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Title inaugural lecture: Monitoring monitors
More recently, researchers have argued that the quality of monitoring by banks as well as the intensity by which banks monitor borrowers varies as a result of a range of conditions, such as the business cycle, the number of banks that are lending to a firm, the presence of collateral, and the extent to which detailed information is available and shared with other banks. This raises several important questions. Are households and businesses as well as supervisors right by assuming that banks are indeed superior monitors? How can we find out if banks are adequately evaluating the riskiness of their borrowers? Is there scope for banks to improve their risk analysis? In his inaugural address Kasper Roszbach argues that there is evidence that some banks may have scope for further improvement of their monitoring technology. He also illustrates why commonly used techniques for evaluating the riskiness of borrowers can give a misleading impression of the actual risk in a bank’s portfolio. In his address Kasper Roszbach also discusses a method that enables bank supervisors to evaluate the monitoring quality of the banks they supervise in a systematic way, i.e. for monitoring the monitors.
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