Research

Publications and Manuscripts

 

A. International refereed journals

 

1. ‘Is Scientific Realism an Empirical Hypothesis?’, Dialectica 49 (1995): 3-14. (Igor Douven and Jaap van Brakel)

2. ‘A Paradox for Empiricism (?)’, Philosophy of Science (Proceedings) (1996) 63: S290-S297.

3. ‘A Defence of van Fraassen’s Critique of Abductive Reasoning: Reply to Psillos’, The Philosophical Quarterly (1997) 47: 305-321. (James Ladyman, Igor Douven, Leon Horsten, and Bas van Fraassen) (A Portuguese translation appeared under the title ‘Uma defesa da crítica de Van Fraassen ao raciocínio abdutivo’ in Critica (2000) 6: 63-88.)

4. ‘Can the World Help Us in Fixing the Reference of Natural Kind Words?’, Journal for General Philosophy of Science (1998) 29: 59-70. (Igor Douven and Jaap van Brakel)

5. ‘Earman on Underdetermination and Empirical Indistinguishability’, Erkenntnis (1998) 49: 303-320. (Igor Douven and Leon Horsten)

6. ‘Truly Empiricist Semantics’, Dialectica (1998) 52: 127-151.

7. ‘Marc Slors on Personal Identity’, Philosophical Explorations (1999) 2: 143-149.

8. ‘Style and Supervenience’, The British Journal of Aesthetics (1999) 39: 255-262.

9. ‘Putnam’s Model-Theoretic Argument Reconstructed’, The Journal of Philosophy (1999) 96: 479-490.

10. ‘A Note on Global Descriptivism and Putnam’s Model-Theoretic Argument’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy (1999) 77: 342-348.

11. ‘Inference to the Best Explanation Made Coherent’, Philosophy of Science (Proceedings) (1999) 66: S424-S435.

12. ‘Theoretical Terms and the Principle of the Benefit of Doubt’, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science (2000) 14: 135-146.

13. ‘The Antirealist Argument for Underdetermination’, The Philosophical Quarterly (2000) 50: 371-375.

14. ‘Quests of a Realist’, Metascience (2001) 10: 354-359.

15. ‘Testing Inference to the Best Explanation’, Synthese (2002) 130: 355-377.

16. ‘A New Solution to the Paradoxes of Rational Acceptability’, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (2002) 53: 391-410.

17. ‘Decision Theory and the Rationality of Further Deliberation’, Economics and Philosophy (2002) 18: 303-328.

18. ‘A Davidsonian Argument against Incommensurability’, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science (2002) 16: 157-169. (Igor Douven and Henk de Regt)

19. ‘The Preface Paradox Revisited’, Erkenntnis (2003) 59: 389-420. (Igor Douven and Jos Uffink)

20. ‘Nelkin on the Lottery Paradox’, The Philosophical Review (2003) 112: 395-404.

21. ‘The Context-Insensitivity of “Knowing More” and “Knowing Better”’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy (2004) 34: 313-326.

22. ‘A Principled Solution to Fitch’s Paradox’, Erkenntnis (2005) 62: 47-69.

23. ‘Bovens and Hartmann on Coherence’, Mind (2005) 114: 355-363. (Wouter Meijs and Igor Douven)

24. ‘Deflating the Correspondence Intuition’, Dialectica (2005) 59: 315-329. (Igor Douven and Frank Hindriks)

25. ‘A Contextualist Solution to the Gettier Problem’, Grazer Philosophische Studien (2005) 69: 207-228.

26. ‘Lewis on Fallible Knowledge’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy (2005) 83: 573-580.

27. ‘Wouldn’t it Be Lovely: Explanation and Scientific Realism’, Metascience (2005) 14: 338-343.

28. ‘Evidence, Explanation, and the Empirical Status of Scientific Realism’, Erkenntnis (2005) 63: 253-291.

29. ‘Bootstrap Confirmation Made Quantitative’, Synthese (2006) 149: 97-132. (Igor Douven and Wouter Meijs)

30. ‘Assertion, Knowledge, and Rational Credibility’, The Philosophical Review (2006) 115: 449-485.

31. ‘Generalizing the Lottery Paradox’, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (2006) 57: 755-779. (Igor Douven and Timothy Williamson)

32. ‘Fitch’s Paradox and Probabilistic Antirealism’, Studia Logica (2007) 86: 149-182.

33. ‘Measuring Coherence’, Synthese (2007) 156: 405-425. (Igor Douven and Wouter Meijs)

34. ‘A Pragmatic Dissolution of Harman’s Paradox’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2007) 74: 326-345.

35. ‘On Bradley’s Preservation Condition for Conditionals’, Erkenntnis (2007) 67: 111-118.

36. ‘On the Alleged Impossibility of Coherence’, Synthese (2007) 157: 347-360. (Wouter Meijs and Igor Douven)

37. ‘The Discursive Dilemma as a Lottery Paradox’, Economics and Philosophy (2007) 23: 301-319. (Igor Douven and Jan-Willem Romeijn)

38. ‘A Three-step Solution to the Two-envelope Paradox’, Logique et Analyse (2007) 200: 359-365.

39. ‘Knowledge and Practical Reasoning’, Dialectica (2008) 62: 101-118.

40. ‘Kaufmann on the Probabilities of Conditionals’, Journal of Philosophical Logic (2008) 37: 259-266.

41. ‘The Lottery Paradox and Our Epistemic Goal’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (2008) 89: 204-225.

42. ‘Formal Methods in the Philosophy of Science’, Studia Logica (2008) 89: 151-162. (Leon Horsten and Igor Douven)

43. ‘Unger’s Argument for Skepticism Revisited’, Theoria (2008) 74: 239-250. (Igor Douven and Diederik Olders)

44. ‘The Evidential Support Theory of Conditionals’, Synthese (2008) 164: 19-44.

45. ‘Fricker on Testimonial Justification’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science (2009) 40: 36-44. (Igor Douven and Stefaan Cuypers)

46. ‘Assertion, Moore, and Bayes’, Philosophical Studies (2009) 144: 361-375.

47. ‘Can the Skepticism Debate Be Resolved?’, Synthese (2009) 168: 23-52.

48. ‘Extending the Hegselmann-Krause Model III: From Single Beliefs to Complex Belief States’, Episteme (2009) 6: 145-163. (Alexander Riegler and Igor Douven)

49. ‘Uniqueness Revisited’, American Philosophical Quarterly (2009) 46: 347-361.

50. ‘The Pragmatics of Belief’, Journal of Pragmatics (2010) 42: 35-47. (To be reprinted in A. Capone, F. Lo Piparo, and M. Carapezza (eds.) Perspectives on Pragmatics and Philosophy, Berlin (Springer).)

51. ‘Probabilist Antirealism’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (2010) 91: 38-63. (Igor Douven, Leon Horsten, and Jan-Willem Romeijn)

52. ‘Simulating Peer Disagreements’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science (2010) 41: 148-157.

53. ‘Adams’s Thesis, Ramsey’s Test, and Left-nested Conditionals’, Review of Symbolic Logic (2010) 3: 467-484. (Richard Dietz and Igor Douven)

54. ‘Extending the Hegselmann-Krause Model I’, Logic Journal of the IGPL (2010) 18: 323-335. (Igor Douven and Alexander Riegler)

55. ‘Identity and Similarity’, Philosophical Studies (2010) 151: 59-78. (Igor Douven en Lieven Decock)

56. ‘The Adams Family’, Cognition (2010) 117: 302-318. (Igor Douven and Sara Verbrugge)

57. ‘Quantum Probabilities and the Conjunction Principle’, Synthese, in press. (Igor Douven and Jos Uffink)

58. ‘Similarity After Goodman’, Review of Philosophy and Psychology, in press. (Lieven Decock and Igor Douven)

59. ‘Further Results on the Intransitivity of Evidential Support’, Review of Symbolic Logic, in press.

60. ‘A Puzzle about Stalnaker’s Hypothesis’, Topoi, in press. (Igor Douven and Richard Dietz)

61. ‘Truth Approximation, Social Epistemology, and Opinion Dynamics’, Erkenntnis, in press (Igor Douven and Christoph Kelp).

62. ‘A New Resolution of the Judy Benjamin Problem’, Mind, in press. (Igor Douven and Jan-Willem Romeijn)

63. ‘Putnam’s Internal Realism: A Radical Restatement’, Topoi, in press (Lieven Decock and Igor Douven).

64. ‘Proper Bootstrapping’, Synthese, in press. (Igor Douven and Christoph Kelp)

 

B. National refereed journals

 

65. ‘De Goddelijke Heelmeester’, Aanzet 9 (1991); 75-84.

66. ‘Stijl, Beperking, Communicatie’, Muziek en Wetenschap 2 (1992): 269-284.

67. ‘Conceptuele Schema’s en Convergentie: Putnams Intern Realisme’, Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 86 (1994): 111-127.

68. ‘Intern Realisme en Incommensurabiliteit’, Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 87 (1995): 142-164.

69. ‘Empirische Toetsing van Inductieve Logica’s’, Tijdschrift voor Filosofie (2000) 62: 701-725.

70. ‘Plantinga, Gettier en (Verdiend) Epistemisch Geluk’, Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte (2001) 93: 195-211.

71. ‘Coherentie en Confirmatie’, Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte (2003) 95: 199-204.

72. ‘De Loterijparadox’, Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte (2005) 97: 3-15.

73. ‘Grondslagen en Toepassingen van de Formele Epistemologie’, Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte (2009) 101: 237-244.

 

C. Books/contributions to books/special issues/entries

 

74. ‘Putnam en de Windmolens van het Metafysisch Realisme’, in: J.P. van Bendegem and G. Cornelis (eds.) Iedereen Die Niet Denkt Zoals Ik, Volge Mij, Brussel (VUB Press) 1994, 274-281.

75. ‘Boyd’s Miraculous No Miracle Argument’, in: P. Cortois (ed.) The Many Problems of Realism, Tilburg (Tilburg University Press) 1995, 89-116.

76. In Defence of Scientific Realism , Dissertation, University of Leuven, 1996.

77. Realism in the Sciences , Leuven (Leuven University Press) 1996, ed. (Igor Douven and Leon Horsten)

78. ‘Introduction’, in 67, 7-12. (Igor Douven and Leon Horsten)

79. ‘Natural Kinds, Scientific Methodology, and Underdetermination’, in 67, 55-86.

80. ‘Westphal on the Alleged Impossibility of Transparent White’, in: P. Weingartner, G. Schurz, and G. Dorn (eds.) The Role of Pragmatics in Contemporary Philosophy, Vol. I, Kirchberg (Digi-Buch) 1997, 224-229.

81. ‘Putnam’s “Just More Theory Move” Reconsidered’, in: W. Löfller and E. Runggaldier (eds.) Vielfalt und Konvergenz der Philosophie, Vienna (Verlag Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky) 1999, 227-230.

82. Wat Heet Wetenschap? (special issue of Wijsgerig Perspectief on demarcation), Meppel (Boom), 1999, ed., with an editorial introduction (33-36).

83. ‘Minimalism and the Correspondence Intuition’, in: U. Meixner and P. Simons (eds.) Metaphysics in the Post-Metaphysical Age, Vol. I, Kirchberg (Digi-Buch) 1999, 167-172.

84. ‘Empiricist Semantics and Indeterminacies of Reference’, in: L. Decock and L. Horsten (eds.) Quine. Naturalized Epistemology, Perceptual Knowledge and Ontology, Atlanta (Rodopi) 2000, 171-188.

85. ‘Against Probabilism’, in: B. Brogaard (ed.) Rationality and Irrationality, Vol. I, Kirchberg (Digi-Buch) 2000, 168-173.

86. ‘On Bayesian Logic’, in: M.C. Galavotti (ed.) Observation and Experiment in the Natural and Social Sciences, (Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 232), Dordrecht (Kluwer) 2003, 321-326.

87. ‘Basic Beliefs, Coherence, and Bootstrap Confirmation’, in: R. van Woudenberg, S. Roeser, and R. Rood (eds.) Basic Belief and Basic Knowledge, Frankfurt a.M. (Ontos Verlag) 2005, 57-76.

88. ‘Empirical Equivalence, Explanatory Force, and the Inference to the Best Theory’, in: R. Festa, A. Aliseda, and J. Peijnenburg (eds.) Confirmation, Empirical Progress and Truth Approximation: Essays in Debate with Theo Kuipers, Atlanta (Rodopi) 2005, 281-309.

89. Scientific Realism (special issue of Erkenntnis), Berlin (Springer) 2005, ed.

90. Wetenschapsfilosofie , Assen (Van Gorcum), 2007. (Leon Horsten, Igor Douven, and Erik Weber)

91. ‘Underdetermination’, in S. Psillos and M. Curd (eds.) The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science, London (Routledge) 2008, 292-301.

92. Applied Logic in the Methodology of Science (special issue of Studia Logica), Berlin (Springer) 2008, ed. (Leon Horsten and Igor Douven)

93. Computer Simulations in Social Epistemology (special issue of Episteme), Edinburgh (Edinburgh University Press), 2009, ed., with an editorial introduction (107-109).

94. ‘Two Accounts of Similarity Compared’, in A. Hieke and H. Leitgeb (eds.) Reduction – Abstraction – Analysis, Frankfurt a.M. (Ontos Verlag) 2009, 389-402. (Lieven Decock and Igor Douven)

95. ‘Extending the Hegselmann-Krause Model II’, in T. Czarnecki, K. Kijania-Placek, O. Poller, and J. Wolenski (eds.) The Analytical Way, London (College Publications) 2010, 245-258. (Alexander Riegler and Igor Douven)

96. ‘Relativism and Confirmation Theory’, in S. Hales (ed.) The Blackwell Companion to Relativism, Oxford (Blackwell), in press.

97. Probability, Confirmation and Fallacies (special issue of Synthese), Berlin (Springer), in press, ed. (Jeanne Peijnenburg, Branden Fitelson, and Igor Douven)

98. ‘Abduction’ (with supplement: ‘Peirce on Abduction’), in E. Zalta (ed.) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, in press.

99. Formal Epistemology (special issue of Synthese), Berlin (Springer), in press, ed.

100. ‘Indicative Conditionals’, in L.Horsten and R. Pettigrew (eds.) A Companion toPhilosophical Logic, London (Continuum Press), in press.

101. ‘Sustaining a Rational Disagreement’, in H. de Regt, S. Hartmann, and S. Okasha (eds.) Proceedings of EPSA2009, Berlin (Springer), in press. (Christoph Kelp and Igor Douven)

 

D. Short replies

 

102. ‘Kennis als Natuurlijke Soort: Een Reactie op Ron Rood’, Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte (2001) 93: 219-221.

103. ‘Van Willigenburg on “P, but I Lack Sufficient Evidence for P”: A Rejoinder’, Ars Disputandi, [http://www.ArsDisputandi.org] (2004) 4.

104. ‘Kuipers’ Comparatief Realisme: Een Vraag en een Suggestie’, Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte (2008) 100: 201-202.

 

E. Reviews

 

105. Review of I. Guest, De Vuile Oorlog, Aanzet 9 (1991): 211-215.

106. Review of R. Swinburne, Epistemic Justification, Ars Disputandi, [http://www.ArsDisputandi.org] (2002) 2.

107. Review of T.A.F. Kuipers, Structures in Science, Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte (2002) 94: 310-312.

108. Review of J. Adler, Belief’s Own Ethics, Ars Disputandi, [http://www.ArsDisputandi.org] (2003) 3.

109. Review of V. Halbach and L. Horsten (eds.) Principles of Truth , Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte (2004) 96: 239-242.

110. ‘Philosophical and Scientific Perspectives on Rationality’ (review of A.R. Mele and P. Rawling (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Rationality), Journal of Economic Methodology (2005) 12: 618-621.

111. Review of J. Kvanvig, The Knowability Paradox, Ars Disputandi, [http://www.ArsDisputandi.org] (2006) 6.

112. Review of D. Christensen, Putting Logic in its Place, The Philosophical Review (2008) 117: 123-126.

113. Review of B. Monton (ed.) Images of Empiricism, Mind (2009) 118: 504-507.

114. ‘A Coherent Collection in Defense of Scientific Realism’ (review of Stathis Psillos, Knowing the Structure of Nature), Metascience (2010) 19: 97-99.

115. Review of J. L. Bermúdez, Decision Theory and Rationality, Economics and Philosophy, in press.