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Inductive probability and the paradox of ideal evidence

Kuipers, T. A. F. 1976 In : Philosophica, vol. 17 (1), 197-205. 17, 1, p. 197-205 9 p.

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  • Theo A.F. Kuipers
In section I the notions of logical and inductive probability will be discussed as well as two explicanda, viz. degree of confirmation, the base for inductive probability, and degree of evidential support, Popper's favourite explicandum. In section II it will be argued that Popper's paradox of ideal evidence is no paradox at all; however, it will also be shown that Popper's way out has its own merits.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)197-205
Number of pages9
JournalPhilosophica, vol. 17 (1), 197-205
Issue number1
StatePublished - 1976

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