

## University of Groningen

### Working after retirement

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# Appendix



**Appendix A: Additional tables for chapter 2**Table A1. *Country ID's.*

ID	Country
EE	Estonia
SI	Slovenia
PT	Portugal
HU	Hungary
PL	Poland
CZ	Czech Republic
BE	Belgium
C	Switzerland
DK	Denmark
FR	France
IT	Italy
ES	Spain
NL	Netherlands
SE	Sweden
DE	Germany
AU	Austria

Source: SHARE, [www.share-project.org](http://www.share-project.org).

Table A2. Multilevel logit model to predict bridge employment among retirees (pooled model, including a dummy for gender differences).

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4 <sup>a</sup>		Model 5 <sup>a</sup>	
	Logit	SE	Logit	SE	Logit	SE	Logit	SE	Logit	SE
<i>Individual level</i>										
<b>Female</b>	-0.36**	0.05	-0.41**	0.05	-0.41**	0.05	-0.42**	0.05	-0.42**	0.05
<i>Age</i>										
60–63 (ref)										
64–67	-0.52**	0.06	-0.53**	0.06	-0.53**	0.06	-0.56**	0.06	-0.56**	0.06
68–71	-0.80**	0.06	-0.80**	0.06	-0.80**	0.06	-0.80**	0.07	-0.81**	0.07
72–75	-1.46**	0.08	-1.47**	0.08	-1.47**	0.08	-1.46**	0.08	-1.46**	0.08
<i>Educational attainment</i>										
Low (ref)										
Middle	0.27**	0.08	0.26**	0.08	0.26**	0.08	0.34**	0.09	0.33**	0.09
High	0.95**	0.09	0.95**	0.09	0.95**	0.09	1.03**	0.09	1.02**	0.09
Health status	0.41**	0.02	0.42**	0.02	0.42**	0.02	0.43**	0.03	0.43**	0.03
Receipt of occupational pension	-0.29**	0.08	-0.30**	0.08	-0.29**	0.08	-0.32**	0.09	-0.31**	0.09
<i>Marital status</i>										
Married (ref)										
Never married			0.17	0.12	0.17	0.12	0.14	0.13	0.14	0.13
Divorced			0.42**	0.07	0.42**	0.07	0.41**	0.08	0.41**	0.08
Widowed			0.29**	0.08	0.29**	0.08	0.29**	0.08	0.29**	0.08
Daily informal care tasks			-0.09	0.09	-0.09	0.09	-0.11	0.10	-0.11	0.10
<i>(Grand)Children</i>										
No children (ref)										
Children, no grandchildren			0.28*	0.11	0.28*	0.11	0.31*	0.12	0.31*	0.12
Grandchildren, no daily care			0.21*	0.10	0.21*	0.10	0.26*	0.11	0.25*	0.11
Grandchildren, daily care			0.06	0.13	0.06	0.13	0.12	0.14	0.12	0.14
<i>Country level</i>										
Expenditure on pensions					-0.44*	0.19			-0.37**	0.13
Norm: Work past retirement							0.23**	0.07	0.20**	0.06
Var (intercept)	0.58**	0.21	0.57**	0.21	0.42**	0.16	0.31**	0.12	0.20*	0.08

Source: SHARE, wave 4, 2011. Level 1:  $N = 22488$ . Level 2:  $N = 16$ .\*  $p \leq 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p \leq 0.01$ .a. Switzerland excluded: Level 1:  $N = 21258$ . Level 2:  $N = 15$ .

**Appendix B: Additional tables for chapter 4**Table B1. *Estimates from the mixed effects models on standardized measure of self-efficacy<sup>a</sup>.*

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	$\beta$	SE	$\beta$	SE	$\beta$	SE
Constant	-0.21 **	0.06	-0.21 **	0.06	-0.21 **	0.06
Age	-0.15 **	0.00	-0.15 **	0.02	-0.15 **	0.02
<i>Retirement decision:</i>						
Working in career job (reference)						
Voluntarily retired	-0.01	0.03				
Involuntarily retired	-0.10 *	0.04				
<i>Bridge employment:</i>						
Working in career job (reference)						
Bridge job			-0.00	0.05		
Fully retired			-0.05	0.03		
<i>Combined effects:</i>						
Working in career job (reference)						
Voluntarily retired – fully retired					-0.02	0.04
Voluntarily retired – bridge job					0.03	0.06
Involuntarily retired – fully retired					-0.10 *	0.05
Involuntarily retired – bridge job					-0.09	0.08
Women (versus men)	-0.09	0.05	-0.09	0.05	-0.09	0.05
High occupational level (pre-retirement) (versus middle/low)	0.29 **	0.05	0.29 **	0.05	0.29 **	0.05
Public sector (versus private)	-0.06	0.04	-0.06	0.04	-0.06	0.04
Living with a partner	0.12 **	0.04	0.13 **	0.04	0.12 **	0.04
Health problems	-0.12 **	0.03	-0.12 **	0.03	-0.12 **	0.03
Personal monthly income	0.06 **	0.02	0.06 **	0.02	0.06 **	0.02
sd (age)	0.16 **	0.03	0.16 **	0.03	0.16 **	0.03
sd (constant)	0.67 **	0.02	0.67 **	0.02	0.67 **	0.02
sd (residual)	0.59 **	0.01	0.59 **	0.01	0.59 **	0.01
r (age, constant)	0.14	0.08	0.14	0.08	0.14	0.08

Source: NIDI Work and Retirement Panel (2001–2011), N = 4419, person-period file.

\*  $p \leq 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p \leq 0.01$ .

a We used an accelerated cohort design in which information on age and the study wave of observation are combined (Singer & Willett, 2003). Self-efficacy, as well as age and personal monthly income. The coefficients of the dummy variables can be interpreted as Cohen's  $d$  effect sizes.

Note: The Hausman test revealed that the estimates of these analyses might be biased (chi-square = 143.24,  $p < 0.001$ , for Model 3)

Table B2. *Estimates from the mixed effects models on standardized measure of life satisfaction<sup>a</sup>.*

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	$\beta$	SE	B	SE	$\beta$	SE	$\beta$	SE
Constant	-0.34**	0.06	-0.35**	0.06	-0.34**	0.06	-0.28**	0.05
Age	-0.02	0.02	-0.02	0.02	-0.02	0.02	-0.02	0.02
Retirement decision:								
Working in career job (reference)								
Voluntarily retired	0.09**	0.04						
Involuntarily retired	-0.18**	0.04						
Bridge employment:								
Working in career job (reference)								
Bridge job	0.10*	0.05						
Fully retired	-0.01	0.04						
Combined effects:								
Working in career job (reference)								
Voluntarily retired - fully retired					0.07	0.04	0.08*	0.04
Voluntarily retired - bridge job					0.16**	0.06	0.15**	0.05
Involuntarily retired - fully retired					-0.22**	0.05	-0.19**	0.05
Involuntarily retired - bridge job					-0.03	0.08	-0.01	0.08
Women (versus men)	0.16**	0.05	0.17**	0.05	0.16**	0.05	0.19**	0.04
High occupational level (pre-retirement) (versus middle/low)	0.11**	0.04	0.10*	0.04	0.11*	0.04	0.02	0.04
Private sector (versus public)	-0.16**	0.04	-0.16**	0.04	-0.16**	0.04	-0.14**	0.03
Living with a partner	0.49**	0.04	0.50**	0.04	0.49**	0.04	0.45**	0.04
Health problems	-0.18**	0.03	-0.19**	0.03	-0.18**	0.03	-0.15**	0.03
Personal monthly income	0.06**	0.02	0.07**	0.02	0.06**	0.02	0.04**	0.02
Self-efficacy	0.13**	0.03	0.13**	0.03	0.13**	0.03	0.09*	0.04
sd (age)	0.57**	0.02	0.58**	0.02	0.57**	0.02	0.51**	0.02
sd (constant)	0.62**	0.01	0.62**	0.01	0.62**	0.01	0.61**	0.01
r (age, constant)	-0.03	0.12	-0.00	0.12	-0.04	0.13	-0.16	0.23

Source: NIDI Work and Retirement Panel (2001–2011), N = 4419, person-period file.

\*  $p \leq 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p \leq 0.01$ .

a We used an accelerated cohort design in which information on age and the study wave of observation are combined (Singer & Willett, 2003). Life satisfaction, as well as age, personal monthly income, and self-efficacy are standardized. The coefficients of the dummy variables can be interpreted as Cohen's  $d$  effect sizes.

Note: The Hausman test revealed that the estimates of these analyses might be biased (chi-square = 35.86,  $p < 0.001$ , for Model 4).