by stories of violent questioning techniques, small and cold cells, overcrowding of the complex and frequent executions (figure 3.12). Both in the Estonian, German and Soviet period, numerous political prisoners were caught in Patarei Prison. After Estonia regained independence in 1991, the Battery kept its function as a prison until 2002 and completely closed down in 2005.

Figure 3.9 – Landscape-historical background of the Battery.

Figure 3.10 – Case study area of the Battery.

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The Battery today
Since the closure of prison, there has been an ongoing debate on the future use of the Battery. From the year 2000 already, advanced plans were raised to transform the complex to the main building of the Estonian Academy of Arts, currently located in the Old Town of Tallinn. Due to political difficulties and a financial scandal, however, these plans faded away around 2005. Numerous cultural activities and temporary exhibitions took place in the complex in the years after. Currently, a part of the complex is managed by a foundation that hosts the Prison Museum, a range of cultural and artistic events, guided tours, a beach café and offers rooms for rent (figure 3.11). No long-term solution has been found yet, whereas at the same time, the physical state of the building is highly problematic following decades without proper renovation and maintenance. Especially the walls and the roofs are in bad condition, seriously affecting the safety in some parts of the complex.

Ambiguous heritage values
The value of the Battery as national or even international heritage is twofold. On the one hand, the Battery is valued as a unique classicist defence structure, whereas on the other hand, it is regarded as a landmark of Estonia’s cultural history due to its latter function as a notorious prison. It is in name of its first value as a fortress that the Battery and the smaller Mortar Battery have been listed as cultural monuments in 1997, just like many other Russian military remnants in Tallinn from before the First World War. From a military-historical and architectural perspective, the structure is clearly regarded as national heritage and even seen by experts as unique in Northern Europe. The defensive shape and the original military function of the Battery cannot be separated from its latter use as a prison, however. Physical adjustments, the interior, but also the collective and sometimes still autobiographical memories of its time as a prison are inseparably attached to the physical remnants of the 19th century fortress. The Battery’s recent history is a much less neutral and partly dark one as it touches upon issues like crime, suffering, injustice, imprisonment and death. There is even a connection to the Holocaust, since many arrested Estonian Jews were detained in the Battery prior to their execution or deportation. As phrased in a pamphlet of a seminar on the future of the Battery in 2015, its decades as a prison now make it ‘a powerful symbol of resistance of the martyrs of the Republic of Estonia and a monument of victims of communist and Nazi crime’.

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222 Treufeldt, 2005.
223 Sihtasutus Mänguväljaku Fond, 2016.
224 Belford, 2014: 52
In its shape as dark heritage, the Battery has proven to be an attractive dark tourism site in recent years. Directly after the prison closed, activities like ‘shock trips’ and ‘prison experiences’ were offered to visitors, even with the option for tourists to be locked up in a cell for some time.\(^{228}\) Although no such luridly named tours are offered anymore today, visitors are still offered guided tours and self-guided tours, the latter with almost unlimited access to the former cell blocks, the infirmary, execution rooms and a watch tower. Due the lack of a formal guidebook or signage, the emphasis of the experience that tourists are gaining lies on its dark history as a notorious prison.\(^{229}\) The information on the website of the company that offers the guided tours invites people to come and admire ‘the magnificent view through a barbed wire’ and furthermore presents quotes of visitors, such as ‘More attractive than Alcatraz’ and ‘On my month-long trip to Europe, this was the most strange and emotional sight’.\(^{230}\) It fits in the picture of the Battery as ambiguous and rather complex heritage structure, one that needs a thoughtful management strategy related to conservation and tourism in order to prevent further obsolescence and uncontrolled commodification.

**Future prospect**

The debate on a proper and lucrative strategy for the heritage management of the Battery is one that lasts until today. The most widely supported and coherent plan at the moment is the Development Plan called **Battery 2020**, published in 2011 by a task group commissioned by the Estonian War Museum. The plan includes a development vision, a SWOT-analysis of development scenarios, a cost-benefit analysis, a proposed management structure, a media plan and a long-term time schedule. In short, it wants to host a conglomerate of museums in the complex, including a Museum of Communist Crimes, the already existing Estonian War Museum, a Battery Complex museum and an Estonian Internal Security Museum. Besides, several other history-preserving institutions and research facilities should get a place in the complex, which also should contain conference rooms, a creative hub, catering services and accommodations. In this way, the task group argues, the Battery can become a historical landmark with a multifunctional museum and a strong recreational function, with a potential of 350,000 visitors a year.\(^{231}\)

\(^{228}\) Lankots, 2005.  
\(^{229}\) Belford, 2014: 52-53  
\(^{230}\) Sihtasutus Mänguväljaku Fond, 2016.  
\(^{231}\) Estonian War Museum, 2011: 8.
Despite these plans, the history of the Battery is still uncertain. The Development Plan offers a workable solution of how to deal with the ambiguous heritage value of the complex by dividing the story amongst a number of museums, but is highly dependent on funding from private, public and European institutions. The task group clearly wants to copy the success story of the Seaplane Harbour, once part of the tsarist-Russian military harbour and now renovated and hosting a maritime museum with European significance. In 2015, the Battery was put on the shortlist of heritage sites applying for the ‘The 7 Most Endangered’ programme ran by Europa Nostra, a leading European heritage organisation. According to the application, the Battery ‘has the potential to become a major tourist attraction in the Baltic Sea Region, in combination with the adjacent Tallinn Seaplane Harbour [...], the Old Town of Tallinn and also with the Suomenlinna Fortress in Helsinki.’ In March 2016, it was announced that request of the Battery has been assigned. Whether realisation of the touristic potential will prove to be realistic or not, already debating the possible touristic reuse for the Battery plays a role in streamlining and rethinking its ambiguous heritage values. Furthermore, the ongoing debate shows the potential function that rooted, touristic conversion can have in neutralizing the darker parts its history and how it provides opportunities for halting the deterioration and ensuring restoration and maintenance.

3.5 Maarjamäe: towards a multi-memorial landscape

At Pirita Tee, the road along the shore that connects the centre of Tallinn with Pirita, the gigantic Maarjamäe memorial complex is situated, with the white limestone obelisk as the main eye-catcher. Maarjamäe is a multi-layered commemorative site with a military imprint, originally built by the Soviets to commemorate the soldiers of the Red Army that died in 1918. The Soviet memorial partly overlays a German cemetery, established in 1941, where German soldiers were buried who died during the Second World War. Latter commemorative layers even make it a more complex piece of military heritage and an interesting example of how meaning-giving and memory politics evolve over time.

![Diagram of Maarjamäe memorial complex]

**Figure 3.13** – Landscape-historical background of the Maarjamäe memorial complex.

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History: timeline
In figure 3.13, the phased history of the Maarjamäe site is summarized. In 1941, the Germans started a cemetery on the previously undeveloped area where in the years after, over 2100 soldiers were buried who fell during the Second World War including more than a hundred Estonians.\textsuperscript{234} In 1960, the Soviet authorities erected the iconic obelisk next to the cemetery, commemorating the Russian soldiers who died in 1918 in fights against the Germans. In 1975, the remainder of the complex was erected, including the granite pathways, protrusions, artificial hills and a bronze creature, together forming a highly modernistic landscape-architectural ensemble (figure 3.14 and 3.15). This more recent complex around the obelisk forms a memorial dedicated to the Red Army soldiers who fell in 1941 and 1944 – referred to in Russia as the Great Patriotic War – fighting the Nazi-Germans.\textsuperscript{235} By the construction of the complex, which partly overlays the German cemetery, the graves were partly excavated. In 1998, the Estonian government restored the cemetery in association with the Volksbund Deutscher Kriegsgräberfürsorge, the German organization that is responsible for maintaining German military cemeteries.\textsuperscript{236}

A matter of multiple meanings
Both physically and ideologically, Maarjamäe is the setting of a commemorative clash: physically since the Soviet memorial complex overlays the German cemetery and ideologically because both sides of the WWII-fights in Estonia are simultaneously commemorated there. Next to the German and Soviet ideological imprint, Estonia has developed its own memorial and monumental politics, starting in late 1980s already.\textsuperscript{237} These politics include the Estonian efforts to build a national identity and a common collective memory, an endeavour that has been complicated by, as Smith writes, ‘the existence within the population of two divergent – one could say diametrically opposed – national collective memories relating to the events of World War II and its aftermath’.\textsuperscript{238} According to Smith, the majority of Estonians associate WWII with the sufferings and repression under the Soviet regime, with 1940 and 1944 marked as years of – respectively – military occupation and replacement of the one occupier by the other. By the majority of the Russian-speaking population, Smith states, ‘World War II is remembered as a victorious struggle against a Nazi German invader that inflicted immense sufferings on the peoples of the USSR’.\textsuperscript{239}

\textsuperscript{234} Öhtuleht, 1998.
\textsuperscript{235} Harterley, 2015: 461-462.
\textsuperscript{236} Öhtuleht, 1998.
\textsuperscript{237} Tamm, 2015: 179.
\textsuperscript{238} Smith, 2008: 420.
\textsuperscript{239} Ibid.: 420.
In the case of Maarjamäe, the Soviet memorials fit within the latter historical interpretation that Smith mentions, whereas the commemorative load of the German cemetery – where also Estonians who fought on the German side are buried – matches the collective memory that he ascribes to ‘the Estonians’. The ideological imprint of Soviet memorials at Maarjamäe, therefore, seems alienated from the current Estonian powerscape. This matches with fact that the German cemetery has been designated as a cultural monument in 1995 and was restored in 1998, whereas the Soviet monuments have not been listed and show signs of decay due to a lack of maintenance (figure 3.16). Triin Talk, member of the National Heritage Board, does not see a direct link between the fact that the Soviet memorial is not listed and its ideologically conflicting imprint, however. She states that Maarjamäe memorial ‘is well known and accepted’ by citizens and does not necessarily need protection because it is not threatened. The perspective of Talk illustrates the converging tendency between the different meanings of the Maarjamäe site during the last decade, being transformed into a multi-commemorative complex instead of heading a future of further commemorative divergence.

Figure 3.14 – Case study area of the Maarjemäe memorial and the German cemetery.

Figure 3.15 – The Maarjamäe memorial complex. On the left the Soviet concrete structures and the obelisk as seen from the shoreline, on the right the German cemetery grounds with crossed added in 1998 during the restoration works.
Future prospect: clash-less convergence?
How opposed commemorative meanings, based on conflicting collective memories, can lead to problematic situations is best illustrated by the controversy around the replacement of the Bronzed Soldier in April 2007. This memorial used to stand in the city centre, slightly outside this thesis’ study area. The government’s aims to replace this Soviet memorial of the Second World War to a location outside the city centre of Tallinn was seen as a provocation by the majority of the city’s Russian-speaking population, with two days of street riots as the result.

In contrast, the meaning of Maarjamäe Memorial complex has, probably partly due to its more peripheral setting at the outskirts of Tallinn, successfully been rearranged during the last decade. In 2005, the Estonian government announced that on May 8 of that year – marking the 60th anniversary of the end of WWII in Europa – it would commemorate all victims of that war, irrespective of which uniform they wore. Maarjamäe memorial is one of the sites where a commemorative ceremony on this occasion takes place every year, described by the government as ‘a symbolic site; soldiers of both sides if the battle have been buried there, among them soldiers of Estonian nationality’. The rearrangement of Maarjamäe’s commemorative meanings is ongoing until today and tomorrow. In 2015, the government confirmed that a new memorial was planned to be established at the 100th anniversary of the Republic of Estonia in 2018, commemorating all victims of communism there. Meanwhile, many tourists ascribe more neutral meanings to the complex, appreciating it for scenic and aesthetic reasons as an iconic example of modernistic and expressionist Soviet architecture.

3.6 Conclusion

Soviet military heritage as a blind spot
The extent to which military remnants in the Tallinn Waterfront area are reused depends strongly on the spatial context. Almost all military remnants at Paljassaare are unused and obsolescent, being taken over by nature. At the inner-city waterfront, most of the remnants are converted for various contemporary uses. At the Pirita coastline, a continuation of the commemorative or scenic functions of the military imprinted objects is observed. The general pattern in the legal protection of military remnants is that mainly Russian and Estonian military objects are listed as cultural monuments, whereas the Soviet ones are not. A first explanation to this is the difference in their architectural unicity and historical significance. Except for the Maarjamäe Memorial, no Soviet remnants can be found in the study area that can be compared to Russian constructions like the Seaplane Harbour, the Battery and the artillery batteries that are part of the Peter the Great Naval Fortress.

Figure 3.16 – Post-military reuse of the Battery.

243 An example of an account highlighting the Maarjamäe Memorial and its symbolic, scenic and architectural values is shown by Harterley (2015: 461-463).
A deeper explanation is that remnants from the Estonian and tsarist Russian era fit better to the national identity of Estonia than the ones from the most recent period of occupation. Soviet remnants like the Border Guard facilities and the Maarjamäe Memorial remind to a rather recent period of occupation with restricted access to the coast and sometimes even acts of repression. Therefore, they can be expected to evoke more dissonance and negative values than the much older and more neutrally valued Russian remnants. Peil drew similar conclusions in her study to heritage creation at the Pakri Peninsula, observing that the past prior to the Soviet annexation is actively recalled whereas the Soviet heritage is neglected and not considered as worth preserving, as it ‘represents the ‘non-Estonian and unwanted past of the country and its physical and mental remains’.’

Reusing an unwanted past: abandonment and rooted conversion

Two post-military reuse strategies were identified throughout the case studies: abandonment in the case of Paljassaare and rooted conversion in the case of the Battery and Maarjamäe. In the first, the past closedness and foreign character of the former Soviet military reserve has contributed to the alienation of the remnants from current society. The combination of apathy and dissonance to the remnants explains the strategy of not having a strategy, with – in line with Edensor’s argument concerning industrial ruins and similar to the former Pärispea military heritage as studied by Rammo – the abandonment and obsolescence as the logical consequence (figure 3.7).

For the Battery, in comparison, the dark history as a notorious prison has led to a strong societal urge for rooted conversion. The current plans for permanent museumification and touristic reuse serves the channelling of the ambiguous and partly dissonant heritage values (figure 3.11). The funding needed for this conversion is currently the bottleneck, as Jauhiainen also encountered based on his Raadi Airfield case study. In the Maarjamäe case, a commemorative form of rooted conversion takes place, considering the restoration of the German cemetery and the addition of new commemorative signs and structures. This strategy can be explained by the fact that the existing Soviet memorial symbolises a ‘non-Estonian’ ideology and consequently evokes dissonance and alienation (figure 3.16).

Discursive rearrangement: erasure, rewriting and co-writing

Above, the history of the military heritage is taken as point of departure for understanding the post-military reuse strategies in line with the second sub question. In the third sub question, it is the reuse strategy that is seen as the determinant for the rearrangement of values that the society ascribes to the heritage. In terms of Jacob’s landscape-ontological threefold: to which extent does the functional and technical redevelopment of a materscape lead to a rearrangement of its power- and mindscapes? In figure 3.17, the diagrams on the post-military reuse strategies have been extended with information on the discursive rearrangements.

The case studies clearly show that the post-military reuse strategies applied to the military heritage can be aligned to a rearrangement of meanings. In the Paljassaare case, the abandonment and decay of the remnants has the erasure of meanings as an effect. The physical ruination goes hand in hand with their mental decay. Instead of heritage that is worth to protect, the military remnants face alienation and are treated as waste, similar to the example of industrial ruins a provided by Edensor. In the case of the Battery, meanings are not erased but actively rewritten. New meanings emerge as a consequence of the reuse of the complex as a temporary Prison Museum. If the plans of the Estonian War Museum for an even more rooted

244 Peil, 2006: 54.
245 Edensor, 2005; Rammo, 2010.
246 Jauhiainen, 1997: 123-124. Currently, the new building of the Estonian National Museum is being constructed at the former military airfield of Raadi near Tartu city.
247 Edensor, 2005.
conversion of the Battery into a multifunctional complex with numerous museums become reality, this rewriting process will continue in the near future. Rearrangement of meanings in the form of rewriting is also the case at Maarjamäe, although older commemorative functions subsist there. That is why the term ‘co-writing’ can be used to describe the discursive rearrangement of the Maarjamäe case: the Estonian government aims to overarch the older, divergent meanings by appointing the complex as a memorial for all victims of the Second World War and – from 2018 onwards – all victims of communism.

**Figure 3.17** – The rearrangement of both matter and meanings in each of the three case studies. The role of military remnants in the social landscape is erased, rewritten or co-written in the present and the near future.
4. Conclusion

4.1 Answering the research questions

Military-historical layering of Tallinn Waterfront area (RQ1)
The research question aligned to the landscape-biographical chapter asks how Tallinn Waterfront has been shaped and imprinted from 1900 onwards. The landscape biography in chapter two has demonstrated that multiple military layers can be traced in the waterfront from this period. Although physical-geographical circumstances have been influential as well, it is mainly the geopolitical and military-historical factors background that contributed to the spatial development of Tallinn. Two military layers have been particularly determinative throughout the 20th century.

Firstly, military considerations most rigorously determined the military-industrial use and outlook of the area in the 1910s, when the Russians constructed the Peter the Great Naval Base – later referred to as the Tallinn’s New Harbour – western from the Old Harbour. Secondly, the period of Soviet occupation, as the most recent and longest foreign occupation during the last century, highly determined the spatial development of Tallinn in no less than two ways. The Soviet military presence restrained private (re)development and implied highly limited public access to the inner-city shoreline, keeping the waterfront in a physical status quo for almost fifty years. Besides, next to the physical imprint of military remnants and ‘green heritage’, the fifty years of stagnation and state-led planning left the city with the tough but ongoing challenge to reopen the seaside by regenerating the waterfront.

Military heritage, rearrangement of matter and meanings (RQ2)
In research question two, the contemporary reuse of military heritage in post-military Tallinn stands central. In general, it can be stated that most of the remnants in the study area have faced conversion, except for those at Paljassaare that are largely abandoned and in decay. In terms of legal protection, the differentiation is time-dependent, since Russian military structures are mostly listed as cultural monuments whereas latter ones are not. Furthermore, the three case studies have signified the important role of the military-historical background of the remnants in their contemporary reuse and meanings. Especially military heritage with a Soviet imprint evokes dissonance and alienation, whereas the reuse and management of older remnants suggest a more neutralized valuation.

The three case studies within the study area have illustrated how the post-military reuse strategies go hand in hand with a discursive type of rearrangement. In the case of the abandoned remnants at Paljassaare, most of the military relics are both materially and discursively erased: military heritage plays no role of importance in today’s nature reserve. At the Battery, rooted conversion for touristic purposes means that the values attached to the complex are slowly being rewritten. The plans for museumification could foster this rewriting process by neutralizing the dark and dissonant history of the complex and channelling its ambiguous heritage values. At the Maarjamäe site, commemorative conversion and a form of co-writing takes place, as new overarching commemorative meanings are added to the complex.
4.2 Recapturing the problem definition

Dissonance as a determinant of post-military re-use
The central problem in this thesis has been formulated as follows: "What role does the military-historical background of the Tallinn Waterfront area play in the contemporary use and future development of 20th century military heritage?" The research applied to Tallinn Waterfront as a case study area has shown how it is the dissonant or contested history of the military heritage that strongly determines their present role, especially regarding the relics of the Soviet period as most recent period of foreign occupation and military presence. The dissonance character lies in the fact that it concerns military heritage representing formations that do not match with the current one. In other words: we are dealing with relics that are present in the matterscape, but absent, alienated and unwanted in the dominant powerscape, similar to the industrial ruins in the Edensor article. This material-discursive mismatch can be mitigated by basically two strategies that can each be placed on one end of a spectrum.

The first strategy is the physical erasure of the military remnants: for example by active deconstruction, but most often by abandonment. Sometimes, this means that nature takes back the outcast relics in the formerly military landscape, like in the case of Paljassaaare and at other sites in the so-called Estonian Green Belt. The alternative for erasure is to assimilate or redomesticate the military relics into the current powerscape. This implies that both the relics and their meanings related to the previous formation need to be rewritten in order to get a role in current society. In terms of reuse, it means that rooted conversion is desirable, like in the case of the plans that exist for museumification at the Battery. An example of the discursive rearrangement that is accompanied with such rooted conversion of military heritage is by ascribing it the role of 'the contradictory other', as suggested by Peil in the Paldiski case.

Other factors of influence
Next to the far-stretching influence dissonant character of the military heritage on its contemporary use and future development, a number of other historical or spatial factors should be taken into consideration:

- The 'degree of darkness' or dissonance – in terms of Stone – plays a role in the reuse strategy applied, as it is harder to erase remnants that symbolize atrocity or suffering, like the Battery, than withering out less darker relics like those at Paljassaaare.
- The uniqueness or amount of military heritage from a certain time or type is of importance as well. Both in terms of funding and ideas, the reuse of – for instance – all former Soviet military areas is highly unrealistic and increases the likelihood of abandonment and decay.
- The role of time in neutralizing dissonance is important as well: military remnants from older formations are often valued more neutrally than the relics from the previous one. The fact that most of the Russian military remnants at the Tallinn Waterfront area are legally protected whereas the Soviet ones are not fits in this picture. Also the fact that the Soviet Maarjamäe Memorial is more and more seen as a symbol of Soviet modernism instead of a despicable ideological symbol – at least by outsiders – stresses this point.
- The urban context is another influential factor: the potential for rooted conversion like touristic reuse is times higher than in Tallinn compared to the countryside.

248 Edensor, 2005.
249 Sepp, 2011: 46-47.
251 Stone, 2006: 151.
252 Peil similarly stresses the higher likeliness of acceptation instead of alienation when the former 'foreign element' is no longer a threat, using the changing attitude in Estonia to Baltic-German manors as an example (Peil, 2005: 54-55).
4.3 Discussion and recommendations

Discussion
A number of aspects of the thesis’ conclusions and the outcomes of the empirical research are critically reflected on here. To start with the landscape biography as presented in chapter two, the aim of this thesis to get insight in the benefits of a landscape-biographical method for studying heritage dynamics is recaptured. The landscape biography from 1900 onwards was indeed essential for providing the spatial-historical context needed to properly understand the contemporary role of military heritage at Tallinn Waterfront. A number of critical remarks should be made to the effectiveness of the method in this particular research, however. One is that many heritage sites at Tallinn Waterfront, like the three cases studied in chapter three, have considerable object- or site-based circumstances, making it hard to generalize the case studies to the level of Tallinn Waterfront or higher. The essence of the point made here it is well arguable to approach the waterfront of Tallinn as a spatial entity in the form of a post-military landscape, but not without mentioning that is a very homogeneous one in both spatial and historical terms. The Tallinn Waterfront area rather is an intersection of numerous military landscapes on distinct spatial levels – many of which exceed the boundaries of the study area – with a rich but also complex imprinted palimpsest as the result. A further note on the landscape-biographical research is the limitations that were in force regarding the use of primary sources in the empirical study. As a consequence of mainly language barriers and the limited primary sources on the 20th century military history available, the decision was made to make let the biography function as an instrument rather than an end of the research in itself.

Another goal of the research was to apply a set of mainly Anglophone theories and concepts to the Central and Eastern European context. Many of those countries are rather young nation states with a complex geopolitical history and a recent history of Soviet dominance. The Estonian example and the specific case of Tallinn indicate that the post-military landscapes in this region are very suitable for research on the post-military reuse strategies of military heritage, as well as processes of discursive rearrangement and the vivid interplay between, landscape, heritage, history and identity. The studies of Palang et al. to the forgotten rural landscapes of Central and Eastern Europe and the article of Ashworth and Tunbridge on heritage planning in Central European cities appoint in a similar direction. A last issue that is to be discussed is the scientific scope of this thesis. It is important to mention that the centre of gravity lies on the post-military landscape from the physical and social perspective, or in Jacob’s terminology: on the matterscape and powerscape. Although concepts like meaning, values and identity have frequently been used, no large scale surveys, in-depth interviews or ethnographic methods were applied in order to study mindscapes.

Recommendations for further research
To start with the last remark in the discussion above, one recommendable possibility for further research is to apply cultural geographical or environmental psychological research to specific military sites and objects at Tallinn Waterfront. By doing so, the meanings and place attachment regarding military heritage from different formations can be derived and analysed in more detail. Also, the interesting field of tension regarding military heritage that can be studied by such methods is the difference in meaning-giving and perception between tourists and locals. Next to broadening the Tallinn-based study, a comparison between the waterfronts at Central and Eastern European cities like Tallinn on the one hand and Western European cities on the other recommendable. The outcomes of a comparative study like this, focusing on the recent

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253 Palang et al., 2006: 347.
254 Ashworth and Tunbridge, 1999; Palang et al., 2006.
landscape history and the contemporary role of military heritage, are especially interesting and useful for cities like Tallinn that are looking to overcome their military past and regenerate their waterfront.

Within the category of comparative research, many other options for future research can be thought of. The influence of particular factors or circumstances on the reuse of military heritage might be studied in more detail, like the role of time, the difference between different kinds and layers of military heritage and the role of the degree of darkness. On a larger spatial scale, an extensive research can be thought of that comprehensively studies or even compares the spatial-historical context and the heritage dynamics of different transboundary military structures. Examples of such structures are the remnants of the German Atlantic Wall at the Western European coast, the Iron Curtain that runs across the European mainland and the structures of the Peter the Great Naval Fortress at both sides of the Gulf of Finland. A final recommendation that applies to this and other examples for further research on this topic is to make an explicit link to spatial planning and the sustainable development of landscapes in the future. The study by Vervloet et al. to the remnants of a 17 and 18th century Dutch military defence line is exemplary in this respect.²⁵⁶ In their article, not just landscape-historical or heritage-related knowledge is shared, but it reports useful and realistic guidelines for both the preservation and development of the former military landscapes in the future as well.

²⁵⁶ Vervloet et al., 2005.
References

Literature and websites


Acknowledgements of figures and tables

Front page – Author, 2015.
Figure 1.1 – Eurostat, 2010.
Figure 1.2 – Top left: author, 2015; top right: Rudi-k, 2006, https://www.flickr.com/photos/rudi-k/182697056/, http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0/; below: Jon Shave, 2009, https://www.flickr.com/photos/shavejonathan/3185499470/, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.
Figure 1.3 – Jauhiainen, 1997.
Figure 1.4 – Baltic Green Belt, 2009.
Figure 1.5 – Author, 2016
Figure 1.6 – Maandi, 2009
Figure 1.7 – Author, 2016
Figure 1.8 – Author, 2016
Figure 1.9 – Left: author, 2013; right: author, 2015.
Figure 1.10 – Author, 2016.
Figure 1.11 – Author, 2016.
Figure 1.12 – Author, 2016.
Figure 1.13 – Base map: Estonian Land Board, 2016.
Figure 1.14 – Author, 2016.
Figure 2.1 – Author, 2016.
Figure 2.2 – Author, 2016.
Figure 2.3 – Gustavson, 1993.
Figure 2.4 – Geotrail, 2008, http://www.klint.envir.ee/klint/eng/13.html.
Figure 2.5 – Geotrail, 2008, http://www.klint.envir.ee/klint/eng/13.html.
Figure 2.6 – Guillaume Speurt, 2013, https://secure.flickr.com/photos/guillaumespeurt/8973566096/in/album-72157633976982304/, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0/.
Figure 2.7 – Raid, 2011.
Figure 2.8 – Treufeldt, 2013.
Figure 2.9 – Author, 2016.
Figure 2.10 – Eesti Instituut, 2014,
Figure 2.11 – Estonian Film Archives, 1918-1921, reference code: EFA.65.A-57-41,
Figure 2.12 – Gustavson, 1993.
Figure 2.13 – Gustavson, 1993.
Figure 2.14 – Author, 2014.
Figure 2.15 – Author unknown. Map digitally obtained from Robert Treufeldt, 2016.
Figure 2.16 – Estonian Film Archives, 1918-1921, reference code: EFA.65.A-57-55,
Figure 2.17 – Left: Bundesarchiv, 1941,
Figure 2.18 – Author, 2016.
Figure 2.19 – Peil, 2013.
Figure 2.20 – www.sewercide.org, 2004, http://www.sewercide.org/old/artiklid-kopli.html.
Figure 2.21 – Estonian Film Archives, 1994, reference code: EFA.204.0-174194,
Figure 2.22 – Author, 2016
Figure 2.24 – Left: Estonian Film Archives, 1994, reference code: EFA.204.0-268476,
http://www.ra.ee/fotis/index.php?type=2&id=498974; right: Estonian Film Archives, 1994,
R(reference code: EFA.204.0-267305,
Figure 2.25 – Estonian Land Board, 2015.
Figure 2.26 – All three: author, 2015.
Figure 2.27 – Left: author, 2015; right: Treufeldt, 2008.
Figure 2.28 – Left and right: author, 2015; middle: Wikimedia Commons, 2009.

Figure 3.1 – Author, 2016.
Figure 3.2 – Wikimedia Commons, 2005.
Figure 3.3 – Author, 2016.
Figure 3.4 – Author, 2016.
Figure 3.5 – Author, 2016.
Figure 3.6 – Author, 2015.
Figure 3.7 – Author, 2016
Figure 3.8 – Left: Estonian Land Board, 1977-1980; right: Estonian Land Board, 1993.
Figure 3.9 – Author, 2016.
Figure 3.10 – Author, 2016.
Figure 3.11 – Author, 2016
Figure 3.12 – Left: author, 2015; right: Belford, 2014.
Figure 3.13 – Author, 2016.
Figure 3.14 – Author, 2016.
Figure 3.16 – Author, 2016.
Figure 3.17 – Author, 2016.
List of consulted people

**Interviewees**
A list with the six experts that were interviewed can be found in attachment 2.

**Otherwise consulted people**
Ragnar Nurk, MA, archaeologist and PhD student at Tallinn University, 13th of March 2015, Tallinn.
Dr. Tarmo Piikner, geographer and researcher at Tallinn University, 16th of March 2015, Tallinn.
Prof. dr. Hannes Palang, geographer and head of the Centre for Landscape and Culture at Tallinn University, 20th of March 2015, Tallinn.
Dr. Epp Lankots, art historian and researcher at the Estonian Academy of Arts, 24th of March 2015, Tallinn.
Dr. Tauri Tuvikene, geographer and researcher at Tallinn University, 27th of March 2015, Tallinn.
Dr. Oliver Orro, art historian and researcher at the Estonian Academy of Arts, 23rd of April 2015, Tallinn.
Ann-Leena Miller, MSc, landscape architect and PhD student at the Estonian University of Life Sciences, 24th of April 2015, Tartu.
Robert Treufeldt, MA, art historian and expert in fortification architecture, 22nd and 30th of April 2015, Tallinn.
## Attachment 1 – List of historical topographical maps

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Year</th>
<th>Name of the map</th>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Origin</th>
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<td>Stadtplan von Reval (Tallinn), Hergestellt im Reichsamt für Landesaufnahme</td>
<td>1:12.500</td>
<td>German (GER2)</td>
<td>Raid, 2011: 136</td>
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<tr>
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## Attachment 2 – List of interviewees

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<td>3</td>
<td>Anna Semjonova &amp; Mihkel Korvits</td>
<td>City Planning Department</td>
<td>Urban planning</td>
<td>15/05/15</td>
<td>0:55:00</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Trivimi Velliste</td>
<td>Estonian War Museum</td>
<td>Tourism and heritage conservation</td>
<td>18/05/15</td>
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<td>Triin Talk</td>
<td>Estonian Heritage Board</td>
<td>Heritage policy</td>
<td>19/05/15</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Robert Treufeldt</td>
<td>Castellum</td>
<td>Architecture and military history</td>
<td>22/05/15</td>
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Attachment 3 – Interview manual

General questions
- Can you introduce yourself and tell something about your organization and your professional activities?
- What are in your opinion the most prominent military remnants of the 20th century at the Tallinn Waterfront area (provide a map where the interviewee can draw on)?
- What kind of value or importance do these remnants have nowadays?
- How is this military heritage from the 20th century treated or conserved?
- How do you judge the current way in which military heritage from the 20th century is treated or conserved?
- What is your view on the future development of the Battery, Paljassaare and the Maarjamäe Memorial?
- What is, according to you, the current state of the Tallinn Waterfront and its function for the city as a whole?
- How has the military past in the 20th century determined the current state and the current development of the Tallinn Waterfront area?
- Which spatial developments are going on or will emerge in the near future (provide a map where the interviewee can draw on)?

Customized questions #1 – Meelis Uustal
- Which nature values currently exist at the Tallinn Waterfront area and how are they protected?
- What should be the role of nature conservation in the future?
- How has the military past influenced ecology throughout the last century?
- How do you judge the combination or clash between nature and cultural heritage at Paljassaare?
- How do you see the future role of tourism and recreation at Paljassaare?

Customized questions #2 – Teele Pehk
- How is Linnalabor involved in military heritage conservation?
- What is the role and prospect of civic participation in the heritage management?
- What are the prospects for military heritage in the Tallinn Waterfront area; how does it clash with or strengthen other spatial developments in the area?
- Which role can tourism play in reusing and redeveloping the Tallinn Waterfront area and the military heritage within?

Customized questions #3 – Anna Semjonova and Mihkel Korvits
- What is the role of the City Planning Department in the spatial development in the Tallinn Waterfront area?
- How has this role evolved from 1991 onwards?
- Which heritage conservation policies, laws and organisations does the city of Tallinn have?
- What is the role of civic participation in the heritage management and which stakeholders are involved?
- Which role can tourism and recreation play in reusing and redeveloping the military heritage in the area?

Customized questions #4 – Triin Talk
- How is the Estonian Heritage Board involved in the protection of cultural heritage?
- How is the EHB involved in the protection of 20th century military heritage at the Tallinn Waterfront area in specific?
- Which regulations and policies are relevant for the protection of such heritage sites?
- What are the consequences of a cultural monument designation?
- Has the value or role of military heritage in the Tallinn Waterfront area changed during the last 25 years?
- How significant are the values of this military heritage in comparison to other sites in Estonia?
- How do nature conservation and military heritage conservation clash or complement each other at the Tallinn Waterfront area?
- How do tourism and military heritage conservation clash or complement each other?
- How do the revitalisation of the harbour areas and military heritage clash or complement each other?
- Which developments do you see to occur within the heritage conservation and planning in Estonia (and more specific in Tallinn) during the next 20 years?

**Customized questions #5 – Trivimi Velliste**

- What is the history of the Estonian War Museum and how is it related to the conservation of military heritage in the Tallinn Waterfront area?
- What is the role of the tourism industry and museums in the conservation of military heritage and what is its potential?
- Which narratives can be told when reusing the military heritage in the Tallinn Waterfront area by touristic or educational purposes?
- What are the objectives of the Estonian War Museum for the future development of the Battery?
- How do you think that the approach towards military heritage in the Estonian society will change in the next 20 years?

**Customized questions #6 – Robert Treufeldt**

- Which narratives are and can be told by reusing the military heritage in the Tallinn Waterfront area for touristic or educational purposes?
- Which organisations or actors are telling this narrative now, and how are they connected to the public?
- How significant are the remnants on the Tallinn Waterfront compared to other sites in Estonia?
- How can the lack of awareness of the military remnants and its history be explained amongst both locals and tourists?
- How do current developments clash or complement with the conservation of the military heritage at the Tallinn Waterfront area?
- How do you think that the approach towards military heritage in the Estonian society will change in the next 20 years?

**Final questions**

- Do you have anything to add or do you have any remarks?
- Do you recommend other people for consultation?
- Do you have any recommendations regarding literature or reports to have a look at?
- Would you appreciate to be kept informed about my master thesis research and would you like to receive a digital version when the thesis is finalized?
Attachment 4 – Cartographic appendix

The cartographic appendix consists out of seven maps that are attached separately:

Map 1 – 1-verst map, 1900.
Map 2 – Eesti Topograafiline Kaart, 1926-29.
Map 3 – Soviet military map, 1939.
Map 6 – Military remnants at Tallinn Waterfront.
Map 7 – Land use maps of the Tallinn Waterfront area from 1900 onwards.
Kalamaja
Toompea
Old Town
TALLINN
Tallinn
Bay
Kadriorg Park
PIRITA
Fort Kalarand or the Battery
Kalamaja Cemetery
Old Harbour
Maarjamäe Palace
Pirita River
White Tower
Väike-Paljassaare
Suur-Paljassaare
TALLINN
MAP 1
1-verst map, 1900
MAP 6
Military remnants at Tallinn Waterfront

PALJASSAARE
a Peter the Great battery
b Mine storages
c Storages and workshops, fence posts
d Narrow-gauge railway dam
e Machine gun bunker
f Border guard observation post
g Storages and barracks, fence posts
h Katiarina Breakwater, narrow-gauge railway
i Border guard facilities

INNER-CITY WATERFRONT
j Laevastiku bomb shelters
k Mine Harbour
l Noblessner Shipyard and factory complex
m Seaplane Harbour
n The Battery or Patarei Prison
o Kalarand fence posts
p Lootsi storages

PIRITA COASTLINE
q Tobruk bunker
r Nikonov memorial fundament
s Russalka memorial
t Maarjamäe Palace
u Maarjamäe Memorial
v German cemetery

LEGEND
- industry
- railway
- park
- urban area
- undeveloped
- sea
- period of construction
  - Russian (RUS)
  - Estonian (EST1)
  - German (GER2)
  - Soviet (SOV3)
- former military function
  - railway
  - defence structure
  - navel structure
  - memorial
  - storage or other building
  - cemetery
  - bomb shelters
  - industry
  - fence

MAP 6
Military remnants at Tallinn Waterfront
MAP 7
Land use maps of the Tallinn Waterfront area from 1900 onwards

LEGEND

- industry
- railway
- urban area
- undeveloped
- park
- sea